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The American Political Science Review

VOL. LXI DECEMBER, 1967 NO. 4

THE CITY IN THE FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY*

ROBERT A. DAHL
Yale University

I need hardly remind this audience that one of the characteristics of our field is the large number of old and quite elemental questions—elemental but by no means elementary—for which we have no compelling answers. I don't mean that we have no answers to these questions. On the contrary, we often have a rich variety of conflicting answers. But no answer compels acceptance in the same way as a proof of a theorem in mathematics, or a very nice fit between a hypothesis and a satisfactory set of data.

Whether the obstacles that prevent us from achieving tight closure on solutions lie in ourselves—our approaches, methods, and theories—or are inherent in the problems is, paradoxically, one of these persistent and elemental questions for which we have a number of conflicting answers. For whatever it may be worth, my private hunch is that the main obstacles to closure are in the problems themselves—in their extraordinary complexity, the number and variety of variables, dimensions qualities, and relationships, and in the impediments to observation and data-gathering.

However that may be, a question of this sort often lies dormant for decades or even centuries, not because it has been solved but because it seems irrelevant. For even when no satisfactory theoretical answer exists to a very fundamental question, historical circumstances may allow it to be ignored for long periods of time. Even specialists may refuse to take a question seriously that history seems to have shoved into the attic. What seem like fundamental controversies in one age are very likely to be boring historical curiosities in the next. And conversely it is my impression that a great many of the elemental political questions regarded as settled in one age have a way of surfacing later on.

I

One question of this kind is the problem of the appropriate unit for a democratic political system. Some aspects of this problem are, at least to me, quite puzzling. For example, suppose we accept the guiding principle that the people should rule. We are immediately confronted by the question: what people? I don't mean which particular individuals among a collection of people, but rather: what constitutes an appropriate collection of people for purposes of self-rule? Among the vast number of theoretically possible ways of dividing up the inhabitants of this globe into more or less separate political systems, or, if you will, into "peoples," are there any principles that instruct us as to how one ought to bound some particular collection of people, in order that they may rule themselves? Why *this* collection? Why *these* boundaries?

Of course there are answers, like Schumpeter's statement that "a people" must define itself. But answers like these do not take us very far, or else they take us too far toward the simple doctrine that past might makes present right, and hence present might will make future right. A century ago in the United States a Civil War was fought to compel the Southern States by force of arms and military conquest to remain in the Union, a war, it is now painful to recall, that did not have as its official, ostensible, or ideological purpose the noble end of liberating Negroes and incorporating them into American life but, simply, the maintenance of the Federal Union, if necessary at the cost of the Negro. We can understand this easily enough as pure nationalism. But it is more difficult to see that the proclaimed goals of the North were much more than a particular and somewhat arbitrary definition of American nationhood. Do we then conclude that even if the development of a strong and uniform nationhood might be a condition for large-scale representative democracy, the manner and process by which a "people" defines itself—how it becomes a nation—cannot be judged or determined by any criteria derived from democratic theories or principles?

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* Presidential address delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 7, 1967.

Just in case you may be about to dismiss all the questions I have just raised as irrelevant or uninteresting, let me be deliberately provocative by asking whether it could be wrong for the American South to have seceded in 1861 but right for South Vietnam to do so today. Alternatively, if military conquest of the Southern Confederacy by the North was justified, is military conquest of the South also justified by North Vietnam? If autonomous self-rule was right for Belgium in 1830 is it wrong for the Flemings today? If the independence of Canada from the United States is right, is the independence of Quebec from Canada also right? And if autonomy is right for France is it also right for the Celtic fringe in Brittany? Or in Britain?

I hope I have asked enough questions to persuade you that the problem of what particular and peculiar collections of people can be said to form a proper unit for self-government is relevant. And not only relevant: It is also perhaps just a bit disturbing, quite possibly even a frightening problem. Yet I do not think we are going to be permitted to ignore it in the near future.

Now that the problem of the appropriate unit for a democratic political system has been opened up, I want to skirt around the questions I have just raised in order to focus in the brief time available to me this evening on certain other aspects of the problem. I propose to ask what *kind* of unit is most appropriate for democratic government. Is there a unit within which the policies steadfastly supported by a majority of citizens should prevail against minorities within that unit and against all persons outside that unit? In fact, can we say that any specific unit is more appropriate for popular rule than any other?

Before I proceed, let me clarify what I mean by the kind of unit. Should democracy be based on a territorial unit, like a town, state, or country, or a non-territorial unit, like a labor union, business firm, or industry? How big should the unit be? Small, like a committee or neighborhood, large like a country or world region, or something in between like a state, province or region? Or should it be any and all of these things?

Like the question of what constitutes a people, the question of what constitutes an appropriate unit is very widely regarded as settled. Yet a little reflection shows that it is actually a wide-open question. The approved school-solution is, of course, the nation-state. Yet the bare possibility that the question has not been so much answered by this solution as ignored is hinted at by the troubling recollection of a simple historical fact: accepting the nation-state as the appropriate unit for democracy required the flat negation of an older conventional view that prevailed for some two thousand years.

II

The prior view, as I surely need not remind this audience, held that the appropriate unit for democracy is the city-state. The vision of democracy in the city-state that prevailed, by and large, from the Greeks to Rousseau is surely one of the most seductive ever generated in the Western world. Its millenial appeal draws its force, I think, from the vision of man living in a genuine human community of man-sized proportions. In this vision, the city-state must be small in area and in population. Its dimensions are to be human, not colossal, the dimensions not of an empire but of a town, so that when the youth becomes the man he knows his town, its inhabitants, its countryside about as well as any of us knows his own college or university. Given these human dimensions, at its best citizenship would be close to friendship, close even to a kind of extended family, where human relations are intense rather than bland, and where the eternal human quest for community and solidarity can be wholly satisfied within the visible and comprehensible limits of the *polis*. If the city-state is democratic—and it is this particular vision I have in mind—it would be small enough to insure extensive opportunities for direct participation by all free (male) citizens in the management of the community; and in the best of circumstances policies and decisions would reflect wide discussion and a pervasive consensus. Above all, the city-state would be autonomous, in the sense that no one who is not a citizen of that community would possess any legitimate right or power to interfere in the management of the affairs of the city.

I cannot think of any better description of this vision than Kitto's lovely account of an imaginary conversation between an Ancient

Greek and a present-day member of the Athenaeum Club in London:

> The member regrets the lack of political sense shown by the Greeks. The Greek replies, "How many clubs are there in London?" The member, at a guess, says about five hundred. The Greek then says, "Now if all these combined, what splendid premises they would build. They could have a clubhouse as big as Hyde Park." "But," says the member, "that would no longer be a club." "Precisely," says the Greek, "and a polis as big as yours is no longer a polis."[1]

One cannot help wondering how much the geography of Greece helped to stimulate this vision, for that land of mountains, valleys, islands and the sea provided magnificent natural boundaries for each community and such a limited supply of arable land for each valley and island that it is only the barest poetic license to say that nature herself suggested the small, autonomous city state—and with this hint from nature a people to whom Prometheus himself had given the first elements of civilization were bound to elaborate among themselves the ideal form of the harsher and very often uglier reality they knew so intimately.

If the deficiencies of the vision seem obvious to the modern man who prefers the grandeur of the great nations and the glories of great metropolises like New York, London, Tokyo and Calcutta, it is worth recalling that the Greeks, too, understood that a price had to be paid for the small, autonomous city-state. If the city were to maintain its autonomy, and particularly if it were to be truly self-sufficient the price included a frugal and austere standard of daily life, pervasive violence and anarchy in inter-city relationships, and the need to defend one's city against all comers, including the giants. The Athenians, as we know, proved unwilling to accept the first and developed an empire; they suffered horribly from the second; and in the end they could not pay the last.

Nonetheless, for two thousand years thereafter the vision of democracy in the city-state dominated thought about democratic-republics. Today, that vision may be seen by a few people as a beguiling form of political life; but as a reality and as an ideal it is in no sense fundamental to modern political culture, it is known mainly to specialists, and almost no one seriously proposes that the modern democratic nations be carved up into genuinely autonomous city-states.

What happened is simply this: In the course of the nineteenth century, the nation-state displaced the city-state as the appropriate unit for democracy. The change, when it came, came swifty. We can bracket the transition quite nicely by comparing Montesquieu and Rousseau, who still see the city-state as the only proper and indeed viable unit for a democratic republic, with John Stuart Mill, who in *Representative Government* dismisses as irrelevant in a single sentence at the end of a chapter, almost as an afterthought, the two-thousand year-old tradition. By Mill's time the nation-state had triumphed, the city-state was for all practical purposes an historical curiosity, and if democratic ideals were to survive they had to survive, it seemed, in the form of representative governments for nation-states and subordinate—but not autonomous—territorial units within nation-states.

In retrospect, the change seems simpler and more complete than it was. Nonetheless, it is almost as if Americans were to go away for a long week-end and come back on Monday morning believing that the Soviet Union represented free enterprise and bourgeois democracy.

We could zero-in even more precisely on this historic cross-roads by looking at the debate in our own Constitutional Convention of 1787, which was to create a constitution for the first of the giant representative democracies. By 1787, the population of the United States was already greater than that of all of Ancient Greece; in area it was immense, and everyone knew that its territory would go on growing. Yet the traditional view that a republic could flourish only in relatively small communities still persisted even among leading members of the Convention. In his famous argument in *Federalist No. 10*, which he originally advanced in the Convention itself, Madison met this prejudice head-on and in a brilliant exercise turned it upside down by arguing that faction, the inevitable and fatal disease of small republics, could be mitigated only in a republic of large size. Extend the bounds of a republic, the old tradition argued, and you destroy it. Narrow the bounds of a republic, Madison argued in rebuttal, and you make it vulnerable to the dread disease of all small republics—factionalism. Extend the bounds of a republic and you help to generate immunity to that disease.

As we all know, the institutional innovation that made it possible to extend the bounds of a republic was representation: an innovation that democrats like Madison, Jefferson, their French contemporary whose work Jefferson so much admired, Destutt de Tracy, and James Mill all regarded as one of the most profound political inventions of all time.

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[1] H. D. F. Kitto, *The Greeks* (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1951, 1957) p. 79.

When the years of the American republic grew into decades, its mere existence stood as living proof that a democratic republic need not be as small as the city; thanks to representation it might indeed be gigantic. In the contest for supremacy in Europe the nation-state had long since come to prevail over the city-state; and as democratic ideas spread, they were focussed not on the obsolete and by now largely forgotten city-state but, naturally, on the nation-state. By the middle—and certainly by the end—of the nineteenth century the idea of democracy in the city-state had been entirely displaced by the idea of representative democracy in the nation-state. The triumph was complete.

Although it is often thought that the older view was refuted, it seems to me that it was not so much refuted as rejected. It is not clear, at least to me, that the kind of political life the Greeks thought possible in the small, autonomous, democratic city-state—even if these possibilities were not often fulfilled—is even theoretically possible with representative government in the large nation-state. Perhaps we create needless trouble for ourselves by claiming that the ideals and potentialities of democracy in the city-state are realized, or theoretically capable of being realized, through the institutions of representative government in the nation-state. One may question the value of the city-state ideal, and suspect the extent to which it was ever realized, for practise fell far short of the ideal even in Athens, and the seamy side of the city-state was, if one looks at it unromantically, pretty appalling. Yet however one may feel about these matters, the essential point is that representative government in the nation-state is in many respects so radically—and inescapably—different from democracy in the city-state that it is rather an intellectual handicap to apply the same term, democracy, to both systems, or to believe that in essence they are really the same.

III

In any case it would surely be a sign of *hubris* to assert that the ideals and institutions of democracy have reached or will reach their final destination, and their fulfillment, in the nation-state. For one thing, with each passing day it grows more reasonable to see the nation-state as a transitory historic form, to foresee that the nation-state will some day cease to exist as an autonomous unit, just as the city-state did. I do not mean to rush things. The nation-state is a tough organism, with great capacities for survival; it is still far and away the strongest and most durable political unit we know. In much of the world political leaders are even now struggling desperately to create their own nation-state out of the fragments of traditional societies; or, having achieved a momentary success, they go to bed each night half sick with worry lest they awake next morning and find their fragile nation has fallen into fragments during the night. In many parts of the world, it will be generations before peoples have defined themselves and have arrived at that state of confident nationhood where it finally becomes possible to imagine, without panic, the decline and supercession of the nation.

Those Western nation-states in which democracy has flourished for some generations are not only tough, but on the whole, I believe, extraordinarily benign units of government. Historically and comparatively, all the alternatives to representative government in the nation-state seem to me, and I imagine to most of us here, markedly inferior by comparison and often malignant, vicious, and anti-human. Nonetheless, straining to peer into the thick murk of the future, it is difficult, at least for me, to see mankind still existing on this globe without larger political orders than the nation-state, without greater displacement of international anarchy by constitutionalism and the rule of law. In the West, the nation-state has already lost some of its autonomy; it will lose more. Unless we political scientists are to be overswept by events, as we usually are; if we try, as Bertrand de Jouvenel keeps urging us, to conjecture about the future, in order to help shape it; if we use the past to help foresee the longer stretch ahead and not merely to dissect yesterday in order to understand a moment in the past and a moment today—then it is not too soon for us to anticipate a future for democracy when the major unit that has prevailed during the past two centuries, the nation-state, has become an integral and subordinate unit in some larger legal and constitutional order.

There is a second and more immediate reason why the nation-state is not an altogether satisfactory fulfillment of the ancient and continuing aspiration for democratic self-government: its immensity—immensity not so much of territory, which becomes less and less important, as immensity of numbers, of population, of citizens.

Unless wholly new evidence turns up, we shall never have anything more than the shakiest estimates of the population of Athens, but there are some reasonable if very rough guesses as to the approximate number of adult male citizens at about the time of Pericles—the demos, then, in the Athenian democracy. A quorum in the Assembly was fixed for some purposes at 6,000. There were about 18,000 seats in the Pnyx, where the Assembly met. An estimate of 40,000 adult male citizens may be high; it is surely not too low.[2] And Athens, remember, was the largest of the ancient Greek city-states.

Consider, now, some present-day nation-states. The smallest democratic nation-state, Iceland, has more than twice as many adult citizens as Athens had by our outside estimate. What we ordinarily call small democracies are, in fact, gigantic. The number of adult citizens in New Zealand is around 30 times that of Athens, while the Netherlands has more than 100 times as many adult citizens as Athens had. France has more than 500 times as many, the United States about 2500, and India, the largest representative democracy in the world, five to six thousand times as many. In fact the number of new voters coming of age each year in India would supply a citizen body for more than a hundred city-states the size of Athens.

Fortunately for these giant systems, there are some important ways of participating in the political life of a democracy that are not significantly limited by the size of the citizen body or its territory. One of these, happily, is voting. Because different individuals can vote more or less simultaneously, and in different places, time and space do not limit the size of an electorate. Nor do time and space limit the number of citizens who can engage in various forms of consummatory and symbolic participation, such as reading about politics in the press, listening to the radio, or watching TV.

Some kinds of participation, on the other hand, cannot be performed simultaneously. Instead they have to be carried on sequentially. In these cases, time does impose restraints on size, and particularly on the number of individuals who can participate. For example, time's harsh and inescapable constraints impose severe limits on the size of a group that is intended for full and free discussion—a group, that is, in which every member has an opportunity to present his views to all the other members. I shall come back to these constraints in a moment.

Returning to our question of the appropriate unit for democracy, and keeping in mind time's inexorable constraint, we discover that this simple and elemental limit on human behavior cuts both ways: Whenever the number of citizens grows large, to maximize their equal opportunities to control their government people must resort to representation. They have no alternative. Yet if time's constraint demands this shift from direct democracy to representative government, it also reduces and ultimately eliminates the possibility that every citizen can engage in a discussion that includes the officials who are charged with the authority to decide.

The greater the number of citizens, then, the longer and more indirect must be the channel of communication from the citizen to his top political leaders. But the communication between a citizen and his leaders is not a symmetrical relationship. Even in the Assembly at Athens, Pericles could speak directly and at great length to many more Athenians than could ever hope to speak directly to Pericles. But where the size of Pericles' audience was limited by the range of the unamplified human voice, radio and television have eliminated all constraints on the size of a speaker's audience. As a result, the larger a system grows, the more and more one-sided becomes communication between citizens and top leaders: the President of the United States can, in principle, speak directly to a hundred million potential voters, of whom only an infinitesimally small fraction can ever speak directly to him. If you doubt that the fraction is infinitesimally small, I urge you to try a few simple arithmetical exercises using the most generous calculations as to the President's time and the most severe restrictions on the length of the conversation between citizen and President.

There are, of course, ways of coping with this asymmetry in communications, but it would take me too far afield to explore them here. The essential point is that nothing can overcome the dismal fact that as the number of citizens increases the proportion who can participate *directly* in discussions with their top leaders must necessarily grow smaller and smaller. The inherent constraint is neither evil men nor evil institutions, nor any other eradicable aspect of human life, but rather a dimension of all existence that is morally neutral, because it is implacable, unswerving, and inescapable—time.

IV

I have a fantasy in which a modern Constitutional Convention assembles a group of 55 men or thereabouts whose commitment to democracy and whose wisdom are neither of them in doubt. Their task is to design democratic institutions suitable for this small planet in the year 2,000. And so they come to the problem of the unit.

---

[2] Various classical scholars have made valiant attempts to guess the population of Athens and its composition—citizens, adult males, metics, slaves—from the most fragmentary bits of evidence. I have not been able to locate any estimate that does not seem to leave great room for error. Kitto suggests "30,000 as a reasonable estimate of the normal number of citizens" in the Fifth Century: *op. cit*, p. 131.

Being learned, as well as wise, naturally they recall the city-state. Well, says one, since full civic participation is possible only if the number of citizens is small, let us arrange for a world of small democratic city-states. Let the unit of democracy, then, be the small city.

Ah, says another, you forget that the world of the 21st Century is not ancient Greece. You even forget that ancient Greece was the setting for a highly defective international system. The trouble with the small city in the modern world is that there are too many problems it cannot cope with, because they go beyond its boundaries. Think of some of the problems of American cities: revenues, transportation, air and water pollution, racial segregation, inequality, public health . . . I would make the list longer, but it is already long enough to show that the small city is obviously an inappropriate unit and that we have to locate democracy in a larger unit. I urge that we consider the metropolis.

But, says a third, even the boundaries of the metropolis are smaller than the kinds of problems you mention. The legal boundaries of the metropolis are an obsolete legacy of the past. What we need is metropolitan governments with legal boundaries extending to the limits of the metropolitan area itself, boundaries set not by obsolete patterns of settlement but by present densities.

Your argument is persuasive, says a fourth, but you do not carry it far enough. Demographers and planners now tell us that in the United States, to take one example, there is an uninterrupted urban area on the East Coast extending from Virginia to Maine. Even your metropolitan governments will be too small there. And in the future much of the world will surely be as densely settled as our Eastern seaboard. Consequently, I believe that we must design regional democracies, controlled by democratic governments responsive to the electorate of a whole region.

Well, says a fifth, I notice you have already bypassed such things as states and provinces, which is all to the good, since they are as anachronistic as the small city. But you will have to agree that even if you carve up the world into regional governments big enough, for instance, to cover the Eastern seaboard, you cannot expect these units to be adequate for very long. With the population of the world reaching 6 billion, or 10 billion, most of the United States will soon be a vast, undifferentiated, urban mass. Other countries are headed in the same direction. There is, then, a good deal to be said for the only traditional unit that enjoys consensus and allegiance on a scale commensurate with the problems. I mean, of course, the nation-state. If we were to think of the United States as one city, as we shall have to do in the future, it is obvious that the proper unit to bound our sovereign electorate cannot be smaller than the United States. With minor changes here and there, the nation-state is probably good for another century or so. So let us proceed to make use of it by eliminating the powers of all the intermediate units, which are, after all, only obstacles that permit local groups to frustrate national majorities.

But, objects a sixth, you are still too much the victim of the past to think clearly about the future. Obviously our very existence depends on our capacity to create a government that will subordinate the nation-state to a larger legal order. Just as your villages, towns, cities, metropolises, and regions are too small to cope singlehandedly with their problems, so too is your nation-state, even one as big as the United States, the USSR, or China. The fatal flaw of the nation-state is its inability to eliminate interstate violence; and because of our genius for violence we can now destroy the species. Even prosaic problems are now beyond the control of the nation-state: the efficiencies that come from world markets, monetary problems, the balance of trade, the movement of labor and skills, air and water pollution, the regulation of fishing, the dissemination of nuclear weapons. . . .I know it is bold, but we must plan for a world government, and to us that surely means a democratic world government. The appropriate electorate for the 21st Century is nothing smaller than the human race. The only legitimate majority is the majority of mankind.

At this point there is a tumult of objections and applause. Finally the first speaker gains the floor. Each speaker, he says, has been more persuasive than the last. But, he adds, I simply cannot understand how my learned friend, the last speaker, proposes to govern the world, if he has in mind, as I thought, a single world-wide electorate, a single parliament, a single executive, all attempting to represent that nonexistent monstrosity, a single world-wide majority. I say that even if it would miraculously hold together, which I doubt, a democracy with six billion citizens is no democracy at all. I, for one, do not wish to be only one six-billionth part of any government. One may as well accept a despot and have done with the Big Lie that what we have is a democracy.

Ah, the advocate of a democratic world government now replies, of course I meant that there would be subordinate governments, which would be democracies.

I thank my learned colleague for this important clarification, says the advocate of the small city-state. I now propose that these subordinate governments consist of units about the size of small cities.

Again there is tumult. The speaker who now gains the floor is the one who had earlier spoken in behalf of the metropolis. Hold on, he objects, if we are to have a subordinate unit, surely it must be one large enough to deal with the problems of an urban society. Obviously this unit should be the metropolis. . . .

Suddenly it becomes as clear to everyone at the Constitutional Convention as it has become to you that the argument over the unit has gone completely around in a circle, that it has now started all over again, that it has no logical terminus, that it could go on forever. Perhaps that is why we still talk about the city-state.

For the logic seems unassailable. Any unit you choose smaller than the globe itself—and that exception may be temporary—can be shown to be smaller than the boundaries of an urgent problem generated by activities of some people who are outside the particular unit and hence beyond its authority. Rational control over such problems dictates ever larger units, and democratic control implies a larger electorate, a larger majority. Yet the larger the unit, the greater the costs of uniform rules, the larger the minorities who cannot prevail, and the more watered down is the control of the individual citizen. Hence the argument for larger units does not destroy the case for small units. What it does is to make a seemingly small but radical shift in the nature of the arguments.

For we drop completely the notion so dear to the Greeks and early Romans that to be legitimate a unit of government must be wholly autonomous. With autonomy we also drop the belief that there is a single sovereign unit for democracy, a unit in which majorities are autonomous with respect to all persons outside the unit and authoritative with respect to all persons inside the unit. Instead we begin to think about appropriate units of democracy as an ascending series, a set of Chinese boxes, each larger and more inclusive than the other, each in some sense democratic, though not always in quite the same sense, and each not inherently less nor inherently more legitimate than the other.

Although this may be a discomforting and alien conception in some democratic countries where political tradition has focussed on the over-riding legitimacy, autonomy, and sovereignty of the nation-state and of national majorities, even in these countries the evolution of pluralistic institutions has vastly modified the applicability of monistic conceptions of democracy. And of course in democracies with federal systems, like Switzerland, Canada, and the United States, or in non-federal countries like the Netherlands that inherit a political tradition powerfully shaped by federalism and the legitimacy of pluralist institutions, to see the units of democracy as a set of Chinese boxes is very much easier—though even in these countries it will take some re-thinking and a vast amount of institution-building before any of us can think easily about the nation-state as a Chinese box nested in yet larger ones of equal legitimacy.

Our imaginary Constitutional Convention, and our Chinese boxes do not, of course, bring us much closer to a solution to our original problem of the appropriate unit for democracy. But they do suggest that there is not necessarily a single kind of unit, whether it be city-state or nation-state, in which majorities have some specially sacred quality not granted to majorities in other units, whether smaller or larger, more or less inclusive.

A Frenchman, perhaps even an Englishman, or any strong believer in majority rule will tell me that surely in one of these boxes there must be a majority that is sovereign, or else conflicts between different majorities, one of which may in a larger perspective be only a minority, can never be resolved. I ask, very well, a majority of what unit? And my critic will say, the majority, naturally, of the nation. To which I reply, *why* is this more sacred than the others? Because it is larger? But I can point to still larger majorities in the making in this world. Will you remain faithful to your answer when your nation is a unit in a world polity? Or will you not, instead, revert to federalist conceptions? Anyway, I might add, in a number of federal countries, including some rather old and respectable representative democracies, citizens have grown moderately accustomed to the idea that national majorities—or rather their spokesmen—are not necessarily more sacred than majorities or minorities in certain kinds of less inclusive units. This is logically untidy, and it requires endless readjustments as perspectives and levels of interdependence change. But it makes for a better fit with the inevitable pluralistic and decentralizing forces of political life in nation-states with representative governments.

The hitherto unreported debate at our imaginary Convention also suggests that in a world of high population densities, ease of communication, and great interdependence, where autonomy is in fact impossible short of the earth itself, we confront a kind of dilemma that the Greeks could hardly have perceived. Let me suggest it by advancing a series of propositions:

> The larger and more inclusive a unit, the more its government can regulate aspects of the environment that its citizens want to regulate, from air and water pollution and racial justice to the dissemination of nuclear weapons.
>
> Yet, the larger and more inclusive a unit with a representative government, and the more complex its tasks, the more participation must be reduced for most people to the single act of voting in an election.
>
> Conversely, the smaller the unit, the greater the opportunity for citizens to participate in the decisions of their government, yet the less of the environment they can control.
>
> Thus for most citizens, participation in very large units becomes minimal and in very small units it becomes trivial. At the extremes, citizens may participate in a vast range of complex and crucial decisions by the single act of casting a ballot; or else they have almost unlimited opportunities to participate in decisions over matters of no importance. At the one extreme, then, the people vote but they do not rule; at the other, they rule—but they have nothing to rule over.

These are extreme cases, and if they were all there were, it would be a discouraging prospect. But may there not be others in between?

Before we turn to this question, I want you to notice that our hypothetical Constitutional Convention and the Chinese boxes also hint at the possibility that we may need different models of democracy for different kinds of units. By models I mean here both empirical models that would help us to understand the world as it *is* and normative models that would guide us in shaping the world we believe *ought* to be. We need models that approximate reality in the world of history and experience, and models that indicate standards of performance by which we can appraise the achievements of a particular democracy. I see no reason to think that all kinds of units with democratic institutions and practices do, can, or should behave in the same way—no reason, then, why we should expect democracy in a committee, in a city, and in a nation to be markedly different both in fact and in ideal. If we expect that representative government in the nation-state is roughly equivalent to democratic participation in a committee then we are bound to be misled in our understanding of political life, in our hopes, and in our strategies for changing the world from what it is to what it ought to be.

V

Let me rephrase my question. If the nation-state is too immense, and if interdependence and population densities render the autonomous self-governing city-state too costly, are there units powerful enough, autonomous enough, and small enough to permit, and in the right circumstances to encourage, a body of citizens to participate actively and rationally in shaping and forming vital aspects of their lives in common? Is there, in this sense, an optimal unit?

There are a number of candidates for this position. Occasionally, for example, one still runs across a nostalgia for the village—a nostalgia strongest, I suspect, among people who have never lived in small towns. There are also suggestions going back nearly a century that we shift our search for the democratic unit away from the government of the state to the government of non-state institutions, such as the workplace, business firm, corporation, or industry. And lately there has been a resurgence of interest, especially among young political activists, in the old and recurring idea of reconstructing democracy around small units that would offer unlimited opportunities for participation.

Although I cannot possibly do justice to these various alternatives in the brief time available to me here, I would like to venture a few comments on each.

The fragmented and even shattered community in which modern man seems condemned to live tempts one to suppose that the appropriate unit for democratic life might be the village or small town. Only there, it might be thought, could one ever hope to find a center of life small enough so that it permits wide participation, and small enough besides to foster the sense of unity, wholeness, belonging, of membership in an inclusive and solidary community which we sometimes seem to want with such a desperate yearning. Speaking for myself, I doubt whether man can ever recapture his full sense of tribal solidarity. Like childhood itself, there is no returning to the childhood of man. What is more, the attempt to satisfy this craving, if carried far on a densely packed globe, leads not to community but to those hideously destructive forms of tribalism that this century has already seen too much of.

Anyway, I suspect that the village probably never was all that it is cracked up to be. The village, including the pre-industrial village, is less likely to be filled with harmony and solidarity than with the oppressive weight of repressed deviation and dissent which, when they appear, erupt explosively and leave a lasting burden of antagonism and hatred. I have not been able to discover much evidence of the consensual *gemeinschaft* in descriptions of the small town of Springdale in upstate New York, or St. Denis in Quebec, or Peyrane, the village in the Vaucluse, or the small English town of Glossop near Manchester, or the peasant village of Montegrano in South Italy, or the Tanjore village in South India that André Betéille recently described.[3]

Here, for example, is how Horace Miner saw political life in the French Canadian parish of St. Denis thirty years ago:

> Politics is a topic of continual interest and one which reaches fever heat during election time . . . The whole parish is always divided between the "blues" or Conservatives, and the "reds." Party affiliations follow family lines and family cliques and antagonisms. The long winter *veillées* are attended almost invariably by family groups of similar political belief. Constituents of each party have a genuine dislike for those of the other . . . Election time is one of great tension, of taunts and shouting as parishioners get their evening mail . . . Insults are common, and many speaking acquaintances are dropped. During the last election the minority candidate had to have one meeting in the parish in secret, another open but under provincial police protection . . . Campaigns reach their climax with the *assemblée contradictoire*, at which both candidates speak. Characteristically at these meetings there are organized strong-arm tactics, drinking, and attempts to make each candidate's speech inaudible . . .
>
> The chicanery of politicians is a byword in the parish. Factional strife threatens the life of every organized association . . . On the whole the associational life of the community is weak. The people are not joiners.[4]

Thus the village democracy before the demos was ruined by industrialization and urbanization!

If the democratic village seems hardly worth seeking in this industrial and post-industrial epoch, the prospect is all the more appealing that democracy might be extended to the place where most adult citizens spend most of their time—their place of work. Professional people with a great deal of autonomy, academics like ourselves who enjoy an extraordinary amount of autonomy and a fair measure of self government in our universities, executives and administrators who see authority relationships from above rather than from below, all are likely to underestimate the consequences for the average citizen in a modern industrial society flowing from the fact that at his place of work he is a rather low-level subordinate in a system of hierarchical relationships. Although the term democracy has been prostituted in the service of employee relationships, the fact is that practically everywhere in the world, the industrial workplace—the factory, industry, or corporation, whether owned privately or publicly—is no democracy in any sense consistent with our usage in the realm of the state. "The idea of a factory, nationalized or privately-owned," it has been said, "is the idea of command."[5] The factory, the enterprise, the industry, the corporation is a hierarchy; it may be an aristocracy, an oligarchy, a monarchy, a despotism, but it is not a democracy. This is as true in socialist economies as in capitalist and mixed economies. A century ago Engels asserted that hierarchy would be necessary in the factory even under socialism, that even in a socialist enterprise the worker would lose his autonomy. Over the entrance to the factory, he said, recalling *The Inferno*, the words should be written:

> *Lasciate ogni autonomia, voi che entrate!*[6]

Whether the work-place should be democratized, and if so how and how much, are questions that need to be distinguished from the problem of regulating the enterprise, industry, or corporation to insure that it accomplishes the social and public functions that are the only reason the rest of us are willing to grant its vast legal rights, privileges and immunities, and extraordinary power. If democratic states have become immense, so have corporations. There are privately owned corporations that have gross annual revenues greater than the GNP of most countries of the world, that spend annually sums greater than the entire budgets of the governments of most of the nation-states in the world. To insure that these immense resources and powers are used for public purposes is a staggering problem. But internal democracy in the factory, firm, industry or corporation is not necessarily a more effective means of public control than regulating a hierarchically administered firm by competition and the price system, by a regulatory agency, by government ownership, or by various combinations of these and other possibilities. Indeed, even if the modern corporation were internally democratic, no matter whether it were public or private and no matter whether it were to operate in an economy predominantly privately owned or predominantly publicly owned, I do not think we any more than the Soviets or Yugoslavs would want to dispense entirely with such external controls as competition and the price system. In short, no system of *internal* control negates the need for a system of *external* controls that compel or induce those who exercise authority within the enterprise, whether these managers are chosen by and are accountable to stockholders, workers, or the state, to employ their power and resources for jointly beneficial purposes rather than for exploiting consumers.

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[3] Arthur J. Vidich and Joseph Bensman, *Small Town in Mass Society* (Garden City, N. Y.: Anchor Books, 1960); Horace Miner, *St. Denis, A French Canadian Parish* (Chicago: University of Chicago Phoenix Books, 1939, 1963); Laurence Wylie, *Village in the Vaucluse* (New York: Harper Colophon, 1957, 1964); A.H. Birch, *Small-Town Politics, A Study of Political Life in Glossop* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1959); Edward C. Banfield, *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society* (New York: The Free Press, 1958); André Betéille, *Caste, Class and Power* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966).

[4] Miner, *op. cit.*, 58–61.

[5] Graham Wootton, *Workers, Unions and the State* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966), 36.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 36. The quotation is from Engels' essay "On Authority" in Lewis S. Feuer (ed.), *Marx and Engels: Basic Writings* (New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1959), 481–484.

But even if we can distinguish the problem of internal democracy from that of external control, the problem does not vanish. And even if this problem is extraordinarily difficult—as I think it is—it seems to me too important to be neglected, particularly by political scientists. It is true that in many developed countries with representative governments, trade union power has substituted bargaining for undiluted hierarchy in the control of wages and working conditions. But even where they are most powerful, labor unions have by no means created a democratic factory or industry; moreover, as a result more of apathy than of repression, few unions anywhere have developed a really high degree of internal democracy. Aside from a few scattered instances elsewhere,[7] the most massive, ambitious, and far-reaching experiment in democratizing the workplace has been taking place in Yugoslavia since 1950. Sober studies[8] suggest that while the system of workers' control has problems—some of them, like apathy and Michel's iron law of oligarchy, familiar to every student of democratic organizations—it might well prove to be a viable system of internal control. If it does, it will surely stand as an alternative with a very great appeal—at least in the long run—to workers in other industrial nations. If workers can participate in the government of their factories in Yugoslavia, and if these factories prove to be relatively efficient, surely the whole question of internal democracy will come alive in other countries.

Yet even if it should prove to be possible, efficient, and desirable, I do not believe that democracy in the work-place is a substitute for democracy in the state. For one thing, I doubt whether democracy in the work place can be preserved indefinitely unless there is democracy in the state. Moreover, where an opposition party is illegal in the state, opposition in the factory has distinct limits.[9] Finally—and this is the most important point—the work place is not as important as the state and with increasing leisure it may grow less so. To accept as a focus for self-government a type of unit that is and must be concerned with only a small part of the range of collective concerns would be to trivialize the democratic idea. I find it hard to believe that man's aspiration toward rational control over his environment by joint action with his fellow men will ever be satisfied by democratizing the production of aspirin, cars, and television sets.

As I have already suggested, any form of political participation that cannot be performed more or less simultaneously but must be carried on sequentially runs into the implacable barrier of time. Time's relentless arrow flies directly to the Achilles' heel of all schemes for participatory democracy on a grand scale. It is easy to show that any unit small enough for all the members to participate fully (where each member has the opportunity to present his views and have them discussed) cannot be larger than a working committee. If you doubt this, I ask you to sit down with pencil and paper and do a few exercises with various assumptions as to the time available for decisions and the time required for each participant to make his point or at least present his point of view.[10] You will quickly see how cruel is time's neutral guillotine. Or let me simply evoke your own experience with committees to remind you how quickly a committee grows too large for every member to participate fully. Or consider the experience of legislative committees, cabinets, regulatory commissions, judicial bodies.

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[7] Wooton, *op. cit.*, 113–124.

[8] Cf. Albert Meister, *Socialisme et Autogestion, L'Expérience Yougoslave* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1964); and Jiri Kolaja, *Workers Councils: The Jugoslav Experience* (New York and Washington: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966).

[9] See the comments of Kolaja, *op. cit.*, pp. 7 and 66ff.; and Meister, *op. cit.*, pp. 240–245, 263–278, 373.

Would we not all agree that an effective working committee can have no more than—let us err on the side of generosity—30 to 40 members? Drawing on your own experience, most of you, I imagine, would cut these figures by a half or two-thirds.

Now if the great advantage of a unit the size of a working committee is that it allows full participation by its members, its great drawback, from a democratic point of view, is that unless it is a representative body or an agent of a representative body it ought not be given much public authority. Either the unit, though small, is granted authority because it represents a much larger number of citizens; or else, not being a representative body, it has little authority other than to recommend and advise; or else, if it has much power and is not a representative body, its power is illegitimate. In an interdependent society, any significant power wielded by a body the size of a working committee is bound to have important effects on citizens not sitting on that committee. Consequently either the committee is representative or its power is illegitimate. We can hardly espouse the small, self-governing, fully participatory unit as a normative goal if it is illegitimate. If it is representative, then it is no longer a body in which all citizens can participate fully. We have run into a cul de sac, as you see, and so we must get back to the starting point.

Some of you may regard this as a pessimistic analysis. It is, I admit, a very large fly in the ointment. Like death, it may be a brutal and perhaps even a tragic limit on man's possibilities, but I do not see why this conclusion must lead to pessimism. The idea of democracy would never have gotten off the ground if enthusiastic democrats had not been willing to settle for something a good deal less than complete and equal participation by all citizens in all decisions. It is worth recalling that in Athens, where the opportunities for free male citizens to participate in running the city seem to have been about as great as they have ever been anywhere, citizens were chosen for what was probably the most coveted participation in the life of the polis—a seat on the Council of Five Hundred, the inner council, or the various administrative boards—by lot or, in the case of the Board of Generals, by election, and to that extent these bodies were instances of representative government and not direct democracy. Participation in the Assembly, which met about once a month, was scarcely the fullest flowering of participatory democracy. I have been to enough town meetings myself to know something of their limitations. If you think of a town meeting in which a quorum sometimes required the presence of 6,000 people, where maybe as many as 30–40,000 were eligible to attend, and where perhaps 4–5,000 were frequently present, it is obvious that most Athenian citizens must have lived their lives without once speaking to their fellow citizens in the Assembly. That, one judges from the reports in Thucydides, was a forum that gave preference to orators.

Nonetheless, I doubt—although we shall never know—whether many Athenians felt frustrated because their opportunities to participate were not as unlimited as their skies. Between the working committee and the nation-state there is, I think, a critical threshold of size, below which the opportunities for participation can be so great and so fairly meted out that no one feels left out and everyone feels that his viewpoint has been pretty fairly attended to. Athens was far too large for the democracy of the working committee; de facto it had to employ a certain amount of representation. Yet I suspect that it was below the critical threshold. And even if we now reject as unattainable the ideal of full, equal, and direct participation by all citizens in all collective decisions—the ideal of committee democracy—we can still search for a unit that remains within this critical threshold for widespread participation.

VI

We have travelled a long trail and turned into a number of branching paths in our quest but we have not found a unit that seems optimal for rational self-government. The journey would have been much longer had we taken the time to explore the by-ways as carefully as they deserve. Yet if we keep going, I think that we shall finally end up about at the place where the Greeks left off: somewhere within view of the democratic city.

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[10] Cf. Bertrand de Jouvenel, "The Chairman's Problem," this REVIEW, 55 (June, 1961), 368–372.

Yet what we come to is not the Greek city, nor can it be; not the *polis*, then, but a democratic city that would be consistent with the presence of the nation-state, the institutions of representative government, a level of technology beyond anything the Greeks dreamed of, and huge populations densely spread over the face of our shrunken earth.

If ancient Greeks were the first truly modern people, choice shaped by geography and historical accident made them also city people. So, too, choice shaped by demography and technology makes us a city people. But even if the Greeks were a city people and though they were modern in almost every important sense, our cities must differ in fact and in ideal from their actual and ideal cities. For one thing, the proportion of the residents of a modern democratic city eligible to participate in political life will be very much larger—something like half of the population, so that even a city of 100,000 will have around 50,000 adult citizens. Much more quickly than the Greeks, we reach the limits of direct democracy. Moreover, the citizens of a modern city will also be highly mobile. A resident of Athens was a citizen only if his ancestors were Athenians; in any modern city, many citizens are recent arrivals, or are about to move to another city. In 1960 more than one resident out of every six in American cities had moved there within the last five years.[11] As a result of our mobility, socialization into the political life of the modern democratic city is enormously more difficult for us than for the Greeks. Then, too, the Greek city was completely autonomous in ideal and pretty much so in fact. Our cities are not autonomous in fact nor would many of us offer total autonomy as an ideal. Finally, the citizen of a Greek city ordinarily had one inclusive loyalty to the city of his ancestors and to its gods. He invested in his city a kind of engagement in comparison with which patriotism in the nation-state must seem either shallow or strident. But the citizens of our modern cities will have no single loyalty and no single community; they will have multiple loyalties to many associations; and nowhere will they find the all-inclusive community.

If for these reasons a modern city cannot be a *polis*, we can nonetheless reasonably hope one day to achieve great democratic cities. As the optimum unit for democracy in the 21st Century, the city has a greater claim, I think, than any other alternative.

To begin with, from now on into the next century man seems clearly destined to live in cities. If to live in cities is our fate, to live in great cities is our opportunity. Is it not of some significance that of the four great waves of experimentation in the West with popular government, during three of these—the Greek, the Roman, and the medieval communes of North Italy—popular governments managed to construct cities of exceptional and enduring beauty?

Yet during the fourth wave, that of representative democracy in the nation-state, we have so far failed most profoundly in our cities. Is it too much to hope that we might be on the verge of a fifth wave, the age of the democratic city within the democratic nation-state? By we, I mean of course, the whole of the Western democratic world and its off-shoots. But most of all, I mean we here in the United States.

City-building is one of the most obvious incapacities of Americans. We Americans have become an urban people without having developed an urban civilization. Though we live in cities, we do not know how to build cities. Perhaps because we have emerged so swiftly out of an agrarian society, perhaps because so many of us are only a generation or two removed from farm and field, small town and peasant village, we seem to lack the innate grasp of the essential elements of the good city that was all but instinct among Greeks, Romans, and the Italians of the free communes. Our cities are not merely non-cities, they are anti-cities—mean, ugly, gross, banal, inconvenient, hazardous, formless, incoherent, unfit for human living, deserts from which a family flees to the greener hinterlands as soon as job and income permit, yet deserts growing so rapidly outward that the open green space to which the family escapes soon shrinks to an oasis and then it too turns to a desert.

One advantage of the city as a unit for democratic government is, then, that it confronts us with a task worthy of our best efforts because of its urgency, its importance, its challenge, the extent of our failure up to now, and its promise for the good life lived jointly with fellow citizens.

These considerations point to another asset of the city as a democratic unit. While the city is not and cannot be autonomous, the policies of city hall and the totality of city agencies and activities are so important to our lives that to participate in the decisions of the city means, or anyway can mean, participating in shaping not merely the trivial but some of the most vital aspects of our environment. I say shaping and not totally controlling because the city is only one of our Chinese boxes. But it is in the city and with the powers and resources made available to cities that we shall deal with such crucial problems as the education of our children, our housing, the way we travel to and from our place of work, preventive health measures, crime, public order, the cycle of poverty, racial justice and equality—not to mention all those subtle and little understood elements that contribute so heavily to the satisfaction of our desires for friendship, neighborhood, community, and beauty.

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[11] In 1960 the percentage of migrants from another country since 1955 for all U.S. cities 25,000 and over was 18.4%. The percentages ran slightly higher (19.7%) in small cities of 25–50,000 than in cities over 150,000 (15.6%). See Jeffrey K. Hadden and Edgar F. Borgatta, *American Cities, Their Social Characteristics* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), Appendix, Table 1. variable #19, p. 108.

Yet if the city and its government are important to us, can the good city today be small enough to remain below that critical threshold for wide participation that I mentioned a moment ago? I do not know any question more important to us as political scientists, nor any that we have so completely ignored. From evidence and analysis that are both all too incomplete, I should like to hazard an answer.

The existence of a few giant metropolises here and there may mislead us as to fact and possibility. Only a modest percentage of the world's population lives even today in the giant metropolis. Indeed, in 1960 only one-fifth of the people of the world lived in cities over 100,000. It is true that in the most urbanized region of the world, North America, in 1960 six out of every ten people lived in cities over 100,000. Yet even in the United States, less than one out of every ten lived in cities over a million.

It will take some doing, but we do not have to end up all jammed together in the asphalt desert of the large metropolis—unless that is really what we want. And Americans pretty clearly do not want to live in the large metropolis but rather in cities of modest dimensions. For example, in a survey by Gallup last year nearly half the respondents living in cities of 500,000 and over said they would like to live somewhere else—suburb, small town, farm; by contrast, few of the people living in suburb or town wanted to move to the big cities. About three out of four respondents are distressed by the prospect that their own community will double in population.[12] Census figures for the past several decades tell us that Americans have been acting out these preferences.

What, then, is the optimum size for a city? Curiously, this question, which so far as I know was first asked by political philosophers in Athens over 2,000 years ago, is no longer a subject of discussion among political scientists. I do not know why this should be so, but I wonder if it is because we have come to take a purely passive and defeatist view: the size of a city, we say, is beyond control, so the best we can do is to adapt political institutions to the facts. I am reminded of Rousseau's comment on Grotius, that his invariable mode of reasoning was always to establish right from fact. One might employ a more logical method, Rousseau remarked, but not one more favorable to tyrants.

If to our own loss we have ignored the question of the optimum size of cities, fortunately it has been examined by scholars in a variety of fields other than our own. It is impossible to do justice to this discussion here but the analysis and the evidence are too important for us to ignore.[13] It is only fair to warn you that this is a controversial area, yet the evidence seems to me to support the conclusion that the all-round optimum size for a contemporary American city is probably somewhere between 50,000 and 200,000, which, even taking the larger figure, may be within the threshold for wide civic participation.

There is, for example, no worthwhile evidence that there are any significant economies of scale in city governments for cities over about 50,000. The few items on which increasing size does lead to decreasing unit costs, such as water and sewerage, are too small a proportion of total city outlays to lead to significant economies; and even these reductions are probably offset by rising costs for other services, such as police protection.[14]

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[12] American Institute of Public Opinion release, April 24, 1966.

[13] The most extensive survey and analysis of the evidence seems to be the work of Otis Dudley Duncan. The findings of his Ph.D. dissertation, *An Examination of the Problem of Optimum City-Size* (University of Chicago, 1949) have been summarized in Otis Dudley Duncan, "Optimum Size of Cities" in Paul Hatt and Albert Reiss (eds.), *Reader in Urban Sociology* (Glencoe, Ill: Free Press, 1951), 632–645; and James Dahir, "What is the Best Size for a City?," *American City* (August, 1951), 104–105. Robert A. Lillibridge, "Urban Size: An Assessment," *Land Economics*, 38 (Nov., 1952), 341–352, summarizes Duncan and others. In addition, see William Fielding Ogburn and Otis Dudley Duncan, "City Size as a Sociological Variable," in Ernest W. Burgess and Donald J. Bogue, eds., *Urban Sociology* (Chicago: The University of Chicago, Phoenix Books) 58–76; Otis Dudley Duncan, "Optimum Size of Cities" in Joseph J. Spengler and Otis Dudley Duncan (eds.), *Demographic Analysis* (Glencoe, The Free Press, 1956), 372–385.

Per capita city expenditures increase with the size of city, at least in the United States. In 1960 the mean expenditure for U.S. cities over 150,000 was $123 per capita compared with $70 per capita for cities in the 25–50 thousand range. Yet there is no evidence that these higher costs per capita provide residents of large cities with a better life, taking it in the round, than the life enjoyed by residents of smaller cities. If it costs more in a city of a million than in a city of 25,000 to build, maintain, and police a park within walking distance of every citizen, then higher per capita expenditures for parks in big cities hardly signify that their residents have better public services than residents of smaller cities. What is more, the outlays in larger cities are actually less for some key functions than in smaller cities. For example, even though larger cities employ more persons per capita in public administration than smaller cities, per capita employment in education is on the average lower in larger cities than in small cities.[15]

Roads and highways nullify the older economic advantage of the metropolis as a market and a source of specialized labor. A student of urban economics argues, for example, that

> A half-dozen towns of, say, 25,000 population with two or three main industries each plus a dozen small one- or two-industry towns of half that size add up to a 300,000 population, extended local labor market, built on the moderately broad base of a couple of dozen separate industries.[16]

The oft-cited cultural advantages of metropolis are also largely illusory. On the basis of his research on American cities, Duncan estimates that the requisite population base for a library of "desirable minimum professional standards" 50,000–75,000, for an art museum, 100,000, "with a somewhat higher figure for science and historical museums." Yet, even though larger cities have larger libraries, the circulation of library books per capita markedly decreases with size of city. There is also a negative correlation between city size and per capita museum attendance.[17] Moreover, just as smaller cities can retain their collective identities and yet form a larger economic unit, thanks to ease of transportation and communication, so we have barely begun to explore the ways in which small cities by federating together for specific purposes might enjoy all of the cultural advantages of the large city and yet retain their individual identities, the pleasures of living in communities of lower densities and more open spaces,[18] and relatively greater opportunities for political participation.

When we think about the size of a city in which a high culture may flourish, it is instructive to recall that Rome in the Augustan age probably had a population of about 350,000. During the Renaissance the city that produced Machiavelli and, I think it fair to say, an outpouring of great paintings, sculpture, and architecture beyond anything we Americans have yet created, had a population of around a hundred thousand. This was probably about the population of the city of Venice during the Renaissance, and of Rome when Michaelangelo chiselled out his Moses and painted his frescoes in the Sistine Chapel.

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[14] I am indebted to Mr. Garry D. Brewer for undertaking an extensive survey of the writings and findings dealing with economies of scale in American cities. The relevant literature is extensive, but the most relevant studies appear to be Amos H. Hawley's seminal article, "Metropolitan Population and Municipal Government Expenditures in Central Cities," *Journal of Social Issues*, 7, nos. 1 and 2 (1951), 100–108; Werner Z. Hirsch, "Expenditures Implications of Mettropolitan Growth and Consolidation," *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 41 (August, 1959) 232–241; Harvey E. Brazer, *City Expenditures in the United States*, National Bureau of Economic Research Occasional Paper no. 66 (New York, 1959). See also the analysis of the evidence of these studies in Wilbur R. Thompson, *A Preface to Urban Economics* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1965), Ch. 7, "The Urban Public Economy," 255–292.

[15] Data in the paragraph above are from Hadden and Borgatta, *op. cit.*, Appendix, Table 1, p. 110, variables 57, 58, and 65.

[16] Thompson, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

[17] Duncan, "Optimum Size of Cities," *op. cit.*, p. 381.

[18] " . . . museums, professional athletic teams, complete medical facilities, and other accoutrements of modern urban life could be supported collectively. As the federated places grew and prospered the interstices would, of course, begin to fill in, moving the area closer to the large metropolitan area form. But alert action in land planning and zoning could preserve open spaces in a pattern superior to those found in most large urban areas." Thompson, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

Now what is strangely missing from the discussion of the optimum size of cities is the voice of the political scientist. The question is, of course, broader than the problem of what size of city may be optimal for a democratic political life. But political life is not trivial. Surely political criteria have a place among the criteria for the optimum size of cities; and among these political criteria surely one of the most important is whether a city is beyond the threshold for widespread participation. The whole question needs more study than it has had. But it looks to me as if the all-round optimum size for a city—the range, say, from 50 thousand to about 200 thousand—is below this threshold. If this is so, then there is no other unit in the nest of Chinese boxes that is at once so important and so accessible; a unit that can and must be clothed with great powers, if it is to manage its problems, and yet can be small enough so that citizens can participate extensively in determining the ways in which this great power will be used. Only the city, it seems to me, can avoid the extremes we began to confront some time back. For the city need not be so huge that, like the nation-state, it reduces participation to voting, nor so small that its activities are trivial.

The city has at least one more advantage: it has great potentialities as a unit for educating citizens in civic virtue or—if I must use a term that comes more readily to the lips of a contemporary political scientist—for political socialization.

We may be approaching a crisis in the socialization of citizens into the political life of the democratic nation-state, a crisis that the challenges of nation-building, democratization, and overcoming the most blatant evils of industrialism have delayed or obscured. There are signs of malaise among young people, among the very citizens who shortly before the dawn of the 21st Century will have become—to use the word that has now become a mindless cliché—the establishment. If the malaise were only American, one could put it down to television, over-permissive child-rearing, the persistence of an unpopular and ugly war, or other causes more or less specific to the United States; but there are signs of this malaise among youth in almost all the democratic countries.

I am not going to try to explain here a phenomenon too complex for brief analysis. But a part of the phenomenon—I don't know how much it is symptom and how much underlying cause—is a belief that the government of the nation-state is remote, inaccessible, and unresponsive, a government of professionals in which only a few can ever hope to participate actively and a still smaller number can ever gain great influence after years of dedication to political life.

What we need, what they need, and what some of them are trying to create (often with incredible ignorance of elementary political wisdom) is a political unit of more truly human proportions in which a citizen can acquire confidence and mastery of the arts of politics—that is, of the arts required for shaping a good life in common with fellow citizens. What Pericles said of Athens, that the city is in general a school of the Grecians, may be said of every city of moderate size: it is a marvelous school. I have no doubt that a modern city even of moderate size is a good deal more complicated than Athens was. It has a much greater need for highly trained professionals, permanent administrative agencies, full-time leaders. Yet in the main, its problems are, I believe, within reach of the average citizen. And I believe it may be easier for citizens to reason about the good life and the ways to reach it by thinking in the more immediate and palpable context of the city than in the context of the nation-state or international politics. Even if solving the problems of the city is not quite enough for the good life, it is a great, indispensable, and comprehensible prerequisite.

VII

What I have presented is not a program but a perspective, not a prophecy but a prospect. It is not a solution to the problems of the city or of democracy, but a viewpoint from which to look at the problems of democracy and the city. It it does not lead directly to the answers, it might nonetheless help one to see the questions.

I have already suggested one implication of this way of looking at things—if popular governments in the modern world are a series of Chinese boxes, then we obviously need different models, theories, and criteria of excellence for each. I may seem to be repeating only what was commonly said nearly two centuries ago as ideas about representative government began to develop, that we cannot judge representative government in the nation-state as if it were or could be democracy in a committee, or, for that matter, a town meeting. Yet it is interesting to me that we have made so little of these palpable and evidently inherent differences in the performance of different kinds of units, all of which we are prone to call democratic.

Yet if the democratic city lies somewhere between democracy in the committee or in the town meeting and representative government in the nation-state, then it would be important to know what the similarities and differences are, and what standards of excellence we can apply to one but not the other. Even the democratic city, I fear, cannot satisfy anyone who has a vision of leaderless and partyless democracy, for at its best the politics of the democratic city will be more like a competitive polyarchy than a committee; organized parties and interest groups are more likely to exist than the free and spontaneous formation and dissolution of groups for every issue; a full-time leader or activist will exert more influence than any of his followers; institutionalized conflict is more likely than uncoerced consensus. Yet these are hunches that do no more than point to new worlds that need exploring.

The perspective I have been describing also bears on the way we think about units of government intermediate between nation-state and city. An American obviously must take the 50 states into account. These are too solidly built to be done away with and I don't propose to break any lances tilting against them. Yet in the perspective I am suggesting the states do not stand out as important institutions of democratic self-government. They are too big to allow for much in the way of civic participation—think of California and New York, each about as large in population as Canada or Yugoslavia and each larger than 80% of the countries of the world. Yet an American state is infinitely less important to citizens of that state than any democratic nation-state is to its citizens. Consequently the average American is bound to be much less concerned about the affairs of his state than of his city or country. Too remote to stimulate much participation by their citizens, and too big to make extensive participation possible anyway, these units intermediate between city and nation are probably destined for a kind of limbo of quasi-democracy. They will be pretty much controlled by the full-time professionals, whether elected or appointed. Moreover, many of the problems that states have to deal with will not fit within state boundaries. It cannot even be said that the states, on the whole, can tap any strong sentiments of loyalty or like-mindedness among their citizens. Doubtless we shall continue to use the states as important intermediate instruments of coordination and control—if for no other reason than the fact that they are going institutions. But whenever we are compelled to choose between city and state, we should always keep in mind, I think, that the city, not the state, is the better instrument of popular government.

This argument also applies to megalopolis, to the city that is *not* a city, to the local government that is *not* a local government. The city of New York, for example, has about the same population as Sweden or Chile. It is twice as large as Norway, three times the size of New Zealand. To regard the government of New York as a local government is to make nonsense of the term. If the Swedes were to rule their whole country from Stockholm with no local governments, I am quite sure that we would begin to question whether the people of Sweden could rightly be called self-governing. Where, we might ask the Swedes, are your local governments? But should we not ask the same thing of New Yorkers: Where are *your* local governments? For purely historical and what to me seem rather irrational reasons, we continue to regard the government of the giant metropolis as if it were a local government, when we might more properly consider it as the equivalent of a state or a provincial government—and hence badly in need of being broken up into smaller units for purposes of local government. If it turns out that the government of a metropolis cannot be decentralized to smaller territorial units, then should we not quite openly declare that the metropolis cannot ever be made into a democratic city? This may be an inconvenient truth, but if it is true, it may be—like much truth—liberating in the end.

Yet I must admit that problems like these involving the metropolis demand more than we now know. The metropolis is a world to be explored, so let us explore it, hoping that we may discover how even it might be turned into a democratic city.

VIII

There are many questions that I shall have to leave unanswered. I could plead lack of time, but the fact is I don't know the answers, nor perhaps does anyone else quite yet.

There is above all the question that now overshadows all else in American life of how we shall solve the problems presented by race, poverty, inequality, discrimination, and centuries of humiliation. No failure in American society has been as enduring, as profound, as visible, as corrosive, as dangerous, and as tragic as our refusal to enable black Americans to share in equal measure with white Americans the realities of the American dream. Now this problem has become central to the whole future of our cities and indeed to the future of the country. I scarcely need to say that unless and until it is solved neither we nor our children nor our grandchildren nor any future generation can have anything like a decent urban life.

There is also the question of how the city can acquire adequate resources, particularly funds, without becoming excessively subordinated to higher levels of government. The bloc grant is a very promising solution, but only if grants are made directly to the cities and not, as is often proposed, exclusively to the states. In the perspective that I have been suggesting, to think of the states as the natural and exclusive recipients of bloc grants is anachronistic; for if the autonomy that is promised by the bloc grant is desirable for states—those barely democratic units in the limbo—autonomy is all the more desirable, and indeed necessary, if citizens are to enjoy the power to shape their cities.

A third question is how to control the size of cities. If there is an optimum size in the broad range from about 50,000 to about 200,000, as I have suggested further inquiry might show, then how can cities be maintained within this range—to say nothing of breaking up the giant metropolis? Typically, the people who influence decisions about the future of cities have acted on the simple-minded axiom: the bigger the better. This is most notably true here in America where the rational prospect of great gain encourages an almost pathological obsession with the virtues of sheer bigness, as if the very bigness of the city, the height of its buildings, and the crowds on its streets must somehow outweigh all squalor and ugliness. There seems to be a fear, too, that the moment we stop growing we start to die, a half truth that overlooks the fact that in nature the mouse and the sparrow have outlasted the brontosaurus and the sabre-toothed tiger. There are, I suspect, all sorts of devices we could use to control the growth of a city when it reaches the optimum range. These need to be explored, but they will be of little use until we decide that this is what we really want to do.

A closely related though much more formidable question is how we can make the legal boundaries of a city coincide more closely with what might be called its sociological boundaries. As I suggested earlier, our view up to now has been passive or defeatist: we say that we must constantly change legal boundaries to fit social boundaries. But as I tried to suggest with my fantasy of a Constitutional Convention, this way lies madness; for the legal boundaries must be extended until they cover the whole globe, which, whatever else it may be, cannot be a complete substitute for smaller territorial units. In general, the political autonomy allowed a territorial unit is likely to be less, the higher the amount of interaction with others outside the legal boundaries. In building nations or international systems, the greater the interaction; and consequently the less "real" the significance of local boundaries, the easier the task. Yet if we are to build democratic cities with enough autonomy to permit their citizens to participate extensively in significant decisions about their environment, we must somehow reverse the tendency for the legal boundaries of the city to lose all social and economic significance. Nor can we simply go on creating separate authorities for each problem. Obviously different problems call for different boundaries, and we may have to live in a network of authorities. Yet the indefinite multiplication of units of government is bound to fragment the control of the ordinary citizen over a broad range of policies.

The problem of fragmented authority touches closely upon another, the problem of decentralization of authority and power within the city. Even in a city in the range from 50,000–200,000 political participation is reduced for most people to nothing more than voting in elections—as it is in the representative government of the nation-state—unless there are smaller units within which citizens can from time to time formulate and express their desires, consult with officials, and in some cases participate even more fully in decisions. Unfortunately, I can only indicate the problem; I have no answers to it. There are a number of proposals floating around for creating smaller participatory units in the city, the oldest and most popular candidate being the neighborhood; and there are even some interesting experiments of this kind going on. So far as I know none of the proposals or experiments triumph over the universal tendency for a few activists to engage in most of the overt activities while the rest participate only sporadically, symbolically, or not at all. Although this limitation seems to me to deflate rather cruelly the most grandiose and utopian claims for citizen participation, and in addition raises serious problems, I do not think it is a reason for rejecting these efforts and experiments out of hand, if we are aiming not for committee democracy but, as I suggested a moment ago, a degree of participation so great and so fairly spread about that no one feels neglected and everyone feels, with justice, that his viewpoint has been pretty fairly attended to. To aim for the point at which practically everyone in the city believes with good reason that his claims ordinarily receive a fair hearing, and decisions, even when adverse to his claims, have been arrived at with understanding and sympathy, is already so distant and so splendid a goal that I am quite content to leave the exploration of what lies beyond it to someone in the 21st Century.

If there were time, I know that one could turn up more questions, more problems, more obstacles. We might even conclude that the fifth high tide of democracy, the age of the democratic city in the democratic republic, is not after all in our destiny.

Or it may be within the possibilities of other countries, but not our own, to achieve in the rest of this century what the Greeks did 2500 years ago, to develop an urban civilization founded on the democratic city, only consistent this time with the imperatives of modern technology, the existence of representative governments ruling over huge populations and territories, and the extension of constitutionalism and the rule of law to vast areas of the earth—ultimately, perhaps, to the globe itself.

Yet even if no one can say whether this will ever come about, or where, for everyone stirred by the prospect of shaping politics now toward the good life in the 21st Century—or at least toward a better life—the opportunities lie all around.

COMPATIBILITY AND CONSENSUS: A PROPOSAL FOR THE CONCEPTUAL LINKAGE OF EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL DIMENSIONS OF FOREIGN POLICY*

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The relative intractablility of the international environment poses a problem for the foreign policy of all nations. Purpose and power meet with cross-purpose and countervailing power, and most foreign policy projects face external restraints that the makers of policy can neglect only at the risk of failure. Foreign policy—the more or less coordinated strategy with which institutionally designated decision-makers seek to manipulate the international environment—generally meets with tenacious resistance, if not insuperable obstacles.

To regard foreign policy and statecraft from this perspective, however, implies a good deal of determinism. In its more extreme analytical applications, this viewpoint reduces the pursuit of foreign policy goals to a contest between statesman and environment that is already settled by the insurmountable restrictions of the international "system." Nations are implicitly delegated to play out the roles that the international system has "assigned" to its "actors" to maintain system stability or equilibrium. Domestic political variables are largely neglected in this analytical perspective. Foreign policy aspirations are assessed primarily in terms of whether a nation has adequately "internalized" system "rules"—that is to say, whether a polity has adjusted to the contingencies of the international system, which seems to move toward a preordained historical or analytical *telos*. The strictures of necessity, imposed by the international environment, take analytical precedence over considerations of preferences and the possibility of choice.[1]

There is an analytical alternative for viewing foreign policy that focuses on the *internal* political processes of the nation-state. This perspective stresses the motivational elements that shape a nation's foreign policy goals; it highlights the sociocultural predispositions and institutional processes that lead to the formulation of goals and to the choice among methods of implementation. Although this approach apparently stresses choice rather than necessity, it frequently imposes a teleology of its own. The international conduct of nations tends to be regarded as either irreversibly determined by their historical experience and "political culture," or decisively shaped by the personal idiosyncrasies of their decision-makers. Analytical emphasis rests on the domestic political system as a "subsystem" of the enveloping international system; the strictures and opportunities of the international environment are relegated to the secondary analytical role of serving as "in-puts" from the international system into the domestic system.[2]

The advantages and shortcomings of both of these views of international politics and international statecraft result from the kinds of questions that are being raised. The choice between the "systemic" and the "subsystemic" approach does not reflect caprice on the part of the analyst but a legitimate and calculated decision that is determined by the analytical purpose of the inquiry. A primary analytical

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[1] See, for example, Morton A. Kaplan, *System and Process in International Politics* (New York: John Wiley, 1957); George Liska, *International Equilibrium* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957); Morton A. Kaplan, Arthur L. Burns, and Richard M. Quandt, "Theoretical Analysis of the 'Balance of Power,'" *Behavioral Science*, 5 (July 1960), 240–252; Maurice A. Ash, "An Analysis of Power, with Special Reference to International Politics," *World Politics*, 3 (January 1951), 218–237.

[2] See, for example, Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin, *Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1954), and the early essay by Snyder, "The Nature of Foreign Policy," *Social Science*, 27 (April 1952), 61–69; Otto Klineberg, *Tensions Affecting International Understanding* (New York: Social Science Research Council, 1950).

interest in the *outcome* of foreign policy will necessarily focus on the *operational* environment that the nation-state faces in the historical circumstances of the international system. Analytical pre-occupation with *motivational* aspects of foreign policy making will necessarily turn to internal political processes and to the *perception* of external conditions that is the basis for choosing among alternatives of ends and means.[3]

Nonetheless, the analyst of foreign policy is on safe ground in arguing that a full consideration of a nation's foreign policy should focus both on the opportunities and strictures presented by the nation's external, operational environment and on the internal, psychological environment prevailing in the national system. By taking both dimensions into account, a wider range of relevant data is brought together and a more comprehensive analysis becomes possible. Almost by definition, foreign policy goals are circumscribed both by internal-motivational-psychological phenomena and by external-operational contingencies. It is literally impossible to speak of foreign policy goals without thinking at once of a psychological-motivational "unit" and the contextual, operational environment in which the unit seeks to realize its goals.[4]

It is the purpose of this essay to propose an analytical framework for a "linkage system" between the external and internal dimensions of foreign policy projects or, in a larger sense, between international systems and national systems. Before we turn to this task, it will be helpful to discuss briefly some of the concrete historical developments that lend a special urgency to this analytical issue and to comment on some of the conceptual schemes that have been proposed for its resolution.

I. THE SETTING

It has been widely recognized that contemporary historical circumstances throw serious doubt on the value of retaining the traditional and comfortably neat separation between international and domestic politics and the corollary distinction between external and internal dimensions of foreign policy projects. Although the nation-state may still be regarded as the major actor in world politics, both the nature of the nation-state and that of the political processes of the international system have changed to such an extent that the analytical formulation of these transformations is a question of immediate concern.[5]

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[3] Harold and Margaret Sprout suggest that "In analyzing a particular outcome, performance, or state of affairs, it is generally possible to identify certain elements of the total environment that appear to be strategic (that is, very immediate and important). These specific elements constitute the *operational* environment of the actor in that situation. The operational environment (the factors which an outside observer judges to be relevant and significant in explaining an event or state of affairs) should be distinguished from the environment as it appears to the actor in the situation. His image of reality we shall call his *psychological* environment": *Foundations of International Politics* (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand, 1962), 46–47. "How one draws the line between unit and milieu also has practical as well as purely analytic consequences, depending on whether the focus is on *psychological behavior* or on achievement or accomplishment as measured in terms of *capabilities*": *The Ecological Perspective on Human Affairs, with Special Reference to International Politics* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965), 41 (italics in original).

For a trenchant examination of the international and national levels of analysis and their methodological implications, see J. David Singer, "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations," *World Politics*, 14 (October 1961), 77–92. A "three-level" analysis is presented by Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State, and War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), and a "six-level" set of variables is proposed by Robert C. North *et al.*, *Content Analysis: A Handbook with Applications for the Study of International Crisis* (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1963), 5–7; see also Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), chapter 3; George Liska, "Continuity and Change in International Systems," *World Politics*, 16 (October 1963), 118–136, esp. pp. 126*ff*.; Odd Ramsoy, *Social Groups as System and Subsystem* (New York: Free Press, 1963); Raymond Aron, *Introduction à la philosophie de l'histoire* (Paris: Gallimard, 1948), esp. pp. 227 *ff*. For admirable studies that combine both systemic and subsystemic perspectives, see Richard N. Rosecrance, *Action and Reaction in World Politics* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1963), and Adda B. Bozeman, *Politics and Culture in International History* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1960).

The "level-of-analysis" problem not only is an issue in international relations and the social sciences, but poses searching questions in physics, philosophy, and linguistics, to mention just a few fields of inquiry. Cf. Daniel Lerner (ed.), *Parts and Wholes* (New York: Free Press, 1963); see especially the Introduction and the contributions by Edward Purcell, Ernest Nagel, and Roman Jakobson.

[4] See Wolfram F. Hanrieder, "Actor Objectives and International Systems," *Journal of Politics*, 27 (February 1965), 109–132; Arnold Wolfers, "The Actors in International Politics," in Wolfers, *op. cit.*, 3–24.

In the first place, many of the national actors in the contemporary international system find it increasingly difficult, or meaningless, to distinguish between foreign policy and domestic policy. This holds true not only for the developing new nations but also for the industrialized nations of the Northern Hemisphere, whose reallocations of resources and values are strongly affected by international contingencies. The occupation regimes in Germany and Japan in the postwar period, United States involvement in South Vietnam, United Nations operations in the Congo, foreign aid grants with restrictions on utilization—these are just a few cases where the allocation of values in a national system has been strongly affected by the prevailing patterns of power and purpose in the international system. Not only are domestic allocations of values strongly affected by the international environment, but national decision-makers have become very conscious of the fact that many external events have a more or less direct impact on the allocation of values that traditionally has taken place largely within national institutional structures.[6]

Secondly, nowhere is this phenomenon more clearly visible and institutionalized than in the operations of regional international organizations that are endowed with some measure of supranational authority, however limited. How can one distinguish between domestic and foreign policy in an institution whose policies have consequences that cannot be assessed in terms of either purely external or purely internal ramifications?[7] In fact, the whole phenomenon of "regionalism"—whether institutionalized or not—suggests the value of applying an intermediate level of analysis to avoid the traditional analytical bifurcation of national and international systems.[8]

Third, the very nature of the nation-state has been subjected to far-reaching mutations. As John Herz has cogently argued, the previously existing "hard shell" of physical, legal, and psychological boundaries that national systems have maintained against the external environment is becoming increasingly "permeated," primarily because of developments in modern weapons technology and the application of economic and psychological warfare.[9]

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[5] For a full treatment of this issue and a critical review of the relevant literature, see James N. Rosenau, "Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," in R. Barry Farrell (ed.), *Approaches to Comparative and International Politics* (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1966), 27–92.

[6] See Philip E. Mosely, "Research on Foreign Policy," Brookings Dedication Lectures, *Research for Public Policy* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1961), 43–72, esp. p. 50; Robert E. Good, "State-Building as a Determinant of Foreign Policy in the New States," in Laurence W. Martin (ed.), *Neutralism and Nonalignment* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), 3–12; Fred Riggs, "The Theory of Developing Politics," *World Politics*, 16 (October 1963), 147–171. Andrew Scott, *The Revolution in Statecraft* (New York: Random House, 1965).

[7] See Ernst B. Haas's *Beyond the Nation-State* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1964), his "Regionalism, Functionalism, and Universal International Organization," *World Politics*, 8 (January 1956), 238–263, and his *The Uniting of Europe* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1958). See also Leon Lindberg, *The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1963); Ernst B. Haas, *Consensus Formation in the Council of Europe* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1960); Amitai Etzioni, "The Dialectics of Supranational Unification," this REVIEW, 56 (December 1962), 927–935, and his "The Epigenesis of Political Communities at the International Level," *American Journal of Sociology*, 68 (January 1963), 407–421; Karl Deutsch *et al.*, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1957); Wolfram F. Hanrieder, "International Organizations and International Systems," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 10 (September 1966), 297–313.

[8] Leonard Binder, "The Middle East as a Subordinate International System," *World Politics*, 10 (April 1958), 408–429; Michael Brecher, "International Relations and Asian Studies: The Subordinate State System of Southern Asia," *World Politics*, 15 (January 1963), 213–235; George Modelski, "International Relations and Area Studies: The Case of South-East Asia," *International Relations*, 2 (April 1961), 143–155, and his *The Communist International System* (Princeton, N.J.: Center of International Studies, Research Monograph No. 9, 1960); Thomas Hodgkin, "The New West African State System," *University of Toronto Quarterly*, 31 (October 1961), 74–82; Richard L. Walker, *The Multi-State System of Ancient China* (Hamden, Conn.: Shoe String Press, 1953).

All these examples—and they are by no means exhaustive—go beyond the mere fact that there is an increasing "interdependence" among national actors in the system; rather, they are examples of a process in which the traditional boundaries separating the nation-state from the environing international system are becoming increasingly obscured.[10]

II. EFFORTS AT LINKAGE

It is not surprising, therefore, that the conceptual relationship between the external and internal dimensions of foreign policy, or between "international politics and foreign policy,"[11] has received increasing attention. This reflects not so much an academic fashion of the day as the saliency of the problem in an historical period when the nature of international politics and the nation-state is apparently undergoing an important transformation.

It is questionable, however, whether the abundance of literature on this matter has contributed appropriate analytical frameworks to accommodate the concrete historical phenomena of the interpenetration of international and domestic systems.[12] I do not intend to review such proposals here in any detail. Nonetheless, it may be useful to indicate briefly two major problems that diminish the value of most attempts in this direction.

(1) A major disadvantage of these efforts is their highly idiosyncratic nature. Although many are imaginative examples of conceptual creativity, they are so individualistic that it is unlikely that other analysts will feel compelled to apply them. If past performance is a valid indicator, most analysts prefer to strike out on their own in constructing conceptual frameworks.[13] Furthermore, only rarely is the

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[9] John H. Herz, *International Politics in the Atomic Age* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), esp. ch. 6. See also Edward Hallett Carr, *Nationalism and After* (London, New York: Macmillan, 1945); Kenneth Boulding, *Conflict and Defense* (New York: Harper, 1962).

[10] See Rosenau, *op. cit.*, pp. 63–65; Wolfram F. Hanrieder, "The International System: Bipolar or Multibloc?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 9 (September 1965), 299–308.

[11] James N. Rosenau (ed.), *International Politics and Foreign Policy* (New York: Free Press, 1961); see especially the Introduction and Part I.

[12] In addition to the studies already mentioned, see the following: Fred W. Riggs, "International Relations as a Prismatic System," *World Politics*, 14 (October 1961), 144–181; Chadwick F. Alger, "Comparison of Intranational and International Politics," this REVIEW, 57 (June 1963), 406–418; Roger D. Masters, "World Politics as a Primitive Political System," *World Politics*, 16 (July 1964), 595–619; Bruce M. Russett, "Toward a Model of Competitive International Politics," *Journal of Politics*, 25 (May 1963), 226–247; Rudolph J. Rummel, "Dimensions of Conflict Behavior Within and Between Nations," *General Systems*, 8 (1963), 1–50; Michael Haas, *Some Societal Correlates of International Political Behavior* (Ph.D. Dissertation, Stanford University, 1964); Raymond Tanter, "Dimensions of Conflict Behavior Within and Between Nations, 1958–1960," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 10 (March 1966), 41–64; William H. Riker, *The Theory of Political Coalitions* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1962). esp. ch. 9; James N. Rosenau (ed.), *International Aspects of Civil Strife* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1964); Harry Eckstein (ed.), *Internal War* (New York: Free Press, 1964); Bruce M. Russett, *Trends in World Politics* (New York: Macmillan, 1965), esp. ch. 4; Otto Klineberg, "Intergroup Relations and International Relations," in Muzafer Sherif (ed.), *Intergroup Relations and Leadership: Approaches and Research in Industrial, Ethnic, Cultural, and Political Areas* (New York: John Wiley, 1962), 174–176; Raymond W. Mack and Richard C. Snyder, "The Analysis of Social Conflict—Toward, an Overview and Synthesis," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 1 (September 1957), 212–248; J. David Singer in his concluding remarks in Singer (ed.), *Human Behavior and International Politics* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), 453–457. Paul Y. Hammond, "The Political Order and the Burden of External Relations," *World Politics*, 19 (April 1967), 443–464; Kenneth N. Waltz, *Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics: The American and British Experience* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967); James N. Rosenau (ed.), *Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy* (New York: Free Press, 1967).

The timeliness of the question is also reflected in the international relations program of the 1966 APSA Convention which was devoted exclusively to the issue of national-international linkages (see below, notes 13, 17, and 21).

[13] This appears to be a problem even when there is prior agreement on a highly structured, collaborative research agenda. The papers prepared for the international relations program of the 1966 APSA Convention were to follow, as much as possible, the agenda spelled out in James N. Rosenau's lead-off paper. Regardless of the intrinsic merit of the other contributions, it seems to me that only three of the eleven papers (Bernard C. Cohen, "National-International

theorist prepared to follow through with a laborious case study that tests the utility of his conceptual framework. Most proposals conclude with cordial invitations or urgent exhortations to other analysts to substantiate empirically the promise of the new analytical vista that has been opened up to the discipline. Hence, the opportunity to exploit comparative case studies for building a theory of conceptual linkages is largely foreclosed. Although some political scientists have expressed their satisfaction that analysts of international politics are increasingly building on the work of others,[14] this optimism seems to me premature. To be sure, approaches based on systems analysis, structural-functional analysis, or decision-making frameworks have advanced to a stage where a "revisionist" conceptual venture is generally linked to already existing, similar proposals. But this is a far cry from a consciously coordinated research strategy that would provide extensive comparative studies of linkage systems. On the contrary, grafting a growing number of conceptually refined models on pioneering theoretical works lends an embarrassing aura of narcissistic scholasticism to such endeavors: rarely are they followed up with the empirical evidence that fulfills the promise implied in the "improved" analytical proposals.

This may be deplorable, but it is certainly understandable. Most analysts balk at taking over someone else's conceptual framework or serving as "researcher" for a theorist. This reluctance is strengthened by the fact that an empirically oriented analyst of international politics and foreign policy—presumably the ideal researcher for individual and comparative case studies—frequently views elaborate analytical schemes with a good deal of skepticism, if not distaste. These tensions of purpose and interest are further aggravated by the apparent lack of communication between specialists in international politics and specialists in comparative government. This lack is especially impoverishing because the enterprise of correlating external and internal dimensions of foreign policy necessarily calls for such a dialogue.

(2) A second range of problems that plague efforts to link international systems with national systems is of a more substantive nature. Although undoubtedly there are advantages in considering external and internal dimensions of foreign policy in conjunction as a "linkage system," there is also a good deal to be said for separating them analytically. Separation not only sharpens a subsequent correlation of external and internal dimensions, but also acknowledges that both dimensions reach into significantly different analytical environments—namely, the external-international-operational and the internal-domestic-motivational.

This poses a problem. There is a good deal of merit in the argument that propositions derived from these two different analytical environments, or levels of analysis, cannot be readily correlated because they are culled from different sets of empirical data and methodological assumptions. This is the old problem of adding pears and apples. Propositions that can be established either for the international-systemic level of analysis or for the domestic-subsystemic-national level of analysis are frequently regarded as non-cumulative because they emerge from significantly different analytical contexts.[15] Consequently, if concepts of linkage are to be established between these two levels, they must be sufficiently isomorphic to assuage critics who contend—for sound reasons—that adding pears and apples makes good fruit salad but bad theory.[16] To put it another way, one can perhaps with analytical impunity *contrast* and *juxtapose* a great number of propositions that derive from the two levels of analysis. It is a different matter, however, to establish *cumulative* propositions for integrating the two levels of analysis, because such

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Linkages: Superpolities"; Robert T. Holt and John E. Turner, "National-International Linkages—Geographic Conditions: Insular Polities;" and Ole R. Holsti and John D. Sullivan, "Non-Conforming Bloc Polities: France and the People's Republic of China") followed Rosenau's ingenious framework, even though a conference had preceded the writing of the papers.

[14] Cf. James N. Rosenau, "The Functioning of International Systems," *Background*, 7 (November 1963), 111; and Sidney Verba, "Simulation, Reality, and Theory in International Relations," *World Politics*, 16 (April 1964), 490.

[15] Singer, for example, argues that such propositions, "representing different levels of analysis and couched in different frames of references . . . would defy theoretical integration; one may well be a corollary of the other, but they are not immediately combinable. A prior translation from one level to another must take place": "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations," p. 91.

[16] Haas, *Beyond the Nation-State*, p. 74. For a symbolic-logical précis of isomorphism, see Rudolf Carnap, *Introduction to Symbolic Logic and Its Applications* (New York: Dover, 1958), p. 75.

propositions must meet the test of isomorphism and hence are much more difficult to formulate.

With few exceptions, analytical attempts to link international and domestic systems have circumvented the issue of isomorphism and hence are deficient in fundamental respects. To cite just a few examples: the proposals advanced by Riggs, Masters, Alger, and Russett all recognize the relevance of isomorphic attributes in linkage systems. However, these analysts have reduced the requisite of isomorphism to essentially one feature by suggesting, in effect, that the isomorphic quality connecting international and domestic systems consists in the fact that both are *political* systems, and that the differences between international and domestic political processes are not as pronounced as we have been led to believe. Consequently, so this argument goes, analytical precepts that apply to domestic political processes—especially in "primitive" societies that apparently resemble the disorganized "state of nature" in international politics—can also be applied to processes of the international system. The resulting analytical frameworks sidestep the issue of isomorphism—and that of linkage—by simply positing parallelisms between the processes of international and domestic politics.[17]

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[17] Some typical passages indicative of this line of argument are the following: Riggs advocates a "prismatic" model of a political system which occupies a conceptual middle position between a "fused" model (traditional agricultural and folk societies) and a "refracted" model (modern industrial societies), and whose "configurations would have points of correspondence in contemporary world affairs . . . " (*op. cit.*, p. 181). The "wide range of intermediate positions having these [prismatic] characteristics . . . " rests on the possibility that "if there is any similarity between the basic political structure of government in a new state and in our international system, then perhaps models developed for one might shed light on the other. An analysis of the contemporary interstate system might help us understand the underdeveloped country, and models for politics in these countries may illuminate aspects of international relations" (*ibid.*, 147–148). Alger (*op. cit.*), although critical of the Riggs model in some respects, accepts its basic assumption of isomorphism as valid and proceeds to apply to the international system the structural-functional categories formulated for developing societies by Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman in *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1960). A similar argument is made by Masters, who views "world politics as a primitive political system." He suggests that "Four elements common to politics within a number of primitive societies and international relations deserve mention: first, the absence of a formal government with power to judge and punish violations of law; second, the use of violence and 'self-help' by the members of the system to achieve their objectives and enforce obligations; third, the derivation of law and moral obligations either from custom or from explicit, particular bargaining relationships (i.e., the absence of a formal legislative body operating on the basis of—and making—general rules); and fourth, a predominant organizational principle which establishes political units serving many functions in the overall social system" (*op. cit.*, p. 597). Masters contends, however, that although "there is a striking similarity between some primitive political systems and the modern international system . . . one cannot employ the polar opposites of 'primitive' and 'modern' or 'functionally diffuse' and 'functionally specific' as the basis of a comparative analysis of primitive political systems. Because primitive political systems vary enormously, one must explicitly distinguish the particular *kind* of primitive society which is supposed to present the greatest similarity to world politics" (*ibid.*, 599). Russett goes even further in postulating structural isomorphisms between international and domestic politics, arguing that "The world could be thought of as a political system in which the major blocs are analogous to two parties that compete for the favor of the uncommitted voters. Each 'party,' including a leader and loyal party members of 'partisans,' tries to convince 'voters' that it is best able to fulfill their needs and respect their ethical prescriptions. At this stage of the analysis we shall consider a voter, whether neutral or partisan, as equivalent to the government of a particular nation" (*Trends in World Politcs*, p. 57).

The imaginative framework presented by James N. Rosenau in the paper "Toward the Study of National-International Linkages" also does not fully face up to the fundamental question of "cumulativeness" raised by Singer ("The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations"). Rosenau wants "to identify and analyze those recurrent sequences of behavior that originate on one side of the boundary between the two types of systems and that become linked to phenomena on the other side in the process of unfolding. Since the boundaries can be crossed by processes of perception and emulation as well as by direct interaction, allowance must be made for both continuous and intermittent sequences. Hence we will use a *linkage* as our basic unit of analysis, defining it as any recurrent sequence of

Consequently, while these analytical schemes implicitly portend to lead to conceptual linkages, they fall short on two important grounds. First, they practically ignore the injunction that concepts from different analytical environments can be used interchangeably only with grave methodological consequences. In that respect, these proposals are too radical in dismissing voices of caution that point out the dangers of interchanging concepts from one level of analysis with those of another. Secondly, they are too conservative in implying that structuring international and national politics with parallel analytic concepts "naturally" links these two levels of analysis. Ironically, the very assumption of parallelism tends to perpetuate the traditional notion that international and domestic systems are conceptual entities with ineradicably *distinct* boundaries, even though the nature of their political processes may be regarded as not fundamentally *different*. To tackle the problem of isomorphism by simply positing parallelism between international and domestic systems obscures and circumvents the issue of how to provide analytical frameworks for processes of interpenetration.

III. COMPATIBILITY AND CONSENSUS

There are, I believe, two concepts that permit the correlation of important external and internal dimensions of foreign policy aims, and that allow the analyst to view foreign policy as a continuous process bridging the analytical barriers between the international and the domestic political system. The first is the concept of *compatibility*, which is intended to assess the degrees of feasibility of various foreign policy goals, given the strictures and opportunities of the *international* system; the second is the concept of *consensus*, which assesses the measure of agreement on the ends and means of foreign policy on the *domestic* political scene.

By compatibility between the conditions of the international system and foreign policy goals, I mean that a particular objective has a reasonable chance of realization if implemented by a policy that an outside observer would deem appropriate. The degree of complementarity *among* goals—an interesting target for speculation—can be established by aggregating their respective individual compatibilities vis-à-vis the international system. If one goal is judged to be compatible with the conditions prevailing in the international system, and if the pursuit of this goal is seen to have a negative effect on another goal's chances of attainment, these two goals can be regarded as incompatible. That is, the respective degrees of compatibility between individual goals and the international system serve as the basis for evaluating the degree of complementarity among goals. The conditions of the international system provide the backdrop for both relationships.

Clearly, the concept of consensus lacks this kind of "operational" background. No standard of feasibility on the domestic political scene corresponds precisely to that which the operational contingencies of the international system provide for the external dimensions of foreign policy goals. The motivational-psychological determinants of foreign policy projects may be checked by ethical restraints, inadequate perception of opportunities, realistic perception of external strictures, and so on, but the range of political goals that the members of a political system can advocate and agree on is at least hypothetically without limits. Still, the differences between the concepts of compatibility and consensus need not be exaggerated. Compatibility is a concept of feasibility by definition, and if consensus is defined as the existing measure of agreement on policy projects among the relevant elements of a national system's decision-making process, it necessarily imposes boundaries on the activities the political system can pursue without risking fragmentation. In that sense, consensus is in fact a standard of feasibility, especially in a democratic political system; it determines, in the long run, what foreign policy goals a government can pursue without losing popular support and office.

Two major claims can be made for the application of these concepts to establish linkage systems between external and internal dimensions of foreign policy projects or, in a larger sense, between international systems and domestic systems. Both claims are addressed to the two major problem areas indicated in section II as posing difficulties for the analytical formulation of linkage systems.

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behavior that originates in one system and is reacted to in another" (p. 12, italics in original). The concept of linkage, used as a basic unit of analysis and representing an interaction flow between the two systems, is by definition a "cumulative" concept that reaches into two different analytical environments. By focusing his basic unit of analysis on the *process* of interaction rather than on its source or target, Rosenau avoids parallelism; but the concept of linkage is intended to connect such an extensive and variegated array of phenomena (Rosenau mentions 3888 possible linkage combinations) that their cumulative quality is somewhat questionable.

(1) With respect to highly individualistic conceptual schemes that lack supportive case studies and fail to bridge the gap between international and comparative politics, the organization of data under the categories of compatibility and consensus seems to offer a fruitful compromise. Even the most diverse approaches to the study of external and internal dimensions of foreign policy—and the case studies that have already emerged from them—can be reformulated without too much difficulty in terms of compatibility patterns and consensus patterns. The idea of compatibility is inherent in the many approaches to the study of international politics that focus primarily on external determinants of foreign policy endeavors or, more broadly, on the systemic, global approach to international politics. The results of such diverse approaches as those of Morton Kaplan, Arthur Lee Burns, Hans Morgenthau, and George Liska—to mention just a few—can readily be reformulated in terms of compatibility, since all these analysts stress the systemic level of analysis, irrespective of the diverging paths of inquiry they follow within that category. At the same time, the concept of consensus has been so widely used in the field of comparative politics that it provides an invitingly open door for the specialist in international politics to exploit the work already done in comparative politics. To some extent, decision-making approaches to the study of foreign policy already draw on data closely akin to material covered by the specialist in comparative politics. In short, the concepts of compatibility and consensus can tap a large reservoir of existing studies whose findings can be couched, and economically reformulated, in terms of compatibility and consensus patterns.

(2) There remains the question of the intrinsic analytical utility of applying compatibility and consensus as concepts of linkage. In this respect, the major claim that can be made for the two concepts is that both are standards of feasibility and hence not totally non-isomorphic. As mentioned previously, the quality of isomorphism is important if analytical concepts are used to form linkage systems. The concepts of compatibility and consensus do share this isomorphic quality and hence are useful not only for contrasting external and internal patterns of foreign policy phenomena (although this is in itself desirable) but also for making integrative propositions about the linkage between international and domestic systems. To repeat: the concept of compatibility is a standard of feasibility by definition because it serves to assess the chances of success of foreign policy projects, given the strictures and opportunities of the operational environment of the international system; it falls squarely in a framework of analysis that stresses capability analysis and the importance of external stimuli for explaining the conduct of actors in the international system. The concept of consensus is subsystemically oriented and serves as an organizing principle for domestic political phenomena, but it may similarly be regarded as a standard of feasibility. Of course, the concept of consensus also includes a much larger (and different) dimension than that of feasibility. It reflects the aggregate of the *motivational* and *psychological* preferences prevailing in the body politic; its aspect of being a standard of feasibility is merely an operational consequence of psychological phenomena. This dual nature of the concept of consensus is precisely what makes it so useful, when coupled with the concept of compatibility, in a linkage system between domestic and international systems. Sterile parallelism is avoided because the notion of consensus is not only a standard of feasibility (like compatibility) but also an aggregate of motivational phenomena; hence, the coupling of the concepts of compatibility and consensus provides an analytical framework which specifically recognizes that two different analytical environments are involved. At the same time, an element of isomorphism is maintained, since consensus shares with compatibility the attribute of being a concept to assess feasibility.

We can now apply these two concepts within an analytical framework that is specifically designed for considering linkage relationships between international and national political systems.

IV. PROPOSAL FOR AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

In one of the most suggestive arguments for establishing linkages between international and domestic systems, James N. Rosenau has proposed "a new kind of political system, the *penetrated* system, . . . to comprehend the fusion of national and international systems in certain kinds of *issue-areas*."[18] Rosenau argues that national societies have become so penetrated by their external environment that they are no longer "the only source of legitimacy or even of the employment of coercive techniques." Consequently, "national political systems now permeate, as well as depend on, each other and . . . their functioning now embraces actors who are not formally members of the system." Such considerations

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[18] Rosenau, "Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," p. 53; see also his *Calculated Control as a Unifying Concept in the Study of International Politics and Foreign Policy* (Princeton, N.J.: Center of International Studies, Research Monograph No. 15, 1963).

> not only lead to the conclusion that cogent political analysis requires a readiness to treat the functioning of national systems as increasingly dependent on external events and trends, but they also suggest the need to identify a new type of political system that will account for phenomena which not even a less rigid use of the national-international distinction renders comprehensible. Such a system might be called the *penetrated political system* and its essential characteristics might be defined in the following way: a penetrated political system is one in which *nonmembers of a national society participate directly and authoritatively, through actions taken jointly with the society's members, in either the allocation of its values or the mobilization of support on behalf of its goals*. The political processes of a penetrated system are conceived to be structurally different from both those of an international political system and those of a national political system. In the former, nonmembers indirectly and nonauthoritatively influence the allocation of a society's values and the mobilization of support for its goals through autonomous rather than through joint action. In the latter, nonmembers of a society do not direct action toward it and thus do not contribute in any way to the allocation of its values or the attainment of its goals.[19]

In elaborating his proposals with examples, Rosenau suggests that although "no other type of penetrated system can be more all-encompassing than a postwar occupation, it does not necessarily follow that all military occupations constitute penetrated systems. France during the German occupation of 1941–1944, for example, would not be classified as a penetrated system since the French did not accept German participation in their affairs as legitimate and therefore resisted being mobilized in support of values that the Germans had allocated for them."[20] In other words, *consensus* on the reallocation of values caused by external events is a crucial element in defining a penetrated system.

My only reservation about Rosenau's conception of a penetrated system is that while he specifically recognizes that national systems are strongly affected by external "events and trends," his formal definition of a penetrated system focuses entirely on the direct and authoritative participation of non-members of a national system in its value allocation. This definition seems unnecessarily restrictive. Its stress on authoritative participation of nonmembers renders it strongly institutional, and it cannot accommodate the penetration of national systems by external events and trends that takes place without the direct and authoritative participation of nonmembers. For example, the "permeability" of the modern nation-state as a consequence of developments in weapons technology—a most important case of penetration by external events and trends—cannot be accommodated by Rosenau's definition, although the recognition of this type of penetration by national decision-makers could plausibly lead to a shift in the allocation of values.[21] In short, penetrative processes may take place without the direct, personal, or authoritative participation of nonmembers of the national system.

A broader and more useful definition of a penetrated system would seem to be the following: a political system is penetrated (1) *if its decision-making process regarding the allocation of values or the mobilization of support on behalf of its goals is strongly affected by external events*, and (2) *if it can command wide consensus among the relevant elements of the decision-making process in accommodating to these events*. This definition not only can cover a wider range of types of penetration but also makes possible the correlation of patterns of compatibility with patterns of consensus.

Two important and directly related analytical consequences follow from viewing international and domestic systems as interpenetrated. First, the distinction between foreign policy and domestic policy diminishes substantially. This is part of the definition of a penetrated system: as external events affect a wide range of value allocations, it follows that few allocations can remain isolated from external contingencies. This raises the question of how "foreign" policy goals are perceived and formulated by the decision-makers of a penetrated system. As a result of the traditionally sharp analytical distinction between international systems and domestic systems, the question whether policy is made in response to domestic impulses or to international restraints necessarily had to be answered in one of three ways: policy is made (1) primarily in response to domestic impulses; (2) primarily in response to international restraints; (3) in response to both. The third alternative seems to come closest to the line of analysis suggested by the political processes of a penetrated system. But to say "in response to both" does not really fuse the two systemic levels—it actually underlines their distinctiveness. I have argued in some detail elsewhere that it might be useful to categorize goals according to three frames of value reference that national actors (or, more precisely, their decision-makers) may respond to.[22] First, policy objectives may derive from *internal* referents. Such objectives do not directly depend for their formulation and realization on forces outside the state. The advocacy of a certain sociopolitical and economic order or devotion to high living standards, natural law, and peaceful change—these are some examples of goals with internal value referents. Goals are drawn from *external* referents when their realization depends on the behavior of other members of the international system. These goals cannot be formulated or achieved without making specific reference to, or demands on, other states. Territorial revisionism, a crusading foreign policy, colonial emancipation, the advocacy of regional economic integration or of a fundamental change in the world economic system—all such goals emerge from an externally focused value referent because their formulation and achievement require the specific identification of other nations as "targets." Finally, objectives may stem from *systemic* referents. These goals are highly instrumental because they are not based on tenaciously held value systems but are formulated in response to what national decision-makers perceive to be the existing patterns of power and purpose in the international system. Goals and policies derived from systemic referents often reflect survival values of the nation. They are flexible because they change with shifting perceptions of environmental threats; they are frequently implemented by defensive armaments programs, alliances, and so forth. Systemically focused goals are imposed by the contingencies of the international system and represent the nation's "acculturation" to its environment.

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[19] "Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," 63–65 (italics in original).

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 66.

[21] In his later paper ("Toward the Study of National-International Linkages") Rosenau views this type of permeability—which I regard as a form of penetration—as the *opposite* of a penetrative process: "A *penetrative process* occurs when members of one polity serve as participants in the political processes of another. That is, they share with those in the penetrated polity the authority to allocate its values . . . . A *reactive process* is the contrary of a penetrative one: it is brought into being by recurrent and similar boundary-crossing reactions rather than by the sharing of authority. . . . The actors who initiate the output do not participate in the allocative activities of those who experience the input, but the behavior of the latter is nevertheless a response to behavior undertaken by the former." (p. 12, italics in original).

In a penetrated political system these three types of goal referents overlap considerably. Goals with essentially internal value referents have to be translated into goals and policies that make demands on foreign decision-makers—that is, internal and external referents partially coincide. Furthermore, depending on concrete historical circumstances, goals and policies derived from systemic referents may closely resemble those derived from external referents. For example, in the postwar international system very few issues could escape the grip of the Cold War. Many nations perceived the system as polarized; their policies stemmed from systemic goal referents that inevitably reflected the Cold War tensions of the system. These policies, formulated against a polarized systemic backdrop, required specific reference to other states or alliance blocs, and their implementation depended on the behavior of specifically identified members of the system—that is, systemic referents were similar to external referents. Consequently many nations perceived a continuous linkage and extensive overlap among all three frames of value reference. This phenomenon may be regarded as typical of contemporary penetrated systems.

There is a second major analytical consequence that follows from viewing the international system and a domestic system as interpenetrated: the factor common to both the concept of compatibility and the concept of consensus—their status as standards of feasibility—begins to coalesce. The conceptual boundaries between the international system and a national system are initially maintained by the application of these two concepts to the external dimension and the internal dimension of policy goals. This allows the analyst to juxtapose the compatibility patterns and the consensus patterns of foreign policy goals, irrespective of the degree to which the national system is penetrated. However, as the allocation of values in the national system becomes strongly affected by external events and as the domestic consensus on the new allocation increases—that is, as the system becomes highly penetrated—analytical concepts (such as compatibility) that relate goals to external strictures necessarily begin to overlap with analytical concepts (such as consensus) that serve as

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[22] Hanrieder, "Actor Objectives and International Systems."

"domestic" standards of feasibility. In a highly penetrated system, the external operational environment extends into the internal domain, and the concepts employed for structuring the two environments begin to blend. In other words, it becomes possible to analyze systems of linkage between international systems and national systems by applying concepts that, although they orginate from distinct analytical environments, are sufficiently isomorphic to allow cumulative propositions. In fact, the very notion of a penetrated system is a cumulative proposition that covers both analytical environments: the degree of penetration is established by determining (1) the perceived impact of external events on value allocation, and (2) the extent of overlap between patterns of compatibility and patterns of consensus.

A most interesting variable in this system is the relationship represented by the concept of compatibility. Compatibility is a concept for judging the feasibility of demands made by the national system on the external, operational environment: it assesses the strictures and opportunities of that environment with respect to a range of goals. As the system becomes highly penetrated, and as the distinction between foreign policy and domestic policy diminishes, the concept of compatibility necessarily begins to apply to feasibility relationships in an operational environment that is simultaneously "external" and "internal." This provides an opportunity to bridge the gap between concepts pertaining to goals and the *international* system and those pertaining to goals and the *national* system.

To offer just one example: assume that the structural-functional conceptualization of national systems proposed by Almond and Coleman[23] adequately formulates the internal, operational contingencies that impinge on interest articulation, aggregation, and so forth. The concept of compatibility in a penetrated system can easily be extended to cover these categories by tracing feasibility relationships from a macro- to a micro-level. For instance, the East-West polarization of power and purpose in the 1950's provided a (highly conducive) macro-level operational background for the economic, political, and psychological aspirations of the newly emerging nations. In accepting foreign aid, under conditions explicitly or implicitly imposed by the donors, reallocations of the recipients' values were frequently required and affected such domestic operational contingencies as transport and communication networks, economic systems, the recruitment of political, military, and bureaucratic elites and, ultimately, considerations of consensus among the relevant elements of the recipients' decision-making process. In other words, external patterns of feasibility blended into internal, structural-functional patterns of feasibility. Hence, in a penetrated system, the concept of compatibility extends over a continuum of feasibility relationships, ranging from such macro-patterns as bipolarity in the international system to such micro-patterns as structural prerequisites in a national system. (It should be noted that this linkage along a continuum is not a parallel structuring of international and domestic political processes like the examples discussed in section II; the linkage system proposed here acknowledges that two distinct analytical environments are involved by stressing the areas of their overlap and penetration.)

Compatibility can also be linked with the motivational and cognitive dimensions of consensus. Consensus, in addition to being an operational standard of feasibility, reflects the converging and conflicting aspirations of relevant elements in the decision-making process: it rests on the motivations that shape interest articulation and interest aggregation. By coupling compatibility with this dual nature of consensus, a linkage is established between the operational dimensions of policy projects and their psychological-motivational sources.[24] Furthermore, when coupled with the three types of goal referents, such a linkage of operational with psychological-motivational dimensions of goals allows interesting combinations of variables. As mentioned before, in a penetrated system goals with essentially internal value referents have to be translated into goals and policies that make demands on foreign decision-makers; internal and external referents tend to coincide. Inevitably, this means that the internal value referents of some groups in a society have a better chance of realization than those of others. For example, Kurt Schumacher, the postwar leader of the German Social Democrats, was fully aware of this in saying that "The contest over foreign policy is at the same time the contest over internal policy and the social content of the political order. . . .Foreign policy sets the limits to the possibilities of our economic and social policy."[25] Similarly, Adenauer and his supporters expected that the results of their foreign policy would help create the prerequisites for the sociopolitical and cultural values they hoped to instill in the German body politic. In Adenauer's case, internal and external-systemic value referents overlapped extensively, because systemic circumstances allowed him to guide West German society in a direction he favored on intrinsic grounds. The Socialists, on the other hand, experienced considerable tension between external-systemic referents and their internal value referents until the party felt obliged to adjust its doctrinaire stand in the late 1950's.

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[23] Almond and Coleman (eds.), *op. cit.*

[24] It must be stressed again that the isomorphic attribute that allows this analytical coalescence is partial; it covers only the area of correspondence between compatibility and consensus in which both concepts are standards of feasibility or capability. Since the concept of consensus also includes psychological dimensions, the range of correspondence or overlap between compatibility and consensus is necessarily restricted. However, the concept of compatibility ultimately can also be tied to psychological-motivational sources. Compatibility assessments regarding goals and environment are based on the strictures and opportunities posed by the international system. These systemic contingencies are the product of the constellation of power and purpose in the international system—that is, they are the product not only of the physical capabilities of the major actors in the system but also of the purposeful behavior that motivates these actors. Hence, at both ends of a conceptual continuum—the microcosmic of a penetrated national system and the macrocosmic of the international system—capability aspects of compatibility blend into motivational aspects of consensus.

It would be premature at this point to speculate as to what cumulative propositions may result from applying compatibility and consensus patterns within the framework of a penetrated political system. The nature of such propositions depends on the concrete historical circumstances prevailing in international and national systems and on the results of comparative analyses of penetrated systems. The following lines of inquiry appear promising, however. By examining the value referents and goals of relevant elements of the decision-making process it is possible to measure consensus on internal, external, and systemic referents;[26] the chances of realizing these goals in the international system can be evaluated by applying the concept of compatibility. If there is wide consensus on value referents and on the goals and policies stemming from them, and if consensus patterns coincide with compatibility patterns, we have a highly penetrated political system. If there is wide consensus on goals and policies that are *not* compatible with systemic conditions, the national system makes ineffectual demands on foreign decision-makers and probably entertains a distorted perception of the international system. If consensus is lacking, the value referents and policy proposals of some elements of the decision-making process presumably have a better chance of realization than those of others; in that case, the national system is partially penetrated and it should be possible to determine what elements experience tensions among their value referents and between value referents and systemic conditions. Depending on concrete historical circumstances, this type of analysis may produce a large number of coinciding, overlapping, and conflicting consensus and compatibility configurations—while simultaneously establishing the extent of penetration.

By applying partially isomorphic concepts, all these analytical operations yield cumulative propositions that link external and internal dimensions of policy projects. If the policy projects of all members of the international system were analyzed in this fashion—in both bilateral and multilateral interactions—the resulting aggregate would automatically reflect the system's predominant patterns of power and purpose.

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[25] *Die Staatsgewalt geht von den Besatzungsmächten aus* (SPD pamphlet, n.d.), p. 3; see also George Stambuck, *American Military Forces Abroad: Their Impact on the Western State System* (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1963).

[26] Disagreement over internal referents would not necessarily entail contesting the desirability or legitimacy of existing national institutions—it may be limited to advocating different sociopolitical and economic values within an accepted institutional framework; agreement on external referents would mean consensus on demands made of specifically identified members of the international system; agreement on systemic referents would indicate a common perception of international contingencies.

For a discussion of the relationship between the international system's stability and the predominant value referents of its members, see Hanrieder, "Actor Objectives and International Systems," 124–132.

COMPATIBILITY, CONSENSUS, AND AN EMERGING POLITICAL SCIENCE OF ADAPTATION

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When the laws of social dynamics are codified, surely the First will be that people see what they want to see. Given its universality, the First Law is no less applicable to scholars than anyone else. As political scientists, seeing what we want to see in a colleague's work, we find it "insightful," "constructive," and "important"; alternatively, not seeing in it what we want to see or, even worse, seeing what we don't want to see, we find it "turgid," "misleading," and "trivial."

So it is with Hanrieder's formulation. Since it is only a bare outline and contains no data, no one is likely to regard his article as a definitive statement, but reactions to it are likely to be quite varied and conflicting. Some readers, especially those who worry about the prevalence of a malady they call "methodologism" in political science, will see in Hanrieder's effort to develop the concepts of compatibility and consensus yet another case of the quibbling over words that is the prime symptom of this affliction. After all, such critics will point out, compatibility and consensus are, respectively, only thirteen- and nine-letter words and to claim great explanatory power for them without elaboration is to substitute the form of language for the substance of thought. In a similar manner those long committed to a particular framework for examining foreign policy phenomena will preserve their commitment and wonder why Hanrieder makes so much fuss about the need for a new formulation when the available conceptual equipment seems capable of handling the convergence of national and international politics. After all, these analysts will conclude, Hanrieder himself says that researchers should be less inclined to create new schemes and more ready to build on existing ones; why, then, does he not follow his own advice?

On the other hand, analysts who are themselves perplexed by the convergence of national and international politics are likely to be more sympathetic to Hanrieder's effort, if not to its result. They may have doubts as to whether Hanrieder's unqualified claims for the concepts of compatibility and consensus are justified, but they will see his article as a serious attempt to confront a genuine and difficult problem. Some might also wish that he had been more explicit as to how and by whom "a standard of feasibility" is applied, but will nevertheless respond favorably to the effort to bridge the gap between action and outcome. Others might wonder what phenomena are encompassed by his concept of compatibility and what ones are excluded by his formulation of penetrative politics, but even so they will see virtue in the endeavor to link what is desired at home with what is possible abroad. Still others will regret the absence of operational definitions, but will stress that a subject must be comprehended before its terms can be operationalized and that therefore it is premature to expect Hanrieder to specify the empirical referents for his key concepts.

Two other responses to Hanrieder's article can be anticipated on the basis of the First Law. Faced with the probability of such conflicting reactions to the article, the Editor of this REVIEW will see in it what he wants to see, namely, a chance to carry forward the policy of stimulating progress in the discipline by fomenting controversy in the pages of its journal. Since the policy has yielded lively results in the recent past,[1] why not continue it? After all, the Editor will reason, Hanrieder finds fault with Rosenau's view of the state of progress in the field and with his concept of a penetrated political system, so perhaps a controversy over these and related matters can be engendered, thereby provoking thought and fostering clarification. To be sure, the letter to Rosenau will have to acknowledge that "this article is in no sense an attack upon your analysis of the general questions," but the letter can note that "it does refer to your work a good deal" and therefore "there might well be an exchange between Hanrieder and you comparable to the LaPalombara-Lipset and Walker-Dahl exchanges."

The last predictable reaction to Hanrieder's article demonstrates the pervasive power of the

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[1] Cf. Joseph LaPalombara, "Decline of Ideology: A Dissent and an Interpretation," and Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Further Comments on 'The End of Ideology,'" this REVIEW, LX (March, 1966), 5–18: and Jack L. Walker, "A Critique of the Elitist Theory of Democracy," and Robert A. Dahl, "Further Reflections on 'The Elitist Theory of Democracy,'" this REVIEW. LX (June, 1966), 285–305.

First Law. While there may also be a group of readers who will be unhappy that Hanrieder relied so heavily on Rosenau's formulations, Rosenau himself will feel so pleased that his work proved helpful to a colleague that if he is asked to respond to the article, he will be disinclined to engage in a detailed critique of its omissions and confusions. Instead he will prefer to note its weaknesses only briefly and to then call attention to the larger trend of which Hanrieder's article is only the latest instance.

I

I am not inclined to engage in a detailed critique of Hanrieder's assertions. There is much that is unsubstantiated and even more that is ambiguous. The presentation is so continuously abstract and so lacking in concrete specifications that it is extremely difficult to evaluate the utility of the concepts of compatibility and consensus. It is contended that great advantage would follow from the use of these two concepts, but there is no indication of why this is so. In effect, the reader is asked simply to assume that somehow these concepts will array data in a more meaningful fashion than ever before. This article of faith is made even more precarious by the absence of any clearcut indication of what is meant by compatibility and consensus. Compatibility is posited as a relationship between foreign policy goals and international conditions, but what the dynamics of this relationship are and when it prevails cannot be deduced from the presentation. How does one know whether a goal and a condition are compatible? No instances of compatibility or incompatibility are cited. Rather the whole matter is left to "an outside observer" who would determine—by criteria that are not specified—whether the implementation of a particular foreign policy goal is "appropriate" to the conditions operative in the international system. The meaning of consensus is even more obscure. It is defined simply "as the existing measure of agreement on policy projects among the relevant elements of a national system's decision-making process," but what is meant by agreement and how various degrees of agreement affect the conduct of foreign affairs is nowhere indicated. Is agreement among 10 percent of the relevant decision-makers sufficient? Is 51 percent? Or must the consensus approach 100 percent? Does a 51 percent consensus have different consequences than a 100 percent one? Not the slightest hint of an answer to such questions is offered. Instead it is merely asserted that "consensus is in fact a standard of feasibility" and that "it necessarily imposes boundaries on the activities the political system can pursue without risking fragmentation."

Even greater confusion is to be found in Hanrieder's reformulation of the concept of a penetrated system. Rather than delimiting such systems in some way, he posits them as existing whenever decision-making processes are "strongly affected by external events." What might this mean? If the world is shrinking and interdependence is mounting, does it not mean all national systems are of the penetrated type? In the absence of any delineation between "strong" and "weak" external events, has he not, in effect, extended the concept of penetration to cover all international phenomena, both political and nonpolitical? The answer must be in the affirmative. Hanrieder has substituted penetration for influence and equated politics with interaction. His formulation encompasses the entire range of international relations and therefore distinguishes none. Even the influences that stem from developments in weapons technology are treated as penetrative even though they are not in themselves political in character. Indeed, it can be fairly said that in his desire to make an analytic accommodation to a shrinking world, Hanrieder has thrown out the baby with the bathwater. No distinctions survive his analysis. The boundaries between political systems are obscured rather than clarified. The boundary between a single political system and its nonpolitical environment is erased. In the name of greater differentiation, everything gets bridged and blended to the point where differentiation no longer seems possible. Even the distinction between the observer and his subject matter is lost in a welter of linkages that sometimes seem to pertain to interconnections between concrete systems and at other times appear to involve ties between conceptual levels of analysis.

Yet, no less important than the defects of Hanrieder's article is the purpose to which it is addressed. For national and international politics *are* converging and Hanrieder's efforts can be seen as the latest in a series of attempts to make an analytic accommodation to this convergence.[2] Such attempts are necessary because both foreign policy phenomena and the many other types of links between national and international politics have been ignored by political theorists. For the good reason that something has to be held constant, the external world is treated as given in virtually every available model of national political systems. Politics are posited as existing in a troubled and threatening environment, but it is nevertheless assumed that foreign policy somehow copes with this environment, thus freeing the theorist to explain national systems in terms of their own internal dynamics. Where, then, does the analyst fascinated by foreign policy phenomena and by the problem of how national polities adjust to a shrinking world turn for theoretical guidance? To the recent spate of theories dealing with the development and decay of political systems? No. Even though the importance of certain external variables (such as foreign aid) is recognized in these models, their operation is also treated as a constant in order to facilitate analysis of the developmental process itself. To models of federalism and international organization? No. While such formulations do relate internal and external processes to each other, their scope is confined to the question of how and why coherence is or is not achieved in political communities and such a perspective offers little help to those interested in adaptive rather than integrative political behavior. To models of the foreign policy process? No. Most of these are explanations of particular polities trying to resolve a particular problem at a particular moment in time. To generalized models of system-subsystem interaction and system-environment relations? No. Empirical political theory contains no such models and the sociological theory that does deal with these matters is not readily translated into the context of national polities.

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[2] For other recent attempts not mentioned by Hanrieder, see Henry A. Kissinger, "Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy," *Daedalus*, Vol. 95 (Spring 1966), 503–29; Karl W. Deutsch, "External Influences on the Internal Behavior of States," in R. Barry Farrell (ed.), *Approaches to Comparative and International Politics* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966), 5–26; Rudolph J. Rummel, "Testing Some Possible Predictors of Conflict Behavior Within and Be-

Thus it is hardly surprising that recent years have witnessed a widening search for conceptual equipment with which to handle the convergence of national and international systems. Unable to build upon existing theory, but convinced that the separation of the two types of systems no longer serves useful analytic purposes, a number of analysts have felt compelled to reexamine old concepts, invent appropriate terminology, and construct new models. For some the notion of national-international "linkages" seems to offer hope as a solution of the problem. For others the concept of "system transformation" appears promising. For still others the idea of a "penetrated" political system that is distinguishable from both a national and an international system opens up the possibility of accommodating the changing structures of macropolitics. For a fourth group the tenets of "field" theory in physics and social psychology appear to offer a fruitful approach to the problem. For Hanrieder "compatibility" and "consensus" loom large as central organizing concepts.

Like any new endeavor, our search for analytic control over the convergence of national and international systems has unfolded in an uneven and somewhat chaotic fashion. Often our language is ungainly, our premises are contradictory, our concepts are ambiguous, our criteria of evidence are unspecified, and our claims of originality are excessive. Sometimes it may seem as if old concepts are rejected and new words created just for the sake of being different. On occasion much of the activity may appear to be little more than a contentious striving for intellectual identity or even a combative substitute for empirical inquiry.

To dwell on these aspects of the widening search for conceptual clarity, however, is to obscure its central thrust. This amounts, in my judgment, to no less than the emergence of a new field of inquiry in the discipline of political science. Assuming that a field is characterized by a subject matter not otherwise investigated and a body of theory not otherwise pursued, what seems to be emerging is what might be called—at the risk of further proliferating terminology and for a reason to be noted below—the field of adaptive politics. The distinctive subject matter of this field is the interaction between a political actor and its external environment. The distinctive theory of the field has yet to achieve coherence but the outlines of its central dimensions can already be discerned: they consist of propositions in which the functioning of the actor is linked either to its external behavior or to variations in its environment.

At the level of the national actor the political science of adaptation embraces foreign policy phenomena and also those in which the internal functioning of the polity is linked to its envi-

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tween Nations," *Peace Research Society Papers*, Vol. I (1964), pp. 78–111; the papers presented at the Conference on Comparative Foreign Policy, Committee on Comparative Politics, University of Michigan (Ann Arbor: mimeo., March 1967); and the proceedings summarized in my *Of Boundaries and Bridges: A Report on a Conference on the Interdependencies of National and International Political Systems* (Princeton: Center of International Studies, Research Monograph #27, 1967).

ronment through processes other than the purposeful governmental actions known as foreign policy. The subject matter of the foreign policy analyst is distinctive because his prime focus is the association between variations in the national actor and variations in its environment. Such associations do not fall within the purview of any other field of the discipline. They are not part of the study of national (or comparative) politics and they do not get explored in the field of international politics. Even when these two fields are stretched to their limits, associations between internal functioning and external developments remain unexplored. The student of national politics concentrates on the association of variables within the national system and has no theoretical justification for sustaining an interest in foreign policy once the processes it initiates extend into the external environment. Likewise, the student of international politics concentrates on the association of variables within the international system and nothing in the theoretical foundations of his field leads him to probe either the domestic repercussions of external behavior or the impact of external variables upon the domestic processes of a polity that do not lead it to undertake new actions abroad. Only the student of foreign policy—or, using the terminology of the emerging field, the student of national adaptation—is concerned with the systematic analysis and theoretical implications of such actions as these.

An analogy to the discipline of social psychology helps to clarify the distinctive qualities of adaptive politics as an emerging field of political science. Social psychology evolved as a separate analytic focus because neither psychology nor sociology dealt with the interaction between the functioning of the individual and the social influences to which he is exposed. Sociology deals with groups or whole classes of individuals, whereas psychology deals with the single individual and his internal functioning. "In neither field does protoplasm 'meet' society, for individual psychology has little or nothing to say about culture; and sociology and cultural anthropology have little or nothing to say about protoplasm as it functions in the human organism. It is social psychology which provides this meeting ground, by borrowing from both fields data upon which to build principles of its own."[3] Similarly, in neither national nor international politics does polity 'meet' environment, for the former has little or nothing to say about external conditions and the latter has little or nothing to say about domestic processes. It is adaptive politics at the national level which provides the meeting ground, by borrowing from both national and international politics data upon which to build principles of its own.

While psychologists focus on individuals, the actors that concern political scientists are much more various. The executive officer, the cabinet, the legislature, the party, the nation-state, and the international organization are but a few of the actors who serve as the focus of political analysis. It is for this reason that I prefer to treat Hanrieder's article as illustrative of an emerging political science of adaptation rather than as only indicative of a trend in the study of foreign policy phenomena. Compatibility and consensus are problems not only for polities in the international system. They confront every political actor—the local government in the national system, the party in the party system, the cabinet or the legislature in the policy-making system, and so on. All of these actors and the many others that could be listed must develop and maintain policies that both are compatible with the systems of which they are a part and fall within the consensual limits of the subsystems they serve. Foreign policy phenomena are thus merely instances of adaptive politics at the national level, and while I am not competent to assess trends in other areas of the discipline, it is my impression that the dilemmas of adaptation at other levels are increasingly occupying the attention of political scientists. A recent text on American federalism, for example, carries the subtitle "A View from the States" and begins with a section on "The States as Systems within a System."[4]

Let me call attention to the emergence of a political science of adaptation in another way. If all the problems that concern students of politics were classified in terms of either an integrative-disintegrative or an adaptive-maladaptive continuum, it is probably fair to say that the vast majority would be found arrayed along the former. Most theory and research on political units at any level is primarily concerned with the question of how the unit contributes to or detracts from the stability, change, and goal achievement (i.e., the integration or disintegration) of the larger political systems in which it is located. Do the enactments of a legislature reconcile conflicting interests? Do the programs of a political party deepen cleavages? Do the decisions of a chief executive facilitate the realization of community aspirations? Do the actions of a nation move the world toward war or peace? Such questions are typical of prevailing concerns and they rely on a political science of integration for solution. Yet, perhaps because this is an age in which the dignity and well-being of individuals command attention, the welfare of the political actor—that is, the price *it* pays for its integrative or disintegrative contribution to the larger system—would seem to be emerging as a focus of political inquiry. Will the enactments of a legislature be sufficiently responsive to public demands to avoid disrepute and the consequent loss of viability? Will a party's program attract sufficient new support to insure it a continued voice in the affairs of the community? Will the decisions of a chief executive be sufficient to result in re-election? Can a nation's foreign policy preserve both its independence and its way of life?

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[3] Theodore M. Newcomb, *Social Psychology* (New York: The Dryden Press, 1950), p. 27.

[4] Daniel J. Elazar, *American Federalism: A View from the States* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1966).

Such questions are being asked with greater frequency and they require a political science of adaptation for solution. Models and concepts must be used that allow the researcher to assess actor-environment interaction from the perspective of the consequences for the actor. Whatever the actor and whatever the level at which it is active, I would argue that such a perspective infuses the models and concepts employed with a common basis that amounts to a distinctive subject matter and a distinctive body of theory. To be sure, the adaptive problems of a political actor are integrative problems for the larger systems of which the actor is but one subsystem. However, this overlap between the two types of politics ought not be mistaken for similarity. The differences between adaptive and integrative politics are considerable and not only a matter of perspective. When the observer moves from the integrative perspective of a system to the adaptive perspective of one of its subsystems, he must employ vastly different analytic equipment even though he continues to focus on some of the same concrete phenomena. To investigate how an actor adapts to its environment is to ask different questions, use different concepts, assess different motives, trace different processes, outline different structures, and apply different criteria of effectiveness than is the case when the same actor is examined as a subsystem moving toward or away from integration with other subsystems in a larger system. Hence it seems reasonable and useful to flag the emergence of the field of adaptive politics, with foreign policy phenomena as one of its main components.

II

It is unfortunate but true that the theoretical challenges posed by political adaptation have not commanded the attention that is needed if the emerging field is to grow. At the national level, for example, many first-rate theorists tend to lose interest in foreign policy phenomena and turn to analyzing integrative problems. Dahl and Almond are two good illustrations: both of these distinguished theorists started their careers with important works on foreign policy phenomena[5] and subsequently trained their talents on phenomena that originate and unfold within national boundaries. Neither ever returned to the study of foreign policy, apparently finding the construction of theory about the integrative processes of units bounded by a common system of authority more challenging. Hence the drama of foreign policy undertakings, of national actors coping with their environments, needs to be emphasized if the field of adaptive politics is to recruit and keep theorists capable of exploiting the emerging concern about such matters.

It is not difficult to make a strong case for the theoretical challenges inherent in adaptive politics. Foreign policy phenomena provide a good example. Even though national systems may collapse for strictly internal reasons, they cannot persist without coping with their environments and this never-ending effort to maintain boundaries and achieve an accommodation with the environment commands attention and provokes inquiry. It is just as dramatic as a newborn child's effort to make the transition to an oxygen-filled world, an adolescent's search for identity in a world that seems to engulf independence and demand acquiescence, a marriage's endeavor to survive in a world of possessive relatives and tempting lovers, a business firm's struggle to keep up with technological change and a world of aggressive competitors, a minority group's fight to bring about a world of fair and equal treatment, a political party's striving to extend its popularity and create a world that it can govern. For none of these—or for any of the many other actors that could be listed—is accommodation with the environment easy or predetermined. At any moment the boundaries separating a system from its environment can give way and suffer drastic revision, if not elimination. At no point can an actor assume that a permanent accommodation has been attained. Adaptation is never complete, but must be continuously achieved. Thus foreign policy undertakings are inherently intriguing, both in the basic emotional sense that they are rooted in human efforts to survive and prosper and in the theoretical sense that it is no simple matter to fathom why and how national systems manage to remain differentiated from their environments.[6]

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[5] Gabriel A. Almond, *The American People and Foreign Policy* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1950), and Robert A. Dahl, *Congress and Foreign Policy* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1950).

It is from the perspective of the need for theory, then, that Hanrieder's article must be evaluated. If it cannot be said that his formulation presently contributes very much, neither can it be asserted that his concepts do not constitute the basis of a useful contribution. So little has been done on adaptive politics that it would be inappropriate to conclude that nothing can come of his formulation. Considerable elaboration and specification are needed, not only by Hanrieder, but by all those who are fascinated by the processes whereby political actors realize goals in their environment even as they remain differentiated from it.

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[6] For an elaboration of the theoretical challenges posed by foreign policy phenomena, see my "Comparative Foreign Policy: Fad, Fantasy, or Field?" a paper prepared for the Michigan Conference on Comparative Foreign Policy (*op. cit.*), 44–49.

(EDITOR'S NOTE: For further comments by Professor Hanrieder, see Communications to the Editor, pp. 1096–1098).

DIMENSIONS OF MODERNIZATION IN THE AMERICAN STATES*

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Among the crucial facts of our time are the profound differences in "modernization" or "development" that characterize contemporary nation-states. Despite a lack of complete agreement about the nature of these differences, it seems clear that variations in incomes, literacy levels, and rates of human reproduction are intimately involved. Development also affects so many other social characteristics that it has become a major preoccupation of social science in all of its branches.[1]

The purpose of this paper is to specify modernization levels of states in the American federal system, and to relate variations in development to other aspects of the state political systems. The quest is a natural one in view of the evident concern for development shown by political activists in the states, the emphasis placed upon it in many textbooks and monographs that deal with problems of state government, and the potential relevance for more general theories about all political systems. Problems of development are undoubtedly more pressing in poor nations, but it is not inappropriate to study modernization in an advanced setting. As Siegfried has noted, modernization tends to be an American phenomenon: it is the United States "which is presiding at a general reorganization of the ways of living throughout the entire world."[2]

Questions and answers about development have been formulated in a variety of ways, reflecting a variety of analytic concerns. Scholars concerned with poverty, for example, tend to ask (not unnaturally) "What produces economic growth?" The answers have frequently consisted essentially of single causes: e.g.,—technological innovation (Adam Smith), population growth (Smith and Ricardo), the Protestant ethic (Weber), the achieving motive (McClelland), empathy (Lerner). The question can, of course, be phrased more broadly: "What causes a civilization to flower?" This query elicits some of the same answers, but others in addition: climate (Huntington), leaders or luck (Muller), cultural diffusion via trade (Buchanan and Ellis), race (Wax), challenge of the environment (Toynbee).[3]

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* All views expressed in this paper are the sole responsibility of the author. However, I am greatly indebted to John Wahlke for encouraging my interest in comparative state analysis, to Richard Johnson and Abraham Barnett for insisting upon the usefulness of factor analysis for the problem at hand, and to Lloyd Lueptow, Richard Hofferbert, and William Buchanan for valuable critical comment on an earlier draft.

[1] In this analysis, the term "modernization" is used merely as a convenient equivalent of the term "development." I avoid the term "economic development" because it implies too much in the way of causation. As Robert Heilbroner puts it, "Economic development is not primarily an economic, but a political and social process." *The Great Ascent* (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), 24. The following items, selected from a voluminous literature, are especially suggestive for the concerns of this study: Seymour M. Lipset, "Economic Development and Democracy,"—Chapter 2 of *Political Man* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1963); Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1958); Robert E. Ward and Dankwart Rustow (eds.), *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964); W. W. Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth* (Cambridge, England, 1960); Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," this REVIEW, 55 (September, 1961), 493–514; David C. McClelland, *The Achieving Society* (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1961). Development has been a natural concern of recent attempts to apply survey research techniques to differences among nation states. See Lipset, *op. cit.*; Arthur S. Banks and Robert B. Textor, *A Cross-Polity Survey* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: M.I.T. Press, 1963); Bruce Russett *et al.*, *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964); Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Boston: Little Brown, 1965). Important works appearing since the basic structure of this paper was established include Lucian W. Pye, *Aspects of Political Development* (Boston: Little Brown, 1966); and Daniel Elazar, *American Federalism: a View from the States* (New York: Crowell, 1966).

[2] Cited in Lerner, *op. cit.*, p. 43. Perhaps the most influential framework for the study of modernizing political systems is contained in Gabriel Almond and James Coleman, *The Politics of Developing Areas* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1960). For comparisons among American states, see Herbert Jacob and Kenneth N. Vines (eds.), *Politics in the American States* (Boston: Little Brown, 1965).

Perhaps the dominant characteristic of contemporary research on development is an emphasis on complex and speculative concepts based on a very large number of empirical referents. The underlying question has become "What is development?"; and "causes" and "effects" have tended to be subsumed within the phenomenon itself. Some current research is still oriented to economic aspects of development, but the primary emphasis has enlarged to include political and social characteristics.[4] These broader concepts of modernization refer either implicitly or explicitly to so many different social characteristics and individual behaviors that it becomes difficult to specify what variables are *excluded* and on what basis. The findings of this study will hopefully be of interest to those who seek a middle ground between development as an all-inclusive social pattern, and development as a single low-level variable (like income or literacy or electric power production).

Modernization has been approached in a different fashion by students of American state government and politics. A good example is that of the best general comparative study to date in which authors have taken one or more single indicators of development (urbanism, income, labor force in manufacturing, education, mobility, etc.) and used these as *independent* variables in efforts to explain differences in such political or governmental characteristics of the states as voting turnout, degree of party competition, group membership and effectiveness, volume of legislation, partisan control of legislatures, education policies, welfare policies, strength of the governor, and highway expenditures.[5]

The potential utility of the findings presented below may be somewhat different for scholars interested in questions of this sort. My approach to development appears to have the advantage of working with a larger number of variables than are usually employed in this context, of assimilating political characteristics into the independent variable in appropriate ways, and of permitting more confident assignment of individual states to relative levels of development. Although the approach is heavily empirical, it may also have the advantage of encouraging more imaginative conceptualizations of development by researchers and political activists.

I. METHOD OF ANALYSIS

Examination of some leading works (referred to above) reveals that development involves most aspects of individual and social life. Since high income, high literacy (education) and low fertility are crucial variables that characterize the more modernized societies, I take these as basic indicators of development and relate them to other aspects of the process. Three areas of specifically political variation are also examined: participation, scope of government, and centralization.[6]

The underlying data consist of thirty-three quantitative characteristics of forty-eight American states in 1960. Although each characteristic is directly relevant to level of development, so many variables are potentially germane that the search for data depicting the process or tracing its consequences could proceed almost indefinitely.[7] As a result, there can be no claim that these indicators comprise a unique group resulting from the application of precise criteria. A number of considerations entered into the selection of particular variables:

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[3] McClelland, *op. cit.*, 1–9; Lerner, *op. cit.*, 49.

[4] Pye, *op. cit.*; Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, *Political Culture and Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1965).

[5] Jacob and Vines, *op. cit.*, 52, 69, 114, 152, 155, 199, 230, 400, 441.

[6] ". . . Differences in the level of human reproductivity more sharply differentiate more-developed from less-developed areas than any other criterion, including per capita income, urbanization, literacy, industrialization, etc.": Philip M. Hauser, "World Population Problems" (Headline Series No. 174, Foreign Policy Association, December, 1965), p. 10.

[7] A preliminary analysis suggested that most of these indicators are highly stable in the short run. Little would be gained by adding variables from other years unless a specific time dimension were incorporated in the research design. The nature of the indicators is for the most part obvious either from the title or the discussion below. Benchmark variable titles are shorthand for median family income, median school years completed by persons twenty-five years old and over, and children ever born per ten thousand women ever married. Variable 10, Commuting, is based on the percent of workers who neither worked at home nor walked to work. Ethnic Diversity, variable 18, was obtained by multiplying the percentage of foreign born combined with the percentage native of foreign or mixed parentage, total quantity by the percentage non-White. Voting, variable 19, is taken from data reported at p. 40 of Jacob and Vines, *op. cit.*, and consists of average turnout in gubernatorial and Senatorial elections in non-presidential years 1952–1960. Variables 20 through 23 merge general revenue or expenditure patterns of state and local units. Variable 21 is amount of general revenue from own sources per $1000 of personal income. Gov-

1. *Ready availability and at least an ordinal level of measurement.* The study exploits data on the states from census and other sources, and there was no attempt to generate new data except as an end product. The requirement of ordinal measurement (with no missing data and relatively few ties) was aimed at securing maximum differentiation among the states within a common frame of reference.

2. *Comparable time period.* Most variables characterize the states in 1960. A few others deviate by no more than five years. In some cases, indicators summarize the experience of other years because of assumed relevance for the systems in 1960.

3. *Preference for relative indicators.* In order to eliminate the effect of simple differences in population or area among the states, most indicators are expressed as percentages or rates. However, it was not deemed necessary to express variables 24 (Executive Salary Score) and 28 (Power of the Governor) in relative terms. Variable 21 (Tax Level per Income Unit) controls wealth, but not population or area. Variables 29 and 30 (Population and Area) were included for reasons cited below.

4. *Descriptive relevance for social development.* Studies of modernization indicate that higher levels of material well-being usually accompany higher education and literacy, less economic dependence on agriculture, greater urbanization, more sophisticated communications technology, greater participation of ordinary people in political life, broader dissemination of mass communications, greater geographic mobility, and a larger proportion of technical specialists in the labor force. Variables 4 through 19 are assumed to correspond directly to these aspects of development.

5. *Problematic relevance for social development.* Some of the literature suggests that transition from backward to modern brings with it both a greater penetration of government into the lives of ordinary men, and greater involvement of ordinary men in political life.[8] Although they are not entirely satisfactory, usable indicators of mass political participation are available for this study in the form of turnout percentages. Penetration of government into the society is more difficult to conceptualize, and harder to measure in a way that permits state-by-state comparison.

An interesting approach is the "scope of government" concept offered by Agger, Goldrich and Swanson.[9] If all activities of a community could be classified as either governmental or private, "scope of government" would express the ratio of the former to the latter. For these writers it is intriguing to view political history "as a series of large or small movements of government along a continuum of expansion and contraction."[10] Scope of government may be at the core of politics, as these authors assert, despite the fact that the mixed public and private character of community activities makes measurement difficult. Indicators of government taxing, spending, and employment were included on the presumption that they might be scope indicators, and therefore related to modernization.[11]

Another problematic area concerns the

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ernment Employment, variable 23, refers to the number of state and local government employees per 10,000 population. Executive Salary Score, variable 24, was based on combined salaries of Governor, Attorney General, Justice of State Supreme Court and Auditor. Variables 25, 26 and 27 refer to state government percent of state and local tax revenue, state government percent of state and local direct general expenditure, and percent of state and local employees employed by state government. Power of Governor, variable 28, is an index developed by Joseph A. Schlesinger which can be found at p. 229 of Jacob and Vines, *op. cit.*, based upon budget powers, appointive powers, tenure potential and veto powers. Variable 32, Party Competition, is depicted by deviations from fifty percent of grand averages of electoral victories by the Democratic party in the period 1946–1963, and represents a processing of data at p. 65 of Jacob and Vines, *op. cit.* Variable 33, Democratic Influence, depicts the same data in raw form and therefore amounts simply to the proportion of Democratic party victories in the period 1946–1963.

[8] Almond and Verba, *op. cit.*, p. 3; Pye, *op. cit.*, pp. 46–47.

[9] Robert Agger, Daniel Goldrich, and Bert Swanson, *The Rulers and Ruled* (New York: Wiley, 1964), pp. 6–14.

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 7. "Scope of Government" has interesting affinities with "Political Development"; see Pye, *op. cit.*, chapter 2.

[11] One difficulty is how to treat federal grants. Indicators 20 and 21 exclude federal grants, while 22 and 23 include them directly or indirectly. When these pairs of indicators are intercorrelated, the r's are all found to be +.49 or higher, and two of them are higher than +.80. The correlations may seem high in view of the absolute dollar magnitude of federal grants in recent years. How-

degree of centralism and integration in the political system. If development means a "participation explosion," there are implications in the direction of centralism as well as decentralization. Participation on the one hand implies sharing and diffusion of governmental activity. With urbanism comes the need for more government at the local level, and penetration implies the need for structural elaboration in parties, groups and media of communication. Yet for Ward and Rustow the implications are centralist. They argue that the modern polity, in addition to large volume, wide range and high efficiency of political and administrative decisions, also possesses a high degree of integration within its system of government.[12] In order to clarify certain aspects of this issue for the United States, I test the hypothesis that Strong Governor and high proportional state shares of state and local taxing, spending and employment are related to each other and to development level. Again, the appropriateness of the indicators is moot. Both Benson and Kaufman, for example, emphasize supervision of local units by state units as the essence of centralization. For them it is not a question of *where* activities are performed in the system.[13]

6. *Inclusion of reference indicators.* A few characteristics are frequently alluded to in discussions of state politics:—Population, Area, and Party Competition. At the same time, none of these variables is wholly irrelevant to patterns of development and measures of them therefore appear in the roster of indicators. Democratic Influence is less familiar than the other indicators and finds a place in this study because it seems a logically separable component of what is commonly regarded as party completion.[14]

II. OVERVIEW OF FINDINGS

A good deal of information about modernization in the American states could be obtained by examining the way in which each of the variables included for analysis is related to the others. A 33×33 matrix of Pearsonian correlation coefficients in fact comprises one step in the analysis undertaken. However the large number of cells, like the raw data entries from which they are derived, makes for unwieldy and difficult analysis. Therefore, only a few correlations are presented in the pages that follow. Where they appear, they are termed "original correlations."

A more efficient and rigorous technique than inspection of correlations is principal axis factor analysis.[15] Factor analysis is "flexible"

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ever, a large quantity of federal grants need not appreciably change the *orders* of the states in their levels of spending. The extent to which federal grants "equalize" can be easily exaggerated. A separate analysis suggested that federal grants operate to somewhat reduce the range of differences among states, but that they have little effect on the ordering of states within a given range.

[12] *Op. cit.*, pp. 6–7. See also the interesting finding of Russett *et al.* that the central government's role in the economy increases with development, but may diminish at very high levels. Their data show the United States to be much lower than most highly developed countries in the ratio of central government revenue to G.N.P., *op. cit.*, pp. 308–309.

[13] G. C. S. Benson, *The New Centralization* (New York; Farrar and Rinehart, 1941), p. 116; and Herbert Kaufman, *Politics and Policies in State and Local Governments* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963), p. 12. Kaufman's comment is relevant: "No one has yet devised a method of measuring organizational centralization, so it is mostly by means of intuitive application of rough clues that we form our impressions about this trait of organization."

[14] The essence of the distinction, as suggested above, is that Party Competition measures the extent to which the parties divide the electoral stakes equally, regardless of the direction in which the deviation from fifty percent occurs. A state in which Democrats won 48% of the victories is scored as being just as competitive as a state where Democrats won 52% of the victories. Democratic Influence uses the same data to simply indicate the ordering of the states on the percentage of electoral victories won by Democrats. I thus clarify, and present separately, the two elements contained in such classificatory designations as "One-Party Democratic," "Modified One-Party Republican," etc. Austin Ranney's scheme, presented at p. 65 of Jacob and Vines, *op. cit.*, sets cutting points at comparable intervals, but orders twenty five states in the "Two-Party" category on Democratic Influence only, and not (directly) on party competition.

[15] The author is grateful to James B. Wigle of the Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, for the use of his Factor Analysis Program for the IBM 7090, and to the Technical Services Branch of the Inter-university Consortium for Political Research for performing the computations. Neither Mr. Wigle nor the Consortium is in any way responsible for flaws in the method, approach, or conclusions of the study. Standard treatments of factor analysis are described in Benjamin Fruchter, *Introduction to*

in at least two important ways: the number of factors extracted, and the method of rotation. An orthogonal type of rotation, the sort used here, results in factors which are as nearly as possible distinct from each other. Orthogonal rotation also permits a calculation of the theoretical amount of correlation accounted for by the factors. The two most commonly used orthogonal techniques are Quartimax and Varimax. The former tends to relate each variable to as few factors as possible and tends toward a general factor solution. Varimax has the objective of defining each factor as nearly as possible in terms of the variables with which it is most strongly associated, and it tends to produce factors which are more nearly of equal strength in accounting for the total variance. It was selected for this study because of the correspondence between these characteristics and the presumed complexity and multiplicity of relationships in the domain to be analyzed. Varimax also has the advantage of tending to have an "Invariance" property. That is "... varimax factors obtained in a sample will have a greater likelihood of portraying the universe varimax factors."[16]

Examination of output showed that the first five roots accounted for 80.53 percent of trace. This was accepted as an arbitrary cut off point for extraction of factors, in conformity with conventional standards. To raise the cumulative percent to 90.00 it would have been necessary to extract four more factors with little gain in explanatory power.

Rotated factors appear in Table 1 together with the relationships, called "loadings," of each factor to each of the original indicators. Loadings, like correlation coefficients, vary between plus one and minus one. Sums of the squared loadings appear at the bottom of the columns as "Factor Contributions;" figures which indicate the relative importance of the factors in explaining relationships among original indicators. Sums of squared loadings also appear in the column labeled "Communalities." Here they indicate the proportion of the total variance of a given indicator that is accounted for by the factors in combination. The heaviest loading for each indicator is underlined in order to highlight the significance of particular indicators for given factors. Names chosen for the factors assign somewhat subjective meanings which are intended to correspond to the pattern of loadings.

Table 1 conveys considerable information in a condensed form. If one reads down a given column corresponding to a Factor identified in the caption he can identify the highest loadings and obtain a good profile of the Factor. Such profiles are in fact presented separately for the first two factors, since these have a large number of high loadings. It is also interesting to note which variables are *not* highly loaded on a given factor. For example, Newspaper Circulation is not very highly correlated with *Integrative Message Exchange*, and Automobiles are not as strongly related to *Migratory Pull* as one might expect.

In the analysis that follows, I discuss only the first four factors, although five were extracted for reasons stated above. The fifth factor has the least importance statistically. Although it is rather easily characterized, two of the three defining indicators (Area and Population Density) were included only for reference purposes. The crudity of these indicators is confirmed by the size of the corresponding communalities: although Area, Population Density and Non-Agricultural Land Use define the factor, a third or more of the variation of these indicators remains unexplained.

A major assumption of this paper is that factors can be classified as dimensions of development if they have high positive loadings for Education and Income, and high negative loadings for Fertility. The assumption can be applied to Table 1 by looking across the first three rows. In doing so, we discover that none of the factors fully meets the requirement as stated. However, it is quite clear that Factors I, II, and III have a strong tendency in this direction, while Factors IV and V do not. Accordingly, I have designated the first three factors as development factors, even though some of the loadings might well be higher. Factors IV and V clearly do not qualify, since these benchmark values are all low, and since some of the signs are in the wrong direction. The basic reason that a really good development factor fails to emerge derives from relatively low correlations among benchmark variables when states are used as units of analysis (actual values are presented in the matrix below).

It is important to understand that none of

Factor Analysis (New York: Van Nostrand, 1954); and Harry H. Harman, *Modern Factor Analysis* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960). For an interesting example of factor analysis which may be compared to that used in this study see Philip M. Gregg and Arthur S. Banks, "Dimensions of Political Systems: Factor Analysis of *A Cross-Polity Survey*," this REVIEW, 59 (September, 1965), 602–615.

[16] Harman, *op. cit.*, pp. 307–308. Data were also submitted to Oblimin rotation with results that await further analysis.

TABLE 1. LOADINGS OF THIRTY-THREE INDICATORS ON FIVE FACTORS: I (METRO-URBANISM), II (INTEGRATIVE MESSAGE EXCHANGE), III (MIGRATORY PULL), IV (SCOPE OF GOVERNMENT), V (AGRARIAN SOCIETY)

	I	II	III	IV	V	Communalities
Benchmark Indicators						
1. Education	.12	.68	.52	.33	.07	.86
2. Income	.49	*.71*	.38	.05	−.21	.93
3. Fertility	−.65	−.34	−.29	.26	.27	.75
Other Indicators of Modernization						
4. Urbanization	.76	.31	.39	−.09	−.22	.88
5. Out-of-State Births	.00	.18	.88	.29	.02	.89
6. In Migration	−.14	−.05	.91	.22	−.01	.90
7. Population Increase	.26	−.02	.88	.06	−.04	.85
8. Non-Agricultural Land Use	.05	−.03	.23	.00	−.76	.63
9. Good Housing	.51	.68	.45	.03	−.20	.96
10. Commuting	*.60*	−.10	.46	−.29	−.40	.83
11. White Collar	.57	.45	.48	.21	−.15	.82
12. Television Sets	.38	.77	−.06	−.24	−.25	.85
13. Telephones	.33	.90	−.01	.06	−.02	.92
14. Lawyers	.70	.27	−.00	.35	.00	.69
15. Physicians	.63	.45	−.02	.07	−.43	.79
16. Newspaper Circulation	.66	.44	−.11	.06	−.03	.64
17. Automobiles	−.33	.68	.50	.08	.32	.93
18. Ethnic Diversity	.77	.02	.23	−.04	−.16	.67
19. Voting	−.05	.90	.05	.15	−.13	.86
Scope-of-Government Indicators						
20. Tax Level per Capita	.30	.52	.35	.68	−.04	.95
21. Tax Level per Income Unit	−.31	−.14	.03	.82	.22	.83
22. Spending Level per Capita	.13	.46	.35	.76	−.05	.92
23. Government Employment	.06	.33	.37	.77	.10	.86
Centralization Indicators						
24. Executive Salary Score	.90	.03	−.04	.00	−.10	.81
25. State Tax Share	−.33	−.70	.17	.00	−.24	.68
26. State Spending Share	−.75	−.28	−.07	.05	−.32	.75
27. State Employment Share	−.73	.05	−.06	.10	−.48	.78
28. Power of Governor	.52	.32	.04	.08	−.10	.39
Reference Indicators						
29. Population	.87	−.06	−.17	−.04	.10	.80
30. Area	.11	−.10	.38	.33	.62	.66
31. Population Density	.43	.26	−.13	−.34	−.52	.65
32. Party Competition	.18	.81	.22	.10	−.16	.77
33. Democratic Influence	.01	−.88	.14	−.24	−.08	.86
Factor Contributions	8.0	7.8	4.7	3.3	2.5	

the factors presented in the table and discussed below are correlated with each other; the first three factors explain *different* components of the variance of benchmark indicators. Thus a 5×5 correlation matrix of factor scores yields values which are all at or near zero. This is a predetermined result deriving from the use of Varimax rotation—a method that builds each factor around variables having little relationship to variables associated with other factors. One of the results is that some relationships are emphasized at the expense of others. For example, the original correlation between variable 2, Income, and variable 9, Good Housing, is .94. Instead of a separate factor emerging from this, these variables are loaded at lower levels (but in a very similar pattern) on each of the five factors.

The rotated factor matrix does not directly reveal anything of the way in which benchmark indicators themselves are intercorrelated. The original correlations of these variables with each other are as follows:

	Education	*Income*	*Fertility*
Education	—	.72	−.33
Income	.72	—	−.68
Fertility	−.33	−.68	—

None of the three different values in this matrix are as high as might have been expected, and one is rather low. If these indicators were correlated at substantially higher levels, it seems unlikely that there would be as many as three separate dimensions of modernization emerging from Table 1, and there would be a better possibility of finding a more satisfactory development factor.

While the factors are empirically distinct from each other, the interrelationships remain complex. For example, Factor IV, *Scope of Government*, does not load on the benchmark indicators in such a way that permits us to characterize it as a development factor. However, this is not true of each of the major components of *Scope of Government*, as can be seen from the following original correlations:

Major Components of Factor IV	*Education*	*Income*	*Fertility*
Tax Level per Capita	.76	.72	−.34
Tax Level per Income Unit	.16	−.25	.61
Spending Level per Capita	.71	.60	−.19
Government Employment	.70	.40	−.08

In fact, only one of the components (Tax Level per Income Unit) is loaded inappropriately. However, this happens to be the variable with the heaviest loading for the Factor. It is quite possible that other factor analyses, using somewhat different variables, would turn up analogous factors having a clear positive relationship to development.

Despite such qualifications, the clear implication of Table 1 is that comparative state politics should deal with separate dimensions of development. Data of Tables 1 and 4 enable the researcher to do this for many problems where it is appropriate to deal with the states as the units of analysis. Needless to say, these measurements can and will be improved upon—especially as researchers learn how to deal more systematically with variations *within* the states.

It is not really possible to say which of the factors in Table 1 is "most important." *Metro-Urbanism* has the highest factor contribution, but this may result merely from the choice of indicators. Loadings on the benchmark indicators point to *Integrative Message Exchange* as being an extremely significant dimension of development. In fact, given the initial benchmark intercorrelations, the relevant loadings for Factor II appear to be at the maximum. The most interesting thing about Factor IV (*Scope of Government*) is its lack of relation to development. This is discussed more fully below.

III. NATURE OF FACTORS AND COMMUNALITIES

We label the first factor *Metro-Urbanism.* The highest loading is on Executive Salary Score, followed by Population, Ethnic Diversity and Urbanization. There is a moderately strong negative relationship to Fertility. The factor contains important traces of White Collar, Physicians, Lawyers, and Newspaper Circulation. State spending and employment shares are both negatively associated, presumably because of the prominent roles played by local governments in urbanized areas. Somewhat paradoxically, Power of Governor is positively related, although the loading is only .52. Indeed, the notion of centralization as representing a greater role for state as opposed to local units does not seem to fit the pattern of factor loadings. Highest centralization loadings show up on *Metro-Urbanism,* but in a sharply inconsistent manner. The term *Metro-Urbanism* is used here in preference to "urbanism" because the high scoring states in fact contain extensive urban complexes covering large areas, and involving very great numbers of people.

Factor II (*Integrative Message Exchange*) is less easily comprehended and characterized, but it is about equal in strength to *Metro-Urbanism.* Education and Income load more strongly here than on other factors, but the

TABLE 2. FACTOR I: METRO-URBANISM

Factor Loading	Variable
.90	Executive Salary Score
.87	Population
.77	Ethnic Diversity
.76	Urbanization
.70	Lawyers
.66	Newspaper Circulation
.63	Physicians
.60	Commuting
.57	White Collar
.52	Power of Governor
.51	Good Housing
−.65	Fertility
−.73	State Employment Share
−.75	State Spending Share

most distinctive relationships have to do with Telephones, Voting, Party Competition, and (negatively) Democratic Influence. One might easily suspect that inclusion of Southern states accounts for the very high negative relationship with Democratic Influence. However, an earlier analysis which excluded the South produced a factor with very similar loadings. The simple term "Affluence" was considered as a possible name for the factor, but was rejected because of high loadings on distinctive indicators. Telephones, Television Sets, Voting and Party Competition all connote high levels of communication flow, as do other indicators which are associated at more modest levels, such as Population Density, Automobiles, and Newspaper Circulation. Association of these tendencies with measurers of affluence and Republicanism carries the implication of consolidation and stability.[17]

Migratory Pull (Factor III) is third in order of statistical strength, and is rather straightforwardly related to Out-of-State Births, In-Migration and Population Increase.[18] There are also important traces of Education, Good Housing, Commuting, White Collar, and Automobiles. (Since high loadings are clustered together in Table 1, we omit a separate tabular presentation of this factor.) Some of the states which are high on *Migratory Pull* seem to be "modern" in a rather literal sense: populations, together with their living and working structures, exist in areas which were very sparsely settled until very recently. Interestingly enough, none of the political indicators included in this study load as high as .40. It might be suspected that the lack of relationship of the Factor to political variables might not be true of some of the components. The following array of original correlations helps to clarify this matter.

Selected Political Variables	*Out-of-State Births*	*In Migration*	*Population Increase*
Voting	.28	.06	.02
Party Competition	.37	.15	.21
Tax Level per Capita	.60	.39	.46
Tax Level per Income Unit	.20	.23	.03
State Tax Share	−.02	.15	.05
State Spending Share	−.10	.05	−.25
Power of Governor	.18	−.06	.06
Democratic Influence	−.12	.10	.09

Most of these values seem quite low. Possible exceptions are correlations with Tax Level per Capita. As noted above, some of the components of *Scope of Government* are related to the

TABLE 3. FACTOR II: INTEGRATIVE MESSAGE EXCHANGE

Factor Loading	Variable
.90	Telephones
.90	Voting
.81	Party Competition
.77	Television Sets
.71	Income
.68	Good Housing
.68	Education
.68	Automobiles
.52	Tax Level per Capita
−.70	State Tax Share
−.88	Democratic Influence

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[17] Systematic comparison of our findings with results of cross-nation studies is not attempted in this paper. However, the possibilities are tantalizing. For example, in the world contest too, message exchange may suggest consolidation rather than instability. Thus Russett *et al.* report significantly high negative correlations between Deaths from Domestic Group Violence and nine communications indicators: *op. cit.*, p. 272.

[18] In-Migration is the proportion living in a given state in 1960 which resided out of state in 1955. Population Increase compares 1950 with 1960.

benchmark indicators of development. Here we see that some of the same group of components are related to *Migratory Pull*, despite the zero correlation between the Factors. Otherwise, the picture conveyed by the Factor loadings does not appear to distort relationships in the matrix of original correlations. When the states are used as units of analysis, *Migratory Pull* seems less relevant to the political process than one might expect.

Scope of Government (Factor IV) is so named because the highest loadings seem to clearly confirm the speculative basis for inclusion of indicators twenty through twenty-three. Tax Level per Capita, Tax Level per Income Unit, Spending Level per Capita, and Government Employment all show high loadings on this Factor. Scope of Government thus appears to be a concept having definite operational utility in comparisons among the states. (As noted above, this is in marked contrast to the notion of centralization as I have attempted to measure it here.) The pattern of loadings is rather simple, and the reader is again referred back to Table 1 rather than to a special factor table. Unlike Factors I, II, and III, *Scope of Government* is not a dimension of development. However, the reader should recall the presentation of an earlier paragraph which shows some relationship among components. There is an impressive lack of relationship with any of the centralization indicators. Indeed, all of the trace loadings are weak: aside from the Scope of Government indicators, only Area, Population Density, Education and Lawyers load as high as .30, and none of these loadings exceeds .35. It would seem that in the American states modernization is not as conspicuously accompanied by penetration of government as it is by greater political participation. Further, political participation is associated with one specific aspect of modernization—*Integrative Message Exchange*.

Taken together, the factors cited in Table 1 account for a large share of the original variance. Many of the communalities are higher than .80, and seven are in excess of .90. Communalities are markedly low (less than .50) only with respect to Power of Governor. The loadings of this variable tend to confirm only in part Schlesinger's finding that Power of Governor is greater in highly urbanized states.[19] While association is stronger with *Metro-Urbanism* than with other factors, a large proportion of the variation remains unexplained. As noted above, indicators of "centralization" tend to be inconsistent in their loadings. A complementary point is that the strength of the associations, as measured by the communalities, tends to be somewhat weaker than average.

IV. RANKINGS OF STATES

Major factors which account for most of the relationships among indicators selected to measure development can be made the basis of a scheme of classification for the American states. This is provided in Table 4, which arrays factor scores from high to low on the first four dimensions of Table 1.[20] Because of the large number of tied scores a small number of groupings is desirable. Range quartile intervals are therefore indicated along with actual scores so that researchers may devise other groupings as appropriate.

The first three columns of Table 4 permit a multidimensional assessment of modernization levels of particular states. Cross reference between Tables 1 and 4 permits one to place any of the original indicators in a dynamic and suggestive context. Thus Population in Table 1 carries a strong connotation of *Metro-Urbanism*, while the column under this heading in Table 4 portrays the concrete nature of the differences. Although Population Density might intuitively appear more relevant to development, we see that it is far less meaningful for the major dimensions than Population. On the other hand, if one starts with specific states in Table 4, it is possible to discover many of the systematic differences and similarities. Thus Kansas and Nebraska have very similar positions on *Metro-Urbanism*, *Integrative Message Exchange*, and *Migratory Pull*. North and South Dakota are even more alike developmentally. While such cases confirm an assumption of likeness based upon geographic contiguity, the matter is somewhat different with respect to Southern states. North and South Carolina score similarly on the first three factors, as do Alabama and Georgia. But for the South as a whole, there is considerable spread except on *Integrative Message Exchange*.

Scope of Government presents a special case since it is substantially unrelated to Educa-

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[19] Jacob and Vines, *op. cit.*, p. 228.

[20] Factor scores for the Varimax factor structure were computed according to the method of complete estimation (regression) from a matrix of standard score coefficients. The program employed produces a mean of 50.0 and a standard deviation of 10.0 for each factor on each observation. Factor V scores are omitted from Table 4 for reasons stated above.

TABLE 4. RANGE QUARTILES* AND FACTOR SCORES

	Metro-Urbanism	Integrative Message Exchange	Migratory Pull	Scope of Government
1	N.Y. (87)	Conn. (63) Iowa (61) Kan. (60) Mass. (60) Neb. (60) N.H. (59) Utah (59) Wis. (59) Ind. (58) Minn. (58) N.J. (58) R.I. (58) S.D. (58) Id. (57) Ohio (57) N.D. (56) Ore. (56) Vt. (56) Colo. (56) Del. (56) Mich. (56) Mont. (56) Ill. (55) Pa. (55) Wyo. (55) Me. (54) Wash. (54)	Nev. (79) Ariz. (77) Fla. (73) N.M. (68)	N.Y. (76) Wyo. (73) La. (71) N.D. (66)
2	Cal. (70) Ill. (68) N.J. (65) Mass. (62) Tex. (62) Pa. (61)	Cal. (52) Md. (51) Mo. (51) Nev. (50) W.Va. (46) Okla. (46) N.Y. (46)	Del. (61) Cal. (61) Colo. (59) Wyo. (59) Wash. (57) Utah (57) Md. (56) Tex. (56) Id. (55) Ore. (55)	Colo. (63) Vt. (61) Ore. (61) Nev. (61) Cal. (60) Mont. (60) Wash. (59) Minn. (58) S.D. (58) Miss. (57) N.M. (56)
3	Ohio (60) Fla. (59) Md. (57) Mo. (57) Mich. (56) Colo. (54) Conn. (53) Ga. (52) La. (52) Wis. (52) Wash. (52) Minn. (51) Va. (51) Tenn. (50) Okla. (50) Nev. (49) Ind. (49) Kan. (48) Ariz. (48) Ala. (48)	Va. (43) Ariz. (43) Ky. (43) N.M. (42) Tenn. (39) Tex. (39) N.C. (37) Fla. (37) Ga. (34)	Va. (54) Conn. (52) N.J. (52) Mont. (51) Mich. (51) Kan. (51) N.H. (50) Ind. (49) Okla. (49) Ohio (48) R.I. (48) Ga. (48) S.C. (47) Mo. (46) Ill. (46) N.C. (46) Ala. (45) Tenn. (45) Neb. (45) La. (44) Ark. (43) Minn. (43) Wis. (43)	Okla. (53) Utah (52) Mass. (51) Id. (51) Iowa (50) Kan. (50) Ark. (50) Ariz. (48) Me. (47) Neb. (47) W.Va. (46) Wis. (46) Fla. (46) Ga. (46)
4	R.I. (47) Neb. (47) Ore. (47) Iowa (45) Miss. (45) Utah (44) N.M. (43) Mont. (43) Ky. (43) N.C. (43) Ark. (42) Del. (42) S.C. (42) Wyo. (42) W.Va. (41) N.H. (40) Me. (38) S.D. (37) N.D. (36) Id. (35) Vt. (35)	Ala. (33) Ark. (32) S.C. (32) La. (30) Miss. (24)	Me. (42) Ky. (42) Mass. (41) Pa. (41) W.Va. (40) Vt. (40) S.D. (40) Iowa (40) Miss. (39) N.D. (35) N.Y. (31)	Mich. (45) Del. (45) N.H. (43) S.C. (43) Tex. (43) Ill. (42) N.C. (42) Ala. (42) Md. (42) Tenn. (41) Conn. (41) Pa. (40) Ohio (40) Ind. (39) Mo. (39) Ky. (37) Va. (37) R.I. (37) N.J. (36)

* Range quartile assignments were made by attempting to break each range of scores into four equal segments. Where this was impossible (as in Factors I, III, and IV), a reduction of the range by one point at the top yielded equal segments with a tendency towards reduction of skew.

tion, Income and Fertility. In addition to locating and comparing states on this dimension, there is a pressing need to examine *why* some states have higher levels of government activity than others. Aside from differences in level of development, why do some state governmental systems tax, spend and employ more than others?

Perhaps the states attempt to provide a uniform level of services. Because of coexistence within the confines of the same larger system, pervasive competition, and overall similarities in the patterns of governmental services, it could be hypothesized that the states seek to offer the same level of services, and that, *other things being equal*, they succeed in doing so. If this notion is correct, differences among states of column four in Table 4, are explainable in terms of characteristics which raise or lower costs of providing services. Differences in *Scope of Government*, while real enough in a sense, may connote levels of *effort* rather than increased scope and intensity of service. The observed variations might not be the result of different ideologies about the proper role of government, or of the actions of leaders who have discovered and are implimenting ways of getting popular support. Instead, if the hypothesis is correct, these differences result from such characteristics as the following:

1. *Extreme differences in area and density.* Although loadings for Area and Population Density are low, they suggest that a small densely settled state like Rhode Island can maintain a given level of service with less effort than a large sparsely settled state like Montana.

2. *Climate and topography.* In the harsh winter climates of North Dakota, roads deteriorate relatively quickly, school buildings must be substantial, and inadequacies in shelter available to poor people make welfare a more pressing need. These considerations do not apply in the gentle climes of Maryland, Kentucky and New Jersey. Similarly, there is nothing comparable to the rugged terrain of Wyoming, Colorado and Nevada in Ohio, Indiana and Missouri, and road construction costs vary accordingly.

3. *Substitution effects.* States with a strong tradition of parochial schools (like the New England states appearing mostly in the third and fourth range quartiles) do not "need" to spend as much on public education. Toll roads in Indiana and Connecticut, and toll bridges and tunnels in Virginia shift highway costs, born directly by government in states like California, to users and bondholders.

4. *Spillover effects.* If an area like New York City, as a special case, happens to offer a higher actual level of services than is usually available, adjacent states (New Jersey and Connecticut) may not "need" to spend as much as they otherwise would.

5. *Generalized corruption and/or inefficiency.* A corrupt, inefficient state (Louisiana?) must spend more to maintain a given level of services than a clean, well administered state (Wisconsin?).

6. *Grant-in-aid incentives.* As noted above, addition of federal grants to amounts spent by state and local units, does not appreciably affect the order of differences on *Scope of Government.* However, the possibility remains that low income states (like Arkansas and Mississippi) may be induced to raise and spend more of their own funds than they otherwise would by the relatively favorable terms on which they presumably obtain federal grants. The converse may also be true. New Jersey, with the highest income level, may, because of the formulas for sharing, receive federal grants on much less advantageous terms.

7. *Specialized population characteristics.* States with large proportions of school age population (like Louisiana, Minnesota and New Mexico) may need to spend more per capita than Illinois, Missouri and Florida where a higher proportion of the population was over twenty one years old in 1960. The large influx of low income Puerto Ricans into New York increases the "need" for welfare outlays.

The above list is incomplete and emphatically speculative. Examples chosen all tend to prove the point at hand—even where contrary examples are available. Furthermore, the theoretical basis for the model needs a more thorough elaboration.[21] However, it seems to be both desirable and feasible to theorize broadly about why ordered differences in *Scope of Government* exist. In the final paragraphs of this paper I will actually suggest a possible basis for rejecting the equal-service-level hypothesis.

V. CONCLUSION

Factor analysis of thirty-three ordered differences among the American states yields a number of implications of significance for comparative state politics and comparative political systems generally:

1. Differences in development level among the states do not simply occur along one dimension. To be accurate, one must recognize at least three different contexts in which one state may appear more (or less) developed than another.

2. Political participation is, as anticipated, related to one of the modernization factors. As it turns out, this is the dimension (*Integrative Message Exchange*) which is most strongly correlated with high education, high income, and low fertility. It is also a dimension with which students of American government have little familiarity.

3. Four indicators of state and local taxing, spending, and employment load rather markedly on a Factor (*Scope of Government*) which

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[21] This is especially true of the notion of pervasive competition. One difficulty is that competition among states is usually assumed to center around tax rates. If this is true, and if the eventual result is more tax *rate* equality, the developmental differences among states should lead to service *inequalities* with the more affluent states possessing a higher level of services. It is a nice question whether inequalities in service levels would in turn set competitive forces in motion that would reduce the inequalities.

is difficult to regard as a dimension of development. However, three of these indicators by themselves do possess the appropriate relation to Education, Income and Fertility. Therefore, future analyses using different variables may turn up a factor somewhat analogous to *Scope of Government* which is distinctly related to development. The present factor is substantially unrelated to any of the other twenty-nine variables included in the study.

4. The hypothesis that development leads to greater governmental centralization is best described as unproven. In this case, however, loadings fail to vindicate the concept of centralization that was employed. Instead of a clear ordering of differences, loadings of appropriate indicators are inconsistent.

This study has an important limitation in that none of the data or findings deal with variations within individual states. It should also be emphasized that findings pertain exclusively to *orderings* among states; the magnitude of differences in particular cases may not be very large. Yet there do seem to be advantages to the approach offered above. Scores and loadings capture some of the extensiveness of development as a theoretical concept, derived as they are from a reasonably large number of variables. At the same time limits and exclusions are clearly specified. None of the factors is related to the others in the slightest degree, but jointly they account for as much of the variance of crucial variables as we are likely to be interested in.

Major dimensions cited above are built up from a large number of specific characteristics of the states, but one can of course go outside these characteristics and test these dimensions against other phenomena. A preliminary analysis suggests, for example, that state rank on average welfare payments per recipient tends to be much more consistently and positively associated with *Integrative Message Exchange* than with any of the other factors. This tends to confirm the importance of socio-economic variables for certain components of government expenditure. However, the finding conflicts with a previous conclusion that socio-economic variables make a greater difference than political variables.[22]

Crime statistics provide a very different area of potential relevance. Preliminary analysis suggests that murder (and non-negligent homicide) rates, as reported by the FBI, are inversely related to *Integrative Message Exchange*, just as one might expect. The impact of this factor seems especially pronounced among those states with relatively *high* murder rates. Among states with lower rates, *Migratory Pull* seems more important, and the relationship is *positive*. *Metro-Urbanism*, on the other hand, displays an interesting curvilinear pattern: state scores are *inversely* related to murder rate in the 24 states with highest murder rates, but *positively* associated in the other states. It would seem that there may be distinct analytic and diagnostic gains for the study of crime when development is viewed as a multidimensional phenomenon.[23]

As a final example, let us note some interesting relationships between the reported dimensions and the speculative types of political culture suggested by Daniel Elazar.[24] We might expect that states with "traditionalistic" political cultures (where closed hierarchies rule, and where family ties or social position are the essential qualification for office) would score low on *Migratory Pull*. This expectation is confirmed. However, the low ranking of these (Southern) states on *Integrative Message Exchange* is much more striking, and suggests lack of openness in these systems that is more salient than "the search for continuity."[25] The "individualistic" political cultures with their marketplace orientation to politics might be expected to score low on *Scope of Government*. This turns out to be correct: eight of the eleven pure "I Culture" states identified by Elazar rank in the fourth range quartile. Similarly, we might predict that the "moralistic" political cultures (characterized by an accepting attitude towards the value of public life and an emphasis on public interest) would score high on the same factor. This too tends to be the case. Five of the nine states with a pure "M culture" rank in the first and second range quartiles. Needless to say, if differences in *Scope of Government* can be consistently related to differences in state political cultures, then the equal-service hypothesis proposed in an earlier part of this paper must be rejected.

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[22] Data are not reported in this and the following illustrations which should be regarded as tentative findings only. See Dawson and Robinson's analysis in Jacob and Vines, *op. cit.*, Chapter 10; and Richard Hofferbert, "The Relation Between Public Policy and Some Structural and Environmental Variables in the American States," this REVIEW, 60 (March, 1966), 73–83.

[23] Cf. Richard Quinney, "Suicide, Homicide, and Economic Development," *Social Forces*, 43 (March, 1965), 401–406. On the basis of a unidimensional notion of development, this author simply asserts that highly developed countries have relatively low homicide rates, but relatively high suicide rates.

[24] *Op. cit.*, Chapter 4.

[25] *Op. cit.*, p. 109.

In pursuing the kinds of concerns which have been touched upon in this paper, it would appear that certain broad dimensions, representing ordered differences among systems may be of real utility in posing significant questions, as well as offering meaningful answers. Hopefully, the approach taken will help us in realizing more fully the remarkable potential for comparative analysis which is offered by the American states.

SOME CONDITIONS OF DEMOCRACY*

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It has been argued that political democracy in nation-states is dependent upon certain levels of social and economic development. Some authors (Lipset and Cutright) argue that a particular complex of social and economic requisites appears necessary for the institutionalization and maintenance of democracy. Others (Lerner and Pye) suggest that national political development of any form is predicated upon the development of a system of communications sufficiently sophisticated to overcome the parochialism of traditional society. Still others (Almond and Verba) find social factors such as education crucial for the development of those attitudes deemed adequate for active citizens of democratic polities.[1]

By definition, political democracy in nation-states requires some minimal level of citizen participation in decision making. Historically the most effective method of institutionalizing such participation is through some form of representative government. This mechanism permits groups of citizens with common preferences to support representatives who will, in turn, attempt to schedule those preferences for decision by the government. Groups of representatives will form coalitions in an attempt to insure that their common preferences will be enacted into public policy. Because preferences in society are likely to vary in direction and intensity, the successful implementation of political democracy imposes two requirements. One, communication of preferences among competing groups, must be widespread. If they are not, it will be difficult for groups with shared preferences to combine their resources such that "majority" preferences can be successfully implemented. Indeed at a more basic level, communication is necessary for the identification and articulation of common preferences. Second, groups within the citizenry holding competing preferences must be socialized into the procedural norms of the system. Most important is the acceptance of the norms of compliance so that groups which "lose" on any given issue (enactment of a preference set) do not withdraw from the decision system or opt to overthrow it. In short, two primary conditions for the maintenance of any system of political democracy are, (1) communication among members of the political system and, (2) socialization into the "rules of the game."

The arguments cited above assert that these conditions are most easily maintained when certain levels of "social and economic development" have been achieved. The reason is clear; in states that are at all large, the most effective method of statewide communication is mass communication, a product of societies with relatively advanced technologies. The existence of such communication systems greatly enhances the development of nationally held values, one of which might be agreement on the norms of governmental decision making.

The argument encapsulated above represents one major thrust of recent work on "political development." If one intends the argument as a partial explanation for the existence of democratic political organization in one set of countries which are relatively "advanced," as opposed to its absence in another set of countries typified by essentially agricultural economies and traditional cultures, it appears to be sufficiently persuasive not to warrant argument. As the argument is developed in the literature, however, it seems to imply more. Although its proponents are careful to specify that they are speaking of necessary conditions for the achievement of political development (not sufficient conditions), confusions have

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[1] S. M. Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy," this Review, 53 (March, 1959), 69–105. See also his *Political Man* (New York: Doubleday, 1960), Chapters 2 and 3. Philips Cutright, "National Political Development: Its Measurement and Social Correlates," in Nelson W. Polsby, Robert A. Dentler and Paul A. Smith, (eds.), *Politics and Social Life* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1963), 569–582. Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society* (New York: The Free Press, 1958). See also his "Communication Systems and Social Systems: A Statistical Exploration in History and Policy," *Behavioral Science*, 2 (1957), 266–275. Lucian Pye, *Aspects of Political Development* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., Inc., 1966). Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963).

arisen in the manner in which this particular developmental hypothesis has been presented. For example, Philips Cutright has posited a linear relationship between socio-economic development and political development. One implication of the linearity assumption is that, as countries become more "advanced" economically and socially, they tend also to become more "advanced" politically. An increment of one is associated with a commensurate increment of the other.[2]

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that to a significant degree this assumption is incorrect. The argument proceeds in two parts: (1) the findings which are utilized by Cutright to document his assertions are misleading. The index of national political development does not measure political development as defined by Cutright, but is rather a measure of democratic political development. (2) Democratic political development cannot be adequately measured by Cutright's index of national political development. When one utilizes a more appropriate index, he finds that above the "developmental threshold" there is no significant relationship between democratic political development and socio-ecomic development.

I. A RE-EXAMINATION OF NATIONAL POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

Because the studies by Lipset and Cutright state most clearly the relationship of social and economic requisities to democratic political development, a closer examination of them will facilitate the argument to follow.

Lipset's studies indicate that the existence of stable democratic political systems is positively associated with selected indicators of wealth, industrialization, education and urbanization.[3] His correlations suggest that on the basis of these indicators one can distinguish between these regimes and those which are either unstable democracies, popular dictatorships, or elite-based dictatorships. While Lipset's study was the first to give some empirical substance to this previously untested hypothesis, it suffered from methodological shortcomings. (See Cutright for an analysis of Lipset's data). Philips Cutright attempted to refine Lipset's methods while at the same time broadening the theoretical scope of his findings. Lipset had sought simply to demonstrate that certain gross differences existed between the social and economic composition of different forms of regimes. Cutright, on the other hand, has attempted to demonstrate that "political development" in and of itself is a function of the social and economic characteristics of society. Defining political development as "the degree of complexity and specialization of its (a country's) national political institutions," he attempted to test the hypothesis that "political institutions are interdependent with educational systems, economic institutions, communications systems, degree of urbanization and the distribution of the labor force."[4] To test his hypothesis, Cutright constructed an index of political development by assigning points to nations on the basis of their legislative and executive composition.[5]

The most interesting feature of Cutright's index is that, while it purports to measure "political development," it utilizes indicators which give the highest scores to nations which have established and maintained a set of explicitly democratic political institutions. This index does not measure "political development" in Cutright's definition of the term. It measures "degree of democraticness" by which is meant the extent to which nations institute and maintain overtime multiple party political systems and "open elections." The use of Cutright's index is directly equivalent to asserting that those nations which are characterized by the institutions of liberal democracy, are those which are most highly developed politically. Given another set of normative assumptions one might wish to agree that "most highly developed" means "most democratic," but one cannot, utilizing Cutright's definition of the term "political development," easily equate development with democracy. To cite the most obvious example, many modern states are characterized by political institutions of considerable complexity, but this fact is not related to the existence of a set of democratic political institutions. The Communist countries most clearly fit this category. Impressionistically, it *is* probably the case that the complexity of political institutions is related to the social and economic factors suggested above; this seems to be an inevitable consequence of conducting the affairs of government in large nation-states which maintain or attempt to maintain distributional patterns commensurate with a highly productive and diversified economy. To repeat the important point: Cutright's index does not measure this feature of political development. An appropriate measure of political development defined as institutional complexity should probably focus on the proliferation and specialization of governmental bureaucracies. One might, if one wished, then attempt to associate this measure of political development with the existence of certain types of legislatures and bureaucracies, but this in turn would require an independent theory of governmental organization as related to the phenomenon of organizational complexity.

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[2] Cutright, "National Political Development," see especially 577–578.

[3] Lipset, "Some Social Requisities of Democracy," *op. cit.*

[4] Cutright, "National Political Development," *op. cit.* p. 571.

[5] Nations receive two points for each year that a parliament exists in which the lower or only house contains representatives of two or more political parties and the minority party or parties have at least 30% of the vote. They receive one point if the multiple party rule is operative but the 30% rule violated and no points when neither of these conditions exist. Points are given to the executive branch on the following basis: one point for every year that the nation has a chief executive in office by virtue of a direct vote in an open election in which he faced political competition, or was chosen by a political party in a two- or more-party system as defined by the conditions necessary to gain two points on the legislative point assignment scheme. No points are given for years in which the nation was ruled by a chief executive selected in some manner other than the above. The study covers a 22 year period (1940–1961). It is thus possible for a nation to receive anywhere from 0 to 66 points.

Cutright has used a similar index as a "political representativeness" scale in an examination of the relationship of economic and political development to the growth of social security programs in a number of countries. Many of the criticisms of the index developed in this paper apply to its use as a political representativeness scale. In particular, it is interesting to note that, while in this later study the index is said to measure this political dimension, no attempt was made to build into the index any participation data. Cf. Philips Cutright, "Political Structure, Economic Development and National Security Programs," *American Journal of Sociology*, 70 (1965), 537–548.

On balance, then, one can derive from Cutright's analysis the hypothesis that the more socially and economically developed a nation is, the more democratic it is likely to be. There is no question that in gross terms this is correct. The most casual inspection of Cutright's socio-economic data indicates a clustering at one end of the scale of the "underdeveloped" countries (predominately nondemocratic) and at the other end of the scale of the "developed" nations (predominantly European or Anglo-American democracies). What Cutright's data do not make clear is the degree to which this relationship persists beyond the measuring capability of his index. The maximum amount of points that a nation can receive on Cutright's scale is 66, a total achieved by very many of the democratic countries in his sample. Not much can, therefore, be inferred concerning the effect, if any, that differential social and economic development has upon democratic development in these countries. To what extent do *these* countries develop more politically (i.e., democratically) as they attain higher levels of socio-economic development?

In order to suggest the effect which continued socio-economic development has upon democratic development, it is necessary to have an index which goes beyond Cutright's, one which is capable of measuring variation within the sub-sample of "most democratic" countries which are largely undifferentiated on Cutright's index.

We have devised an index of democratic development expressly for this purpose. This index, derived from definitional and empirical constructs of Dahl and Downs, concentrates mainly on electoral features of democratic regimes.[6] Explicitly, the index is composed of four indicators which measure the relative amount of *electoral equality* and *competition* present in a given political system. The rationale behind the index construction is rather simple. The most characteristic feature of democratic regimes is the election of key governmental personnel. As suggested in the introduction, this is the mechanism whereby citizens give some indication of which preferences they wish scheduled for governmental decision. The form of elections alone, however, does not guarantee their democratic substance. Democratic elections are those in which opposition groups are given some opportunity to contest office with ruling groups. Two key indicators of a country's tolerance of electoral opposition groups are the existence of actual electoral competition and the existence of multiple sources of public information. The indicators chosen for the index reflect these considerations. They are:

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[6] Down's conditions for a democratic political system are:

1. A single party (or coalition of parties) is chosen by popular election to run the governing apparatus.
2. Such elections are held within periodic intervals, the duration of which cannot be altered by the party in power acting alone.
3. All adults who are permanent residents of the society, are sane and abide by the laws of the land are eligible to vote in each such election.
4. Each voter may cast one and only one vote in each election.
5. Any party (or coalition) receiving the support of a majority of those voting is entitled to take over the powers of government until the next election.
6. The losing parties in an election never try by force or any illegal means to prevent the winning party (or parties) from taking office.
7. The party in power never attempts to restrict the political activities of any citizens or other parties as long as they make no attempt to overthrow the government by force.
8. There are two or more parties competing for control of the governing apparatus in every election.

(a) Percent of the adult population eligible to vote. This indicator is basic to the concept of "democraticness." The variation between nations on this measure indicates the percentage of the population which is excluded from the suffrage for whatever reasons (sex, race, residence, literacy, etc.). Those nations which score the highest are those which most closely approximate the norm of permitting all adults to participate in the choice of a preferred set of leaders.

(b) Equality of representation. The notion of one man, one vote is basic to modern concepts of democracy. The implication of this norm goes beyond the exclusion of plural voting. It demands that votes be given equal weight in the choice of candidates. We will make use of a measure which calculates the "mean range of distortion" in equating votes with seats in legislatures. The computation is arrived at by determining which parties are most over-represented in the assignment of seats and which are most under-represented. The two are combined to obtain a range of distortion and the mean for all elections studied is then computed.

(c) Information equality. An important condition in Dahl's model, but one which is absent from Downs is: "All individuals possess identical information about the alternatives." Clearly the task of measuring this directly is overwhelming. As an indicator of this condition, we have made use of a measure of the degree to which multiple sources of information are available to citizens of a given country. The measure focuses upon newspapers under the assumption that, if there is considerable "pluralism" in this sphere of mass communications, there is a positive probability that it will exist in other areas of communication. The indicator also attempts to measure the degree to which pluralistic ownership of the press

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Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper and Row, 1957), 23–24.

Dahl's definitional characteristics of polyarchy are:

During the voting period:

1. Every member of the organization performs the acts we assume to constitute an expression of preference among the scheduled alternatives, e.g., voting.
2. In tabulating these expressions (votes), the weight assigned to the choice of each individual is identical.
3. The alternative with the greatest number of votes is declared the winning choice.

During the prevoting period:

4. Any member who perceives a set of alternatives, at least one of which he regards as preferable to any of the alternatives presently scheduled, can insert his preferred alternative(s) among those scheduled for voting.
5. All individuals possess identical information about the alternatives.

During the postvoting period:

6. Alternatives (leaders or policies) with the greatest number of votes displace any alternatives (leaders or policies) with fewer votes.
7. The orders of elected officials are executed.

During the interelection stage:

8.1 Either all interelection decisions are subordinate or executory to those arrived at during the election stage, i.e., elections are in a sense controlling.

8.2 Or new decisions during the interelection period are governed by the preceding seven conditions, operating, however, under rather different institutional circumstances.

8.3 Or both.

Robert A. Dahl, *A Preface to Democratic Theory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), p. 84. For a modification of Dahl's polyarchy model, see Deane E. Neubauer, *On the Theory of Polyarchy: An Empirical Study of Democracy in Ten Countries* (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Yale University, 1965).

exists. Since adequate data of this form exist only for large cities, the indicator is explicitly concerned with the pattern of newspaper ownership in capital cities. In order to provide for greater comparability among the sample countries, one must also build into the measure some control for the size of the capital city. The formula:

$$\text{number of separately owned papers} \times \frac{\text{average circulation}}{\text{size of capital}}$$

is utilized to derive a coefficient that suggests the relative number and circulation of newspapers in capital cities.[7]

(d) Competition. Electoral competition by political parties is meaningful only if the nature of that competition is such that the alternation in office of competing sets of leaders is probable as well as possible. The measure should reward those countries which come most close to providing the electorate with this alternative. Two measures are utilized.

(1) Percent of the time period in which the dominant party held office. Competition may be close, but if no alternation occurs over a long period of time, the nature of the alternative perceived by the electorate is substantially different than that in which alternation actually takes place.

(2) Mean percentage of the vote received by the winning party (parties). This indicator actually measures the closeness of the competition. It distinguishes particularly among those situations in which alternation does not occur. Non-alternation with a margin of 51–49 is thus distinguished from non-alternation with a margin of, say, 90–10.

These two measures eliminate the need of a third, obvious measure—the number of parties competing in the election. Single party states are distinguished from multiple party states by showing no alternation in office, and by the percentage of the vote gained by the winning party.

A sample of twenty-three democratic countries was selected and scored on the above indicators. The scores were then combined into an index of democratic performance.[8]

A multiple regression analysis was undertaken correlating the socio-economic variables with the index of democratic performance. The correlation coefficients are reported in Table 1. If one compares these results with those obtained by Cutright reported in Table 2, it is clear that the two sets of findings are distinctly different. These results could occur for two reasons.

The considerable difference between the two sets of findings could result from either the fact that different samples are employed in the two studies, or because the indexes measure quite different things, or both. The factors are interrelated. It is necessary to use a smaller sample than Cutright for the simple reason that the kind of data necessary for the democratic performance indicator come only from democratic countries. But, if the Cutright hypothesis were correct, neither the use of the smaller sample nor the use of the democratic performance index should account for the diminution of the correlation between socio-economic development and democratic "development" assuming Cutright's "political development" index and my democratic performance index measure the same thing. As suggested above, what Cutright terms an index of "political development" is actually an index which measures the existence over time of liberal-democratic regimes. The index of democratic performance, at the conceptual level, attempts to measure the same thing. If socio-economic development were linearly related to democratic development operationalized as institutional maintenance, one would predict that it should also be related to the

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[7] For a more comprehensive discussion of this indicator see Neubauer, *op. cit.*

[8] In order to avoid unnecessary complications in comparing these results with those obtained by Cutright, the democratic performance index was constructed in a manner analogous to that used by Cutright to construct the political development index. In fact, to enhance overall comparability between the two studies, his scoring procedure was utilized on all the data. The data for the independent variables (the indexes of communication, urbanization, education and agricultural employment) were obtained by consulting the sources cited by Cutright. The individual scores for each indicator were T-scored, combined (by adding T-scores) into the appropriate indexes and those T-scored. The twenty-three countries comprising the sample were: Austria, Denmark, Belgium, Ireland, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Finland, Luxembourg, Norway, New Zealand, Canada, Israel, Venezuela, United States, Great Britain, France, Sweden, Italy, The Federal Republic, Mexico, Chile, Japan and India. The "N" for the communications index is 21, Luxembourg and Venezuela are not included.

TABLE 1. MATRIX OF CORRELATIONS OF NATIONAL MEASURES OF DEMOCRATIC PERFORMANCE WITH LEVELS OF EDUCATION, COMMUNICATION, URBANIZATION AND EMPLOYMENT IN AGRICULTURE

	1	2	3	4	5
1. Communication		.314	.732	−.698	.424
2. Urbanization	(21)		.578	−.612	−.008
3. Education	(21)	(23)		−.712	.055
4. Agriculture	(21)	(23)	(23)		.016
5. Democratic Performance	(21)	(23)	(23)	(23)	

(Numbers in parentheses represent the sample "N".)

minimal performance measured by the index of democratic performance. The results indicated above suggest that this is not the case. The correlation between the index of democratic performance and Cutright's index of political development is only .182. This suggests that the two indexes are not measuring the same phenomena. In particular, the low correlation points again to the undifferentiated manner in which relatively well-developed democratic countries are treated in Cutright's index. Close inspection of Cutright's index suggests that its success as a measure of democratic performance is only sustained by the use of countries in the sample which feature wide variation.

II. PATTERNS OF DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

What then is the status of this particular developmental hypothesis? "Can it be saved?" Assuming that my index of democratic performance differentiates among levels of performance in democratic countries, the answer is no, at least not without serious modification. The data presented in Table 1 suggest that, for this set of democratic countries, there is simply no relationship between level of democratic performance and measures of socio-economic development. (Urbanization, −.008, education, .055, agriculture, .016. The correlation between democratic performance and communication, .424, is partially due to the intercorrelation between this measure and the informational equality measures in the performance index.) This in turn suggests that political development, to the extent that it represents democratic political development, is a threshold phenomenon. Certain levels of "basic" socio-economic development appear to be necessary to elevate countries to a level at which they can begin to support complex, nation-wide patterns of political interaction, one of which may be democracy. Once above this threshold, however, the degree to which a country will "maximize" certain forms of democratic practice is no longer a function of continued socio-economic development. In fact, as Table 3 suggests, in a variety of instances one observes some democratic countries that are highly developed socio-economically have high levels of democratic performance, whereas others rank quite low.

TABLE 2. MATRIX OF CORRELATIONS OF NATIONAL MEASURES OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT WITH LEVELS OF EDUCATION, COMMUNICATION, URBANIZATION AND EMPLOYMENT IN AGRICULTURE

	1	2	3	4	5
1. Communication		71	85	−79	80
2. Urbanization	(69)		75	−72	64
3. Education	(69)	(70)		−72	62
4. Agriculture	(57)	(56)	(58)		−56
5. Political Development	(71)	(74)	(72)	(58)	

(Cutright's correlations are multiplied by 100 to produce whole numbers.)

Why should this be so? How does one account for this considerable variation in the performance of democratic countries? In answer to these questions, one is tempted to reply that countries perform differently in this respect because democracy is a very complicated form of political organization. The

TABLE 3. ORDERING OF SAMPLE COUNTRIES ON INDEX OF DEMOCRATIC PERFORMANCE

1. Great Britain	236.3
2. France	231.4
3. Finland	229.2
4. Sweden	225.8
5. Netherlands	220.9
6. Belgium	214.9
7. Japan	212.7
8. Luxembourg	210.1
9. Norway	209.7
10. New Zealand	209.4
11. Denmark	205.7
12. Israel	203.2
13. West Germany	199.4
14. Italy	198.6
15. Canada	196.8
16. United States	190.9
17. Venezuela	188.3
18. Austria	186.9
19. Chile	184.6
20. Ireland	181.4
21. India	172.7
22. Switzerland	169.3
23. Mexico	121.9

unique feature of democratic political organization is that it permits the variety of interests which characterize society to be translated into controlled social conflict. Although some kinds of political problems are common to all democratic countries, each differs somewhat in its social composition, its pattern of social organization, its political culture and its tradition of resolving political conflict. Thus, if one wishes to explain such variation in performance, it is necessary to examine the effect which these kinds of factors have on the democratic development of a country. In a recent study of ten democratic countries, the author found that, to a considerable degree, such variations in performance could be explained by variations in the patterns of pluralism and cleavages. This study suggests that, when cleavages are intense and disruptive, the level of democratic performance is not commensurate with that expected given existing levels of social and economic development. It also suggests the obverse. When some countries are characterized by an ameliorative pattern of pluralism and cleavages, democracy can function relatively well despite a somewhat lower level of social and economic development.[9] Similarly, Robert Dahl has examined the political development of the United States in terms of its pattern of pluralism and cleavages and found this to be a satisfactory explanatory device.[10] In a comparative study of Britain and Germany, Harry Eckstein has suggested that the congruence (or lack of it) between social norms and the authority patterns of regimes may account for the stability or instability of some democratic regimes.[11] In short, variations in the performance of democratic countries appears to be a function of factors such as pluralism and cleavage which, though obviously related to the gross level of socio-economic development, have an effect on performance which extends far beyond this development.

It is also prudent to acknowledge the degree to which choice influences the relationship of socio-economic development to democratic development. The real world is not a deterministic one, and within quite appreciable limits, countries and their leaders are free to choose from a variety of alternatives concerning their form of political organization.

The case of Communist countries is the most clear. Many of these have made remarkable progress toward obtaining higher levels of socio-economic development of the type referred to by Cutright and Lipset. This socio-economic development is not reflected in higher levels of "political development" or democratic development of the form discussed in this study.[12] By choice these regimes prefer a quite different type of institutional structure than that of traditional liberal democracy. Less obvious examples also exist such as India where the governing elite makes considerable efforts on the one hand to extend the suffrage, but limits the effect of citizen participation by supporting a system of representation which heavily over-represents the Congress Party. The examples could be easily multiplied. The point is that the nature and extent of democratic practices in many countries appear to be less a function of their state of social and economic development than of certain values embedded in their political culture; values which, in turn, are related to particular patterns of conflict resolution which need not result in the growth of democratic institutions.

In conclusion, one must be most careful when drawing inferences about the effect which social and economic conditions have on the institutions and practices of nations. It is quite clear, one might say obvious, that extremely poor, traditional societies characterized by illiterate, rural populations in which intergroup communication is barely developed and national identifications and institutions barely extant, will have considerable difficulty in establishing and maintaining political democracy. It is not at all clear that the more well developed these societies are, the more likely they are to become democratic, at least if one wishes to respect differences in the degree to which basic democratic practices are implemented. If we are to have theories of democracy which take into consideration the full range of factors which impede or enhance democratic development, we must go beyond consideration of those factors which are at best threshold conditions.

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[9] Neubauer, *op. cit.*

[10] Robert A. Dahl, *Pluralist Democracy in the United States: Conflict and Consent* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967).

[11] Harry Eckstein, *A Theory of Stable Democracy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959). For additional uses of this form of explanation see: Giovanni Sartori, "European Political Parties: The Case of Polarized Pluralism," in Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner (eds.), *Political Parties and Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), 137–176; Robert A. Dahl (ed.), *Political Oppositions in Western Democracies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966).

[12] With one exception. One of Cutright's indicators gives points to nations which for each year had in existence a parliament "whose members were the representatives of one or more political parties, but where the 30% rule was violated", (p. 547). This is one of the most unfortunate features of his index, for it permits parliaments such as the Soviet parliament to be considered as a functional decision-making organ. Communist states consequently receive scores on the index which are unjustified from any practical point of view.

REPRESENTATIVE BUREAUCRACY: A REASSESSMENT

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The term "representative bureaucracy" was first given currency in 1949 through Donald Kingsley's book with the same title[1] and since then it has gained popularity through the discussions of a few American political scientists and British sociologists.[2] The underlying concept, however, is still subject to some confusion owing in part to its normative overtones. This paper attempts, in the first place, to analyse some important sources of confusion and, secondly, to show the practical difficulties in the realization of a representative bureaucracy by comparing the social backgrounds of civil servants in different countries.

I. CONCEPTUAL CONFUSION

Kingsley himself was partly responsible for injecting some ambiguity into the meaning of the term. He pointed out—though without giving precise figures—the actual dominance of the middle class in Britain's higher civil service and traced its history. He was generally satisfied that this class 'mirrored the dominant forces in society' and so 'can be entrusted with power' and at the same time he was anxious that the civil service should draw proportionately more from the working class.[3] In other words, he was happy in one part of his book to see the same class which called the political tune well represented in the higher civil service—thereby ensuring harmony between the body politic and body administrative and sorry in another part that the working class was left out. This ambivalence confuses the straight meaning of the term 'representative bureaucracy.' Literally, it would mean a civil service in which *every* economic class, caste, region or religion in a country is represented in exact proportion to its numbers in the population. In practice, its American proponents interpret it less literally to mean a bureaucracy drawn 'from all social, racial and religious groups on the basis of ability'—but not necessarily in exact numerical proportion to produce 'a copy of the total society'.[4] European research workers on the social backgrounds of higher civil servants would agree by implication with the American definition.

There is thus broad agreement on the basic meaning of the concept—though people can and do disagree about the desirable degree of representation and the categories to be represented.[5] But two other basic confusions still remain. The first of these, found usually among European leftwing critics of middle class-dominated civil services, shows itself in their disappointment with the simultaneous and apparently incongruous evolution of representative democratic political institutions and unrepresentative civil services in the course of of the last 150 years. The second confusion inheres in the naive and dogmatic argument advanced in favor of representative bureaucracy—that it is necessarily responsive to the needs of all the classes it is drawn from and to the general public. I shall analyse each confusion in turn.

To understand the disappointment of leftwing critics with the processes of recent history it is revealing to examine them with the help of the sociological categories, 'ascriptive' and 'performance-oriented,' rather than use normative political terms such as representative and unrepresentative. These twin sociological categories are used as modes of reference—in judging men and things in different societies.[6] In the ascriptive mode some abilities are 'ascribed' to those who belong to certain families or clans, or groups—and whenever and wherever such abilities are required, the 'ascribed' are automatically called up. In the latter mode, the presence of such abilities is tested for by actual performance. The first mode is historically older and *prima facie* less rational than the second, but neither mode has a necessary logical relation with a representative or unrepresentative bureaucracy. But the first mode has been associated with an unrepresentative upper-class-dominated bureaucracy just as the latter has come to be associated with representative bureaucracy. We shall see why. Until about a century and a half ago, the higher positions in government and administration in all countries were filled by men from a numerically small upper class, regardless of whether the social organization was feudal, mercantile or semi-industrial and the form of government parliamentary, monarchic or aristocratic. This was justified by the ascription of certain abilities to members of that upper class. It was replaced by a performance-oriented mode of reference in the course of the 18th and 19th centuries, for two reasons. The first was the general growth of rationalism in Europe from the Renaissance onwards and its increasing influence in the late 18th century. In such a climate it appeared rather indefensible to ascribe abilities where they could be tested for by performance. The second reason was the patent failure of 'ascribed' groups in some European countries to deliver the goods. It was most dramatic in France where the decadent *ancien regime* with its tradition of patronage appointments and sale of offices collapsed suddenly. It was more gradual in countries such as Prussia and Britain but nevertheless evident.[7]

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[1] J. Donald Kingsley, *Representative Bureaucracy* (Yellow Springs, Ohio. The Antioch Press, 1944).

[2] E.g. Van Riper, Long and Warner (American), Kelsall and Bottomore (British). Their published research is referred to in detail in other footnotes that follow.

[3] See Kingsley, *op. cit.*, 282–283, for the social harmony argument; and the second half of the chapter "The New Aristocracy" for the working class representation argument.

[4] Warner *et al.*, *The American Federal Executive* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963), p.5.

[5] For example, the Western critics would be interested in the proportionate representation of economic classes while an Indian politician would lay stress on representation by caste, region and language.

[6] Concerning the two modes of reference, see Talcott Parsons, *The Social System* (London: Tavistock, 1952), 63–65.

The most important historical feature from our point of view—of this replacement of ascription by performance-testing—was that it coincided in time with the spread of democratic institutions. Again, France provides the dramatic example. The fall of the *ancien regime* was followed simultaneously by the rise of two most powerful slogans—that of liberty, equality and fraternity and that of a career open to talents. In Britain too, the introduction of competitive examinations went on *pari passu* with the enlargement of the franchise. This historical association, not unnaturally, led some to look upon selection by performance tests and representative democracy as complementary and even corollary and raised expectations, not altogether logical, that these two in combination should lead to a representative bureaucracy. The disappointment implied even in academic discussions about the non-development of representative civil services is largely the result of such association. The expectation was not altogether logical as it was based on the somewhat temporary and sporadic phenomenon of some unrepresentative 'ascribed' groups being replaced in power by more representative groups who had perforce to prove their ability by performance. As we shall see a little later, ascription and performance-orientation are both to be found fairly well mixed up in stable societies both old and new—and the representativeness of a bureaucracy and its selection by performance-testing (or merit) are logically separate. Whether they are practically compatible or otherwise is a matter of observation and political manipulation.

Historical developments in the United States followed a different path wherein these implications were sorted out more clearly.[8] Representative democracy started more or less with a clean slate, ascription played too insignificant a part in American modes of thought to produce any reaction against it and the Jacksonian democrats were not without some logic in their rejection of a whole corpus of contemporary European ideas and practices. They set their face against the European concept of property in office and instituted rotation in office. As against ascription of abilities to a few noble-born, or a test for their presence by examination performance, they attributed a minimum of ability to all citizens—which they declared was ample for the performance of the simple duties of a public office. Conceived as a rejection of decadent European ideas about property in office and the mystique of bureaucratic work, this Jacksonian theory as a whole was self-consistent. Its results were rather mixed. Its immediate consequence was the spoils system, which withered away in due course. A more lasting effect was a moral commitment to keep public services in America open to, and representative of, all sections and classes of the general public and this has, since then, influenced all procedures of selection to official posts. To sum up the different developments in Europe and the U.S.A. somewhat sweepingly: in the former, the parallel growth of representative political institutions and performance tests for civil service recruitment raised some misplaced expectations about the automatic evolution of a representative bureaucracy; whereas in the U.S.A. representative political institutions and representative civil services were developed in fact simultaneously, separately and deliberately as partly soft-pedalling the need for, and the rigor of, performance tests.

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[7] For the gradual introduction of the middle class element in British administration, see Kingsley, *op. cit.*, Chapter Seven. For Prussia, see H. Rosenberg, *Bureaucracy, Autocracy and Aristocracy* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958).

[8] This paragraph is based upon Paul Van Riper, *History of the United States Civil Service* (Evanston: Row, Peterson & Co., 1958), Chapter 3.

II. ASCRIPTION V. PERFORMANCE-TESTING

We shall now examine the related question—whether ascription and performance-testing are so sharply different and whether they were and are practised in all their theoretical rigor anywhere. Ascription of a certain ability or quality, say, (a) to those who possess another quality, (b) such as membership of a class, family or clan, is by itself neither irrational nor opposed to the practice of testing for this quality by actual performance. It is not irrational, if observation over a period suggests that (a) and (b) have a significant correlation and concrete tests for ability (a) might themselves have suggested earlier or confirmed later such correlation. It failed in those societies where the correlations were false or overrated or never tested. Conversely, performance-testing, to be perfectly rational, would test one's performance of a single act—before entrusting him with further performances of that specific act—a procedure somewhat expensive and elementary.[9] In actual practice, performance tests or examinations in the recruitment of civil services are usually based on a more complex chain of correlations. Some of these examinations are relatively specific—when technicians are tested broadly in their subjects and techniques, and professionals such as doctors and engineers are recruited on the basis of proven ability through professional examinations. Even here the test is for general technical or professional performance and not for ability to perform a specific act. Other examinations are based on somewhat conjectural correlations; thus the competitive examination for the British Administrative class is not based on actual performance in any given administrative situation but rather on a tenuous chain of Macaulayan reasoning:[10] that those who show ability in their teens and early twenties keep it to the end of their career; that such ability is best revealed by a competitive examination—which tests intelligence, academic ability and self-discipline; that ability is general, i.e., ability of one type is easily transformed into another type and therefore the ability revealed by competitive examination is transformed into administrative ability. There seems to be plenty of room for ascription to slip into this long chain of reasoning, relating examination performance in the humanities to administrative ability, as there is even more in reliance upon a short interview. In other words, ascription is not as irrational or unfunctional as appears at first sight even as performance-testing is not so rigorously rational. It is therefore possible for the social composition of civil services elected by the latter to be not so strikingly different from those selected by the former.

Moreover, in actual practice, ascription was modified in older societies in many ways so as to include some recruits from all ranks of society. Thus entry into, and advancement in, institutions based on celibacy such as the Catholic Church and various eunuch groups of the Turkish and Chinese Empires was always open to all classes and it was possible to climb to high administrative positions through them. Even where a small class controlled administrative recruitment tightly, it could accept members of somewhat less wellplaced classes through marriage and adoption. The commercial classes of England and Japan penetrated the ranks of the landed aristocracy by the former method as many talented Roman and Turkish slaves rose up socially through the latter. Again, a new king or a new dynasty, keen to break the control of an older class over administrative recruitment might encourage men of lower social origins to enter and advance in the governmental bureaucracy.[11] In some bureaucratic empires, the King tried continuously to gain control of civil service recruitment and even instituted elementary performance criteria for this purpose.[12] Absolute practice of ascription and continuous monopoly of one social class was much less usual in non-democratic regimes than popularly supposed.

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[9] Such elementary rationality—i.e. taking into account specific ability for the duties of a specific post—is shown in traditional Australian public service definitions of fitness or efficiency in the respective State and Commonwealth Public Services Acts. But good sense has mitigated its literal application.

[10] For the two famous speeches of Macaulay, see *Speeches—Parliamentary and Miscellaneous by Rt. Hon. Thomas Babington Macaulay* (London: Clarke Beeton & Co.), p. 183, Vol. I for the speech of 1853, pp. 267–273, Vol. II, for the speech of 1855.

[11] Re the efforts of kings to gain greater control of bureaucracies in bureaucratic empires, see S.N. Eisenstadt, *The Political Systems of Bureaucratic Empires* (The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), Chapter 10 particularly pp. 278–279.

[12] For an early advocacy of selection by performance, see Shamasastry, *Kautilya's Arthasastra*, p. 13 and chapter X for details of tests.

Nor were ascriptive assumptions taken too seriously by the ruling class even as they were preached. There were other important reasons for recruitment by an upper class from its own ranks to the state bureaucracy. In the first place it provided some guarantee of loyalty to the existing regime on the part of the recruit—out of sheer self-interest.[13] Secondly, the recruit could be expected to understand the unstated major premises of the regime without tedious explanation and might even have picked up some of the finer details of administration through the vicarious experience of watching his family elders at work. As a last resort, a blatantly inefficient or disloyal person could be silently removed or relieved in the interests of the class image by some established methods.

III. THE ARGUMENT FOR REPRESENTATIVE BUREAUCRACY

I have dealt with the confusion flowing from some naive expectations of the establishment of representative bureaucracy in the wake of representative democracy. I shall now examine briefly the confusion attaching to the argument in support of the former. The essential case is that a civil service which includes members of all classes *therefore* ensures that all their different values and interests are articulated and hence brought to bear upon the decisions taken and policies formulated by it.[14] This argument is implied by some and explained by others. We may set aside Kingsley's argument, which is really a case for political harmony, and summarize—as an example— Kelsall's use of the foregoing pattern of argument to plead for a wider representation of all classes.[15] In his view, the attitudes and sympathies of the British civil servant such as 'smugness and complacency' and 'lack of touch with working class problems' are those of the middle class he is drawn from. He has unconsciously imbibed a sense of superiority to the working class and with no 'memory of misery, hunger, squalor, bureaucratic oppression and economic insecurity,' his perception of such problems lacks depth. The greater representation of the working class through various means would make for a truly representative and *therefore* responsive civil service. The American proponents are more direct and precise in presenting this case. Thus Van Riper makes it clear that a representative bureaucracy must "(1) consist of a reasonable cross section of the body politic in terms of occupation, class, geography and the like, and (2) must be in general tune with the ethos and attitudes of the society of which it is part," and he would attribute the success of American democracy in part at least to the representative character of the Federal Civil Service.[16] Norton E. Long goes even further to say that it is 'a better sample of the mass of the people than the Congress,' that 'important interests which are unrepresented or malrepresented' in the Congress receive 'more effective and more responsible representation through administrative channels,' that it has saved the democratic process from bogging down and should be duly recognized as 'our great fourth branch of Government.'[17]

The arguments for representative bureaucracy (or rather guaranteed representation for some unrepresented groups) put forward in India around the turn of the century followed the foregoing basic pattern with local variations.[18] Indian society, it was argued, was really divided into caste and religious groups rather than economic classes, but these divisions were more rigid, being based on birth, and had more influence on their members than class. The case for equitable and proportionate representation of each caste and religious group was founded frankly on the probability of the sectional sympathies or even sectional loyalties of recruits causing harm to unrepresented sections. The danger was held to be very real in late 19th and early 20th century India more than elsewhere because (1) India had a purely bureaucratic form of government with little democratic control, and membership in the civil service meant more power than elsewhere, which power could be used and was often alleged to be used by the administrator in favor of one's community; and also because (2) membership in the civil service conferred significant financial security, a prize most sought after in Indian society. It was argued that there was a strong case for the more equitable, i.e., proportionate, distribution of the two scarce commodities of power and security, particularly because competition for them was weighted heavily in favor of the more fortunate early starters (the higher Hindu castes) who could deliberately use it to keep out the latecomers.

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[13] In this regard, aristocrats, imperialists and communists are all the same in trying to recruit members of a given class for key administrative positions on grounds of political reliability.

[14] The argument becomes stronger, the greater the power of the civil service.

[15] R. K. Kelsall, *Higher Civil Servants in Britain* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1955), pp. 189–193.

[16] Van Riper, *op. cit.*, pp. 549–559.

[17] Norton E. Long, 'Bureaucracy and Constitutionalism,' this REVIEW, 46 (1952), 808–818.

[18] For further details and references regarding the Indian arguments see V. Subramaniam, "Graduates in the Public Service—A Comparative Study of Attitudes," *Public Administration* (London), 35, 377–378.

Thus the basic argument—stated in different ways in different contexts—is that bureaucrats carry their class attitudes and prejudices into their official life and only when all classes (or castes) are properly represented in the civil service will their different needs and interests find due consideration. Norton E. Long would stretch this further to say that such a representative bureaucracy would even make up for the sins of unrepresentative political institutions such as the Congress in U.S.A.[19]

How good is this basic case founded on the inevitability of one's sympathies for one's class of origin? Is it as self-evident as its proponents make it out? Of course, Freudians and Behaviorists are agreed that childhood influences are long-lasting. There is also plenty of empirical research evidence (in regard to the U.S.A.) to show that the middle and working classes differ substantially in several regards, from toilet training for children to the style of promiscuity, from the nature of their mental disorders to their marital lives. But all this neglects the existence of deviants from class norms, in both the upper and lower classes. We are familiar with aristocrats and rich heirs who have passionate sympathy for the working class. On the other hand, the proportion of deviants among the members of the lower classes who work their way up is held by many observers to be high. Leaving aside the familiar upstart and the climber, they point out that those founders of Britain's industry in the 19th century who came from poor families were not conspicuous for their sympathy to their class of origin and that leadership studies of working class parties and unions reveal the same story. It has been suggested that the men who climb out of the lower classes, the upward-mobiles, under present conditions anyway, shed their class sympathies either at the beginning of the climb itself or halfway through. The proven existence of deviants from class norms and the probability of their high proportion among recruits from the lower classes, shakes to the foundations the basic argument for representative bureaucracy.[20]

Besides this, one has still to explain—in more detail than its advocates have done—the process by which a representative bureaucracy becomes responsive to sectional *as well* as general interests. If the various classes represented have all different and conflicting interests and if their members in the bureaucracy advocate mainly class interests—in accord with the basic argument—the result is likely to be a divided and even ineffectual bureaucracy. It might work after a fashion—on the basis of a hostage theory according to which bureaucrats of each class do not harm the interests of others for fear of retaliation.[21] Or to think of a less gruesome picture, bureaucrats with different social backgrounds may influence each other by formal and informal contacts and bargaining. This is known to happen but such mutual influence and bargaining is not half as free as in the open legislative forum between politicians of different persuasions—for it is severely cramped by the hierarchical position of the incumbent.[22] The actual picture is often brighter than the foregoing ones at least in the United States, mainly because the majority of bureaucrats cherish some common values which are part of the nation's sociopolitical consensus and they also expose themselves to all influences regardless of their class origins. In other words, this responsiveness is more a reflection of the consensual and equalitarian ethos of the community as a whole than a direct result of its representativeness only.

The old Wilson-Goodnow argument against 'elective' bureaucracy may not hold good in its old form against 'representative' bureaucracy but it is not without relevance. The original argument may be paraphrased thus.[23] Political institutions such as Parliaments and Presidents should reflect, shape and so represent the popular will—and it is right they should be constituted on the elective-representative principle. Administrators carry out this will—and should be selected solely on the basis of competence in execution—as revealed by professional qualifications or (competitive) performance tests. It is disastrous to apply the ethos of one to the other—to apply the principle of appointment by performance-testing to political institutions and that of election (or representativeness?) to administrative establishments. The main flaw in this argument has been recounted *ad nauseam* by proponents of representative bureaucracy, namely, that the dichotomy does not work as strictly as stated and that administrators influence political decisions and make them too. But this does not make an automatic case for representative bureaucracy, though it weakens the original argument against elective offices. From a purely logical and dichotomist standpoint, if an administrative position involves a large proportion of political decisions, it should be made a purely political position—perhaps even elective or politically responsible in some way. For many practical reasons this proved extremely difficult in the American governmental framework. At the same time, administrators have progressively grown politically responsive without going embarrassingly partisan—a fortunate development that seems to have saved American democracy from the need for drastic reorganization. This development owes something to the 'representative' character of the Federal Service and a lot more to other factors too. It is clearly stretching the evidence somewhat to claim that 'representative' bureaucracy is the only or even the most effective answer to the problem of increasing bureaucratic power. It is stretching it too far to assert, as Norton E. Long does, that it is a part-cure for unrepresentative political institutions.

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[19] Long, *op. cit.*; see in particular the latter half of the article.

[20] Re the several differences in attitudes and customs of the middle and working classes, see Harold M. Hodges, Jr., *Social Stratification: Class in America*, (Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman, 1964), the two chapters on Values and Behaviour, and the chapter on Social Class and Social Intimacy. Regarding lack of class sympathies among successful men from the lower classes, see Maurice Duverger, *Political Parties*, Chapter III, Section III, and Kenneth Robinson, "Selection and the Social Background of the Administrative Class," *Public Administration* (London), 35, 388. All this evidence is impressionistic and Hodges produces no evidence about deviants to rebut this impression.

[21] For a version of the hostage theory see *Speeches and Writings of Mohammed Iqbal*, Speech in the Punjab Legislative Council, July 19, 1927.

[22] For hierarchy and the inhibition of free communication see Blau and Scott, *Formal Organizations* (San Francisco: Chandler, 1962), 121–124.

IV. SOCIAL BACKGROUNDS OF CIVIL SERVANTS

I have so far pointed out some conceptual and logical shortcomings of the idea of representative bureaucracy—even while conceding its limited advantages. I shall further justify this cautious approach by a comparative analysis of the social backgrounds of higher civil servants in different countries. In the present stage of my research I would not like to hazard any firm conclusions on the subject because reliable data are not available for many countries and even the readily available data need some reprocessing and reinterpretation.[24] Even so, it is difficult to resist the tentative conclusion about the widely prevalent middle class domination of higher civil services in the six countries listed in Table 1, in spite of their different economic, social and political backgrounds.[25] The extent of the domination is nearly the same (from 80 to 95 percent) and the differences relate mainly (a) to the degree or coefficient of over-representation of the middle class as a whole, and (b) to the different degrees of representation of different sections of the middle class. To illustrate; the percentage of the sons from middle class occupational categories does not differ very much between U.S.A. (81%) and India (87.6% for the Accounts Services and 96% for the Administrative Service) but in the former, these categories constitute something near 60 percent of its working population and so, the degree of over-representation is of the order of 1.35. In India, however, they constitute just about 9 percent of the working population and the degree of their over-representation is near 10. Thus,

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[23] For the original argument and detailed references, see R. S. Parker and V. Subramaniam, "Public and Private Administration," (section II) *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, Brussels, Vol. XXX, No. 4.

[24] I am processing material for a book entitled *Social Composition of Public Bureaucries* to be published M/S Longman Green in a series under the general editorship of J. W. Grove. The present paper is a preview of the general argument of the book.

[25] Please see Table 1 for details. The sources for the figures for different countries are as follows:

For Denmark—Henry Stjernquist, "Centraladministrationens Embedsmaend 1848–1946", *Centraladministrationen 1848–1948*, Ministerialforeningen, Copenhagen, 1948.

For Turkey—C. H. Dodd, "The Social and Educational Background of Turkish Officials." *Middle Eastern Studies*, London, Vol. I, p. 271.

For U.S.A.—Warner *et al*, *op. cit.*, p. 321.

For Great Britain— R. K. Kelsall, *op. cit.*, pp. 150–51.

For France—T. B. Bottomore, "Le Mobilité Sociale dans la Haute Administration Française," *Cahiers Internationaux Sociologie*, Vol. XII, Sommaire, p. 169.

The Indian figures are based on my own research.

TABLE 1. COMPARATIVE TABLE OF THE OCCUPATIONS OF THE FATHERS OF HIGHER CIVIL SERVANTS IN SIX COUNTRIES

Name of Country	Middle Classes						Others	
	Shopkeepers Businessmen etc.	Governmental (incl. Army) Employees	Business Employees	Professionals	Skilled Workers	Total for Middle Classes	Unskilled Workers	Agricultural Workers and Farmers
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
1. Denmark (1945)	19.5	25.1	4.3	38.3	—	87.2	4.3	8.5
2. Great Britain (1949–52)	17.8	27.0	13.3	30.4	8.7	97.2	1.5	1.3
3. France (1945–51)	11.4	50.2 (41.8)	8.3	23.1	3.3	96.4	—	3.6
4. U.S.A. (1959)	20.0	?	24.0	20.0	17.0	81.0	4.0	15.0
5. Turkey (1960)	16.0	45.5	—	29.0	—	90.5	1.0	8.5
6. India (1947–56) (a) I.A.S.	12.0	50.6	4.5	29.2	—	96.3	—	4.7
(b) A/cs Services	7.5	46.7	5.2	28.2	—	87.6	4.2	8.6

N.B.: Research workers differ about the inclusion of skilled workers in the middle class. In this table, it affects the size of middle class representation only in the case of the U.S.A. and to a much lesser extent to the case of Great Britain. The inclusion can be justified in the former case on the basis of (a) their nearness to the professional and clerical middle classes in their earnings and ethos and (b) the significant proportion of them that transfer to the professional and clerical middle classes in one generation.

while the middle class share is about the same in different countries, the degree of its over-representation depends on its size, and the larger it is, the more representative the bureaucracy. Secondly, the representation of different sections of the middle class differs sharply from one country to another even when its total representation is about the same. Thus in India, Turkey and France, the sons of civil servants form more or less half (46 to 50%) of the total number of recruits—whereas in Denmark and Britain, their percentage comes down to about 25 and to even less in the case of the U.S.A., in all of which countries the skilled workers, business executives, farmers and businessmen are better represented. These variations may be explained in part by the different origins and history of the middle class in different countries. In India and Turkey it was artificially created in response to Western occupation or influence—and is still largely made up of salaried employees of government and business.[26] As the sons of the former have a traditional predilection for following in their father's footsteps the degree of over-representation is very high indeed. The middle class of France is more varied but seems to be nearly as tradition-bound as its counterparts in Eastern countries with the result that civil servants' sons are just as well represented in her civil service as in India's and Turkey's. Greater occupational mobility and lack of traditionalism seem to have weakened the urge to follow the father's profession in U.S.A. which has a more varied pattern of middle class representation, with Denmark and Britain standing midway. It is again interesting to note in the case of India (for which detailed figures are available from my researches) that the social composition of the various services as revealed in Table 2 follows closely their prestige rating.[27]

To reiterate the main point, the higher civil service is drawn to an equally large degree from the middle class in all these countries, in spite of their different social, economic and political backgrounds—and is more 'representative' just where the middle class itself is large. This is rather sobering but it can be explained by the combination of skills and qualities cultivated by the middle class—which increases immensely its chances of success vis-a-vis the working class. If civil servants were chosen through a random number table from the whole population, it is highly probable that each class (i.e., the upper middle, lower middle and working class) might be represented in the civil service more or less in proportion to its numbers. In practice the selection is restricted by several requirements operating more or less in favour of the two branches of the middle class. Let us take note of four important requirements relating to age, intelligence, a certain level of education and eagerness to compete. We can see that the middle class has *prima facie* a higher probability of meeting the last three requirements than the working class and the final combined probability which is a product of the separate probabilities is therefore so much higher than that for the working class. Let us see how.

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[26] Regarding the evolution of the Indian middle class, see B. B. Misra, *The Indian Middle Classes* (London: Oxford University Press, 1961).

[27] The table is based on my researches to be published by the Government of India. The table tallies with evidence available elsewhere about social mobility. The sons of the lower middle class and working class make easy entry into the less coveted and lower services—as for example the Executive Class in U.K., but *their* sons find it easier to enter the more prestigious services. It seems to take two generations to bridge the distance between working class and the higher civil services.

We may assume that under normal conditions the age distribution in all the three classes is the same—with perhaps a slightly higher proportion of the working class in their twenties and thirties—perhaps enjoying a very slight advantage in regard to their numbers in the recruitable age groups. During some periods of history this advantage may constitute a significant factor against an ageing and infertile middle class—whose depleted ranks may be filled up rapidly from below. We are not concerned with this rare occurrence at the moment and may proceed on the assumption of the same age distribution in all classes.

We do not have any reliable knowledge about the distribution of native intelligence in the different classes.[28] Some researchers suggest that it is about the same in all classes, others that it is slightly higher in the city working class than in the middle class and still

TABLE 2. INDIA'S ADMINISTRATORS: PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION BY FATHER'S OCCUPATION, COMPARATIVE TABLE FOR ALL SERVICES

1947–56

	Higher Civil Servant	Doctors	Other Learned Professions	University Professors	Total % of Upper Middle Class Occupations	Business-men	Employees of Private Firms	Lawyers	School teachers	Lower Civil Servants	Total % of all middle class occupations	Land-owners	Farmers	Workers Artisans
1. I.F.S.	45.90	3.28	6.56	3.28	59.02	11.48	1.64	4.92	6.56	4.92	88.53	11.47	0.00	0.00
2. I.A.S.	32.91	5.06	1.89	7.59	47.45	12.02	4.43	11.39	3.80	17.72	96.81	3.19	0.00	0.00
3. I.P.S.	19.85	5.16	2.06	5.94	33.0	9.28	3.09	13.14	6.44	17.78	82.73	13.66	2.32	1.29
4. A/cs Services	24.53	3.30	2.83	6.60	37.26	7.55	5.19	8.49	7.55	22.17	88.20	4.25	3.30	4.25
5. Customs & Postal Services	12.12	6.06	3.03	9.09	30.3	12.12	0.00	9.09	7.58	25.76	84.85	10.61	1.51	3.03

1957–63

	Higher Civil Servant	Doctors	Other Learned Professions	University Professors	Total % of Upper Middle Class Occupations	Business-men	Employees of Private Firms	Lawyers	School teachers	Lower Civil Servants	Total % of all middle class occupations	Land-owners	Farmers	Workers Artisans
1. I.F.S.	42.17	3.61	1.2	10.85	57.83	10.84	8.43	3.61	4.82	4.82	90.35	3.61	0.00	6.02
2. I.A.S.	26.50	5.13	3.0	4.70	39.33	8.55	5.98	6.84	6.92	17.09	84.71	11.54	0.85	2.90
3. I.P.S.	22.92	4.17	0.26	3.13	30.48	12.24	3.13	5.45	6.77	19.01	77.08	18.49	0.52	3.91
4. A/cs Services	12.01	3.36	2.10	4.20	21.67	13.03	5.88	7.56	8.40	25.22	81.76	6.90	6.72	4.62
5. Customs & Postal Services	11.84	3.95	1.32	5.26	22.37	9.21	7.23	7.24	7.89	26.32	80.26	3.95	12.50	3.29

1. I.F.S. =Indian Foreign Service. 2. I.A.S. =Indian Administrative Service. 3. I.P.S. =Indian Police Service.

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[28] For summaries of I. Q. surveys, see N. Eysenck, *Uses and Abuses of Psychology* (Pelican); P. E. Vernon, *Intelligence and Attainment Tests* (University of London Press, 1960); and John B. Miner, *Intelligence in the United States* (Springer, N. Y. 1957). It would appear from Miner, *op. cit.*, pp. 78–84 and C. O. Carter, *Human Heredity* (Pelican), pp. 132–135, that I.Q. increases proportionately with social class, but this I.Q. is based somewhat heavily on verbal ability.

others that it is lower. At the same time, psychologists have identified different areas of intelligence and suggested that different groups may excell or fail in different areas, women in shape and color perceptions, working class children in manipulative tests and middle class children in verbal ability. Perhaps there is no conclusive evidence of advantage to any one class in regard to *general* intelligence, but we may accept the evidence in regard to the greater verbal ability of middle class children. Thus they have an edge on others in something which matters a great deal in competitive examinations.

We know a little more about the opportunities for school and university education for different classes. In most industrial and developed societies, the differences in the proportion of school-leavers in different economic classes are not very large; they are rather small at the junior school level and somewhat larger at the secondary school level. But the difference is more striking in regard to university education even in industrial societies—the proportion of the university trained in the middle classes often being a hundred times their proportion in the working classes.[29] Thus any system which recruits University graduates in their early twenties is bound to give a striking advantage to the middle class at the expense of the working class and the peasantry.

There is little doubt that the middle class boy—by the very nature of his class—is more aware of the existence of professions and salaried jobs in the civil service and realizes that he has to look after himself by competing for life's prizes. As against this middle class competitive individualism, the working class boy suffers by his proneness to, and training in, cooperative effort.[30]

The middle class boy thus enjoys at least three advantages separately, and his combined advantage, which is the product of the separate advantages, is conspicuously greater than that of the working class boy. We have shown in Figure 1 how this combined advantage and the class structure react to produce two different models in the case of India and the U.S.A. We shall now illustrate concretely how recruiting systems can favor one class or another by stressing or soft-pedalling one or more of these advantages. The traditional British system of recruitment to the Administrative Class is based on a competitive examination of University Honours standard open to those between the ages of 20 and 25. The traditional pre-second World War Australian system recruited youths between the ages of 14 and 18 with an examination at junior or secondary school level. The American system recruits people at nearly any age through specific job-oriented examinations. It is clear that the British system favors the middle class whose members put their children through University before 21 or 22 as a matter of course. The older Australian system threw it open to a much wider section of the population—indeed the whole school-going population, but deliberately kept out those who wanted to go on to the University.[31] The American system is the most open in allowing a very large section of the population within the widest age limits to compete—without keeping out the would-be graduates. It is also clear that changing one factor or other in a system would alter its clientele and products. If the British system had extended its upper age limits to thirty or more, many working class young men, who graduated later in life, might have competed and entered the Administrative Class. Similarly, the Australian system by merely extending its upper age limits in the postwar years has been able to recruit many graduates and the American system, if it imposed narrower age limits would automatically exclude late developers from the less fortunate sections of the community. In practice most countries follow a modified British system and offer a clear advantage to the middle class.

V. CONCLUSION

Let us now sum up the thesis and end on a practical note. There are serious weaknesses in the case for representative bureaucracy and in practice the sons of the middle class occupy over eighty percent of the posts of the higher civil service in several (non-communist) countries regardless of their stage of economic development—because of possessing a combina-

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[29] The distribution of university education among the middle class and the working class and its bearing on civil service recruitment has been discussed by Kelsall, *op. cit.*, Kingsley, *op. cit.*, pp. 146–147 and Bottomore, *op. cit.* It seems that the opportunity for university education for the middle class boy was about 35 times that for the working class boy in Britain according to Kingsley and about three to four times in the U.S.A. according to Hodges, *op. cit.*, pp. 260–261. In other Western countries the ratio might be in between the two, whereas in India, it may be well over 100.

[30] For some evidence of the competition-proneness of the middle class vis-á-vis the working class, see Hodges, *op. cit.*, p. 265.

[31] W. K. Hancock, *Australia* (1930 edn.), p. 142.

FIG. 1. Diagrammatic comparison of U.S.A. and India.



In both model diagrams the classes are arranged in slabs one over the other in the same order and the proportion of each is indicated by its respective area.

Each diagonal line separates those who have an ability or qualification (placed on the right) from those who do not (placed on the left). Line 1 does this for verbal ability, Line 2 for University education and Line 3 for eagerness to compete. The first quality is distributed probably in the same way in U.S.A. and India but the second and third are much more in short supply in India—as indicated by the sharper turn to the right of Lines 2 and 3.

The shaded area on the right of Line 3 includes those who have the best chance of getting into the higher civil services by virtue of possessing all the three qualities. It is seen that in India, the bulk of this comes from the small middle class (darker shaded area) giving it a very high coefficient of representation. In U.S.A. too the bulk comes from the middle class which is however larger—giving it only a moderate coefficient of representation.

tion of advantages. We have also suggested that the U.S. Federal Civil Service is representative because U.S. society is largely middle class. In fact, there are further reasons to justify caution about the possibility or benefits of a representative bureaucracy outside the American context.[32] If the representativeness of the U.S. Federal bureaucracy is based on its middle class society, its responsiveness flows much from factors other than mere representativeness. Reference has been made to the general American consensus transcending class barriers and covering a wide field of political and social values—and the reflection of this in bureaucratic attitudes. An important element in this consensus is one's general accessibility regardless of class or position and this exposes the bureaucrat to many prevailing winds of opinion and interest. Indeed his sensitivity is heightened to public and professional needs because he moves in and out of the Federal bureaucracy frequently into the private practice of his profession or to private enterprise. In short, a numerically representative bureaucracy may not be possible to establish when torn from its American context except with immense difficulty, and its consequences would be certainly unpredictable and perhaps even undesirable.

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[32] As against the enthusiasm of Norton E. Long, Van Riper has doubts about the exportability of representative bureaucracy and would anyway treat it as only one of several possible devices to ensure democratic administration: *op. cit.*, p. 559.

MEASUREMENT IDENTITY IN THE LONGITUDINAL ANALYSIS OF LEGISLATIVE VOTING*

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Recent advances in data processing technology have made it possible for the political scientist to extend the coordinates of his research space across political systems as well as through time. Without the present-day capacity to retrieve and process speedily the large banks of data accumulated through comparative analyses, such studies would be prohibitively time-consuming, and probably not done at all. As it is the technical hurdles are diminishing in importance, only to be replaced in our attention by the methodological barriers to comparative analysis. In this paper the focus is on one of the basic problems of comparative analysis: the achievement and validation of measurement identity.

Measurement identity refers to the content equivalence of two or more measures and is a key consideration in comparative studies whether the comparison is cross-cultural or historical. Unless there are clear indications of the identity of the measures on which the comparisons are based, such comparisons are meaningless. For the political scientist engaged in cross-cultural research, the problem of measurement identity virtually thrusts itself upon him, since he is already sensitive to differences between culturally different political systems. In contrast, the historical researcher who is working within a single cultural context, and is attuned to the continuity of historical themes, may neglect the measurement identity requirements of his research. The purpose of this paper is to give visibility to this measurement issue as it confronts historical research in the field of legislative behavior. My specific referent is the longitudinal study of legislative voting behavior.[1] A model for the validation of measurement identity will be presented, and subsequently applied to a longitudinal analysis of roll call voting in the United States House of Representatives.

I. LONGITUDINAL ANALYSIS OF LEGISLATIVE VOTING

The foundation for my longitudinal analysis is laid by a series of objective measurements of the legislator's perceptions of roll call propositions advanced at different points in time and his reactions to them. The most commonly employed models of measurement, Guttman scalogram and Thurstone factor analysis, provide orderings of legislators on dimensional continua. When a pattern of voting leads to an ordering of legislators on a common dimension, as a result of that pattern's fit with a measurement model, the pattern is assumed to be the result of the legislator's sharing a common frame of reference. A further assumption is that the sharing of perceptions is made possible by the commonality of the roll call attributes. Thus, the scalar or factoral relationships between roll calls are attributed to shared policy attributes which are perceived in terms of the same policy referent by various legislators. The policy referent (e.g., federal versus local control, civil rights) constitutes the substance of the voting dimensions on which the legislators are ordered according to their positions on the commonly perceived items.

On the assumption that Guttman scalogram and Thurstone factor analysis are valid methods for discovering roll call dimensions, we can turn our attention to the criteria which may be used in establishing dimensional identity over time. The question we are asking is: *How do we know that the policy dimension being measured at time-one by scale X is the same as that being measured by scale Y at time-two?* There are two criteria commonly employed here: (1) the strength of the statistical correlation between the measures taken at different points in time, and (2) the comparability of the content of the roll calls at times one and two. Let us first consider the substantive criterion.

The substantive criterion of dimensional identity comes under suspicion almost immediately since the specific character of the legislative items are rarely identical from one measurement of a voting dimension to the next. Unlike the survey researcher and the psychometrician, the roll call analyst is not given the opportunity to construct the set of items on

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* I am deeply indebted to Professors Warren E. Miller and Philip E. Converse for their critical evaluations and judicious suggestions. My thanks go to the Survey Research Center, The University of Michigan, for the use of its facilities.

[1] For a review of the methodology and literature of roll call voting research see Lee Anderson et al., *Legislative Roll-Call Analysis* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966).

which his measurements are based. Neither can he repeat the measurements utilizing the same set of items. Instead he must base his measurements on items that emerge at the different points in time.

Even if the specific character of the legislative items being used in the time comparison remains the same, there is no assurance of dimensional continuity. There is the very real possibility of a change in the policy context within which the legislation is presented. This in turn may produce a change in the referents employed by the legislators in their consideration of the same piece of legislation. For example, *before* Sputnik, federal aid to education may have been perceived in terms of federal versus local responsibility for educational support. *After* Sputnik the Congressman's vote on federal aid may have been determined by the extent of his concern for the "education gap" between the United States and Russia.

A second and quite different criterion concerns the statistical correlation between measures taken at two different points in time. The correlation criterion of measurement identity is even more difficult to apply to roll call analysis than is the criterion of manifest content. In the application of this criterion a level of correlation must be specified as supporting the conclusion that measurement identity has been achieved. Unfortunately, there is no basis for setting the requisite statistical level. The investigator can only assume that a given correlation is "high enough" and report it to his readers—*caveat emptor*.

I propose to reduce the dependence on criteria of dimensional identity involving the arbitrary specification of acceptable levels of correlation and subjective evaluations of policy content by using a *pattern* of statistical and substantive relationships which extends through time. This pattern is designed to fix each dimensional measure into a context which is substantively and statistically coherent. The two components of this model of analysis are: (1) the analysis of the statistical relationships (a) among measures of roll call dimensions and (b) between dimensional measures and predictor variables; and (2) content analysis of the voting dimensions. The major component of this model is the pattern of statistical relationships and will be discussed first.

The statistical portion of my measurement identity model consists of two interlocking parts: 1) correlations between the measures of the voting dimensions both *within* and *between* Congresses, and 2) correlations between measures of the voting dimensions and measures of other politically relevant variables at the same points in time. The strength of this web of relationships derives from the mutual support one part provides the other. Before considering the web in its entirety, let us consider each of the parts.

A certain pattern of differential correlations may be expected to emerge when measures of voting dimensions constructed on one session are correlated with measures of parallel dimensions in a second session. This is a *pattern in which each measure of a given dimension has a higher correlation with other measures of the same dimension than it has with measures of a different dimension.* In the case where measures of two dimensions have been constructed at two points in time, the pattern of differential correlations is as shown in Figure 1.



FIG. 1. Pattern of correlations between measures at time-1 and time-2.

This pattern is based on two interrelated postulates: 1) correlations between measures of the same dimension must be higher and will have an upper limit of 1.0; 2) correlations between measures of different dimensions should be lower with the limit of zero. As the measurements of the dimensions increase in their validity and reliability these differential tendencies will be clarified. The point is, measures of the same dimension may be expected to be more highly correlated with each other than with measures of different dimensions, and the better the measurements are, the clearer will be the definition of this pattern of relationships within the constraints imposed by the actual underlying pattern.

It will be noted that this model avoids the specification of absolute minimums or maximums providing instead an *expected* pattern of *differential* correlations to which the *observed* pattern may be fitted. Furthermore, it is theoretically possible to extend this model to include as many dimensions and time points as required. The analytic complexity resulting from the extension of the model is always reducible to the simple test applied to the individual measures of the voting dimensions: *Is measure X more highly correlated with other measures of the same dimension than it is with any of the measures of another dimension?*

The complementary segment of the web of statistical relationships used in the validation of dimensional identity consists of the correlations between the measures of the voting dimensions and other quite different but theoretically relevant variables. The expected or model pattern is one in which the indices of the voting dimensions are differentially correlated with the relevant variables and maintain the same pattern over time. Figure 2 presents this pattern as applied to two voting dimensions (A & B) and two differentially associated variables (X & Y) at two points in time:



FIG. 2. Pattern of correlations between voting dimensions and relevant variables.

Variable Y has a stronger correlation (.80) with both measures of dimension A and a weaker correlation (.20) with both measures of dimension B. Variable X, on the other hand, has a stronger correlation with both measures of dimension B but a weaker correlation with the two measures of A.

The assumption underlying this pattern of relationships is that the dimensions of voting differ in the magnitude of their correlations with at least some of the variables thought to be relevant as influences on legislative voting. Consequently, measures of the same dimension, although taken at different points in time, can be expected to maintain the differential pattern in their correlations with the theoretically relevant variables. Similarly, measures of different dimensions may be expected to correlate differently with a given variable and their correlations with this variable may be expected to remain at the same *relative* levels over time.

The model of differential correlations never specifies absolute magnitudes but only relative ones. This allows for the possibility that the correlation between a voting dimension and an associated variable will fluctuate from one measurement to the next as a function of measurement error. Focusing on the relative magnitudes of the correlations does not preclude the distorting effects of measurement unreliability, but it does diminish their influence. Given the extensive correlation network of the model patterns, there is little reason to fear that measurement error will produce spurious fits of the data to the model. There are simply too many pieces that would have to fall into place for this to occur. At the same time it is true that a limitation on the applicability of this correlation pattern model accompanies the reordering of legislators that may take place on a given dimension over a period of time. Such a reordering reduces the correlation between two measures, even though they are highly reliable and valid measures of the same dimension. The overall effect of this limitation is to decrease the likelihood of the data fitting the model, thereby making it a conservative test of measurement identity.

Prior to the selection of the independent variables which are hypothesized as relevant to the voting behavior represented as the voting dimensions, the content of these dimensions must be inspected. This inspection constitutes the second component of our model and is directed toward determining whether the roll calls included in the measures of the voting dimensions may be subsumed under a single policy referent, and whether different policy concerns are reflected in indices of different dimensions. In other words, we do indeed return to the use of a manifest content criterion. When a Guttman scale analysis is employed, this review of the manifest content linked to the voting dimension is straightforward because items are uniquely associated with a single measure. When factor analysis is utilized, the same observations may be made in terms of the major factor loadings of the legislative items.

It was observed earlier that specific legislative proposals may be viewed in an altered context at different points in time. It is also possible that some overlap in manifest content may occur between different dimensions. However, it is reasonable to expect that measures of the same dimension usually include the same kinds of legislative proposals from one time to the next, whereas different dimensions emerge in items of a different character.

The content analysis of the items making up the several voting indices constitutes the final component of this model of measurement identity (or differentiation). When this component is considered in relation to the statistical component, the pattern of correlations among the voting indices and between the voting indices and the relevant variables, a solid basis is provided for an interpretation of the roll call indices. An application of the model follows.

II. AN APPLICATION TO A LONGITUDINAL STUDY

The model of measurement identity was applied to a longitudinal analysis of roll call voting in the United States House of Representatives during the four Congresses of the Eisenhower administration. In each of the four Congresses a minimum of thirty-seven roll call votes was selected from the domestic policy domain. This selection was confined to legislation concerned with socio-economic, regulatory and fiscal policy. These are policy issues commonly thought of in terms of a single liberal-conservative dimension. Contained under the rubric of socio-economic policies are the matters of social welfare, public works, and federal services. The regulatory category includes legislation on labor-management relations, patent rights of private corporations under government contract, and development of natural resources including atomic energy, water power and mineral resources. The fiscal policy category subsumes legislation on debt limitations, revenue policy and interest rates. Excluded from the study are roll calls taken on questions of foreign policy, defense policy and civil rights. In addition, legislation representing the demands of special interests has been set aside; this includes veteran and farm policy, and legislation pertaining to the operation of federal agencies not involved in the policy deliberations to which we have restricted the analysis. These designations of policy domains, and the partial listings of the legislative matters included within them, are provided to assist the reader in his comprehension of the scope of the legislation covered in this study; they do not in any way affect the subsequent analysis.

In addition to the substantive criteria for selecting roll calls, a set of "distributional" criteria were employed for the purpose of collecting as much information as possible while skirting the absurd, such as including roll calls with only one or two members in the minority. Included in the analysis were roll calls on which more than 350 members voted and more than five percent of either party opposed a House majority. In the case of party conflict votes, roll calls were included if at least ten percent of the members of one party deviated from the party position. In addition, a single roll call was selected from any subset characterized by the same content and by highly similar alignments. These criteria were relaxed on occasion to allow the inclusion of relevant roll calls which fell one or two votes off the required distributions.

Separate Guttman scalogram analyses were performed on the roll call set in each of the four Congresses. The technique employed to identify scalable roll call sets was the Lingoes Multiple Scalogram Analysis (MSA) program designed for the 7090 IBM computer. Since a detailed description of the MSA program may be found elsewhere I shall confine my description of its properties to those of relevance to the present roll call analysis.[2]

The MSA program proceeds by searching through the set of items for a scalable subset. Setting aside those items, it makes another pass picking up another scalable subset. This process continues until all of the roll calls are either included in scalable subsets or designated as non-scalar. In each pass the MSA seeks out the set of items which *best fits* the scalar model while satisfying certain minimum criteria. As a consequence of these features of the program, if there is a large pool of items which tap a single dimension, a number of scales may be produced which measure that same dimension. Thus on the first pass the subset of items which best fit the model are selected and on the second search, the best set among the remaining items in the unidimensional pool is selected, with as many iterations as there continue to be items.

The fact that the MSA program may produce a number of scales measuring the same dimension, as well as a set of scales measuring different dimensions, can pose a bothersome interpretive riddle: How does one distinguish the scales measuring a common dimension, with varying degrees of reliability, from scales which are tapping different but correlated dimensions? An example of this kind of situation is provided by the present study. An inspection of the correlations among the scales constructed within each Congress (see Table 1) makes it clear that there is little basis for deciding which scales are measuring the same dimension and which ones are measuring different dimensions—within each Congress. In no case does the correlation between two scales reach such a high level (near 1.0) that it is safe to presume that both are measuring the same dimension. On the other hand, some of the correlations may reflect dimensional commonality if one allows for a certain amount of measurement error. It does seem fairly reasonable to conclude that two or more dimensions are being tapped in each Congress.

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[2] James C. Lingoes, "Multiple Scalogram Analysis," *Educational and Psychological Measurement*, 23 (Autumn 1963), 501–524.

TABLE 1. INTRA-CONGRESS, INTER-SCALE CORRELATIONS*

83rd

	A	B	C	D	E
A	—	.743	.659	.394	.501
B		—	.663	.474	.584
C			—	.739	.669
D				—	.610
E					—

84th

	A	B	C	D
A	—	.806	.472	.396
B		—	.574	.388
C			—	.388
D				—

85th

	A	B	C	D
A	—	.815	.707	.655
B		—	.682	.550
C			—	.503
D				—

86th

	A	B	C	D	E
A	—	.725	.765	.703	.702
B		—	.666	.658	.606
C			—	.846	.868
D				—	.851
E					—

* The matrix entries are "gamma" rank order correlations. See Leo A. Goodman and William H. Kruskal, "Measures of Association for Cross Classifications," *Journal of the American Statistical Association,* 49 (December 1954), p. 749.

However, it is literally impossible to draw the line between the two conditions of measurement identity and measurement differentiation, on the basis of the information provided by Table 1.

The strong correlational ties among the scales constructed in each of the four Congresses is a complicating factor, not only in the discrimination between dimensions in a single Congress, but also in the determination of dimensional identity across Congresses. The reader will recall that my model of measurement identity is dependent on the observation of a differential pattern of correlations to define the measures of the same and of different dimensions. In the present situation in which even the least related scales are quite strongly correlated, and where measurement reliability may be relatively low because of the uncontrolled conditions under which the measurements are taken, the manifest pattern of correlations may be extremely difficult to interpret because of the small differences among the correlations. On the one hand, the statistical constraints between the individual scales limit their capacity to differ in their correlations with other scales and other variables. On the other hand, some of the observed differences in the correlations may be due to measurement error. Thus it may happen that the measurement error associated with each of two scales will equal the maximum difference that is possible in their correlations with a third variable. As a result, the differentials in the underlying pattern of relationship will not be clearly articulated in the correlations among the derived measures.

The means for resolving this statistical quandary has been devised. Although a discussion of these means involves a relatively lengthy detour from the main line of exposition, it is essential. I am confident that the statistical terrain which is covered in this detour is not unique to this study, or to this general field of study, and is therefore of general interest.

III. DETOUR

Clarification of the dimensional structure underlying the scale relationships is dependent on a reduction of the correlations between scales measuring different dimensions, while avoiding a commensurate reduction in the correlations between measures of the same dimension. Since it is expected that the higher correlations are those which obtain between measures of the same dimension, with the weaker ones characterizing the relations between measures of different dimensions, there is the rather paradoxical need to reduce the weaker correlations more than the stronger ones. Surprisingly, this can be accomplished under a specified set of conditions, nor do these conditions appear to be particularly uncommon.

By way of introduction to the necessary conditions, let me briefly indicate the manner in which the reduction in correlations is to be



FIG. 3. Bivariate distributions.

achieved, leaving a fuller description for a later and more appropriate point in the discussion. It consists of setting aside those legislators whose positions on the several scales are most highly correlated. The expectation is that for the residual set of Congressmen, the correlations are not only all reduced, as expected, but reduced in the differential manner described above: *lesser* reductions in the correlations between scales measuring the *same* dimension, *greater* reductions in the correlations between measures of *different* dimensions. Although this generally implies the greatest reduction in the weakest correlations, it is also possible that some of the stronger correlations are between measures of different dimensions. In either case, it is the form of the bivariate distribution underlying the correlation, rather than the strength of the correlation which determines the size of the expected reduction.

Let us examine the form which the bivariate distribution must take to produce a correlation which is both high and relatively resistant to diminution by the physical removal of cases contributing to that correlation. A prime example is the perfect correlation in which each case is located on the regression line. So long as three cases (the minimum necessary to evaluate a bivariate relationship) remain, the correlation will stay at 1.0. The bivariate distribution yielding the perfect correlation is a special case of a more general form characterized by minor deviations of data points all along the regression line, as represented by Form A in Figure 3. Although the selective removal of cases located nearest the regression line would reduce the original correlation, we would not expect the reduction to be anything approaching that which would occur in Form B in Figure 3.

A distribution of Form B is one which is heavily dependent on the cases located at the extremes of the dimension to produce the correlation. Indeed, a concentration of extreme cases about the regression line can produce a rather substantial correlation. By the same token the removal of a few cases from the extreme score positions, where these cases are correlated in their positions on the two variables, can cause a dramatic reduction in the magnitude of the correlation.[3] We expect that the bivariate distribution of measures of the same dimension will approach Form A. Due to measurement error there will be some minor reversals in the ordering, but generally one would expect that each subject will deviate only slightly from his position on the underlying dimension.[4] On the other hand, if the scales are measuring different dimensions, there is no reason to anticipate a parallel ordering of cases, or any other bivariate distribution.

In sum, there is a certain asymmetry in our expectations regarding the forms the bivariate distribution may take for measures of the same and of different dimensions. We expect that when measures of the same dimension are involved, the bivariate distribution will conform to Form A. However, when the correlations are inter-dimensional, the bivariate distribution may assume a variety of forms, including both A and B.

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[3] Hubert M. Blalock, *Social Statistics* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1960), 290–291.

[4] The expectation of minor reversals in ordering on two measures of the same dimension is based, in the present case, on the error characteristics of Guttman scales. In a Guttman scale there is a steeply inverse relationship between the frequency of error response patterns and the number of errors in the patterns. Thus if the Guttman scale is accepted as a reliable representation of legislator ordering on a given dimension, when two such scales tapping the same dimension are correlated, the minor reversals in the orderings will be predominant.

The same asymmetry accompanies the anticipated effects of the correlation reduction operation on the intra-dimensional as opposed to the interdimensional correlation. Since we are fairly certain that scales measuring the same dimension will have bivariate distributions similar to Form A (involving minor deviations from the regression line) we feel fairly confident that the removal of some of the cases contributing to the inter-scale correlations will leave the original correlation relatively intact. We are much less certain of the impact of a similar operation, involving the removal of the same number of cases, on the correlation between measures of different dimensions. If the original correlation is highly dependent on the extreme cases as in the Form B distribution, the removal of some of these cases will have a sharply depressing effect on the magnitude of the correlation. As the inter-dimensional correlation distribution approaches the A form, the reduction in the correlation will be less. However, we anticipate that measures of different dimensions will not match the measures of the same dimension in their fit to Form A. Certainly the odds of success favor our entry into the next phase of the analysis, that of assaying the differential reduction in the inter-scale correlations.

IV. REDUCING THE CORRELATIONS

Earlier in the discussion of the correlation reduction operation, I stated that those legislators whose positions on the scales are highly correlated would be set aside. This operation was performed on each of the Congresses and consisted of three phases: 1) the definition of the negative and positive poles on each scale, 2) the division of scale scores into positive and negative scores, and 3) the sorting out of all Congressmen who either scored positively on all scales, or negatively on all.

The definition of negative and positive poles of the scales in each Congress proceeds by fiat for the first scale but is determined for the remaining scales by the correlations between them, i.e., the poles of the scales are designated so as to maximize the positive correlations between them. Once the positive and negative poles have been established, there remains the determination of which scale scores are positive and which are negative. This is needed in order to sort out the consistently "negative" and consistently "positive" legislators. For our purposes we could probably do well enough by using the median as the cutting point. However, the alternative chosen in this study is less arbitrary. At the most presumptive level, the cutting point we use may be designated as zero point of the scale where this refers to a central point of origin for the positive and negative positions on a bi-polar dimension. It is highly comparable to the notion of the zero point of an attitude scale that divides the *anti* from the *pro* attitude positions.[5]

Our designation of a zero point follows from the finding that the function described by computing the *ratio of the number of cases observed in each perfect scale pattern* to the *number expected by chance* (computed from the item marginals) is nearly always of a U-shape with a single scale position at its minimum. (This assumes an *ordering* of scale patterns by scale score.) See Figure 4.

The U-shape function of score distributions is a general characteristic pertaining to the scoring of subjects on dichotomous items. Guilford observed the same phenomenon in relation to the strength of item intercorrelations, "As item intercorrelations increase, the distribution of total scores grows flatter, from mesokurtic to platykurtic, to rectangular, to bimodal and finally U-shaped."[6] The relatively late arrival of the U-shape in Guilford's description follows from his attention to score frequencies. When these score frequencies are taken in ratio to the frequencies expected by chance (observed: expected), the resultant probability ratio function is already rectangular (all probability ratios at 1.0) when the items are independent. The function assumes a convex form when the items are mutually positively correlated.

The rationale underlying this designation of a zero point, generalizable to other index forms utilizing dichotomized items, is based on the assumption of a bi-polar dimension. The more polarized the population is, the steeper the sides of the probability ratio function become. In the condition of maximum polarization, the function assumes an "open box" form

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[5] Edward S. Suchman, "The Intensity Component in Attitude and Opinion Research" in *Studies in Social Psychology in World War II*, Vol. IV (Measurement and Prediction), S. A. Stouffer (Ed.), (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1950).

[6] J. P. Guilford, *Psychometric Methods*, 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1954), p. 360.

FIG. 4. Probability ratio function.



Scores: Perfect Scale Patterns	*Expected*	*Observed*	*Probability/Ratio Observed Expected*
0	.12	25	208.33
1	1.04	48	46.20
2	2.72	22	8.10
3	4.60	21	4.60
4	6.12	6	0.98
5	6.35	4	0.60 <0-point
6	5.86	7	1.20
7	4.44	14	3.20
8	3.08	100	32.50

(└──┘) which reflects the concentration of cases at the polar extremes. One would argue in this case that the minimum of the function denotes the zero point on a bi-polar dimension. Extrapolating from this extreme case I am for the moment equally willing to argue that the minimum of the function continues to perform the same service when the polarization is not so sharp. Beyond the moment and the purposes at hand, I would strongly recommend that the general validity of this representation of the zero point be subjected to a more formal analysis than is presently available. A more detailed exposition of my argu-

TABLE 2. CORRELATION REDUCTION: 83RD CONGRESS

(a)

	Pre-reduction correlations (N = 475)						Post-reduction correlations (N = 266)				
	A	B	C	D	E		A	B	C	D	E
A	—	.743	.659	.394	.501	A	—	.616	.289	.006	−.037
B		—	.663	.474	.584	B		—	.344	.160	.151
C			—	.739	.669	C			—	.675	.362
D				—	.610	D				—	.328
E					—	E					—

(b)

	Absolute decrements						Proportional decrements				
	A	B	C	D	E		A	B	C	D	E
A	—	.127	.370	.388	.538	A	—	.17	.56	.98	1.07
B		—	.319	.314	.433	B		—	.48	.66	.74
C			—	.064	.307	C			—	.09	.46
D				—	.282	D				—	.46
E					—	E					—

ment may be found elsewhere;[7] the more formal analysis is in process.

Employing the minimum of the probability ratio function as the positive-negative watershed, I set aside those legislators who occupied a positive position on all the scales constructed on a single Congress, as well as those occupying a negative position on every scale. As an example of the efficacy of the technique, the pre- and post-reduction correlations for the 83rd Congress are presented in Table 2(a); in Table 2(b) is shown the absolute as well as the proportional decrement in each of the correlations.

As anticipated, the general effect of the correlation reduction sort was to reduce the lower correlations more than the higher correlations. Thus, before the sort was performed, the highest correlation was .743 whereas after the sort the highest was .675, a decrease of only .068. In contrast, the lowest correlation before the reduction was .394, after the sort it was −.037, a decrease of .431.

Closer inspection of the post-reduction matrix reveals that the sorting process has laid bare the communality of scale A with scale B, and of scale C with scale D. There is also an absence of a strong relationship between the two pairs. This pattern was suggested by the original correlations, but is illuminated in the post-reduction correlation matrix. The fact that the post-reduction correlation matrix reveals the same general pattern as the pre-reduction matrix suggests that the procedure provides a clarification of the existing order rather than being a distorting intrusion.[8]

V. LONGITUDINAL RELATIONSHIPS

At the conclusion of the correlation reduction operation, I had in hand a set of House members in each Congress on which the pattern of interscalar relationships had been sharpened. In order to look at the scalar relationships across Congresses to test them against the longitudinal validity model, it was necessary to define a more restricted subset of Congressmen who were members in all four Congresses. This definition consisted of setting aside all House members who had been sorted out in

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[7] Aage R. Clausen, "Policy Dimensions in Congressional Roll Calls: A Longitudinal Analysis," (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1964), pp. 108–119.

[8] I want to emphasize that this procedure for clarifying statistical relationships is not being presented as a measurement innovation of widespread utility. It is useful in the present case; it *may* be useful in other analyses of roll call voting. Perhaps the strongest feature of this correlation reduction technique is that it does not simply reduce *all* correlations by eliminating the significant variance on each measure. As we shall presently observe, the differential pattern of correlations involve substantial variations in the magnitude of the correlations.

TABLE 3. INTER-SCALE CORRELATIONS FOR CONTINUOUS MEMBERSHIP 83RD-86TH CONGRESS

N = 149

	85-D	86-E	84-B	84-A	83-D	83-C	83-E	86-C	86-D	85-A	85-B	86-A	83-B	84-C	86-B	85-C	83-A	84-D
85-D	—	72	68	71	60	66	56	59	46	39	25	21	21	12	10	12	08	10
86-E		—	72	68	54	56	61	63	53	49	31	37	25	14	11	20	09	21
84-B			—	70	59	68	52	53	42	43	27	32	34	21	20	25	19	06
84-A				—	68	64	52	66	46	41	17	24	25	08	11	09	11	02
83-D					—	69	51	54	26	14	−07	−04	04	−18	−20	−17	−13	03
83-C						—	55	43	40	35	20	21	27	10	14	15	18	01
83-E							—	45	35	34	15	15	22	02	−02	02	−04	21
86-C								—	44	38	−01	24	24	−09	−03	−21	06	13
86-D									—	59	34	33	29	06	14	13	35	−14
85-A										—	64	62	46	51	42	55	45	−06
85-B											—	51	44	27	46	50	35	00
86-A												—	53	60	58	59	53	11
83-B													—	55	51	44	53	04
84-C														—	69	62	61	−06
86-B															—	71	60	01
85-C																—	52	11
83-A																	—	−06
84-D																		—

Cluster X

Cluster Y

Average Within Cluster Correlation
Cluster X = .61
Cluster Y = .53
Average Between Cluster Correlation
.12

the reduction process in three out of the four Congresses in our study.[9]

On this continuous membership base, correlations were obtained between all the scales constructed in the four Congresses. These correlations were arranged in a matrix in a manner which would define the inter-scalar correlational structure (Table 3). The emergent structure consisted of two distinct scale clusters, two scales (86-D, 85-A) whose relationships to either of the two clusters were too mixed to warrant their inclusion in either, and one scale (84-D) which was not correlated with any other scale to any significant degree.

Two aspects of this correlation matrix are of particular interest. First, there is the marked clustering effect with two clusters accounting for 15 of the 18 scales. The clarity of these cluster formations is reflected in the high averages (.61 and .53) of the within-cluster correlations and the low average (.12) of the between-cluster correlations. This strongly suggests the presence of two dimensions of voting behavior. Secondly, there is the presence

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[9] This definition of the analytic subset might have involved one, two, or four Congresses as well as three. In the present case, the selection criterion involved three Congresses because this was the minimum number necessary to provide the required differentiation in the pattern of inter-scale correlations.



FIG. 5. Pattern of longitudinal relations for measures of dimensions *X* and *Y*.

of at least one scale from each Congress in each of the clusters. This suggests the longitudinal extension of the two dimensions throughout the Eisenhower administration.

Given our interest in longitudinal analysis, which is facilitated by using the measures providing the most reliable comparisons of legislative voting over time, it is advantageous to select from each Congress the two scales which are the most reliable measures of the two dimensions. The remaining scales are useful only for the information they provide on the content of the two dimensions, to be considered later. The test for the relative reliability of the scales involves an expansion of the subject base on which the inter- and intra-dimensional correlations are computed. This is accomplished by returning to the post-reduction matrices in each Congress. Since these were based on the separate Congresses, and not restricted by any continuous membership definition, they provided a membership base approximately twice that of the continuous membership set used in the longitudinal correlations. From the post-reduction matrices, I selected those scales which showed the strongest intra-dimensional and weakest inter-dimensional correlations. For example, from the 83rd Congress scale A was selected from the highly correlated pairing, A and B (see Table 2a), and scale D was selected from the pairing, C and D, to represent the two dimensions suggested by the two pairings. Scale A was selected from the A-B pairing because of its relatively low correlation with scales C and D; similarly scale D was selected from the C-D pairing because of its relatively low correlation with scales A and B. Note that the correlation of .006 between scales A and D is the lowest of the four correlations between the members of the two pairings A-C, A-D, B-C, B-D). Comparable, but independent, operations were performed on each of the four Congresses to select the set of scales to be used in the remainder of the analysis; their longitudinal pattern of correlations is shown in Figure 5.

A visual penetration of the maze of lines showing the 28 correlations is aided by observing that the solid exterior lines join the scales which measure the same dimension at different points in time whereas the internal broken lines represent all of the possible inter-dimensional correlations. The average correlation for the intra-dimensional relationships is .63 to be contrasted with the −.01 average for the inter-dimensional correlations. Nor are these "average" correlations obscuring any overlap in the magnitude of the intra- and inter-dimensional correlations. The range in the first instance is from .54 to .72 and in the second instance from −.20 to .12, a difference of .42 between the lowest correlation in the intra-dimensional set and the highest among the inter-dimensional correlations. When one considers the many elements which may enter to reduce the reliability of the measures taken at points in time as far apart as eight years, this pattern of relationships is remarkable, and suggests a high degree of order in Congressional perceptions and responses to roll call stimuli.

On the basis of these formal statistical relationships we are prepared to view the manifest content of the scales within a bi-dimensional framework. Although it is clearly beyond the scope of this paper to provide a detailed discussion of the substantive character of the two dimensions, I can indicate the major points of difference and similarity which appear to underlie the different patterns of voting. Due to space limitations I cannot list all the items identified with the two dimensions. Instead, a partial listing is provided which consists of items drawn from subject matter areas uniquely identified with one of the two dimensions.

Economic Policy (Dimension X)	*Welfare Policy (Dimension Y)*
Health Insurance Plan	Hospital construction
Rural Telephone Subsidy	Unemployment Compensation
National Debt Limit	Tidelands
Public Land Management	Mexican Farm Labor
Atomic Energy	Minimum Wage
Public Power	Municipalities Loan Fund
Postal Rates	Fed. Preemp. Doc. Modification
Federal Securities trading	Federal Employee Raise
Gov't Defense Work to Private Sector	Labor Department
	Labor Union Restrictions
Monetary Policy Study	Govt. or pvt. ownership of NASA Research Patents
Federal Airport Construction	
Irrigation Acreage Limit	Auth. of Fed. Res. Bd. to Ease Reserve Requirements

An inspection of the items located on these two dimensions clearly suggests a substantive differentiation between them. To indicate what I believe to be the nature of the substantive difference I have called one of the dimensions "Economic Policy" and the other "Welfare Policy." The items located on the Economic Policy dimension represent attempts to define the public and private sectors of the economy, to stipulate the degree of control to be exercised by the federal government over the private elements of the economic system and to establish fiscal policy. In contrast, the dominant theme of the Welfare Policy dimension is that of individual and social welfare.

The validation of the two voting dimensions rests presently on the pattern of correlations between the indices of the two dimensions and the content of the roll calls included in the indices. The Miller-Stokes study of representation provides a most unusual opportunity for a subsequent validation of the two dimensions within the attitude-vote context.[10] In this study, probability samples of the members of the House in the 85th and 86th Congresses were asked the following policy questions:

1) "Do you approve the use of federal funds for *public housing* or do you generally feel that housing can be taken care of better by private effort?"
2) "Do you think the federal government ought to sponsor programs such as large public works in order to maintain *full employment* or do you think that problems of economic readjustment ought to be left more to private industry or state and local governments?"
3) "Do you think the government should provide grants to the states for the construction and operation of *public schools* or do you think the support of public schools should be left entirely to the state and local governments?"
4) "How about the controversy over the development of atomic power. Do you think the government should develop power from *atomic energy* or do you think this should be left to private industry?"

The correlations between these items, based on the set of representatives in the 85th Congress who remained after the reduction sort, is shown in Table 4.

The correlation matrix reveals a cluster of three items, namely, education, housing, and employment, which are relatively highly correlated with each other as compared to their correlation with the fourth item, atomic energy. The last item reflects the same policy concern as the atomic energy roll calls which were uniquely identified with the Economic Policy dimension in the voting analysis. The first three items express a concern with social welfare which is comparable to that represented in the roll calls located on the Welfare Policy dimension.

This finding impels the subsequent analytic stratagem of utilizing the first three attitude items as a measure of Welfare Policy attitudes, while reserving the single item on atomic energy as an indicator of the Economic Policy attitude dimension. Both measures are then related to the scalar representations of the two voting dimensions. This examination of the correspondence between the attitude and

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[10] Warren E. Miller and Donald D. Stokes, *Representation in Congress* (forthcoming book to be published by Prentice-Hall).

TABLE 4. ATTITUDE ITEM CORRELATIONS

	Housing	Education	Employment	Atomic Energy
Housing	—	.468	.395	.110
Education		—	.426	.121
Full Employment			—	.037
Atomic Energy				—

vote dimensions marks our entry into the last stage of our validity analysis: *the correlation of voting dimensions with theoretically relevant policy variables to test whether a pattern of differential correlations emerges which conforms to the expected model pattern* (see Figure 2) *and remains constant over time.*

The Miller-Stokes representation study provides interviews with a probability sample of both the 85th and 86th Congresses, thus allowing us to examine the pattern of attitude-vote correlations over time (Figure 6). In each Congress the policy attitude measure is more highly correlated with its roll call counterpart than it is with the other dimension. The differences in the correlations of the Welfare Policy attitude measure with the two voting dimensions are .476 in the 85th Congress and .316 in the 86th Congress. The comparable differences for the Economic Policy attitude measure are .434 and .265. (Note: In Figure 6 and in the statistical presentations that follow, when the signs of the coefficients are reversed the algebraic difference is computed. Hence, the negative correlation should be read as a "lesser positive" correlation. This follows from the fact that the original correlations were all positive but as a result of the correlation reduction procedure, some of the correlations were reduced below zero, so to speak.)

In addition to the congruence between the attitude and voting measures, further evidence that two distinct dimensions of voting behavior have been measured is provided by the persistence of the differences in the correlation between partisan affiliation and the two dimensions. This correlation was computed for each of the four Congresses, using as a base the set of representatives remaining after the correlation reduction sort. This means that the population varies from Congress to Congress for there is no requirement of membership continuity when the Congresses are treated independently. Despite this source of variation the clearest and most consistent results emerge (Figure 7).

My investigation of the voting dimension correlates is concluded by an analysis of the correlations of two constituency characteristics with the two voting dimensions. The constituency characteristics are industrialization and urbanization. A measure of industrialization was derived from Congressional Quarterly figures on the blue collar percentage of the working force in each Congressional district; the urbanization measure reflects the urban-rural balance via a calculation of the difference between the urban and rural proportions of each district, setting aside the proportion of the district considered by the Congressional Quarterly as suburban. The correlations between these indices and the voting dimension measures is presented in Table 5.

FIG. 6. Attitude-vote.*



* It should be noted that the findings shown here emerge despite there having been no opportunity to formulate the attitude items with the express purpose of tapping the two dimensions. As a matter of fact, the same four items have been used in the Miller-Stokes study as a single measure of social welfare attitudes. Their utilization of the four items was justified in that they satisfied the standard requirements of the Guttman scalar model when applied to the total sample. Only by virtue of the correlation reduction sort is it recognized that two policy dimensions are present; when all Congressmen are brought into the correlation analysis this is not at all obvious.

FIG. 7. Party-vote.*

Vote Measures of Economic Policy Dimensions



Vote Measures of Welfare Policy Dimension

* The extremely high correlations of the Economic Policy measures with party must be understood in terms of the gamma statistic being used. This statistic allows for the possibility of considerable within-party variation in scale position so long as there is no overlap across party lines. The distribution of the Economic-Policy scale scores by party in the 85th Congress illustrates this point:

	Anti		Government Activity				Pro
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6
Republicans	17	51	14	1	5	—	1
Democrats	2	1	14	16	30	29	26

gamma = .917

Thus, although the Economic Policy dimension is highly related to party it is by no means simply a matter of party line voting.

The correlation of the two constituency characteristics with the Welfare Policy scales is the expected one of greater urbanization and industrialization leading to greater support for social welfare activity on the part of the federal government. Furthermore, both measures are consistently more highly related to the Welfare Policy than to the Economic Policy dimension. In light of the model pattern of differential correlations we propose as a test for dimensional identity and differentiation, it is significant to note that the urbanization-industrialization factors are most highly associated with the voting dimension which is least highly associated with party. Thus party is most highly associated with the Economic Policy dimension whereas the character of the district seems more relevant for voting on social welfare policies.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

In conclusion let me briefly retrace my steps with an occasional pause to mark the trail more clearly. I began by selecting a set of items of similar content in four successive Congresses. Independent scale analyses were performed within each Congress. Correlations between the scales, both within and between the Congresses, revealed a bi-dimensional structure. Finally, the scales which best represented the bi-dimensional structure were correlated with theoretically relevant variables to complete the test of their conformity to the model pattern of differential correlations.

Perhaps the best way to appreciate the severity of the validity test implied by the procedure followed is to consider an alternate strategy. Instead of performing simultaneous but independent scale analyses of the four Congresses, I might have initiated the analysis by performing a single scale analysis on the first and earliest Congress. On the basis of that analysis, the roll calls in the succeeding Congress could have been classified prior to the scaling operation so as to promote the construction of scales with the strongest substantive and statistical ties to those built in the first Congress. This procedure might then have been extended to the two remaining Congresses. However, this would have meant incorporating the longitudinal validation into the scale construction stage of the analysis. Instead, two independent operations were performed: the construction of the scales in

TABLE 5. INDUSTRIALIZATION AND URBANIZATION BY ROLL CALL VOTE

Vote Measures of Economic Policy Dimension



Vote Measures of Welfare Policy Dimension

Vote Measures of Economic Policy Dimension



Vote Measures of Welfare Policy Dimension

each Congress, and the subsequent longitudinal validation of those scales.

The longitudinal validation of the scales built in the several Congresses was complicated by the relatively high correlations between the least highly related scales. This necessitated the introduction of a somewhat unusual method for clarifying the statistical relationships among the measures of the voting dimensions. The method consisted of setting aside those House members whose positions on the voting indices were relatively highly correlated, and performing the validation analysis on the remaining legislators.

One may ask whether the findings based on the "residual" set of Congressmen can be generalized to those legislators excluded from the longitudinal analysis. My affirmative conclusion is based on the theory of Guttman scaling. This theory holds that when a set of items (roll calls) conforms to the Guttman scalogram model, it implies the existence of a single dimension extending to all members of the test population (members of the House). Accordingly, the voting dimensions validated for one set of House members should be equally applicable to any other set. There does remain the possibility that the separation of the legislators into two sets has inadvertently resulted in two groups with unequal rates of response error. If one of these groups exhibits a high rate of error, which was balanced off in the scaling of the entire membership by the very low rate of error in the second group, there would be reason to suspect that the high error set was not scalable on the same dimension as the low error set. Hence, in the present situation, the Congressmen excluded from the validation analysis might be characterized by a rate of response error which is so high as to raise doubts about generalizing the dimensional structure of the *residual* set to them. In brief, the facts of the matter are quite the opposite in that the excluded set of Congressmen displayed a somewhat lower error count than their colleagues on whom the validation was performed.

My confidence in this methodology is supported by the coherence of the findings. The evidence is most impressive in support of the measurement of two dimensions of roll call voting behavior where only one (the liberal-conservative) is generally thought to exist. Furthermore, the evidence supports the continuous presence of two separate dimensions over a period of eight years, despite the changes that can occur in such a time span. Consider, for example, the personnel turnover alone. This was fairly substantial, as indicated by the shift in the partisan balance from one which narrowly awarded the Republicans with House control (221–213) to one which abundantly indulged the Democratic party (283–154). Add to this the personnel changes resulting from more idiosyncratic sources of tenure termination. Yet despite these personnel changes, the relationships among the indices of legislative voting, and between them and associated variables, maintained a consistent pattern. This was true whether the pattern was observed for the continuous membership or the more variable membership represented by the four separate Congresses.

The validation of the measures of the voting dimensions which has been accomplished in this study is in a sense no more than a preliminary phase of a longitudinal analysis of roll call voting behavior. Although this "preliminary" analysis provides a delineation of voting dimensions, and an examination of their correlations with other theoretically relevant variables, the most productive part of the longitudinal analysis is yet to be engaged. At hand is the opportunity to specify the conditions under which legislators stabilize in their positions on voting dimensions as well as the influences productive of changing positions. Similarly, an analysis of the representation provided for a given constituency by different individuals, with or without concomitant changes in the partisanship of the representation, may be performed with reference to the positions of the legislators on a single dimension extending through time.

The ability to follow a voting dimension through time is complemented by the capacity to observe its disappearance. Thus, we are in a position to study the life of a dimension, possibly to observe the continuing relevance of a given dimension for the older generation of legislators and the emergence of different dimensions of greater relevance for the younger generation. How indeed does a legislature adapt to changing circumstances? Is it only through the infusion of new members or is it assisted by the capacity of legislators to revise their responses to the changing environment? If this revision does take place, does it occur through the employment of different frames of reference or do attitudes change along the same dimension?

It is beyond the limits of this paper to lay out all the possibilities of longitudinal analysis; my few suggestions have but scratched the surface. At the same time, I feel it worthwhile to emphasize the point which this paper has attempted to make, that a longitudinal analysis requires the greatest care in the identification and the validation of the measures used to represent voting behavior at different points in time. It is my conviction that if the full potentials of historical analysis of legislative voting behavior are to be realized, we can do no less.

POLITICAL RECRUITMENT: THE CASE OF JAPANESE PREFECTURAL ASSEMBLYMEN*

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This paper is an attempt to specify and assess the significance of a variety of factors that condition the recruitment of Japanese prefectural assemblymen. The term recruitment is used here to refer to the entire process involved in a person's induction into a position. Since the aspirants must formally undertake candidacy for the prefectural assembly elections, this paper is in essence concerned with those factors which significantly shape the processes of their candidacy and elections.

Data used here were gathered in Japan during the period of June, 1965 to February, 1966 and are mostly of three kinds: 1) official documents such as election returns, 2) semi-official surveys and polls concerning electoral behavior, and 3) data obtained through interviews which the author conducted with a sample of prefectural assemblymen and other local government officials in Chiba and Kanagawa prefectures.[1] Whenever pertinent and available, comparable data regarding other prefectures and Japan as a whole will be given. They serve as norms whereby the data on Chiba and Kanagawa can be appropriately evaluated.

I. CANDIDACY

Motivation. At the outset, we need to examine the basic question of why some people decide to undertake candidacy. Motivational data, particularly those psychodynamic in nature, are simply unavailable. The limited discussion of this question which follows is based on the interview data. A few open-ended questions were used and the responses were extemporaneous, but the answers represent consciously-formulated reasons for the candidates' political interest and involvement. Socialist Party (SP hereafter) members, who, by the way, usually claim to have been drafted for candidacy, held different kinds of objectives at the time of their candidacy: Some sought the office in order to promote the interests of their labor unions, while others sought to extend their party influence into a predominantly Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) district. An SP member attributed his initial political interest to his study of "theory of class" and "socio-economic problems." Another SP member related how his prisoner-of-war experience made him aware of the plight of the ruled and aroused his political consciousness. One SP member conceived and sought the office as a means of livelihood which would make his active involvement in politics possible. Another explained his candidacy in terms of the sense of duty he felt.

The responses of Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) members somewhat resemble those of the SP counterparts. Most interviewees explained their candidacies in terms of local labor union interests, whereas one member attributed his candidacy to a sense of public service. This particular interviewee traced the beginning of his interest in politics to the readings of his student days, while the others gave their local unions greater weight in arousing and sustaining the level of their political interest and participation. The lack of reference to the role of party organization is striking.

The objective of Kōmei Party (KP) candidates is clear. The incumbents interviewed all recited that their involvement in politics, sanctioned by their religious doctrine, aimed at the welfare and prosperity of the masses. The chairman of Kanagawa prefectural party said that the restrictive powers of prefectural government he experienced as a city councilman impelled him to seek a seat in the prefectural assembly. The impotence of prefectural government in the face of the power of the national government now makes it necessary for him to seek a seat in the House of Represen-

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* I would like to thank Professors G. Almond, R. Beardsley, S. Hoki, T. Nakano, R. Scalapino, K. Steiner, J. Wahlke and R. Ward for their valuable comments and assistance given at different stages of the author's research on Japanese prefectural government and politics. This paper is part of a forthcoming larger study.

[1] Interviews were conducted with 164 persons, most of whom are officials of national, prefectural, city and town governments. A total of twenty prefectural assemblymen, representing all the parliamentary groups in the two prefectural assemblies, were interviewed. There is one Communist Party member represented in the Kanagawa Assembly, who refused interview. Interviews in most cases lasted two to three hours.

tatives. His point is that any significant improvement in the welfare of the masses must await KP's attainment of power at the national level.

As for LDP incumbents, reference to altruistic motives is generously absent. They tend to explain their initial interest and current involvement in politics primarily in personal terms. No clientele group is named as the intended beneficiary of their successful candidacy. Even the notion of promoting their local interest is hardly mentioned as a reason for their candidacy. During the interview, an LDP member could only recall nostalgically his now deceased patron; another declared that he first got into politics by mistake by allowing himself to be pressured into seeking an office of mayor and then he sought the present post to avoid the exacting burden and responsibility of a town mayor. For some elderly LDP members the attainment of office appeared to have been something men of their socio-economic and familial status are entitled to.

For SP members, as compared with LDP members, personal motivation is submerged, verbally at least, and the party and labor union serve as meaningful reference groups. Their realistic appraisal of dependence on the party or union for elections may account for this. KP members in general appear to be imbued with a sense of mission and their apparent belief in the righteousness of their cause may help sublimate the personal dimension.

If it is difficult to probe into the nature of motivation, it is less difficult to note the intensity with which a seat is desired. Indirect evidence in this connection is the proportion of the incumbents who voluntarily retire. Examination of the record between 1955 and 1963 reveals a small incidence of voluntary retirement. About ten to fifteen percent of the membership in Kanagawa and Chiba assemblies retire, usually after serving two terms, and the remainder desires and attempts with high degree of success to return to the assembly.[2] Another indication of the strength of desire for the office is the tenacity with which previously unsuccessful candidates stand for the elections. In Kanagawa, at the time of the 1959 election, seven previously unsuccessful candidates were running for the second time and four were successful at their second try. In the 1963 election, two candidates tried for the third time with success. Eleven candidates were running for the second time and two were successful. Three successful candidates in 1963 were ex-assemblymen who had been defeated in 1959. In Chiba, at the 1959 election, out of fifteen candidates trying for the second time, seven won the seats. As of the 1963 election, out of eleven who tried for the second time three were successful.[3] The above data indicate steady availability of aspirants, and that whatever the motivations, the candidates exhibit strong desire for the office.

Party Nominee vs. Independent. Having decided to undertake candidacy, a candidate must decide whether to run as an independent or as a party nominee. Perusal of the three elections of 1955, 1959 and 1963 shows that independent candidates comprise 28 to 31% of the total candidates in Kanagawa, and 14 to 30% in Chiba.[4] The decision to run as an independent reflects, in some cases, the genuine conviction of the candidates, but perhaps more frequently it reflects electoral strategy. In other cases, candidates have no choice because they cannot obtain a party nomination due to such factors as factional rivalries within local party organization.

The decision to seek party nomination varies with the perceived degree of one's dependence on party support. As will be discussed later in some detail, the perceived degree of candidates' dependence on party organization is generally low and the degree of dependence varies with one's party affiliation, with SP and KP members ranking high, followed by DSP and LDP, in that order.

As a crude indirect test of the value of party label in obtaining votes, we may compare the independents and party nominees with regard to their respective rates of getting elected. Table 1 shows that one's chances of getting elected are far greater for party nominees, especially in Kanagawa prefecture.

The proportion of successful independents among the entire field of winning candidates (i.e., the total membership of a prefectural assembly) is given below, together with nation-

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[2] Computed from the following sources: Kanagawa Ken Senkyo Kanri Iinkai, *Chihō Senkyo no Kiroku* (hereafter CSNK), 1955, pp. 54–61; *CSNK*, 1959, pp. 49–54; *CSNK*, 1963, pp. 79–84; Chiba Ken Senkyo Kanri Iinkai, *Senkyo Kekka Shirabe* (hereafter SKS), 1955, pp. 118–129; *SKS*, 1959, pp. 74–83; *SKS*, 1963, pp. 51–60.

[3] *Ibid.*

[4] *CSNK*, 1955, pp. 64–65; *CSNK*, 1959, pp. 54–55; *CSNK*, 1963, p. 85; *SKS*, 1955, pp. 112–113; *SKS*, 1959, p. 61; *SKS*, 1963, p. 38. There are three legal requirements for candidacy: the minimum age of 25, residence in a locality for three consecutive months and a deposit of ¥30,000.

TABLE 1. RELATIVE PROPORTIONS OF INDEPENDENTS AND PARTY NOMINEES ELECTED

	1955		1959		1963	
	Ind.*	P.N.†	Ind.	P.N.	Ind.	P.N.
Kanagawa	23.2%	53.3%	31.4%	71.3%	46.5%	66.7%
Chiba	31.4	50.5	22.2	52.2	48.1	58.6

* Independents = winning independents/total number of independent candidates.
† Party Nominees = winning party nominees/total number of party nominees.

wide data.[5] The nationwide data indicate the decreasing trend in the proportion of independents among the successful candidates, and this is usually taken to mean an increasing politicization of prefectural governmental process. With regard to the two prefectures under study, it is difficult to discern a clear trend, but it is at least demonstrated that the independents constitute a distinct minority within the legislatures.

How Nominations are Made.

A) Who decides: With regard to the LDP, SP and DSP, the party organization in each electoral district does in fact make a decision. The candidates recommended are then routinely approved by party prefectural headquarters. The national party headquarters exert no control over nominations.[6] In the case of KP, prefectural party officials, especially the chairman of the prefectural office, play an active part in the selection of candidates. The recommendees are then subject to the approval of national party headquarters. The control by the national headquarters in this case is not a mere formality, for some recommendees have actually been rejected.

TABLE 2. PROPORTION OF WINNING INDEPENDENTS AMONG THE TOTAL NUMBER OF SUCCESSFUL CANDIDATES

	Kanagawa	Chiba	All-Japan
1955	14.9%	21.0%	32.8%
1959	15.1%	6.3%	15.7%
1963	25.0%	20.3%	12.7%

B) Eligibility for Party Nominations: Interviews with ranking party officials as well as with legislators themselves point to the employment of a rather flexible and informal set of criteria in nomination. As do other parties, the LDP gives priority to incumbents, and in the case of new candidates the party prefers that they have held some public office or that they be celebrities for other reasons. The DSP nominees in Kanagawa are expected to have had a satisfactory record of service in party posts, to enjoy confidence in and out of the party organization, and to be competent to carry on the work of a legislator. The DSP candidates in Chiba are subject to a much less stringent test. SP candidates must meet the following criteria: 1) willingness to obey and abide by party regulations and directives and 2) a minimum of two years of party work. In the case of a man with labor union background, the latter rule may be waived. Kōmei party nomination is given to those faithful and devout believers of many years standing who have demonstrated their grasp of the true meaning and basic principles of Buddhism, who have actively provided "correct" leadership, and who have gained the confidence of the members of the *Sōka Gakkai.*

The fact that the incumbents are generally given priority over new candidates has an important implication. The number of opportunities available to new candidates is limited. An examination of election data of 1959 and 1963 in Kanagawa and Chiba indicates that the incumbent candidates accounted for about one half of the total number of candidates. Breakdown of the data by party shows that the proportion of incumbent candidates is especially high in the case of LDP. As for the SP and

[5] *SKS*, 1955, pp. 114–117; *SKS*, 1959, p. 85; *SKS*, 1963, p. 62; *CSNK*, 1955, pp. 68–69; *CSNK*, 1959, p. 68; *CSNK*, 1963, pp. 92–94. Jichishō (Senkyo Kyoku). *Chihō Senkyo Kekka Shirabe*, 1963, p. 15.

[6] This is not to deny the incidence of intervention by national Diet members or of the prefectural party headquarters' taking a more active part. In the case of Kanagawa, the local chapters of labor unions sometimes participate in the nomination process. The writer was impressed by discrepancies in the views held among legislators and party officials. They were not altogether clear where the formal authority in nomination matters lie, though all agreed that the district party organization in fact makes the decision.

DSP, the proportion of *new* candidates is slightly larger, particularly in Chiba. In the case of independents, the proportion of new candidates is far greater than that of incumbent candidates.[7] This is so partly because of a high degree of absorption of independents by the LDP following elections. Thus, the opportunities available to new candidates are especially limited among LDP members.

II. ELECTIONS

Ability to obtain votes may be viewed as a function of the following sets of factors: 1) electoral system and other circumstantial variables related to the mechanism of election; 2) general political orientations, such as the degree of political interest and role perceptions; and 3) kinds and strength, objective and perceived, of sources of influence that are brought to bear upon the voters. The third category may be subdivided into two; one is concerned with the voters' orientations regarding such influences, the other with the candidates' orientations.

Electoral System. The first set of factors subsumes the size and nature of electoral district, the number of obtained votes necessary for elections, the ratio of competition, and the incidence of non-contest. Each county (Gun) or city within a prefecture constitutes an electoral district for the prefectural assembly. In the case of major cities like Yokohama, each ward serves as an electoral district. The number of assembly seats allocated to each district is determined by prefectural ordinances in proportion to population.[8] The following table shows the varying size of electoral districts in the two prefectures under study as of the 1963 elections.

TABLE 3. THE NUMBER OF ELECTORAL DISTRICTS AND SEATS ALLOCATED

Chiba		Kanagawa	
Number of Seats Allocated	Number of Electoral Districts	Number of Seats Allocated	Number of Electoral Districts
7	1	15	1
4	3	7	1
3	7	5	2
2	5	4	1
1	14	3	7
		2	7
		1	9
Total	30	Total	28

Notice the preponderance of single-member districts, which account for about 47 percent and 31 percent of all the electoral districts in Chiba and Kanagawa respectively. When combined with two- and three-member districts, about 86 percent of the Chiba electoral districts and 78 percent of the Kanagawa districts are accounted for.

As of 1963 elections, the number of eligible voters of electoral districts ranged from 17,999 to 163,449 in Chiba and 21,647 to 473,861 in Kanagawa. The modal category for Kanagawa is 30,000–40,000, accounting for about 40 percent of electoral districts. The remainder was distributed fairly equally among various sizes up to 185,000. In Chiba, the modal category is 20,000 to 30,000 which accounts for 27 percent of the total. The bulk of the remainder fell between 31,000 to 80,000 fairly equally.[9] The law requires that a candidate be deemed elected when he obtains a plurality, provided that his obtained votes exceed one-fourth of the number computed by dividing the total valid votes cast by the number of seats allocated to his district.[10] Perusal of electoral returns shows that in some districts successful candidates in the 1963 elections obtained about 4,000 and 5,000 respectively in Chiba and Kanagawa. In most cases, however, successful candidates do need and did obtain about 9,000 to 10,000 in either prefecture.[11] The size of electoral district and especially the prevalence of single-member districts offer fertile soil for the operation of traditional orientations and practices. The chief beneficiary of single-member districts appears to be the LDP. The effect of party weakness, characterized by factional strife and inability to allocate supporters' votes in an advantageous manner among multiple candidates, is minimized in the single-member district.

Another factor shaping one's electoral chances is the competition ratio. The ratios of candidates to the seats in the past three elections were 1.8, 2.0 and 2.2 in Chiba and 1.7, 1.7 and 2.2 in Kanagawa.[12] The comparable ratio for the nation as a whole has been steadily on decline, with the 1963 figure being 1.7.[13] This may be due to the amalgamations of cities, towns and villages and to the consolidation of the power of incumbents.[14] The incidence of no-contest elections also shapes electoral chances. In 1963, four candidates in two electoral districts of Kanagawa and three candidates in three separate districts of Chiba were unopposed and won their seats without ballot. The incidence of no-contest elections, about 10 percent in both prefectures, is very low as compared with other prefectures like Gifu, Aichi and Hyogo where the percentage runs up to 30 to 40 percent. The nation-wide figure has been increasing, so that 175 electoral districts saw no contest in 1963 while the number of districts involved in the 1955 and 1959 elections were 54 and 115. Thus, in 1963, 251 candidates, i.e., about 10 percent of the total successful candidates involving 175 districts, won unopposed. The chief beneficiary of this practice has been the LDP, about 73 percent of the unopposed winners in 1963 being LDP members.[15] As Steiner notes, the increase in the number of uncontested elections is related to the increase in the number of single-member districts and this may be explained by the coincidence of an electoral district with the *jiban* (bailiwick) of a prefectural politician, which discourages competition.[16] The campaign period is legally limited to two weeks. This, together with enormously complicated and strict legal provisions governing campaigns, gives advantages to certain candidates, notably incumbents and new candidates with deep local roots.

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[7] *CSNK*, 1959, pp. 54–55; *CSNK*, 1963, p. 85; *SKS*, 1959, p. 61, 85; *SKS*, 1963, p. 38, 62.

[8] Kōshoku Senkyo Hō, Articles 12, 15–18. For the relationship between the size of electoral district and electoral chances of different political parties, see M. Hoshino, "Dai Yonkai Tōitsu Chihō Senkyo o megru Shomondai," *Toshi Mondai*, V. 50, #8 (August, 1959), 7–9.

[9] *SKS*, 1963, pp. 39–40; *CSNK*, 1963, pp. 86–89.

[10] Kōshoku Senkyo Hō, Article 96.

[11] *SKS*, 1963, pp. 51–60; *CSNK*, 1963, pp. 92–94.

General Political Orientations. One's ability to obtain votes is conditioned by another set of factors shaping the extent and direction of voting. This set of factors subsumes political orientations regarding such matters as the meaningfulness of election, perceived connection between elections and governmental process, degree of interest in politics and in elections, and sense of political competence. The theoretical assumption here is that these orientations constitute intervening variables significantly shaping one's overt voting behavior.

a) Knowledge and Political Interest: The extent of knowledge about local autonomy on the part of the Japanese appears to be small. According to a nation-wide survey conducted in 1952, 60 percent of the respondents (N = 2,711) have heard of the term "local autonomy."[17] An earlier survey of 1951 shows that 84 percent of the respondents (N = 855) were totally uninformed about the present distribution of functions or powers between the central and local governments.[18] A nationwide survey of 1954 found about one-third of the respondents (N = 2,634) professing to be fairly well informed on local community affairs, while about 60 percent belonged to the "don't-know-much" category, and 12 percent to the "don't-know" category.[19]

Roughly speaking, the degree of interest in elections increases directly with the geographical propinquity of those being elected to the voter. A greater interest is shown in prefectural elections than in national elections and in city-town-village elections than in prefectural elections. For example, a nation-wide survey of 1963, making use of a composite measure found that the degree of interest in different elections varies in the decreasing order of 1) city-town-village council elections, 2) city-town-village mayor elections, 3) prefectural assembly elections, 4) prefectural governor elections, 5) House of Representatives elections, 6) House of Councillors elections.[20] The voters' interest in elections and governmental process at the prefectural level is relatively low.[21] The general lack of interest or low degree of interest in prefectural politics and elections in both absolute and relative terms does not entail a corresponding low degree of voting participation. As for the extent of voting participation in prefectural assembly elections, the prefecture-wide percentage figure is usually in the lower seventies in Chiba and in the the upper sixties in Kanagawa. The nation-wide figure is in the upper seventies. Voting participation in rural electoral districts is more extensive than in urban districts, reflecting a higher degree of social pressure and a greater effectiveness with which the network of diffuse, personal relationship—involving the influentials of various levels connecting hamlet residents and prefectural assemblymen—can be brought to bear upon the voters.[22] The percentage figure in the seventies is somewhat lower than the figure for the city-town-village level elections, but higher than the figure for national elections. A high degree of voting participation must then be explained in terms other than the degree of political interest. The relevance of the category of political interest for the present discussion is that it seems to be associated with the degree of susceptibility to kinds of external sources of influence that are being brought to bear upon the voters.

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[12] Computed from the sources cited in Footnote 2.

[13] Jichishō, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

[14] On amalgamation, see Kurt Steiner, *Local Government in Japan* (Stanford Calif., Stanford University Press, 1965), pp. 186–194, 203–206.

[15] Jichishō, *op, cit.*, p. 80.

[16] Steiner, *op. cit.*, pp. 432–437.

[17] Kokuritsu Yoron Chosajo, *Chihō Jichi ni kansuru Yoron Chōsa*, 1952, pp. 58–59.

[18] Kokuritsu Yoron Chosajo, *Chihō Jichi ni kansuru Yoron Chōsa*, 1951, p. 7.

[19] Jichichō, *Chihō Jichi ni tsuite no Yoron Chōsa*, 1954, p. 8.

[20] Kōmei Senkyo Renmei, *Tōitsu Chihō Senkyo no Jittai*, 1964, pp. 38–40.

[21] For example, only six percent of Kagoshima respondents (N = 676) named the prefectural assembly elections to be the one in which they were most interested. Forty-two percent mentioned city-town-village council elections and twenty-five percent chose the House of Representatives elections. In the same study, eight percent claimed to be more interested in prefectural politics than any others, while fifty-seven percent chose city-town-village politics and twenty-six percent national politics. Kagoshima Ken Senkyo Kanri Iinkai, *Kagohima Kenmin no Seiji Ishiki to Kōmei Senkyo Undō Kōka ni tsuite,* 1965, pp. 84–89, 137–143.

b) Role Perceptions: One's perception as to the role—in the normative sense—of prefectural assemblymen may be assumed to shape one's voting behavior directly or indirectly. No data are available with regard to the two prefectures under study. A survey conducted in March, 1963, in Miyagi prefecture included a question "what do you think prefectural or municipal assemblymen ought to be doing?" Since the question contains a reference to municipal assemblymen as well, the result is hard to interpret. However, some glimpse of the voters' role perception may be gained. A small proportion of the respondents (18%; total N=635) had some vague and abstract notion that the assemblymen ought to promote the growth and development of their districts (prefecture or city) and that their acts must somehow embody the desire of the residents. A slightly larger percentage of respondents (about 23%) thought that assemblymen ought to work for the improvement of governmental services in the major areas of social welfare, industry and agriculture, thus attending to various concrete problems of daily life. About one-third of the respondents belonged to the DK and NA categories.[23]

c) Perceived Effect of Elections: The assumption here is that the belief in the efficacy of electoral method and perceived effect of elections have some bearing on the degree and, to a lesser extent, on the direction of voting. In the 1951 survey, one-half of the respondents were indifferent to the questions concerning the quality of those elected. Thirty-two percent, however, said that the electoral method is still a good thing even though the quality of the elected may not be good at the present. A belief in the meaningfulness of elections to one's daily life is not extensive. Forty-six percent of the interviewees thought rather intuitively that electoral outcome must have some impact on their living.[24] Eighty percent of Kagoshima respondents (N=676) thought that their living standards would improve if they elected good representatives to the House of Representatives.[25] Thirty percent of the Miyagi sample thought that repeated elections would gradually bring about "good government"; while about 26 percent did not see any difference that the elections would make.[26] In the 1952 survey the overwhelming proportion of the respondents showed a rather low degree of sense of political efficacy.[27]

Voter's Orientations Regarding Kinds and Strength of Sources. The focus will be on the kinds and strength of external sources of influence which are brought to bear upon voters, and relevant political orientations held by voters regarding the propriety and strength of each such source of influence. The sources of influence include political parties, candidates' personal supporters' associations, town and hamlet associations, friends, acquaintances and relatives. An assumption here is that the impact of various sources of influence upon voting behavior is conditioned by what the voters think to be legitimate sources of influence and by the relative weight the voters themselves feel they ought to attach to any such sources.

Before we proceed to specify kinds of influence, we should note the time at which voting decisions about for whom to vote are made. For the effectiveness of various influences is conditioned by the timing of the voting. The nation-wide survey of 1963 shows that a majority of respondents made a decision before the opening of the campaign period. About 60 percent made up their mind by the time the names of all the candidates were announced. When asked whether they had known much about the candidates for whom they voted before the campaign period began, 64 percent of national sample said they had known the candidate they voted for to a certain extent, 16 percent knew the names only, and 14 percent had not even known the names.[28] The data are indicative of the difficulty confronting new aspirants. Another implication of the data is that from the viewpoint of the influencers, they must try to reach the bulk of electorate prior to the beginning of the campaign period or develop more effective campaign technique. This fact probably has some impact on the effectiveness of various influences.

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[22] Steiner, *op. cit.*, pp. 374–440; S. Yamada, "Senkyo ni arawareta Seiji Ishiki," Nihon Seiji Gakkai (ed.), *Seiji Ishiki no Riron to Chōsa* (1965), pp. 180–188; Jichichō (Senkyo Bu), *Chihō Senkyo Kekka Shirabe*, 1955, pp. 58–61; Jichishō, *op. cit.*, p. 64; *SKS*, 1963, pp. 39–45; *CSNK*, 1963, pp. 86–89.

[23] Miyagi Ken Senkyo Kanri Iinkai, *Kōmei Senkyo Jittai Chōsa*, 1963, pp. 27–28, appendix p. 17.

[24] Kokuritsu Yoron Chosajo, 1951, *op. cit.*, pp. 9–11.

[25] Kagoshima Ken Senkyo Kanri Iinkai, *op. cit.*, pp. 73–76.

[26] Miyagi Ken Senkyo Kanri Iinkai, *op. cit.*, pp. 50–51.

[27] Kokuritsu Yoron Chosajo, *op. cit.*, 1952, pp. 41–42.

Kinds or Sources of Influence: The nation-wide survey of 1963 had the respondents identify the groups or individuals which recommended or asked them to vote for a particular candidate. Although defensive attitudes may have operated to produce some distortions, about one-third of the sample conceded the experience of being subjected to such influences. Of various sources of influence, friends, acquaintances, and recommendations by groups to which respondents belong stand out.[29]

In a Chiba study about 34 percent of the sample said that they are usually subject to various sorts of influence, with 63 percent claiming no experiences. A supplementary question led to the following results with regard to who made the request or recommendation. The category of acquaintances (29.7%) accounts for the largest proportion, followed by local influentials (16.1%), candidates and agents (15%), and friends (13.9%), in that order (N = 279). These categories together account for about three-fourths of the sources of influence.[30]

Effect or Strength of Influences: According to the Mainichi newspaper poll taken shortly before the 1963 local elections, about 40 percent (N = 2,946) of its sample would not take into account a recommendation from any quarter while about 60 percent said that consideration would be given to such influences. A Yomiuri newspaper poll taken about the same time found 34 percent (N = 2,557) denying that they would go along with the recommendation of groups or associations to which they belong, while 11 percent said that they would abide by such a recommendation. On the whole, about 50 percent conceded some degree of effect that such a recommendation has on their decisions.[31] The Chiba study found, regarding elections generally, 65 percent (total N = 278) saying that they would give no heed to a request or recommendation from any individuals or groups, the remainder conceding varying degrees of effect: 12 percent would vote as requested without much ado; 10 percent would find it difficult to decline because of personal relationships with candidates; 4 percent would accede when no decision had been made; 8 percent upon further checking such as listening to speeches; and 1 percent would go along to avoid any trouble.[32]

Some assessment of the proportion of the electorate amenable to influence attempts of all sorts in aggregate is thus possible, but it is more difficult to assess relative strength of specific sources of influence separately. As has been mentioned above, the effectiveness must vary with the degree of saliency the recipient attaches, (which in turn must be partially a function of the legitimacy he accords to a particular source) as well as of his assessed advantages and disadvantages. Also, the effectiveness must be conditioned by his general criteria for making voting decisions to be discussed later.

Some data are available concerning orientation toward, and perceived strength of, one influence source, namely hamlet and town associations. A sample of residents (N = 433) in Chikuhō area of Fukuoka prefecture was asked, among other things, the following three questions: 1) whether they feel they are doing him wrong unless they vote for a candidate from their own hamlet or town, 2) whether they feel that they ought to vote for a man who is from the same locality (hamlet or town) and who at the same time has been recommended by their hamlet or town associations, and 3) whether they would still feel that they ought to vote for the recommendee of their associations even when he is from some other locality. The proportion of affirmative answers to Question 3 is reduced by 10 percent from that of Question 2, the overall patterns of distribution still remaining the same.[33] This is suggestive of the strength of local recommendation as a source of influence.

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[28] Kōmei Senkyo Renmei, *op. cit.*, pp. 8–10.

[29] *Ibid.*, pp. 15–17. For a discussion of influence of various groups, see N. Kobayashi, H. Shinohara, M. Soma, *Senkyo* (1960), pp. 76–90.

[30] Chiba Ken Senkyo Kanri Iinkai, *Chiba Ken ni okeru Seiji Ishiki no Jittai Chōsa*, 1962, pp. 210–234.

[31] Kōmei Senkyo Renmei, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

[32] Chiba Ken Senkyo Kanri Iinkai, *Chiba Ken ni okeru. . . op. cit.*, pp. 234–240.

Another source of influence, the organization to which one belongs (exclusive of hamlet or town association) was examined in the same study. The organization here refers to labor union, craft union, trade guild, agricultural cooperative and the like. The question was whether the voters felt they ought to vote for a recommendee of these organizations to which they belonged. About 30 percent were in the affirmative and 14 percent negative. The rest belonged either to the hedging or DK categories. The organizations as a source of influence seems more salient and effective than locality. This was further evidenced by the response to the question, "In case your locality and organization had recommended different candidates, by which would you feel more bound?" The result was as follows: 25.5 percent named organizations, while 10.6 percent named locality. 25.1 percent said it would depend on candidates. The pull of one's affiliated organization seemed stronger.[34] Of course, no general statement is warranted on the basis of this particular study, but it is noteworthy that the patterns of distribution of attitudes remain about the same regardless of the differences in ecological or party characteristics of various districts represented in this sample.

Whatever the relative effectiveness of local associations as sources of influence, an examination of election returns by precincts reveals a significant pattern of relationship between the candidates' place of abode and the proportion and direction of voting on the part of the residents of the precincts. Of course, numerous factors in addition to the pressure of local associations are conceivable. At any rate, in the 1963 election, the Chiba data show that the overwhelming majority of the voters of a town or village invariably voted for their local candidates, that is, those who resided in the same town or village.[35] It is true that the votes from one's own district alone, whatever the size of majority support, are not usually sufficient to assure one's election. However, a candidate from a populous town or village enjoys a substantial comparative advantage, while a man from a small town must rely more on the votes from other towns and villages. One may note in this connection that multiple candidacies from the same town or village have an important bearing on one's chances for a prefectural assembly seat. It appears that somewhat unusual cases of incumbent defeat can in part be explained by the division within one's own district of residence due to multiple candidacies. No comparable data are available with regard to urban electoral districts, but the essentially same pattern may exist in those sections of cities which formed part of a rural county prior to a recent amalgamation.

A somewhat more direct approach to the problem was taken when the voters were asked to indicate the reason for their decision or what they think was the most conclusive factor in determining their voting decision. The nation-wide survey of 1963 posed the following question: "Which was the most conclusive factor in making your decision for whom to vote in the election for the prefectural assembly? Please indicate only one from this list." What emerges from this and other surveys is that the proportion of those to whom "attribute of candidate" is the most salient factor far exceeds the proportion of people to whom the party label of the candidate is salient.[36]

General Criteria for Voting Decision: Candidate-emphasis vs. Party-emphasis. The literature on voting studies speaks of the voter being issue-oriented or candidate-oriented. A similar notion is expressed in the Japanese phrase of "candidate-emphasis" or "party-emphasis." There is a considerable amount of data that deals more directly with the relative proportions of the two groups. The nation-wide survey of 1963, conducted with specific reference to the local elections found that 19 percent of the respondents (total N = 2,426) made their choice according to party affiliation of candidates, 30 percent because of personal attributes. Twenty-seven percent voted the way they did mainly because of personal attributes, though party affiliation was also taken into account. Seventeen percent said that they gave equal weight to both.[37] In interpreting data of this kind, it must be borne in mind that the Japanese notion of personal attributes encompasses not only personality, character, and qualifications, but also others such as being a relative, acquaintance, friend, or local resident. It is more of a residual category exclusive of party affiliation. It may be said then that the bulk of the Japanese electorate attaches greater importance to personal attributes and about 20 percent of the people attach importance to party affiliation of candidates. Later on we will consider the question of how candidates' qualifications such as experience of public service and type of occupation may affect the direction of voting. No direct orientational data are available concerning what the voters perceive to be desirable qualifications in these matters.

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[33] Fukuoka Ken Senkyo Kanri Iinkai, *Chikuhō Chieki Jūmin no Seiji Ishiki*, 1964, pp. 30–33.

[34] *Ibid.*, p. 35. For the voters' attitude toward Diet members personal supporters' associations, see Senkyo Seido Shingikai, *Senkyo no Jittai ni kansuru Yoron Chōsa*. 1965, pp. 27–30.

[35] *SKS*, 1963, pp. 32–37, 51–56. For an analysis of this problem with regard to House of Representative elections, see T. Shibuya, "Tokuhyō Jōkyō yori mitaru Tōhyō Kōi," *Niigata Daigaku Hōkei Ronshū*, V. 8, #1 (October, 1958), 42–53; S. Yamada, *op. cit.*, pp. 188–193.

[36] Kōmei Senkyo Renmei, *op. cit.*, p. 27, 147; Chiba Ken Senkyo Kanri Iinkai, *Chiba Ken ni okeru . . . , op. cit.*, pp. 188–190. Kanagawa Ken Kikaku Chōsabu, *Dai Nikai Kanagawa Kensei Yoron Chōsa*, 1965, p. 61. In this connection, see a discussion of "local notable politics," Alfred B. Clubok, *Electoral Politics in Rural Japan* (Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, University of Michigan, 1962), pp. 3–5, 70–84, 146–185.

A panel study conducted in Kyoto prefecture demonstrates that those without party identification tend to give special importance to personal attributes and those with party identification, especially those with strong identification, vote according to the criterion of party. It was also found that LDP supporters tend to emphasize personal attributes.[38] Whatever the correlates of the personal-attribute-priority and party-priority, the relevance of the data in this section is that the proportion of the Japanese electorate theoretically susceptible to all sources of influence other than party label is larger than that which is susceptible to the influence of party label. For a small proportion of people (about 20%) the sources of influence other than party affiliation except those tending to reinforce party affiliation (e.g., friends speaking for the recipients' party) would not be salient.

TABLE 4. DETERMINANT OF VOTING DECISIONS PERCEIVED TO BE MOST CONCLUSIVE (NATION-WIDE)

Perceived Determinant	Percent of the Respondents
Long thought the candidate is a man of good character	29
Took political party into account	11
Read official election bulletin	6
Heard campaign speeches and broadcasting	8
Saw posters	5
Recommended by various groups*	5
Personally asked by relatives, friends, or acquaintances	5
Consulted the family	7
Hearsay	8
Read newspaper articles	5
Forgot or none	11
	100% N = 1,838

* Groups refer to unions and such associations as hamlet, town, youth and women.

Party as an Influence: By determining the proportion of people who apply the criterion of party affiliation of candidate in the voting decision, I have been indirectly talking about the party as a source of influence. However, in order to assess the influence of party on the direction of voting of both candidate-emphasis and party-emphasis people, we need to look into such things as the image of the party entertained by the voters, perceived and actual socio-economic strata of party supporters, and the reasons given for one's support for a party.

A) Composition of party support: In talking about the relations between certain demographic characteristics and party identification, I am not denying the utility of other intervening variables that might interpret correlations between the two. I merely review here some pertinent data so as better to understand, however crudely, the direction of voting. Perusal of the data dealing with Miyagi, Kyoto, Gifu, Kagoshima and Chiba prefectures suggests the following observations.[39] 1) Roughly speaking, in terms of age, voters in their twenties and thirties tend to be SP supporters, and the proportion of LDP supporters varies directly, i.e., increases with the increase in age group, especially after the age of forty. 2) In terms of education, again speaking crudely, the proportion of SP supporters increases with the level of education. Though the proportion of LDP and SP in the category of college graduates reveals no large percentage differences, the overwhelming proportion of those below the level of middle school (junior-high), especially of those with an elementary school education or lower, are LDP supporters. 3) In terms of occupation, clerical employees and workers tend to support SP, while LDP supporters tend to be concentrated among those with agriculture-fishery-forestry related occupations, among managerial people in private industries and commerce, and among people in service sectors (barbers, etc.).

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[37] Kōmei Senkyo Renmei, *op. cit.*, pp. 24–25.

[38] I. Miyake, Kinoshita, J. Aiba, "Kotonaru Reberu no Senkyo ni okeru Tōhyō Kōdō no Kenkyū (3)," *Hōgakuronsō*, V. 73, #4 (July, 1963), 112–114.

[39] Gifu Ken Senkyo Kanri Iinkai, *Gifu Ken ni okeru Senkyo to Kenmin no Seiji Ishiki*, 1963, pp. 34–38; Miyagi Ken Senkyo Kanri Iinkai, *op. cit.*, pp. 33–34; Chiba Ken Senkyo Kanri Iinkai, *Chiba Ken ni okeru . . . , op. cit.*, pp. 168–181; Kagoshima Ken Senkyo Kanri Iinkai, *op. cit.*, pp. 77–89; Miyake, Kinoshita, Aiba, *op. cit.*, p. 91. For the relationship between "basic political and social attitudes" and party affiliation, see Miyake, Kinoshita and Aiba, "Seiji Ishiki Kōzōron no Kokoromi," Nihon Seiji Gakkai (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 62–65.

B) Perceived support of parties by occupational groups: It is assumed that the perceptions one has about the support of different parties by different occupational groups may affect one's direction of voting through the mechanism of reference group theory. The only firm data available to this writer are the results of a study of rural Shimane. There, salary men, wage earners and daily laborers are perceived more commonly to be SP supporters while men in trade and service sectors are thought to contain mostly LDP supporters. In the same study, out of 12 occupational groups, employees of national railways and the post office were named most frequently to be the groups in support of "progressive parties" such as the SP.[40] Neither prefecture nor nationwide data of this type are available. However, it appears likely that the perceptions in this regard are widely shared. My interviewees, a part of the voters, hold perceptions corresponding to the occupational characteristics of party supporters listed in the preceding passages. There seems to be a general congruence between perceived and actual characteristics of party supporters. The relevance of the data is that one's voting decision about for whom to vote may be influenced in the direction that the "significant others" are perceived to be voting. This of course in turn assumes that the voters give some consideration to the party affiliation of the candidates, and hence this source of influence would be applicable to the party-emphasis voter.

C) Images of the nature of parties: In the Kyoto study, roughly half of the sample was not able to say what they thought to be either the good or the bad aspects about each of the political parties. This reflects a low degree of cognitive orientation. The predominant images entertained by the remainder are as follows: The LDP is commended for its stability, ability to carry out its programs, and for its fiscal and foreign policies. The negative aspects mentioned are the LDP's alleged close connection with "big enterprise" and the "capitalist class" and its arbitrariness in the legislature. The SP is viewed positively for being a progressive friend of workers and negatively for being too radical and for its extra-parliamentary direct actions such as demonstrations and strikes. The DSP is commended or rebuked for its middle-of-the-road attitude. The idealistic and "theoretical" aspects of the Communist Party are praised, but its totalitarian character and propensity for recourse to violence are deplored.[41] It is conceivable that these images held by men perform the function of accentuating, reinforcing or sustaining either the attractive or repulsive attitude he has toward a particular candidate, whether he be a party-emphasis or candidate-emphasis man. The present category would be applicable to the party-emphasis man as well because some party supporters have a friendly image not only of their own party but also of other parties.[42]

D) Reasons cited for supporting the political parties: The Kyoto study yielded the following result. The major reasons cited for SP support are 1) class character of party, i.e., the perception that SP is a friend of workers and 2) general character of the party variously described as socialist, progressive and "theoretical." The two major reasons cited for LDP support are 1) general character of the party identified as capitalist, liberal, pragmatic, and conservative and 2) general confidence in the party owing to its stability and ability to carry out its program. DSP is supported largely for the following two reasons: 1) general character of the party such as the middle-of-the-road and compromising attitude and 2) its pragmatic virtue.[43] These "reasons" identified deal essentially with a highly cognitive dimension and constitute rather rationalization for their support of a particular political party. A study in Shimane prefecture employed a different classification. It was found that about half of the respondents support their parties because of the confidence they have in the future (expected) policies of these parties; about a quarter because of the individual's affiliations with parties, about 10 percent supporting parties capriciously depending on the moods of the moment.[44] No comparable data are available concerning Japan as a whole or the two prefectures under study. It appears that the support for a particular party is a result not so much of a rational decision based on the perceived general characteristics, including policies, of the party, but rather of a less rational acceptance based on the influence of primary, secondary and reference groups. What is more relevant for the purpose of this paper is the question of whether the categories of reasons for party support have any bearing on voting behavior. An educated guess is that the varying reasons for party support, especially of the cognitive dimension, are not directly or significantly correlated with particular directions of voting. Rather, their impact on voting decisions may be felt through the stability or instability of the voters' party affiliation which may have some connection with the types of reason given for party support. It is noteworthy that the authors of the Kyoto study found that there was no significant relationship between kinds of reason given for party support and the degree of consistency in supporting one's party candidates.[45]

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[40] Kōmei Senkyo Renmei, *Shimane Ken ni okeru Nōsonbu Jūmin no Tōhyō Kōdō*, 1965, p. 46, 58.

[41] Miyake, Kinoshita, Aiba, "Kotonaru Reberu . . . ," *op. cit.*, p. 117. See also an earlier article by the same authors, "Kotonaru Reberu no Senkyo ni okeru Tōhyō Kōdō no Kenkyū (2), *Hōgakuronsō*, V. 73, #2 (May, 1963), 107–108. See also K. Nakamura and F. Horie, "Kinkō Nōson ni okeru Jūmin no Seiji Ishiki," *Hōgaku Kenkyū*, V. 34, #4 (April, 1961), 36–51.

[42] In this connection, see Heiwa Keizai Keikaku Kaigi, *Seitō Shiji to Seiji Ishiki no Dōkō ni tsuite no Chōsa Hōkoku*, 1964, pp. 84–99.

E) Party affiliation: More relevant to voting decision is the intensity of party identification. The operation of party identification itself must depend on the more general orientation summarized in the phrase of candidate-emphasis and party-emphasis unless one can assume that the candidate-emphasis people are without any party identification. It is interesting to note that according to the Kyoto study the lower the degree of party identification, the greater the proportion of inter-party voting, and that LDP supporters show the lowest degree of consistency in terms of supporting candidates of the same party at different levels of elections.[46] This is hardly surprising in that a greater proportion of the candidate-emphasis people are found among LDP supporters.

Candidates' Resources and Orientations. In this section the focus will be on what the candidates and their supporters do, and particularly what they think they *ought* to do, to get elected. One's ability to obtain votes depends, among other things, on resources effectively used, and the utilization of resources is in turn based on the perceived nature of one's supporters and the means deemed to be most effective to obtain votes. In addition to presenting these data, an assessment will be made concerning the effect of certain attributes of candidates.

Public Service Experience: It will be recalled that the proportion of people with the personal attribute-emphasis approach to voting decisions is quite extensive and that no data are available concerning the relative weight that qualifications such as the occupational background of candidates occupies in the perceptions of the voters. The data presented below throw some light on the effect of candidates' attributes and qualifications on their electoral chances. Table 5 shows that about one half of the assemblymen had experiences in public service prior to their attainment of their present posts.[47]

TABLE 5. TYPES OF PUBLIC SERVICE EXPERIENCE (AS OF SEPT. 1965)

	Number of Assemblymen	
	Chiba	Kanagawa
City, town, village councilman	17*	24
City, town, village mayor	10	2
Prefectural government employee	7†	12†
Central government employee	1	0
City, town, village government employee	1	2
	36	40
Total number of Assemblymen	61	80

* Includes one person who was also a prefectural government employee.

† Mainly teachers.

This may be explained in terms of one or more of the following ways. It may be a reflection of conscious career perspectives on the part of the legislators. Our interview data suggest, however, that those who intended to use the prefectural assembly post as a stepping stone to higher public office or those who now aspire for higher office constitute a minority of the present membership.[48] Generally speaking, DSP, SP and KP incumbents in particular, have such aspirations. They readily admit their desire and willingness to participate in national politics, provided they get party endorsement. There have been some instances in our two prefectures where prefectural assemblymen have successfully reached the Diet, but this avenue constitutes a rather narrow and infrequently-trodden path to the Diet. The prevailing opinion of the incumbents is that involvement in a prefectural assembly is a detour that is not likely to lead to the Diet. In the case of LDP, younger members indicate a similar aspiration and willingness. The seeming inter-party difference may be spurious when the age is held constant. LDP members tend to be more elderly than the others. Moreover, the difference may simply be a reflection of a more pessimistic appraisal on the part of most LDP members of their electoral chances. Whether by choice or not, for most members the office of the prefectural assembly is a terminal one. During the 1955–63 period, only several assemblymen of the two prefectures made a move to the Diet. The high percentage of ex-public-office-holders in the assembly may be explained simply by the ready availability of candidates from this category of people. It may also be explained as a result of the nomination criteria discussed earlier. It may indicate the voters' preference or propensity to vote for such a candidate both because he is better known to the voters and because he is thought to be better qualified for the office. It is instructive to recall that the majority of the electorate makes its voting decision before the commencement of campaigns.

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[43] Miyake, Kinoshita, Aiba, "Kotonaru Reberu . . . (2)," *op. cit.*, pp. 122–126.

[44] Shimane Ken Senkyo Kanri Iinkai, *Seiji Ishiki to Chihō Senkyo no Mondaiten*, 1963, p. 50, 97, 110.

[45] Miyake, Kinoshita, Aiba, "Kotonaru Reberu . . . (3)," *op. cit.*, pp. 114–115.

[46] *Ibid.*, pp. 98–104.

[47] Compiled from the data obtained at the assembly secretariats.

Age: The average age of prefectural assemblymen in Japan in 1963 was 52. Throughout the past three elections, the assemblies in Chiba and Kanagawa maintained about the same average age of 52. A review of all the candidates in the three elections for the two assemblies indicate that about two-thirds of the candidates and the same proportion of the winners for each election were within the age range of 45 to 60. The mode for each prefecture and the nation as a whole was the 50–60 group.[49] In view of the legal minimum age requirement of 25, a heavy concentration of men in their fifties in the assembly calls for some explanation. First, there is the practical difficulty of attaining early in one's life a certain level of social, economic and professional status. Such a status plus one's command over the necessary resources, material or otherwise, would facilitate a bid for the office. A traditional notion that an office such as a prefectural assemblyman should properly be occupied by the elderly men of distinction reinforces this. An LDP member remarked, with an apparent sense of exasperation, that his bid for the office had to overcome the cool reception of his constituents caused by his youth. He was in his early forties.

Occupation: The nation-wide data indicate that four occupational categories have consistently accounted for about 70 percent of those elected in each of the past three elections. They are, to take the 1963 data, in the order of magnitude of proportion, company executives and employees (31% of the total); agriculture-forestry (24%); "organizational officers" such as labor union officials (18%). Trade accounts for 5% and other occupations such as doctors and lawyers each account for a very few percent.[50] As for the two prefectures under study, the first three categories account for nearly 70 percent of the winners in each of the three elections. While medicine and fishery in the Chiba assembly and party bureaucrats in the Kanagawa assembly each account for about six percent of the membership of the respective assemblies, no other single occupational category accounts for more than a few percent.

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[48] In a Kagawa study none of 11 assemblymen (10 LDP and 1 SP) interviewed by a Kyoto University team showed an aspiration for higher office. Virtually no one expressed willingness to remain in the present post for a long time, Kyoto Daigaku Seijigaku Kenkyūkai, "Chihō Seijika no Jittai Chōsa," *Hōgakuronsō*, V. 67, #3, 74–81. A computation shows that as of 1958, 18% of LDP Diet membership and 27% of the SP Diet membership were ex-prefectural assemblymen. The relative proportion of the ex-assemblymen has in recent years somewhat declined in the case of the LDP while that of the SP has slightly increased, Robert A. Scalapino & Junnosuke Masumi, *Parties and Politics in Contemporary Japan* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1962), pp. 56–57, 165–167.

[49] Jichishō, *op. cit.*, p. 19, 79; *CSNK*, 1955, p. 67, 71; *CSNK*, 1959, pp. 56–57, 66; *CSNK*, 1963, pp. 85, 79–84; *SKS*, 1955, pp. 114, 117; *SKS*, 1959, pp. 61, 85; *SKS*, 1963, pp. 38, 62.

[50] It should be noted that this classification used by the Autonomy Ministry does not reflect either the fact of public service experience or the fact of incumbency.

What are more pertinent for this paper are the patterns of stability and change in the occupational composition of the two assemblies. During the period 1955 to 1963, the weight of the category of agriculture-forestry has been on the decline in Chiba, and the second category of company employment has increasingly gained weight. As of 1963, the second category slightly outweighed the first. In Kanagawa, the pattern of occupational composition has remained fairly stable with company employment leading. Although the category of company employment occupies the leading position in both prefectures, its respective ratios to the category of agriculture-forestry are different: 4.3 to 1 in Kanagawa and 1.2 to 1 in Chiba. It should be noted also that the occupational composition of the winning candidates is roughly proportional to that of the entire body of candidates.[51] Put another way, one's occupational category probably does not operate independently or directly to attract support. The relative prestige perceived to be enjoyed by candidates' occupations may in some way affect the voters' evaluation of the candidates' overall qualifications, thus indirectly influencing voting decisions.[52]

Incumbency as an Attribute: In Table 6 the incidence of failure or success on the part of legislators in maintaining their seats is shown. As a comparison, the number of successful candidates among two other categories of candidates is also given.

In each of the last three elections in Chiba, a much greater proportion of the incumbent candidates, as compared with the other two categories, consistently won their seats. For example, in 1959, 74 percent of the Chiba incumbent candidates (regardless of their respective party affiliation) as compared with 34 percent of new candidates won their seats, and 75 percent as against 35 percent in 1963. In Kanagawa, too, in all three elections, incumbent candidates consistently showed a high degree of electoral success, particularly in the case of LDP candidates and Independents. This is consistent with nation-wide data.[53] The high incidence of incumbent's electoral success cannot be viewed as a direct effect of being an incumbent. A higher degree of exposure to the public and the greater opportunity given to the incumbents for cultivating personal and organizational ties may largely account for the relationship between the attribute of incumbency and the high degree of electoral success. However, even when these factors are held constant, it is conceivable that the candidate-emphasis people may tend to vote for an incumbent, particularly in the absence of strong dissatisfaction with the life situation, political system or with government output.

TABLE 6. INCIDENCE OF SUCCESSFUL CANDIDACY AMONG DIFFERENT CATEGORIES OF CANDIDATES

	Chiba		Kanagawa	
	No. of Candidates	No. Elected	No. of Candidates	No. Elected
		1959		
New candidate	61	21	48	17
Incumbent	50	37	62	49
Ex-assemblyman	10	5	12	7
	121	63	122	73
		1963		
New candidate	52	18	66	30
Incumbent	52	39	59	46
Ex-assemblyman	10	7	8	4
	114	64	133	80

Perceived Characteristics of Supporters of Their Own and Other Parties: An assumption here is that what the candidates do is in part conditioned by the perceived social characteristics of the supporters of their own and other parties. Our interviewees were asked to describe any characteristics of supporters of their own party and then were asked to describe any characteristics of supporters of the other parties.

(1) *SP:* SP members view their party's supporters as likely to have one or more of the following characteristics: 1) members of *Sōhyō*-affiliated labor unions, especially the unions in the public enterprise sector, 2) urban residents and those rural residents commuting to urban centers, 3) white collar workers, especially clerical employees. In addition, in the case of Chiba, due to special historical circumstances, residents of some agrarian villages were mentioned. Members of other parties single out the labor union members as the major source of SP support.

(2) *DSP:* DSP members identify the "intelligentsia" and those in the leading position of "the progressive movement" to be in support

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[51] Jichishō, *op. cit.*, pp.72, 78.

[52] Educational background of assemblymen is:

School Completed

	Elementary	*Junior-high*	*High*	*Junior-college*	*College*
Chiba	3	8	19	10	21
Kanagawa*	0	21	19	15	24

* No information on one member.

[53] Jichishō, *op. cit.*, 17–18, 68–71, 76–77; and compiled from the sources cited in Footnote 2.

of the DSP. They maintain that the SP, in contrast, receives support from the lower stratum of "progressive people." In terms of organized support, *Dōmei Kaigi*-affiliated labor unions and small-medium business are identified as the major sources of support. Members of other parties believe that labor unions of moderate political tendency support the DSP, and that the DSP is destined to go on decline. Both SP and LDP members emphasize that the DSP support is largely personal in nature and that its campaign strategy is essentially that of the LDP. Both SP and LDP members view the DSP as being much closer to the LDP than to the SP.[54] Thus, the LDP, as one of its party officials remarked, can and does aim at *shifting the allegiance of members of the SP* to the DSP, because a sudden, all-out shift to the LDP would be very difficult to achieve.

(3) *KP:* According to KP members, the LDP and SP are concerned exclusively with big business and organized labor respectively, while their party promotes the interest of all strata of people. They say KP supporters are believers, and the believers, together with their relatives and friends, vote for KP candidates in elections. They insist that at present KP supporters come from "all income brackets" and include people of medium-small enterprises, professors, doctors, and labor union members. They concede, however, that initially the supporters came predominantly from the lower stratum of people. Members of other parties state that KP supporters are believers, and that the lower stratum of the poor constitutes the bulk of KP supporters. They characterize the KP supporters as being "ignorant," "illiterate" or "a person without any sense." More frequently, they perceive KP supporters to be "the unfortunate people," such as women with family discord caused by husbands' fickleness. All opposition members especially members of LDP and DSP, show some concern with the growing strength of the KP: an LDP official speaks of the need for some action; the DSP plans to explore new sources of support; and the SP would try to check the loss of current union members by "rational and theoretical discussions" with the wavering union members.

(4) *LDP:* LDP members identify their party supporters as those who are engaged in "primary industry" i.e., agriculture-forestry-fishery and those in business. They say "the middle-stratum" constitutes the bulk of the party's supporters. Members of other parties view the LDP supporters as being capitalists, business people, shopkeepers, wealthy farmers and the poor who are the proteges of local notables and influentials. The ordinary voter's perceived images of parties and of supporters are thus congruent with those held by the legislators and party bureaucrats.

Resources and Perceived Prerequisites for Election: The interview data persented below deal with 1) kinds and extent of assistance from party and other organizations such as labor unions and personal supporters' associations, 2) sources and amounts of campaign funds, 3) factors deemed by the candidates to be essential for election, and 4) the techniques of campaign deemed to be most effective.

(1) *KP:* The officials of KP in both prefectures studied emphatically dismiss the utility of money for elections. The chairman of Kanagawa prefectural party headquarters states that their candidates would not need even ¥ 100,000 each, and his counterpart in Chiba went so far to say that their candidates simply have no use for money. No financial assistance is formally provided either by the national party headquarters or by the prefectural headquarters. The Chiba official said that he voluntarily sends, in his private capacity, "a comfort bag" of an insignificant sum to each KP candidate for various offices. The fellow members of the party assist in canvassing, and the party publication media duly carry the news of party endorsement of nominees. KP campaigning requires no new organizational set-up or communication channels. For party cadre are virtually in daily contact with, and are giving religious instructions to, the members of *Sōka Gakkai.* Announcement of the names of candidates at some juncture and intensification or reinforcement of politico-religious doctrine suffices. The KP leaders take great pride and have tremendous confidence in their organizational cohesiveness and effectiveness. Their confidence, as well as their ability to assess the size of votes they can obtain, is extraordinarily high. The KP members dismiss the utility of such campaign techniques as campaign speeches, whether delivered indoors or at street corners. The most effective means is perceived to be the enlargement and consolidation of Gakkai influence, with the corresponding expansion of KP supporters.[55]

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[54] For a similar finding in Kanagawa, see I. Yagishita, "Seiji Ishiki ni okeru Chiekiteki Yōin," *Yokohama Shiritsu Daigaku Ronsō,* V. 13, #2–3 (March, 1962), 145.

[55] In their perception the confidence which they enjoy within their religious organization is the crucial determinant of their electoral success. This is not to deny the tremendous energy they expend on establishing personal contacts with

(2) *SP:* The nature of the funds made available to SP candidates is complex. No financial assistance is expected from either national or prefectural party headquarters. Labor-union-affiliated candidates in Chiba receive a considerable sum from their union either directly or indirectly through the prefectural party treasury. The candidates without a labor union background must raise their funds themselves, and some candidates rely on their personal supporters' associations for funds. The prefectural party office renders support primarily in two ways: 1) the use of the party newspaper, pamphlets and posters for publicity and 2) the arrangement of public speeches and symposia. The party appears to aim primarily at obtaining support from various labor unions and community and occupational groups. The party officials in Chiba seem more interested in consolidating the present supporters—rather, perceived supporters—than in exploring potential supporters. An SP incumbent said that he himself had to raise funds by borrowing, and added quite seriously that he has to pay back the loans in the course of his four-year tenure. His estimate of campaign funds expended by SP members in Chiba is about one million yen each, though he himself used about ¥ 500,000.

Service functions performed by incumbents on behalf of constituents are deemed to be the most important means of obtaining support. The SP member who said that the most effective method of gaining support would be to "wrestle rigorously with various problems of prefectural government" readily conceded that probably one-third of his constituents appreciates his legislative activities, while another one-third needs to be subjected to "public relations work," and the remaining one-third must be won over by rendering various services. He perceived his basis of support to be composed primarily of the stratum of salary men and that the people in the small and medium enterprises comprise the core of his personal supporters' association, with ranking members of the SP serving as advisors. Another SP member in Chiba remarked that union votes would automatically pour in in his favor, but the nursing of his constituents through the performance of service function is more important. The SP members in Kanagawa maintain that party endorsement is the greatest assistance that the party can give. The degree of dependence on party label varies inversely with the strength of labor union support one has.[56] At any rate, they state that the most essential step in a campaign is to win endorsement from various organizations as well as labor unions. They concede that there have been instances in which some SP members, like some LDP colleagues, resorted to such a method as footing the bill for a prearranged sightseeing tour for his constituents. Their reliance on this method, however, is limited. As an SP member put it, SP members would eventually lose out in such competition with LDP members, for constituents would flock to the well-to-do LDP members who could subsidize more lavish entertainment. When asked to identify what he considers to be the most essential factor affecting one's electoral chances, he stated that a new candidate should have to his credit a record of labor union activities in his community, thus assuring himself of union support. In the case of incumbents seeking reelection, he added, the most crucial factor is how much the candidate has accomplished in terms of taking care of miscellaneous chores for his constituents.

Thus, SP candidates have to operate with more limited funds. The extent of their personal contribution or fund-raising is substantial, but probably less than that of LDP members. This limitation on funds is compensated for by the effective support that the labor unions give to some candidates. SP members' dependence on organized support such as party and labor union is considerably greater than for LDP members, but they are keenly aware of the insufficiency of such support. They realize as acutely as do LDP members that a careful nursing of a candidate's constituency on a personal basis is a most crucial factor.

(3) *DSP:* Candidates receive no financial assistance from either national or prefectural

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their constituents. The difference is that they do not, verbally at least, perceive the relevance of these activities to their re-election. For them such activities constitute a faithful implementation of their religious-political doctrine.

[56] The extent of labor union involvement in prefectural politics can be seen in the following statistics: In the 1963 elections, 56.8 percent of the total number of SP candidates in the entire country and 63.6 percent of all the SP winners were from the labor unions. In the case of DSP, 27.7 percent of its candidates and 21.4 percent of its winners came from the labor unions. 15.4 percent of the Communist Party candidates and 18.2 percent of the total number of CP winners were from the labor unions. Some labor union-backed candidates ran as independents and the percentage of successful candidacy was 65 percent for SP, 44 percent for DSP, and 15 percent for the CP, Naikaku Chōsashitsu, *Nihon no Kumiai no Seiji Katsudō*, pp. 96–101.

party headquarters. The party chairman in Kanagawa remarked that each candidate is expected to contribute ¥ 30,000 to be used by the prefectural party office. An occasional fund-raising campaign by the party office does not yield an adequate sum. Aside from party endorsement, the party's support takes, primarily, the form of "public relations work" conducted through speeches and media releases. Some candidates could rely on their supporters' associations, but in general candidates have to bear the bulk of their campaign expenses. As the chairman emphasized, the greatest proportion of support can be and is obtained through the performance of service functions, and other sources of support include relatives, DSP-oriented unions, and party supporters. It is not surprising, then, that the careful cultivation of personal ties is considered to be the most important factor aiding re-election, though support of DSP-oriented labor unions and small and medium business groups is considered important. The party chairman in Chiba estimated that about 40 percent of the votes necessary for his election came from organized sources such as party members and labor unions, and the remainder was based on personal ties. He complained bitterly about the expense of meeting constituents' expectations for contributions on a variety of ceremonial occasions. The picture emerging from these data is that DSP members attach relatively minor importance to party and are much closer to the LDP in the degree to which the importance of personal support is emphasized.

(4) *LDP:* LDP candidates receive no financial aid from either the national or prefectural party office. A prefectural party official in Chiba stated that his office makes a gift of a nominal sum, approximately one-twentieth of the legally allowed limit of campaign expenses, under the name of a "comfort bag," but individual candidates bear virtually all the necessary expenses. Some candidates can expect a varying amount of aid from their "bosses," members of the House of Representatives with whom they are in special relationships. The party official said that the value of the party label is steadily increasing and party endorsement is of some value. He felt that the fact of endorsement by the governing party generates confidence among the voters. He added, however, that personal assets such as financial resources, character, and public confidence are much more crucial in elections. LDP incumbets interviewed go so far as to say that party support is virtually non-existent and readily dismiss the value of party nomination for elections. The personal bases of power, they insisted, account for their electoral successes. Both LDP and SP incumbents interviewed agreed in their estimate that ordinarily an LDP candidate in Chiba expends about two to three million yen, with some candidates spending about twice as much. A ranking LDP member who suggested the figure of a few million yen insisted that his expenditure usually runs ¥ 900,000. It should be noted that even this figure exceeds the legally allowed campaign expenditure in his district.

The legally allowable amount of campaign funds in the 1963 election, which varies with the size of the electoral district, ranged from ¥ 562,600 to 929,100 in Chiba and from ¥ 719,400 to 1,029,600 in Kanagawa. The amount officially reported to have been spent by each candidate is always within the legal limit. The modal category reported is about several hundred thousand yen.[57] It is an open secret that the amount claimed to have been spent falls far below the actual sum expended. According to an LDP member, about one-half of the LDP candidates in Chiba finance their campaign expenses from their own personal funds, which have been accumulated from the earnings from their occupational pursuits. Other sources of support include national politicians from the same city, business firms and local notables. In view of the virtual absence of party support, LDP candidates' dependence on personal ties is especially strong. As compared with any other parties, it is probable that a greater proportion of LDP members make use of personal supporters' organizations. The size of such organizations in the case of the respondents varies from a few thousand to 11,000 people. Interview revealed that there are no sets of categories of people which are consistently or frequently mentioned by LDP members to be their supporters. In contrast to SP members, LDP members offer a truly varied response when asked to describe their own supporters. It is significant that although they can and did recite, when prompted, essentially correct perceptions of the socio-economic compositional characteristics of LDP supporters, they do not spontaneously perceive their personal followers in these terms. This is consistent with the non-ideological character of LDP.

There was a lone outspoken LDP maverick in Chiba who condemned the use of supporters' organizations by his colleagues on the ground that they constitute a hotbed of dishonesty and corruption, and that unlike most of his colleagues, he does not engage in electioneering prior to the official commencement of the campaign period. The other LDP members interviewed in general did not seem particularly bothered by the supporters' organizations, which they accept as a matter of necessity. This is in contrast with SP and DSP members who showed signs of embarrassment and disapproval-in-principle regarding their involvement in such organizations.

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[57] *SKS*, 1963, pp. 62–66; *CSNK*, 1963, p. 71, 97-100.

The questions designed to get at what the legislators believed to be most essential factors contributing to their elections yielded the following responses. First of all, LDP members attach greater importance to the cultivation of new friends and acquaintances by bestowing personal favors on individual constituents than do the members of other parties. Importance is also given to support by one's relatives. Second, in contrast to members of other parties LDP members tend to emphasize the importance of personal assets and qualifications, such as financial resources and individual character. The maverick reacted instantly and in unequivocal terms, pointing out that his colleagues make effective use of bribery and how prevalent the practice is. The follow-up question, raised hesitantly with all the look of innocence this writer could command, evoked a swift and candid response: "How does bribery work? To buy electors—you just hand them cash!" Despite this blunt assertion, such open and crass bribery does not appear to be widespread.

III. SUMMARY AND INTERPRETATION

Whatever the mixture of motivations involved, there is no dearth of people who aspire for the office of assemblymen with a high degree of intensity.

Electoral chances are shaped in part by what the candidates and their agents do, and this in turn is based on the following: A) the kinds and relative amount of resources available, B) the perceived characteristics of personal supporters and party supporters and C) the perceived prerequisites for electoral success. The fact that the incumbents perceive their personal supporters in terms of characteristics different from those they ascribe to their party supporters—this reflects, and varies with, the different degrees of dependence they feel toward their parties—is correlated with what they consider to be the essential factors shaping electoral success.

With the exception of KP members, incumbent members generally attach great importance to the cultivation of personal ties by performing sundry errand and service functions. This they consider to be a most effective and essential factor affecting their electoral fortunes. The degree of importance attached to personal ties varies inversely with the perceived utility of their respective parties for electoral success. The parties can be ranked in terms of the perceived utility of the party in this order: KP, SP, DSP and LDP. Furthermore, in the order of SP, DSP, and LDP, the reliance on financial resources and organization of more personal and communal type (the supporters' association, hamlet and town association) increases. The candidates' orientations regarding the factors deemed essential for their election are significantly associated with what they think they ought to be doing, what they think their constituents expect them to do, and with what they are actually doing, but this is a topic for another paper.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC VARIABLES AND VOTING FOR THE RADICAL LEFT: CHILE, 1952*

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This is the first of a number of investigations of the socio-economic basis of politics, with a special focus on voting for the radical left or right. In this case, the voting data are the percentage of votes cast for Allende, the socialist candidate in the 1952 presidential elections in Chile.

I. INTRODUCTION

The study of political behavior is relatively a late undertaking of the human sciences. To a certain extent, this delay can be explained in terms of the compartmentalization of academic life. Sociologists and psychologists, for example, hesitated to enter a province thought to be the exclusive domain of political scientists, and, when they finally did, explanatory theories of political behavior had a relatively isolated development along departmental lines, thereby losing the benefits derived from the intercourse among different perspectives. It was, indeed, a lonely development, partly because of the notion that political behavior has a specificity of its own, that it has an etiology different from that of other forms of social and psychological behavior. In this, of course, social scientists may have erred. Voting behavior is probably just another manifestation of basic social and psychic phenomena.

Although the degree of inequality varies from system to system, every system favors some of its members more than others and it is ordinarily the disadvantaged who become aliented.[1] It has been suggested that this alienation may be manifested in many ways—in mental illness, in suicide, in drug addiction, in certain types of crime (but *not* in others), and, interestingly enough, in the active support of radical political movements. Actually, it has also been suggested that some of these responses are functional alternatives.[2] Whether this is true or not remains an empirical question. Some of these alienation responses are essentially a retreat from life in the system; others are essentially aggression against the system. Voting for a radical party is an aggressive form of alienation oriented against the existing socio-economic system, which aims at replacing the system with another. The percent of the radical vote is a good indicator of the extent of this kind of alienation.

As each independent variable is discussed below, several indexes are suggested. Our strategy will be to investigate the underlying relationships of each of these indexes to the index of alienation or radical response—the percentage of a population voting for Salvador Allende, the far left candidate in the Chilean 1952 Presidential Elections.

Industrial Development in Capitalistic Society. Marx's basic hypothesis is to the effect that working class alienation increases as a capitalistic system matures or industrialization develops. He had numerous reasons for making this prediction (too many to review here) and he considered the prediction inevitable as do most orthodox Marxists.

In an economic system based primarily on the private ownership of the means of production, capitalistic development is almost synonymous with industrial or economic development. Based upon a tradition which was systematized by Colin Clark,[3] we considered the proportion of the total labor force in the primary sector (agricultural and extractive businesses such as farming, fishing, and lumbering but excluding mining). Thus, on the basis of the Marxist hypothesis, it is expected that the percent voting for the radical left will increase as the proportion of the labor force in the manu-

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[1] Although for Marx in a class society every individual is alienated from work, we are using here the term alienation in the sense of economic-political alienation. For theoretical statement on the Maxist theory of alienation see Jean Calvez, *El Pensamiento de* Carlos Marx (Madrid: Tourus, 1962), Chapter II.

[2] Ronald Ridker, "Discontent and Economic Growth," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, XI (October, 1962), 1–15.

[3] Colin Clark, *The Conditions of Economic Progress*, (London: Macmillan, 1951). See also S. S. Kuznets, *Six Lectures on Economic Growth*, (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1959), Lecture III.

facturing and in the tertiary sectors *increases*, but as the proportion in the primary *decreases*.

However, another stream of sociological theorizing arrived at conclusions which are diametrically opposed to this Marxist hypothesis. Kornhauser using cross-sectional international data found *negative* correlations between various indicators of industrial development and communist vote.[4] Cutright, also relying on cross-sectional international data, suggests that political development is a positive function of economic development. His dependent variable, political development, is patterned after the Western, capitalistic model and its political institutions. His conclusions nevertheless have a bearing upon our hypothesis in spite of the ideological bias implicit in the very definition of political development used by Cutright.[5] Lipset also relates positively economic development to democracy, Western style.[6] Ulam also predicted that in the advanced stages of industrial development leftist radicalism would diminish.[7] Ulam's theoretical predictions are longitudinal, but he does not present systematic objective data. Thus, there is a considerable amount of research and theory which reverses the Marxist hypothesis[8] at the cross-sectional level, of analysis. Primarily, we are then left with two contradictory predictions, which may operate at two different levels of analysis. Our purpose here is to see which hypothesis has a higher predictive value. However, we will use intranational, rather than international data. As such, our paper aims to explain static differences among provinces, rather than nations. Needless to say, our results do *not* explain change.[9]

Anomie and the Breakdown of Traditional Society. Usually characterized as a condition of normlessness, anomie was assumed by Durkheim to produce alienation. Further theoretical work has refined the concept, but the normlessness dimension continues to be central to the concept. In a developing country, anomie is usually experienced as part of a loss of faith in, or a rejection of, traditional norms and values so the individual tends no longer to be governed by them. Of course, this is not to imply that every post-traditional society is forever doomed to remain anomic; rather, we believe that sooner or later another value and belief system will become accepted and act as guidelines, providing normative orientations. However, we hypothesize that there is a time lag between the rejection of the traditional value system and the institutionalization of a replacement system. This also means that in this period, which may affect more than one generation, a considerable proportion of the total population may lack such an orientation. If, as we assume, there is a psychological "need" for this orientation (all with a varying intensity from individual to individual), these transitional periods may provide coherent ideologies, political and otherwise, a ready and numerically significant audience.

Traditional norms and values may function as tranquilizers by limiting aspirations and by rationalizing frustrations. Furthermore, participation in a traditional community often provides the stability and an identity that contributes toward a satisfactory life. Thus, immersion in traditional norms and values may cushion the frustrations of poverty and therefore tend to prevent alienation. Marx intuitively recognized this when he accused religion of being the opium of the masses.

Durkheim assumed that Catholicism of his day represented such a system of traditional norms and values, and that participation in the Catholic religion was a negative index of the kind of anomie talked about here. Catholic values would still function as guidelines after other traditional values had been rejected. Consequently, we used the percentage of the population listed as members of the Catholic Church as a negative index of anomie.

On the other hand, Marx's observation about religion *per se* suggests that the proportion of the total resident population without religious affiliation (including atheists, free-thinkers, and without religion) can be taken as an indicator of a rupture of traditionalism or a positive index of anomie.[10] Thus, on the basis of the amonie hypothesis, we would expect the percent voting for the radical left to *increase* as the percent of Catholicism *decreases* and the percent with no religious affiliation increases.[11]

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[4] William Kornhauser, *The Politics of Mass Society*, (London: Routledge and Kegan, Paul, 1960).

[5] Phillip Cutright, "National Political Development: Measurement and Analysis," *American Sociological Review*, 28 (April, 1963), 253–264.

[6] Seymour M. Lipset, *Political Man*, (New York: Doubleday, 1960), Part I, and "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," this REVIEW, 53 (1959), 69–105.

[7] Adam B. Ulam, *The Unfinished Revolution*, (New York: Random House, 1960).

[8] Glaucio A. Dillon Soares, "Desenvolvimento Económico e Radicalismo Político; o Teste de una Hipótese," *América Latina, ano V*, n. 3 Julho-Setembro, 1962), 65–82. See also Glaucio A. Dillon Soares, "Desarrollo Económico en América Latina (México, D. F., 1965), 516–559.

[9] We deemed it necessary to emphasize this point because many sociologists working in the area of comparative studies all too often forget that cross-sectional analyses are poor substitutes for longitudinal analysis.

However, indexes of affiliation or non-affiliation are on the surface blurred reflections of anomie since membership can be a poor indication of the impact of religion. A more powerful, more nuclear measure is needed. With Catholicism's emphasis on the family and its rather strong taboo against divorce, the percentage of the population divorced may be such a measure. (Durkheim used this as a positive index of amonie in his study of suicide and with good results.)[12] The anomie hypothesis will be supported, then, if the percent voting for the radical left is significantly and positively related to the percent divorced.

Amomie ordinarily occurs in other contexts; for example, when people migrate from home, and particularly when they move to cities. Consequently, the percentage of the resident population born out of state was included as a possible positive index of anomie. Thus, the prediction; the percentage voting for the radical left will increase with the percent of out-of-state immigrants.

Economic Deprivation. Both Marx and Durkheim assumed that alienation would occur as a direct result of economic deprivation, the best index of which may be the percent unemployed. For Marx, unemployment and underemployment associated with the downswings of the economic cycle were a mjaor cause of alienation of the working class in a capitalistic system. For Durkheim the economic instability associated with both downswing and upswing of the business cycle was a major cause of alienation, as manifested in suicide rates. Ignoring the state of the cycle, our prediction is simply that the percent voting for the radical left will *increase* as the percent of the labor force unempolyed *increases.*

Recent studies have also shown that immigration is influenced by economic conditions. Furthermore, migration usually goes from the more deprived areas to the less deprived areas. Thus, the percentage of the total population born out of state may be taken as a *negative* indicator of economic deprivation. As such, it should be negatively correlated with the percent voting for the radical left candidates or parties. This creates an interesting situation; on the basis of the social dislocation theory, the percent of the population born out of state can be used as an indicator of anomie, and should therefore correlate positively with left radicalism. But this expectation is reversed if one takes the same variable as a negative indicator of relative economic deprivation.

Urbanization. Finally, let us turn to urbanization, a variable we have saved until last because it is apparently related to two of our previous variables—anomie and economic deprivation.

Urbanization brings men into contact with thousands of others, removing them from their previous social isolation, introducing them to new norms and values. It also provides new problems, new reference groups and new reference classes. Consequently, one result of urbanization is the breakdown of traditional norms and values with the subsequent anomic gap.

But anomie is not the only result. Urbanization also displays new forms of material civilization, it stimulates the consumption of new goods, creates new tastes, raises aspirations which oftentimes cannot be easily satisfied. Consequently, while the rural populations migrate to the city to escape economic deprivation, they often find it there in a more severe, a more insidious relative form.[13] Thus, urbanization may serve to increase *relative* economic deprivation, the kind that may effectively stimulate political radicalism.

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[10] Most Latin American countries do not provide alternatives such as atheists, free-thinkers, and non-religious in their censuses. As a result, the overwhelming majority (say, 99%) of the population appears as Catholic, thus rendering this variable useless at the operational level. The Chilean questionnaire, fortunately, included alternatives in the instructions. (It reads: What is the respondent's religion? Write down whichever he declares. Exs. Catholic, Protestant, Muslim, Free-Thinker, None, etc.).

[11] Notice that the percentage Protestant in a predominantly Catholic country may be considered as an indicator of the breakdown of traditionalism. Actually, the same may be true of any religion. Thus, the percentage Catholic in some sections of a few African countries may be taken as an indicator of modernization as opposed to traditionalism. The point that is being made here is that the meaning of indicators of *values* is dependent upon the concerte socio-economic context at hand.

[12] Emile Durkheim, *Suicide* (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1951), 259–276.

[13] There is some evidence that most migrants from deprived areas at first have a feeling of relative reward as they compare their present status with their rural past. However, as time goes on, relative reward gives place to relative deprivation as their rural past is progressively idealized.

Thus, on the basis of anomie and relative economic deprivation, urbanization should be positively related to the percentage vote for the radical left.

Urbanization has been thought by Kornhauser to be negatively associated with the communist vote. However, he adds that *within* each nation, communist vote is strongest in larger cities. Also, preliminary studies by the first author show substantial positive zero order correlations between measures of urbanizaton and the communist vote in Brazil, Costa Rica, Japan, and Venezuela.[14]

Miscellaneous Indexes. At this point, the traditional political scientist might begin to think that we have "left politics out of the analysis of political behavior." But we have not altogether, as two political variables are included. One is based on studies which show that women are usually more conservative than men and thus suggest that the "females as a proportion of the total number of voters" may be a negative predictor of radical leftist vote. Another prediction is based on the simple suggestion that elections do not take place in a political and personality vacuum; there are alternatives and choice is among these alternatives. Visual inspection of zero-order correlations among political and economic variables suggested that the percentage of the total valid vote given to Matte Larrain, a conservative candidate representing the Liberal and Traditionalist (*Conservador Tradicionalista*) parties, correlated negatively with the Allende vote and we decided to leave it in.

The Dependent Variable. A final word with respect to our dependent variable, the percentage of the total valid vote given to Don Salvador Allende Gosens, who was in terms of the official registrar, the candidate of the Socialist Party and "other political groups." Allende was the candidate of the far left in three Chilean Elections: 1952, 1958, and 1964. In 1958 and 1964 he was the candidate of the FRAP, a leftist coalition which included the Socialist Party, the Communist Party, and PaDeNa. Although Allende is not a communist nor a Communist Party member, he never tried to hide his radicalism and in the three aforementioned presidential elections he was placed at the left of all other candidates. In 1952 he was the candidate of a radical minority, having obtained 51,975 votes of 954,131 valid ones, or 5.5 percent. He obtained 15 percent of the vote in Arauco, a coal-mining province with a low degree of social development, and less than 2 percent in Linarea (1.9 percent), Maule (1.6 percent), and Chiloé (1.2 percent), which are rural, non-industrial provinces. His popularity grew from 1952 to 1958 to 1964, when he attracted larger proportions of nonradical, left-of-center groups. Thus, the present study is not an analysis of communist vote, strictly speaking, but an analysis of radical left voting. This is a relevant difference, as it has been shown that voting for communist and socialist has different patterns of relationships with outside variables.[15]

II. ANALYSIS I

A preliminary analysis was made for the 1952 Chilean election using the thirteen indexes selected on the basis of the aforementioned theoretical considerations. The indexes were computed for each of the twenty-five states (or provinces) of Chile, and these data were then analyzed using a linear multiple regression analysis. The results were fairly promising: the twelve independent variables accounted for 60 percent of the variance in the percent of the vote for Allende.

However, twelve independent variables are difficult to manage theoretically. As the beta coefficients of some of the variables were not significantly different from zero, we performed a condensation analysis where the variables were eliminated one at a time in an order inverse to their t-values, and the regression analysis was done over and over (automatically) until the beta coefficients of all of the remaining independent variables were significantly different from zero (at the .05 level).[16] Four independent variables survived this procedure and the explained variance decreased to 45 percent as may be noted in Table 1.

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[14] Kornhauser, *op. cit.*, and Gláucio A. Dillon Soares, *Economic Ddvelopment and Political Radicalism*, (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Washington University, St. Louis. 1964).

[15] Kornhauser, *op. cit.* Soares has suggested that Labor and Socialist vote is positively related to social development after economic development is controlled, whereas the Communist vote is negatively related to social development. See Glaucio A. Dillon Soares, "Congruencias e Incongruencias entre Indicadores de Desenvolvimento Economico," *America Latina* (January, 1965), 47–60. Note, however, that Chilean socialists are far more radical than the European social democrats, and that in recent times a considerable wing of the party is attracted to the Peking line.

[16] We used this reduction process based on the beta coefficients and t-values as a simplifying device only. Insofar as we deal with census and electoral data, all errors are non-sampling errors but there is room for problems of significance.

III. DISCUSSION I

Some may object to the loss of 15 percentage points of explained variance via our condensation procedure, but we consider this a small price for conceptual simplification.

Even so, 45 percent of the variance means a multiple correlation of .67 which is promising given the present state of research findings in social science.

Even so, we should aspire to do better. But how? The usual strategy is to search for other significant independent variables to include in the analysis. This is important, of course, but there are other sources of error variance. For example, what reason is there to believe that voting for the radical left should increase as a linear, additive function of a number of socio-economic variables? None in particular, but if not a linear, additive relationship, what?

We have assumed that aggressive alienation, or voting for the radical left, is the result of certain frustrations or feelings. Feelings, and emotions generally, are part of a class of non-voluntary responses. There are many other types of non-voluntary responses besides feelings or emotions; to name a few, the various reflexes, the activities of many internal organs such as the heart, and interestingly enough, the psychological sensations produced by physical stimuli via sensory receptors. The latter are an important class because we know so much about their relationship to the stimuli which produce them.[17] The magnitude of a psychological sensation Ψ always increases as a power function of the magnitude of the physical stimulus as in Stevens' law: $\Psi = c\Phi^n$ or in its logarithmic equivalent: $\log \Psi = \log c + n \log \Phi$, where c and n are parameters which vary from one physical stimulus to another.

Evidence thus far, although limited, suggests that a power function may be the general form between the relationship of the magnitude of all non-voluntary responses (R) and the magnitude of the stimuli (S) which produced them as in the following equation:

$$R = cS^n$$

or in its logarithmic equivalent

$$\log R = \log c + n \log S.$$

TABLE 1. SOCIO-ECONOMIC VARIABLES AND THE VOTE FOR ALLENDE, 1952*

Variables	Beta Weights†	t test	Partial Correlations
Percent unemployed	.58	1.78	.37
Percent in primary sector	1.23	2.34	.46
Percent in mining	.70	2.65	.51
Percent divorced	.78	2.59	.50

* Results of a linear multiple regression analysis using a stepwise condensation procedure which eliminates insignificant variables.

† Explained variance is 45 percent. With 20 degrees of freedom a *t*-value of 1.72 is needed for significance at the .05 level, one-tailed test or at the .10 level, two-tailed test.

This apparently includes non-voluntary responses at the physiological level as well as the social-psychological level.[18] Of most relevance here, a measure of aggression was found to increase as a .54 power function of a measure of interference in an experimental situation. (It was assumed that the aggressive response increased as a function of feelings of frustration and the feelings of frustration increased as a function of the interference stimulus.) This experiment has led to the appropriate revision of the traditional interference-frustration aggression theory and suggests to us that voting for the radical left, an aggressive alienation response, may increase as a power function of the feeling of frustration produced by relevant socio-economic stimuli.

However, the evidence thus far involves a bivariate relationship. How would the effects of several socio-economic stimuli combine to produce the collective frustration response which is reflected in the aggressive alienation response or the vote for the radical left? The second author has recently extended the above analy-

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[17] S. S. Stevens, "The Surprising Simplicity of Sensory Metrics," *American Psychologist*, 17, 1962, 29–39. See also "The Psychophysics of Sensory Function," *American Scientist*, 48, 1960, 226–253. These are summary articles.

[18] For two straightforward physiological studies see C. I. Hovland, and H. H. Riesen, "Magnitude of Galvanic and Vasomotor Response as a Function of Stimulus Intensity," *Journal of General Psychology*, 23 (1940), 103–121; H. K. Bartoshuk, "Human Neonatal Cardiac Response to Sound: A Power Function," *Psychonomic Science*, 1 (1964), 151–152. For two social psychological studies which suggest a stimulus response power law see R. L. Hamblin et al., "The Interference-Aggression Law?" *Sociometry*, 26 (1963), 190–216; T. Sellin and M. E. Wolfgang, *The Measurement of Delinquency* (New York: Wiley, 1964).

TABLE 2. SOCIO-ECONOMIC VARIABLES AND THE PERCENTAGE VOTE FOR ALLENDE, 1952*

Variables	Beta Weights†	t test	Partial Correlations
Percent unemployed	.75	2.40	.48
Percent in primary sector	.40	2.51	.50
Percent in mining	.14	2.95	.56
Percent in tertiary sector	−1.42	−2.31	−.47
Percent divorced	1.40	4.00	.68

* The results are for a multiple regression analysis using the log transformations of the original indexes. The variables shown survived a stepwise condensation procedure which eliminated all insignificant predictors.

† Explained variance is 79 percent. With 19 degrees of freedom, a t-value of 1.73 is significant at the .05 level, one-tailed test, or at the .10 level, two-tailed test.

sis to the multivariate case where the equation is:

$$R = cS_1^{n_1}S_2^{n_2}S_3^{n_3} \ldots S_j^{n_j}$$

or in logarithms

$$\log R = \log c + n_1 \log S_1 + n_2 \log S_2 + n_3 \log S_3 \ldots + n_j \log S_j$$

This equation has worked well in two stratification studies; multiple R^2 hit circa .98 in both cases.[19] It may be that this multiplicative power function might also describe the relationships which obtain among data in this investigation.

IV. ANALYSIS II

How can one test for a multiplicative power function? The logarithmic version of the equation suggests the answer: transform the indexes to their logarithms; this makes the equation linear and, therefore, a linear multiple regression analysis may be used to obtain least squares estimates of the exponents $n_1 \ldots n_j$. (These will be the regression coefficients.) That is exactly what we did. We transformed all the index values to logarithms and redid our linear regression analysis.

The results presented in Table 2 are quite an improvement; the combined predictive power of the thirteen independent variables is much more satisfactory; they explain 81 percent of the variance in the vote given to Allende. That is to say, their multiple correlation with the radical vote increased to about .90, indeed a rewarding result.

However, for the sake of theoretical parsimony the stepwise condensation procedure was again used to eliminate those variables whose regression co-efficients were not significantly different from zero. The condensation procedure reduced the number of predictive variables to five, whose joint effect happily explained 79 percent of the variance in the vote for Allende. We consider the loss of 2 percent in explained variance a small price for achieving conceptual simplification.

V. DISCUSSION II

With the multivariate power function, only one variable was added to the list of significant predictors, yet the explained variance is almost doubled. A jump from 45 percent to 79 percent is a considerable improvement, enough to indicate the multivariate power function does provide a better description of the underlying processes in these data. At least, the results indicate that the underlying relationships are *multiplicative*, not additive, in their effects, and curvilinear, not as we first implicitly assumed.

We will discuss the theoretical implications of the multiplicative power effect later; now, however, let us turn to the substantive issues raised by the results of the last analysis.

The Industrial Development Hypothesis. On the basis of Marx's industrial development hypothesis we predicted that the percent vote for the radical left would *increase* with the percent of the labor force in the manufacturing sector and the percent in the tertiary sector but decrease with the percent in the primary sector. Actually, none of these predictions were borne out by the Chilean data for the 1952 election. The percent vote for the radical left was *not* related to the percent of the labor force in the manufacturing sector; it was *negatively* instead of *positively* related to the percent in the tertiary sector; and it was *positively* instead of *negatively* related to the percent in the primary sector.

Thus the data suggest that the percentage vote for the radical left is negatively related to industrialization. This is consistent with Kornhauser's findings.[20] and with the prediction of a number of current analysts including Cutright,[21] Lipset,[22] and Ulam.[23] The one exception to this is the size of the manufacturing sector, which did not relate to the percentage vote for Allende.

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[19] R. L. Hamblin and Carole Smith, "Values, Status, and Professors," *Sociometry*, 29, (September 1966), 183–196; and R. L. Hamblin, *Ratio, Measurement and Sociological Theory*, (mimeographed, Department of Sociology, Washington University, St. Louis, 1966).

[20] Kornhauser, *op. cit.*

If industrialization is the key process that reduces alienation, then why should the size of the manufacturing sector not be related to the percentage vote for Allende? The answer may be found in the relationship of industrialization and alienation to class polarization.

Marx predicted that cutthroat competition during the low ebb of the economic cycles would eventually result in a two-class system where the rich became richer and smaller in number and the poor became poorer and larger in number. As Marx analyzed the situation, he assumed that the middle classes would tend to disappear and that the only mobility would be downward. Polarization, the process which describes the development of such a two-class system, was assumed to be a major cause of alienation.

Interestingly enough, cross-sectional data suggest that industrialization is *negatively* related to class polarization.[24] Since class polarization exists in a community or state to the extent of middle class is absent, let us use the percent of the labor force in three occupational groups—employers, employees and self-employed—as a positive index of the size of the middle class, or as a negative index of polarization.[25] (In doing this we ignore the possibility that some in these categories are upper class. However, by most definitions the upper class comprise a very small proportion of the total labor force, usually less than 1 percent, so they hardly affect the index.)

The three middle class occupational categories comprise 16 percent of the working force in the mining sector, 30 percent in the rest of the primary sector, 43 percent in the manufacturing sector, 51 percent in the service sector and 84 percent in the commerce sector.

On the basis of Marx's class polarization hypothesis, then, we would expect the percentage vote for Allende to *increase* as the relative size of the primary sector (including mining) increases, but decrease as the relative size of the tertiary (service and commerce) sectors increase. The prediction for manufacturing is less clear. Of course, the results conform precisely to these predictions and, in addition, they suggest a tipping point. Apparently, when the middle classes are represented by about 40–45 percent of those occupied in a sector, little or no radicalism occurs. However, when the middle class is represented less than this, as in the primary and mining sectors, alienation evidently occurs and the more these sectors are represented in a state, the greater the percent vote for the radical left. On the other hand, when the middle class is represented significantly more than 40–45 percent, as in the tertiary sector, evidently alienation is reduced, and the more this sector is represented in a state, the smaller the percent vote for the radical left.

What are we to make of these findings? Does class polarization act as an intervening variable between industrialization and alienation, or do industrialization and alienation exert independent effects? The data in their present form do not allow us to answer these questions. Thus, the interpretation of the results involving the relative size of the various economic sectors is not at all clear. This, then, is a serious shortcoming of the present analysis.

The Anomie Hypothesis. Only one of the several indexes of anomie turned out to be a significant predictor of the percent vote for Allende in the 1952 election. This was the percent divorced, which we assumed would be a good measure. Actually, this was an important variable as the exponent of 1.4 suggests.

We were somewhat surprised that the percent urban and the percent immigrants did not turn out to be significant predictors of radical vote.

The Socio-Economic Deprivation Hypothesis. We had only one index of socio-economic deprivation, the percent unemployed, and it turned out to be an important predictor of the percent vote for Allende. The exponent was .75. Even so, this index may be less than adequate, for underemployment is omitted, and agricultural unemployment more often than not goes unreported.

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[21] Cutright, *op. cit.*

[22] Lipset, *op. cit.*

[23] Ulam, *op. cit.*

[24] Although historical data suggest that the longitudinal trend is curvilinear and that twentieth cetnury economic take-offs may co-exist with a growth in both middle-classness and urban unemployment. See Glaucio A. Dillon Soares, "Economic Development and the Class Structure," in R. Bendix and S. M. Lipset (eds.), *Class, Status and Power: Social Stratification in Comparative Perspective,* (New York: The Free Press, 1966, rev. ed.).

[25] Actually, the self-employed category may artificially increase the middleclassness of the agricultural sector. For there are many small farmers, with no hired labor, with no mechanization whatsoever, with a very small plot of poor land, who would be better classified in the working class group.

VI. ANALYSIS III

We have already noted that some of the above results have a serious shortcoming; ambiguity. Specifically, the result involving the relative size of various economic sectors support 1) the hypothesis that alienation decreases with industrialization or 2) the hypothesis that it increases with class polarization or 3) perhaps both? What is the pattern of relationships? A simple way to find out is to develop several polarization indicators and include them in a new analysis. If the economic sector measures then drop out of such a new regression analysis, being replaced by one of the polarization indicators, the results would support the class polarization hypothesis at the expense of the industrialization theory. If, on the other hand, they remained significant in the context of the direct indicators of class polarization, then the economic-sector results would support the industrialization hypothesis.

To run this crucial test and generally to elaborate our findings we decided to develop additional indicators of polarization, anomie, and urbanization for each of Chile's twenty-five states.

Class Polarization.

a) The percent of the labor force who are employers or employees (*empleadores y empleados*) may provide an accurate indication of the size of class polarization.

b) The percent of the labor force who are self-employed may provide an alternative *negative* indicator of class polarization since the polarizing process is supposed to reduce the number of businessmen.

c) The percent of the labor force who are workers (*obreros*) may provide a *positive* indicator of class polarization since the polarizing process is supposed to increase the proportion of workers.

d) The percent of the agricultural labor force who are non-manual workers may be an important *negative* indicator of polarization in that sector. Although Marx considered the peasants to be a useless class for revolutionary purposes, the empirical question is: Does polarization produce alienation in the agricultural sector just as it does in other sectors of the economy?

e) The percent of the non-agricultural labor force who are non-manual may be the crucial *negative* indicator of polarization, particularly if Marx was right about the reduced significance of the agricultural sector.

f) We decided to include an educational indicator, one that approximates the size of the middle class: the percent of the population 15 years or over with a high school or college education, a *negative* indicator of polarization. High school education would scarcely indicate membership in the middle class in an advanced industrial economy, but it does in a developing country such as Chile.[26]

g) The percent of the dwelling units whose construction and maintenance was coded "good" or "partly good" by the census interviewers, and,

h) the percent of the dwelling units which have piped drinking water (*Agua potable por canería*).

These last two are negative indicators of polarization; they should show roughly at least the proportion of the families who have escaped rural or urban slum conditions.

Urbanization. Our first index of urbanization may have had a bad cutting point (2,500 or more) for an investigation of the process which produces alienation. The urbanization which produces anomie and alientation may well be large scale rather than small scale. Consequently, the percent of the population living in urban *comunas* with 10,000 inhabitants or more may be a more adequate indication of urbanization. Although there may be several comunas in a large city.

Results. Those ten indexes were coded then for each of the twenty-five states in Chile and together with the original thirteen were transformed to logarithms and subjected to multiple regression analysis with the percent vote for Allende as the dependent variable.

The explained variance with all 22 independent variables is 90 percent. The results, again using the condensation procedure to achieve simplification and significance, may be seen in Table 3.

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[26] It might be argued that sheer literacy should be used instead of high school membership. However, the Chilean 1952 census indicates that workers (*trabajadores*) comprised 79% of the economically active population. This suggests that a large proportion of the workers is literate, as illiterates accounted for only 20% of the population 14 years and older. Actually, the manual non-manual stratification (working class-middle class) might, in the Chilean case, correspond more closely to the less than high school-high school or more educational stratification. However, in countries where over half of the population is illiterate, sheer literacy may grant individuals an upper-working class or even lower-middle class status.

TABLE 3. SOCIO-ECONOMIC VARIABLES AND THE VOTE FOR ALLENDE, 1952*

Variables	Indexes	Type of Index	Regression Coefficient[b]	t-test
Class polarization (P)	% in high school or college	−	−1.33	−3.84
Industrial development (I)	% in primary sector	−	.45	2.62
Industrial development (I)	% in mining	−	.10	2.34
Anomie (A)	% divorced	+	1.57	5.03
Urbanization (U)	% in communities 2,000 or more	+	1.30	2.49
Relative deprivation (D)	% immigrants	−	− .46	−1.87

* Results of multiple regression analysis, using logarithmic transformations of the various indexes. The variables shown survived a stepwise condensation procedure which eliminated all insignificant predictors. The vote for Allende is the vote for the radical left indicating those alienated (V_a) from Chile's socio-economic system as of 1952. Thus, the equation $V_a = cP^{1.33}I^{-.55}A^{1.57}U^{1.30}D^{.46}$.

[b] Explained variance is 85 percent. With 18 degrees of freedom, a t-value of 1.73 is significant at the .05 level, one-tailed test.

VII. DISCUSSION III

A multiple regression analysis isolates the underlying relationships between the dependent and a number of independent variables. When the sample of independent variables changes, so might the results, that is, a variable that is significant or insignificant in one context may not be in another. Such is the case in this analysis: two variables that were previously insignificant predictors now appear to be significant, the percent of the population living in communities 2,500 or larger and the percent of the population who were born out of state (immigrants). Also, two indexes became insignificant predictors; the percent employed in the tertiary sector and the percent unemployed. Apparently, these changes occurred because of the inclusion of the poulation 15 years and older with a high school or college education.

This analysis is a better approximation to reality since a larger proportion of the variance was explained. Thus, the results supercede those of the previous analysis.

How did the underlying hypotheses fare?

Industrial Development. The percentage of the labor force in mining and the percentage in the rest of the primary sector survived with exponents of .10 and .45 respectively. This evidently means that these indicators should be interpreted in the way they are usually interpreted, as negative indicators of industrialization. Thus, the results appear to support the hypothesis that alienation as evidenced by the percentage vote for the radical left *decreases* with industrialization. These findings then are consistent with Kornhauser's data, and with the Lipset-Ulam hypothesis but inconsistent with the Marxian hypothesis.

Class Polarization. As might be recalled, in this analysis nine alternative indexes of the size of either the middle or the working classes were included in an attempt to gauge polarization directly, for we have assumed that polarization occurs to the extent the middle class decreases in size, or conversely, to the extent the working class increases in size.

Of the seven measures of the size of the middle or working classes, one turned out to be a significant predictor of the percent vote for Allende: the per cent of the population 15 years or older with high school or college education. A measure of the size of the middle class, and hence a negative indicator of polarization, the percent with high school or college has an important negative relationship with the percentage vote for Allende; the exponent was −1.33.

The Anomie Hypothesis. In the previous analysis only one indicator of anomie, the percent divorced, turned out to be significantly related to the percent vote for the radical left. In the present analysis this same indicator turned out to be significant and the magnitude of the relationship with the percent vote for Allende is similar for the second and third analyses, 1.40 and 1.57, respectively. Of all the results, this appears to be the strongest. Apparently, anomie may be more important than any other of the variables investigated in the production of radicalism.

Economic Deprivation. It may be recalled the percentage immigrants from out of state was taken as a possible indicator of two variables as a positive indicator of anomie and as a negative indicator of economic deprivation (the latter on the assumption that people migrate to prosperous areas). These epistemic assumptions led to alternative predictions. If the anomie assumption were valid, then the percentage in migrants should be positively related to the percentage vote for Allende. Alternatively, if the economic deprivation interpretation is correct, then the percent immigrants should be *negatively* related to the percentage vote for Allende.

Of course, the data support the latter interpretation. The exponent for the percentage immigrants was −.46.

Evidently the percentage of immigrants is a better indicator of economic deprivation than of anomie. Actually, migration may produce anomie, but only in the long run. Most migration in developing economies is from rural, tradition-oriented areas to urban areas. It may take time, perhaps a few decades, before migrants lose traditional norms and values.[27] Hence, the immigration measure may indicate the percent of a residentially urban population that is predominantly rural—that is, oriented toward traditional norms and values. If so, then the immigration indicator may be negatively rather than positively related to anomie. This interpretation is, of course, consistent with the results presented thus far; the percent vote for Allende is negatively related to the percent immigrants. But is there any further evidence? Consistent with our assumption that the percent urban is closely tied up with the percent immigrants, their zero order correlation is .75 and when one is omitted from the regression analysis the other is not significant. It is as though the percent urban indicator is valid only when the effects of immigration are held constant. This of course, lends support to our interpretation of "interdependence". When the proportion of migrants is not partialed out, it obliterates the positive association between urbanization and radicalism.

Finally, we should note that none of the other significant relationships in this analysis support the economic deprivation hypothesis directly. None of the positive or negative indicators of economic deprivation—the percent unemployed, the percent of the residences which are dilapidated, or the percent of the residences with piped-in water—were significantly related to the percent vote for the radical left.

Why? Perhaps because the deprivation that counts most is relative and not absolute deprivation and then only when the relative deprivations are not cushioned and explained away by traditional norms and values.

Urbanization. The results support the urbanization hypothesis. Two measures were included: one which includes the percentage living in communities 2,500 and over and the other in communities 10,000 and over. The latter was included when the other failed in second analysis. Ironically, it was not the second but the first indicator that turned out to be significant in this analysis. Probably it was not the cutting point that was wrong previously, but the context. When the context is correct, the effect is strong—the exponent is 1.30. This result then tends to confirm previous research by the first author where positive zero-order correlations between indexes of urbanization, and the percent communist vote in Brazil, Costa Rica, Japan, and Venezuela.

VIII. SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT METHOD

Before concluding, we wish to confront four sources of uneasiness which the reader may have about these investigations and the conclusions. One is a question about the application of a non-voluntary response "law" to voting behavior, one a question about economic determinism, one a question about macro versus micro theory, so-called, and the final question is about implications of the multiplicative power function which describes the relationship among the significant variables in this investigation.

The Conditioned Stimulus-Non-voluntary Response "Law". This investigation even in the context of the others which were previously cited does not pretend to establish the multiplicative power function as the form of the conditioned stimulus-non-voluntary response law. This will take many, many investigations; some in the field, some in the laboratory. However, the results reported here do require that we consider how this law, if it is a law, might apply in the case of voting behavior. In particular how can voting in a free election be thought of as non-voluntary? In answering this question, let us start with the concept non-voluntary.

By non-voluntary we refer to particular responses which occur automatically when the eliciting stimuli are present. Unless the individual learns how to control the eliciting stimuli, he cannot choose, rather he just experiences a non-voluntary response. At night when entering an illuminated room, a person does not choose to see the light; it happens automatically because his eyse and his central nervous system are built that way. However, he can choose to modify the stimulus presentation by closing his eyes, turning his head, switching off the current, etc. The latter he can choose to do because they are voluntary responses. A great part of individual learning in life has to do with the discovery of the stimuli which modify, elicit, or control the many non-voluntary responses: hunger pangs, fatigue, sexual orgasm, satisfaction, frustration.

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[27] This is confirmed by Brazilian data, which show that recent immigrants to Rio de Janeiro identify with the "poor" or "working" classes and many vote conservative, whereas many old migrants identify with the proletariat (*clásse operaria*) and vote for reformist parties. See Glaucio A. Dillon Soares, "The Political Sociology of Uneven Development in Brazil," in Irving L. Horowitz (ed.), *Revolution in Brazil*, (New York, Dutton, 1964), 192.

Sensing light is almost if not altogether a purely biological response to unconditioned stimuli. The latter examples, however, involve classical conditioning. Theoretically, at least, frustration occurs automatically to the extent an individual is prevented from acquiring or achieving something of value to him according to expectations. However, what is valued and what is expected is largely a function of individual conditioning in a particular culture. But given that history of conditioning, the frustration response to interference will occur automatically; it will be involuntary as surely as sensing light is involuntary.

What does this have to do with casting a ballot in a free election, a voluntary response if ever there was one? Certainly, the secret ballot was invented to give the voter the opportunity to choose whom he would vote for according to his own feelings and the dictates of his own conscience. Precisely because voting is free, we can expect that by and large, the vote will reflect how the voters feel. However, as we have suggested, the feelings of satisfaction with, frustration with, or alienation from a candidate or a party are largely non-voluntary depending upon a voter's values; they occur rather automatically as the eliciting conditioned stimuli occur. In the United States, many, if not most, liberal Republicans were alienated from Goldwater as they watched the crucial sessions of the Republican Presidential Convenion on TV. Similarly, vast numbers of intellectuals in the United States have been alienated by Johnson's international policies. The exodus of voters from the Goldwater ballot and the flurry of criticism of the Johnson policy is quite predictable given values of these voters.

In their theories, some social scientists have often acted as though they believed in Locke's folly, as though man's behavior were a clean slate that could be written as desired. Yet it is fatal to ignore the invariances in man. More than that, it is a fascistic assumption for it implies that any deviant, alienated response signals a sick or inferior individual instead of a sick or inferior social system. If man is a clean slate whose behavior can be written altogether as desired, then certainly he should be able to adapt happily to any social or political arrangement.

In point of fact, the big task for social scientists is to discover the invariances in man's behavior, the laws which describe the dynamics of man's non-voluntary as well as his voluntary responses. In the case of the voting response, it is crucial to discover the conditioned stimuli which evidently elicit the feelings which are expressed in the choices marked on the ballot. In this, the present study may have made a small start. Certain socio-economic variables apparently function directly or indirectly as conditioned stimuli to produce an alienated vote, and they explain 85 percent of the variance thereof. However, to understand the conditioned stimuli which produce the wide variety of voting will take many more investigations such as this, in Chile and in many other countries as well.

Economic Determinism. At least some readers may see the theory which has emerged in these investigations as blatant single-factor economic determinism. Actually, we have gone well beyond the economic determinism erroneously attributed to Marx.[28] True, the degree of industrialization, the degree of class polarization, and the degree of economic deprivation are crucial variables in our analysis and we are clearly indebted to Marx for them.[29] But anomie is also a crucical non-economic systems variable which evidently interacts with class polarization and the other economic variables, and for it we are indebted to Durkheim. Marx relegated such concepts as anomie to minor functions, devaluating their causal importance.

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[28] The description of the Marxist model as a single factor determinism exists in what has been called "vulgar Marxism." Engels clearly refuted the idea that the economic factor was the only determinant factor in Marxist theory. See his celebrated "Letter to Joseph Block," in L. Feuer (ed.), *Marx and Engels,* (Garden City: Doubleday-Anchor, 1959), 397–398.

[29] Although we have stressed the importance of *relative* deprivation, whereas Marx tended to stress absolute deprivation, and underscore the relative approach. Thus, the *verelendung* theory was stated by Marx in absolute terms, not in relative ones. See Karl Marx, *Salario, Preco e Lucro,* (Rio de Janeiro: Vitoria, 1955).

Yet the curvilinear multiplicative interaction which we found is hard to interpret other than causally, and judging from the exponents in our last analysis, anomie is just as important as industrialization, class polarization, or relative economic deprivation. Urbanization, another systems variable which most would not consider strictly economic in character, was important also.

Secondly, we must assume that the political alienation indicator—the percent vote for the radical left—did turn out to be related to industrialization, class polarization, anomie, economic deprivation, and urbanization, because there was an election in Chile in 1952 and because there was an attractive leftist candidate, Salvador Allende, who effectively campaigned on a radical platform. In other words, Allende and his campaign gave the voters an outlet to express their alienation; the secret ballot allowed them to cast their votes freely so that their feelings were expressed accurately. Thus, politics and political institutions do matter in our theory. Beyond this point, variations in political variables, if they could be measured, might well account for part of the additional 15 percent of the variance which we could not explain. (Another possibility, as noted, is that a significant portion of the residual variance is due to measurement error.)

Macro versus Micro Theory. Some may feel that the theory developed out of this research is "interesting," but they would want it to be verified in an analysis of individual survey data. Since we have used social-psychological assumptions about individuals in our derivations, they reason that individual data should be used in verification of the theory. It is as though we were involved in an ecological fallacy; drawing conclusions about the behavior of micro units using data from macro units.

Actually, our theory does not necessarily partake of the ecological fallacy. True the data are macro but so are the conclusions: We claim no prediction with regard to individual voting behavior. Using tested social-psychological assumptions we have simply put "man back into" macro social system theory.[30] This, because "man" is the micro unit which does the voting which is totaled up to determine the vote of the macro unit, i.e., the state. It is interesting, however, that the stimulus-response relationship for the macro units is evidently described by the same general law which describes the stimulus-response relationship for micro units. This does not imply a psychological reductionism, but rather the elaboration of a theory that applies both to individual behavior and to the behavior of larger, aggregate units. Even so, stimuli such as industrial development, class polarization, and anomie may produce alienation in advantaged as well as in disadvantaged individuals. There are advantaged individuals who empathize with the disadvantaged, thus rebelling against what they see as an unjust system. Senator Salvador Allende is just one of many documented examples. Our only real claim is that stimuli such as industrial development, class polarization, and anomie interact to produce an alienated response of populations which comprise the macro units under investigation.

Modernization and the Multiplier Effect. Finding the variables which affect the outcome of an election is, of course, an important theoretical problem but so is the discovery of how the effects combine. Suppose that Galileo had erred. In his famous law of falling bodies, instead of $D = AT^2$, suppose he had concluded $D = A + T^2$. In the latter case, even though all of the correct variables would have been present, the crucial multiplier effect of A, the accelerating force, would have been missed, the theory would have been grossly inaccurate, the error variance would have been very large.

The finding here is that voting for the radical left in the 1952 elections in Chile was a *multiplier* effect of several variables; class polarization, industrialization, anomie, urbanization, and relative economic deprivation. Since a multiplier effect is rather novel for social science theories, let us explore its meaning in a brief way.

Consider the simple multiplicative equation $Y = X \cdot Z$ (which by convention is the simplified version of $Y = 1.0X^{1.0} \cdot Z^{1.0}$), and consider its linear cousin, $Y = X + Z$. In the linear equation the effects of X and Z are literally independent. If X is increased four units, Y will increase four units regardless of the value of Z. However, in the multiplicative equation, the effects of X and Z are quite *interdependent.* If X and Z are both 1, then Y is 1, and increasing X to 5 will increase Y from 1 to 5. However, if X is 1 and Z is 100, then Y is 100 and increasing X from 1 to 5 will increase Y from 100 to 500. Thus a four-point increase of X will increase Y by 4 or by 400 points depending upon the value of Z. This is the essence of the multiplier effect.

In the case of the present results, the theoretical equation is more complex:

$$V_a = cP^{1.33}I^{-.55}A^{1.57}U^{1.30}D^{.46}$$

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[30] George C. Homans, "Putting Man Back In," *American Sociological Review,* January, 1965.

where V_a is the alienated vote for the radical left; P, class polarization; I, industrialization; A, anomie; U, urbanization; and D, relative economic deprivation. In this equation the independent variables are given differential weight or importance by the various exponents. Beyond that the multiplier effect is so elaborate that is seems to exceed our ken.

Even so, the development of an economy will ordinarily decrease polarization, increase industrialization, and decrease relative economic deprivation. These effects evidently combine to decrease the alienated vote. On the other hand, the development of an economy will also result in urbanization and for a time an increase in anomie which function to increase the alienated vote. The exponents suggest that if development is even, perhaps a precarious balance will obtain, the alienated vote will remain constant. However, if development does not serve to reduce class polarization significantly, or if development occurs unevenly enough to produce serious relative economic deprivation, the multiplier effect could be such as to produce a substantial shift in votes toward the radical left. In other words, while the results suggest a conflict in the effects of our independent variables which evidently produce something of an equilibrium, the interaction among these variables is such as to make wild fluctuations in an alienated or radical vote probable.

In Chile, development during the past fourteen years has been rather uneven, scored with many problems not the least of which has been a debilitating inflation. The result is rather expected. The vote for Allende was about 6 percent in 1952, 29 percent in 1958 and 39 percent in 1964. Although impressive, these figures actually mask the vast change that has taken place in politics in Chile. Allende's opposition has shifted continually to the left so that Senator Eduardo Frei, who was elected president in the 1964 elections, is a moderate socialist of the Christian Democrat variety. In spite of this shift, Allende has gained votes, both in absolute and relative terms, thus indicating a shift to the left in the Chilean voting population.

While this represents only the first of a series of investigations the theory which has emerged may be up to the job of accounting for such wild swings in voting behavior. Nevertheless, the above conclusions should be accepted with caution: in this paper we have not analyzed change data which would be required to substantiate many of our speculations.

Even so, it may be important to consider implications such as was done here particularly for future research. Actually, the present investigation should be replicated many times if the phenomena of the alienated vote is to be understood. Beyond this, however, the present investigation is severely limited; votes for all shades of political parties using trend as well as cross-sectional data will be required for an adequate understanding of the voting patterns of macro systems. The present study is simply a prototype of what might be done; its virtue as a prototype lies in the suggested leads for future research.

GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES AND PUBLIC SERVICES IN THE AMERICAN STATES*

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Much recent policy analysis is based on the assumption that the amount of money spent in a jurisdiction indicates the nature of services provided. This study seeks to test this assumption as it applies to the American states.

Among the studies that have attempted to explain the "outputs" of state and local governments by reference to political and economic characteristics, several have identified expenditures with services implicitly by mixing indicators of spending with indicators of services as the "outputs" to be explained.[1] Other studies have claimed explicitly that government expenditures reflect the "scope and character" or "calibre" or the "alpha and the omega" of public services.[2] A contrary argument is that "money is not everything." Such nonmonetary factors as the quality of personnel or the nature of the political environment may exert the greatest influences upon the quality or quantity of public services within a jurisdiction.

In assessing the relationship between spending and services, this study first defines static relationships between measures of spending and measures of public services. Secondly, it examines relationships over time in an attempt to discern if increases in government expenditures are likely to bring about increases in the quality or quantity of public services.

I. TECHNIQUES

One of the first problems encountered in the analysis of public services is the identification of services that are likely to respond to the expenditures of specific governmental units. In part, this is the problem of Morton Grodzins' marble cake. As he saw it, there are no major services that are solely the product of any one government level.[3] Rather, local, state and federal agencies share in the planning, financing, staffing and directing of prominent domestic services. This is certainly true in the major categories of state and local services. For several fields, it is possible to go beyond Grodzins and note that they are the products of private efforts as well as the activities of local, state and federal governments. For example, officials in education, public welfare, health and hospitals, and natural resources seem likely to adjust their own services, in part, to the programs of private institutions within their jurisdiction.

Because of the public-private marble cake, it is virtually impossible to obtain measures of public services that are solely the outputs of particular governments. In order to cope with this difficulty, this study examines measures of services provided *within* each state. It relates these service indicators to measures of combined state and local government expenditures, and it evaluates these expenditure-service relationships in the light of measures pertaining to federal aid, private economic activity and other elements likely to influence services.

The study considers three measures of expenditures as having likely influence upon public services. Along with the other independent variables, they pertain to 1962:

a) combined state and local general expenditures per capita[4]
b) combined state and local general expenditures per $1,000 of personal income

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[1] Richard Dawson and James Robinson, "Interparty Competition, Economic Variables, and Welfare Policies in the American States," *Journal of Politics*, 25 (May, 1963), 265–289; Thomas R. Dye, "Malapportionment and Public Policy in the States," *Journal of Politics*, 27 (August, 1965), 586–601; Richard I. Hofferbert, "The Relations between Public Policy and Some Structural and Environmental Variables in the American States," this REVIEW, 60 (March, 1966) 73–82.

[2] See, respectively, Robert C. Wood, *1400 Governments* (Garden City, 1961), p. 35; Jesse Burkhead, *Public School Finance* (Syracuse, 1965) p. 50; and Phillip C. Burch, *Highway Revenue and Expenditure Policy in the United States* (New Brunswick, 1962), p. 34.

[3] Morton Grodzins, "American Political Parties and the American System," *Western Political Quarterly*, 13 (December, 1960), 974–998.

[4] "General expenditures" include all state spending for each major category except for insurance trust funds. The year 1962 was selected for all variables because of the data in the *Census of Governments, 1962*.

c) combined state and local general expenditures for each major function as a percentage of total general expenditures

Each of these measures is calculated for spending in the major fields of education, highways, public walfare, health and hospitals, natural resources (agriculture, fish and game, forestry and parks) and public safety. Variable *a* measures the money spent in relation to the population served by state services. Variable *b* measures spending in relation to economic resources. As such, it indicates the effort displayed by state and local governments in supporting the different fields of service. Variable *c* measures the relative success enjoyed by each field of service in competition with other services for government expenditures.[5] If the level of government spending actually reflects the quality or quantity of public services, then each of these spending measures should show positive relationships with service indicators.

Beside these measures of spending, 17 other independent variables were examined as having possible influence upon the nature of public services. After preliminary analysis, the following were selected for more thorough treatment:[6]

d) Federal aid, i.e., Federal payments as a percentage of state and local spending for each service

e) the number of state and local employees per 10,000 population

f) the average salary of state and local employees

g) the percentage of state and local general revenue originating at sources other than local governments prior to intergovernmental transfers

h) per capita personal income

i) population

Variable *d* measures a source of outside money that might influence the nature of services within each state. Variables *e* and *f* measure the size and rewards of administrative units. Presumably, these features might influence services independently of expenditures. Variable *g* measures the centralization in state-local relationships.[7] The degree of centralization may influence the nature of services provided, or the efficiency with which expenditures affect services. Variables *h* and *i* are economic measures that relate strongly with other measures of economic activity;[8] they indicate the base of resources from which state and local governments and private groups draw in order to provide services.

Coefficients of simple correlation (Pearson's *r*) indicate the strength of simple relationships between each measure of spending and the measures of services. Yet coefficients of simple correlation do not indicate if the spending measures have independent relationships with public services. The problem of independence would occur, for example, if variables *a–c* showed positive relationships with public services only because variables *d–i* have stronger positive relationships with both the measures of spending and the measures of services. Partial correlation techniques, controlling for variables *d–i*, will provide a test for the independence of relationships between spending and services.[9]

Sixty-eight variables measure various aspects of public service quality or quantity within each state. Some variables measure the amount of benefits or services provided per client. Some measure the units of service in relation to the total population of the state. Some measure the incidence of beneficiaries among the people likely to use a service. Other variables measure the rate at which a program is performed. Others assess services by the frequency with which the state population chooses to use programs. Finally, some assess services indirectly by measuring the continued existence of phenomena that government activities are designed to control. The Appendix describes each measure of service. Because of space limitations, they are denoted in the tables by short titles only.

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[5] See James A. Maxwell, *Financing State and Local Governments* (Washington, 1965), Chapter 2.

[6] Variables considered, but not retained were: percentage of per capita personal income paid in taxes to state and local governments; percentage of state and local general revenue originating at the state level prior to intergovernmental transfers; percentage of state and local general revenue allocated to the state level after tax collections and intergovernmental transfers; percentage of local general revenue received from the state; voter turnout in state elections; the David-Eisenberg measure of apportionment equity in state legislatures; a measure of party competition derived from Ranney's index of Democratic party strength; number of local governments per 10,000 population; percentage of population living in urban areas; percentage of labor force employed in manufacturing; and value added by manufacturing, per capita. Variables 2–4 of this list were dropped because they reflect the same phenomena as independent variable *g*. Variables 1, 5–8 were dropped because they fail to show strong relationships with either government expenditures or public services. Variables 9–11 were dropped because they reflect the same phenomena as independent variables *h* and *i*.

[7] Beside the state government, the principal non-local source of state-local revenue is the federal government. A high score on variable *g* indicates centralization because most federal contributions to local governments funnel through state agencies.

[8] See Harvey S. Perloff *et al*, *Regions, Resources and Economic Growth* (Baltimore, 1960), Chapters 1–3.

[9] For an illustration of this technique, see Dye, *op. cit.* Also see Hubert Blalock, *Social Statistics* (New York, 1960), Chapter 19.

Since part of the analysis employs data from 1957, prior to Alaskan and Hawaiian statehood, only 48 states are included.

II. FINDINGS: STATIC RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN EXPENDITURES AND SERVICES

The expenditure-service linkage does not appear to be strong. The coefficients of simple correlation reported in Table 1 show that 40 of the service measures (59 percent) have relationships with *any* of the expenditure measures

TABLE 1. COEFFICIENTS OF SIMPLE AND PARTIAL CORRELATION BETWEEN MEASURES OF SPENDING AND SERVICES, 1962†

	Simple Correlation			*Partial Correlation*‡		
	Spending Measure:			Spending Measure:		
	a	*b*	*c*	*a*	*b*	*c*
Education						
teacher-pupil	41*	−01	−08	23	16	−02
BA teachers	00	08	29*	−05	03	29
MA teachers	42*	06	35*	24	27	35*
vocational ed	−20	33*	12	−05	−05	04
school lunch	−35*	37*	08	11	12	10
rehab process	−39*	−07	−07	−34*	−38*	−11
rehab experience	−54*	−15	−05	−38*	−43*	−04
attendance	09	−01	06	−02	−14	−06
school term	17	−21	01	−04	−06	09
consolidation	−22	−18	−11	−25	−20	−07
median ed	76*	21	27	37*	33*	37*
5th grade ed	62*	−01	13	44*	24	19
high school ed	81*	28*	30*	48*	43*	43*
college ed	66*	17	34*	20	27	36*
school completion	25	−30*	15	−16	−22	−23
exam success	65*	08	16	40*	20	17
MA ed	18	14	00	02	04	−03
Dr ed	39*	−03	25	17	17	28
college enroll	07	09	−05	−05	−04	−08
own state enroll	05	09	−05	−05	−02	−07
Highways						
total roads	41*	44*	47*	18	07	25
rural roads	−34*	−27	−18	07	−07	11
urban roads	43*	57*	57*	28	25	27
paved roads	−04	−21	−14	23	32*	26
4 & 6 lane roads	−25	−25	−27	−09	−13	−21
interstate miles	73*	59*	46*	37*	25	21

* Significant at the .05 level.

† For the definition of spending measures *a-c* see the text above; for the definition of service measures see the Appendix.

‡ With variables *d-i* controlled.

TABLE 1 (continued)

	Simple Correlation			*Partial Correlation*		
	Spending Measure:			Spending Measure:		
	a	*b*	*c*	*a*	*b*	*c*
interstate completion	77*	60*	56*	51*	43*	40*
interstate progress	−34*	−45*	−39*	−04	−01	−02
road safety	−40*	−55*	−47*	01	04	−11
Public welfare						
OAA recipients	−02	−07	−18	−13	−07	−11
MAA recipients	−08	−10	−14	−06	−07	−08
AFDC recipients	21	−07	02	24	27	29
AB recipients	00	−07	01	−05	−04	−03
APTD recipients	29*	17	17	26	23	26
OAA payment	36*	01	02	53*	50*	47*
AFDC payment	21	−19	−13	41*	35*	38*
AB payment	37*	−03	04	56*	52*	54*
APTD payment	18	−07	02	25	16	24
child welfare	08	14	06	13	14	09
Hospital & hospitals						
hospital beds	24	−16	04	06	−04	−07
hospital bassinets	00	−07	−33*	06	−03	−10
mental hospitals	07	−11	−04	03	04	−02
mental treatment	20	−15	−04	−03	−11	−16
mental handicap hosp	−11	−14	−45*	−13	−19	−28
physicians	40*	−11	12	−08	−11	−19
dentists	33*	23	33*	20	21	26
child health	19	05	14	16	16	14
white infants	08	−14	17	−16	−11	−08
nonwhite infants	04	−15	−15	−13	−16	−22
Natural resources						
extension agents	25	49*	35*	50*	52*	39*
ag researchers	62*	65*	54*	52*	49*	35*
soil conservation	−47*	−33*	−37*	−36*	−28	−30*
mapped conservation	−41*	−37*	−36*	−08*	−08	−10
ag conservation	−07	03	−06	13	17	04
parkland	43*	39*	27	20	15	03
park space	16	13	08	09	11	06
park visits	18	15	14	15	09	07
fish license	52*	60*	54*	42*	41*	34*
hunt license	49*	58*	48*	40*	40*	29
Public safety						
murder	26	10	11	−33*	−30*	−37*
rape	−37*	−28*	−23	−02	00	−05
robbery	−43*	−34*	−40*	−01	−02	−06
assault	−11	−21	−27	−18	−18	−32*
burglary	−51*	−48*	−43*	−22	−25	−29
larceny	−65*	−59*	−43*	−42*	−39*	−38*
auto theft	−67*	−60*	−54*	−38*	−38*	−41*
paroles	20	22	16	22	21	10
parole success	−12	−12	−16	−02	00	−11

strong enough to be statistically significant.[10] Yet there is a lower incidence of significant relationships between the service measures and all of the three expenditure measures. Of the 204 possible relationships between spending and services, only 78 (38 percent) are significant. Moreover, 37 of these relationships are negative! Only 41 (20 percent) of the simple relationships between spending and services are significant in the expected direction. Public officials may spend at high levels in the face of low service performance in the hope of elevating the level of services at some time in the future.

The relationship between spending and services appears even weaker when the influence of variable *d-i* are taken into consideration. Table 1 also reports coefficients of partial correlation between the measures of spending and service while controlling for measures pertaining to Federal aid, administration size and salary, state-local centralization and economic development. Only 23 (34 percent) of the service measures show significant partial correlations with any of the spending measures. Of the 204 possible relationships between the three spending measures and service indicators, 51 (25 percent) are significant, and 35 of them (17 percent) in the expected direction.

If government expenditures do not exert prevailing influence upon the quality or quantity of public services, what does explain the nature of services? For most of the service indicators considered here, the question must remain unanswered. For only 24 of the service indicators (35 percent) do the combination of a spending measure and variables *d-i* account for at least 50 percent of the interstate variation. These are the service indicators having a coefficient of multiple determination (R^2) of at least .50. The remaining 44 service indicators respond to elements not considered in the present study. Table 2 shows coefficients of partial correlation between the independent variables and each service indicator having an R^2 of at least .50. Measures of spending show significant, positive relationships with 15 of the 25 service indicators of Table 2. Only in the case of five service indicators, however, does a spending measure show a stronger positive coefficient of partial correlation than any of the other independent variables. Spending measures show their strongest positive relationships with payments for Old Age Assistance and Aid to the Blind, Agricultural Researchers, Proportion of Interstate Mileage Completed, and College Graduates. Public safety spending shows strong relationships with crimes of Larceny and Auto Theft, but the direction of the relationships suggests that high crime rates lead to spending, rather than that spending acts upon the crime rate.

Measures of administration size, state-local centralization, per capita personal income and population show some consistent relationships with the service indicators of Table 2. The findings pertaining to administration and personal income suggest that relatively wealthy states with large administrative crops (relative to population) are likely to be high producers of public services. The findings about population suggest that elements generating public services are most likely to occur in states with small populations. The findings about state-local centralization indicate that a *decentralized* system seems to work in behalf of service outputs. Aside from the measures of expenditures, it is only the measures of administrative size and state-local centralization that show the strongest relationships with several measures of service. Per capita personal income shows the strongest coefficient of partial correlation only with school lunch, and population fails to show the strongest coefficient of partial correlation with any of the service indicators.

There are several possible explanations for the general lack of close ties between current measures of government expenditures and public services. The magnitude of funds previously spent in accumulating capital facilities or in assembling a staff of a certain calibre might influence the capacity of current spending to stimulate service outputs. A state may score relatively high in certain types of highway mileage despite relatively low current spending. The market costs of services or products may vary significantly from one area to another. In the case of several programs, private expenditures may affect the service levels and result in weak relationships between government spending and the indicators considered here. Economies of large scale operations may confound the simple relationship between spending and services. Certain characteristics of a program's clientele or its political environment may also influence the efficiency with which money produces services. In the field of education, for example, the family background of students may be a critical ingredient in the quality of services. Where the environment

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[10] Because the 48 states are not a random sample, the common tests for significance are not, strictly speaking applicable. They will be used, however, to provide an arbitrary indication of relationships that appear "sizable."

TABLE 2. COEFFICIENTS OF PARTIAL CORRELATION BETWEEN INDEPENDENT VARIABLES AND SELECTED SERVICE INDICATORS†

	Independent Variables								
	Spending measures			Fedl aid	Employees	Salary	Central.	Pers inc.	Population
	a	*b*	*c*	*d*	*e*	*f*	*g*	*h*	*i*
Education									
teacher-pupil	23			−07	15	−21	−51*	25	−41*
teacher-pupil		16		−04	23	−16	−50*	26	−43*
teacher-pupil			−02	01	41*	−07	−48*	21	−47*
school lunch	11			−02	02	−23	17	−40*	11
school lunch		12		−02	03	−24	16	−20	12
school lunch			10	−01	15	−23	20	−39*	10
rehab experience	−38*			16	04	02	47*	12	−04
rehab experience		−43*		17	03	03	50*	−23	−06
median ed	37*			07	25	−01	−45*	15	−22
median ed		33*		10	35*	04	−45*	31*	−23
median ed			37*	08	63*	21	−41*	16	−29
5th grade ed	44*			08	−09	−16	−66*	32*	−44*
5th grade ed		24		14	10	−01	−62*	34*	−46*
5th grade ed			19	15	34*	13	−59*	27	−50*
high school ed	48*			11	29	−08	−49*	18	−27
high school ed		43*		14	40*	−02	−49*	39*	−28
high school ed			43*	13	71*	21	−42*	19	−35*
college ed	20			07	08	03	21	31*	05
college ed		27		07	08	01	18	38*	07
college ed			36*	03	35*	13	26	35*	05
exam success	40*			05	−05	−04	−58*	11	−37*
exam success		20		11	14	11	−54*	18	−40*
exam success			17	12	34*	24	−52*	08	−44*
Highways									
interstate miles	37*			24	46*	05	09	−13	00
interstate miles		25		29	52*	05	05	−02	−03
interstate miles			21	31*	58*	09	08	−09	−02
interstate completion	51*			09	16	−07	09	21	−32
interstate completion		43*		14	24	−05	05	35*	−34*
interstate completion			40*	17	37*	05	12	25	−31*
road safety	01			−31*	−43*	07	−19	32*	−09
road safety		04		−32*	−45*	07	−19	32*	−09
road safety			−11	−26	−46*	03	−23	31*	−11
Public welfare									
OAA recipients	−13			16	51*	−06	27	34*	−25
OAA recipients		−07		16	50*	−07	26	32*	−25
OAA recipients			−11	17	49*	−08	26	34*	−25
AFDC recipients	24			14	−23	40*	30*	38*	−03
AFDC recipients		27		14	−23	42*	28	41*	−04
AFDC recipients			29	12	−18	43*	31*	38*	−04
OAA payment	53*			−31*	19	26	−38*	−11	−17

* Significant at the .05 level.

† Selected are those combinations of a spending measure with variables *d*-*i* that account for at least 50 percent of the interstate variation in a service indicator; the partials shown represent the relationship between an independent variable and a service indicator while controlling for the influence of all other independent variable.

TABLE 2 (continued)

	Independent Variables								
	Spending measures			Fedl aid	Employees	Salary	Central.	Pers inc.	Population
	a	*b*	*c*	*d*	*e*	*f*	*g*	*h*	*i*
OAA payment		50*		−31*	21	30*	−39*	−01	−16
OAA payment			47*	−34*	31*	33*	−35*	−13	−15
AFDC payment	41*			−36*	−06	46*	−43*	−10	−35*
AFDC payment		35*		−35*	−03	48*	−43*	−04	−34*
AFDC payment			38*	−38*	04	50*	−41*	−12	−35*
AB payment	56*			−17	15	23	−30*	21	−20
AB payment		52*		−16	18	27	−32*	29	−20
AB payment			54*	−22	29	31*	−28	18	−20
Health & hospitals									
physicians			−19	−25	−21	09	11	33*	15
Natural resources									
extension agents	50*			53*	24	−36*	−34*	−22	−09
extension agents		52*		57*	28	−32*	−37*	−05	−06
extension agents			39*	50*	45*	−26	−27	−21	−09
ag researchers	52*			38*	44*	−08	−24	−03	−48*
ag researchers		49*		41*	49*	00	−27	09	−45*
ag researchers			35*	34*	62*	05	−17	−07	−45*
fish license	42*			42*	18	24	−48*	−43*	−32*
fish license		41*		44*	22	30*	−49*	−31*	−29
fish license			34*	40*	36*	33*	−43*	−42*	−30*
hunt license	40*			41*	21	09	−36*	−26	−27
hunt license		40*		44*	25	15	−38*	−14	−25
hunt license			29	39*	39*	19	−31*	−26	−26
Public safety									
murder	−33*				05	42*	−50*	13	−41*
murder			−37*		−15	38*	−54*	14	−42*
larceny	−42*				−30*	−14	−38*	05	−03
larceny		−39*			−32*	−15	−37*	−21	−05
larceny			−38*		−45*	−27	−41*	00	−04
auto theft	−38*				−10	−08	−23	−06	05
auto theft		−38*			−11	−07	−22	−29	03
auto theft			−41		−30*	−19	−29	−08	05

supports favoritism in the hiring of personnel or in the choice of sites for new facilities, then the ratio between financial inputs and outputs in desired services may be less than where "professional" criteria prevail. Measures of such characteristics may add considerably to the present capacity to explain interstate variations in public services.

III. FINDINGS: RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN CHANGES IN SPENDING AND SERVICES

It is possible that changes in spending may exert great influence over changes in public services, despite the lack of strong relationships between current spending and the current level of services. Such phenomena as the level of private support for services, characteristics of a program's clientele or its political environment may remain stable over a period of several years so that increases in government spending can act upon the quality or quantity of public services.

In order to test the relationships between changes in expenditures and changes in public services, the analyses above were repeated using measures of 1957–62 percentage change in variables *a–i* and measures of 1957–62 percentage change for those service indicators

TABLE 3. COEFFICIENTS OF SIMPLE AND PARTIAL CORRELATION BETWEEN MEASURES OF CHANGE IN SPENDING AND SERVICES, 1957–62†

	Simple Correlation			Partial Correlation‡		
	Spending Measure:			Spending Measure:		
	a	*b*	*c*	*a*	*b*	*c*
Education						
teacher-pupil	−01	−13	−03	−09	−15	03
vocational ed	−04	11	19	−11	−09	05
rehab process	−16	−19	−08	−21	−02	−02
rehab experience	−03	04	−24	−28	−27	−09
school completion	−14	−19	−21	−32*	−24	−20
exam success	−11	−23	−24	−21	−20	−27
MA ed	−07	−09	−11	−12	−11	−15
Dr ed	06	−11	−04	−09	−15	−07
college enroll	−12	−05	01	00	01	13
Highways						
total roads	30*	26	23	06	05	05
rural roads	08	11	00	−02	02	01
urban roads	03	06	03	28	27	22
4 & 6 lane roads	13	07	20	05	05	14
interstate miles	−36*	−35*	−36*	−49*	−48*	−46*
interstate completion	−43*	−41*	−42*	−50*	−49*	−47*
road safety	−02	13	09	33*	33*	33*
Public welfare						
OAA recipients	15	15	16	14	13	00
AFDC recipients	27	38*	39*	51*	53*	56*
AB recipients	12	19	31*	09	12	27
APTD recipients	−03	01	−02	12	13	−02
OAA payment	−01	23	16	01	29	17
AFDC payment	00	29*	38*	01	46*	53*
AB payment	−06	13	18	−03	18	18
APTD payment	30*	08	17	29	04	20
Health & hospitals						
hospital bassinets	32*	31*	28*	38*	37*	33*
mental hospitals	00	01	03	08	08	08
physicians	92*	86*	89*	94*	90*	92*
dentists	92*	86*	89*	94*	90*	93*
white infants	25	27	28*	25	26	28
nonwhite infants	17	19	20	14	16	16
Natural resources						
extension agents	−07	−05	28*	−05	−07	18
ag researchers	−03	04	−23	−05	−01	−18
soil conservation	−16	−23	05	−14	−20	08
parkland	38*	38*	−23	37*	35*	−05

* Significant at the .05 level.

† For the definition of the spending measures *a*-*c* see the text above; for the definition of service measures see the Appendix.

‡ With changes in variables *d*-*i* controlled.

TABLE 3 (continued)

	Simple Correlation			Partial Correlation‡		
	Spending Measure:			Spending Measure:		
	a	*b*	*c*	*a*	*b*	*c*
park space	25	14	−09	41*	32*	−26
park visits	16	19	−10	12	11	−24
fish license	−11	−04	−21	−06	01	−26
hunt license	15	21	−15	19	24	−18
Public safety						
murder	11	12	05	16	17	15
robbery	10	09	06	14	14	11
assault	01	07	−01	07	07	07
burglary	02	00	03	05	05	07
larceny	06	00	02	−01	−02	−07
auto theft	01	−01	−03	−01	−01	−05
paroles	−08	−07	−04	−08	−07	−02

where the data was available. The 1957–62 period was selected to take advantage of the data collected by the Census of Governments in those years. In general, both expenditures and service levels increased slowly during the period. Presumably, the five-year span includes some of the lag that may occur between changes in spending and changes in services. Table 3 reports coefficients of simple and partial correlation pertaining to changes in spending and services.

The analysis of change shows even fewer relationships between spending and services than the static analysis. Of the 45 service indicators for which measures of change are available, 14 (29 percent) show significant simple relationships with any measure of change in spending. Of the 135 possible relationships between changes in three measures of spending and services, 26 (19 percent) are significant. Twenty of the relationships (15 percent) are significant in the expected direction. When the influence of change in variables *d–i* is taken into account by partial correlation techniques, it is found that 11 (24 percent) of the service measures show significant relationships with any of the spending measures. Of the 135 possible relationships between measures of change in spending and services, 28 (21 percent) are significant. Twenty-one (16 percent) of the partial correlations are significant in the expected direction.

On the basis of the existing data, it is virtually impossible to assess the elements that do influence changes in public services. The coefficients of multiple determination derived from this analysis reveal that combinations of present independent variables explain 50 percent of the interstate variation for only three of the service indicators! It is possible that the five year time span built into the analysis is not long enough to allow changes in the independent variables to affect changes in public services. Or perhaps other elements subject to state by state measurement—beside those included in variables *a–i* are generally influential with respect to changes in services. Or perhaps marked changes in services typically result from the fortuitous combination of elements that do not lend themselves to state by state measurement. For example, changes in personnel within the executive or legislative branches of state government, or changes in local leadership may occur in ways that permit a sudden take-off of service levels.

IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

In contrast to the assumptions of several authors, it is evident that the levels of state and local government spending do not exert pervasive influence upon the nature of public services. There are many weak relationships and some negative relationships between current spending and services, and between changes in spending and changes in services. There are several possible reasons for the lack of expected relationships between spending and services. The level of private spending or previous capitalization may affect the present measures of services enough to obscure some of the influence from current government spending; market costs may vary from one state to another; economies of scale may affect the spending-service linkage; or the nature of clientele and political environment may influence the spending-service relationship.

The present findings should temper expectations about the results of current government spending. By themselves, however, they do not stand as an argument against increases in government spending. The findings are the product of gross analysis, employing the large categories of education, highways, public welfare, health and hospitals, natural resources and public safety. The results do not mean that focused increases in spending will fail to improve particular services or institutions. Furthermore, the findings do not strike at the variety of reasons for increasing public expenditures that do not assume an early increase in services. Such reasons include the desire to keep salaries of public employees equivalent to people in comparable nongovernmental positions; and the desire to improve staff or physical plant for the sake of obtaining service improvements over the long range or for the sake of avoiding a deterioration of services. The data here only warn that gross levels of spending do not reflect service levels, and that gross increases in spending are not likely to produce early gross improvements in services.

APPENDIX I

Each of the following indicators of public service seems capable of responding to the expenditures of state and local governments. They are defined so that high scores reflect high quality or quantity of public service. The short titles of each indicator are given in parenthesis. It is these short titles that are used in the Tables.

Education

number of teachers per 100 pupils (teacher-pupil)
percentage of elementary teachers with at least the bachelors degree (B.A. teachers)
percentage of secondary teachers with at least the masters degree (M.A. teachers)
total enrollment in Federally-aided vocational education per 10,000 population (vocational ed)
percentage of school enrollment participating in the Federal school lunch program (school lunch)
number of persons in process of vocational rehabilitation per 10,000 population (rehab process)
number of persons experiencing vocational rehabilitation per 10,000 population (rehab experience)
average percentage of students attending daily in elementary and secondary schools (attendance)
length of school term (school term)
population per school district (consolidation)
median number of school years completed by persons 25 years and older (median ed)
percentage of persons 25 years and over with at least five years of school completed (5th grade ed)
percentage of persons 25 years and over with at at least four years of high school (high school ed)
percentage of persons 25 years and over with at least four years of college (college ed)
percentage of eighth graders who graduate from high school four years later (school completions)
percentage of selective service registrants passing mental examination (exam success)
earned masters degrees per 10,000 population conferred by all institutions of higher education (M.A. ed)
earned doctors degrees per 10,000 population conferred by all institutions of higher education (Dr. ed)
enrollment in institutions of higher education per 10,000 population (college enroll)
enrollment of native in their own state's institutions of higher education per 10,000 population (own state enroll)

Highways

mileage per capita of state-administered roads (total roads)
mileage per rural resident of state administered rural roads (rural roads)
mileage per urban resident of municipal roads (urban roads)
percentage of farms on improved (not dirt) roads (paved roads)
percentage of four or six lane miles among the Federally-aided mileage completed during 1963 (4&6 lane roads)
mileage per capita of interstate highways open to traffic by 1963 (interstate miles)
percentage of the designated interstate mileage completed by 1963 (interstate completion)
percentage of the designated interstate mileage completed or in progress by 1963 (interstate progress)
state residents per motor vehicle death (road safety)

Public welfare

incidence of Old Age Assistante recepients among people over 65 and with incomes of less than $2,000 (OAA recipients)
incidence of Medical Assistance for the Aged recipients among people over 65 and with incomes of less than $2,000 (MAA recipients)
incidence of Aid to Families of Dependent Chil-

dren recipients among people with incomes of less than $2,000 (AFDC recipients)

incidence of Aid to the Blind recipients among people with incomes of less than $2,000 (AB recipients)

incidence of Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled recipients among people with incomes of less than $2,000 (APTD recipients)

average payment per receipient of Old Age Assistance (OAA payment)

average payment per recipient of Aid to Families of Dependent Children (AFDC payment)

average payment per recipient of Aid to the Blind (AB payment)

average payment per recipient to Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled (APTD payment)

number of children per 10,000 child population receiving child welfare benefits (child welfare)

Health and hospitals

hospital beds per 10,000 population (hospital beds)

hospital bassinets per 10,000 population (hospital bassinets)

patients per 10,000 population in mental hospitals (mental hospitals)

net live releases from mental hospitals (mental treatment)

patients per 10,000 population in institutions for mental defectives and opileptics (mental handicap hospital)

number of physicians per 100,000 population (physicans)

number of dentists per 100,000 population (dentists)

number of residents per child disability (child health)

percentage of white infants surviving their first year (white infants)

percentage of nonwhite infants surviving their first year (nonwhite infants)

Natural resources

number of cooperative extension agents per 10,000 population (extension agents)

number of agricultural experiment station researchers per 10,000 population (ag researchers)

percentage of farmland in soil conservation districts (soil conservation)

percentage of land in soil conservation districts that is mapped (mapped conservation)

percentage of cropland in Agricultural Conservation Program (ag conservation)

acreage per capita of state parks (parkland)

acreage per visitor of state parks (park space)

visits to state parks per 10,000 population (park visits)

number of fishing licenses sold per 10,000 population (fish license)

number of hunting licenses sold per 10,000 population (hunt license)

Public safety [note: each of the figures pertaining to crime are inverted from their usual presentation to be consistent with the other service indicators. That is, high scores on the following indicators reflect low crime rates and high public service in the field of public safety.]

population per murder and nonnegligent manslaughter offenses (murder)

population per rape offense (rape)

population per robbery offense (robbery)

population per aggravated assault offense (assult)

population per burglary offense (burglary)

population per larceny offense (larceny)

population per auto theft offense (auto theft)

percentage of conditional releases from correctional institutions (paroles)

percentage of conditional releases *not returned* as violators (parole success)

The sources of these measures include Council of State Governments, *The Book of the States*; U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States*; U.S. Office of Education, *Digest of Educational Statistics*; Federal Bureau of Investigation, *Uniform Crime Rates in the United States*; U.S. Bureau of Prisons, *National Prisoner Statistics*; U.S. Bereau of Public Roads, *Annual Report*; Social Security Administration, *Social Security Bulletin: Annual Statistical Supplement*; U.S. Department of Agriculture, *Agricultural Statistics*; National Education Association, *Rankings of the States*; U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Census of Agriculture.*

In gathering the data an effort was made to obtain measurements as close as possible to 1962 for the static analysis, and as close to 1957 for the analysis of change. In each case, it is assumed that the recorded data provide reasonably accurate indications of fact. It is recognized, however, that the quality of the data may occasionally disappoint the author's hopes. For comments on the quality of specific measurements, the reader is referred to the sources noted above.

APPENDIX II

The results of factor analysis tend to confirm the findings in the text. Three principal factors result from the analysis of 68 service indicators. Their names derive from the indicators having the highest loadings with each:

Education—welfare

exam success	.905
5th grade ed	.892
school completion	.871
AFDC payment	.790
OAA payment	.750
teacher-pupil	.745
high school ed	.693
mental handicap hosp	.690
median ed	.686
AB payment	.651
murder	−.865

Highway—natural resource

total roads	.835
interstate miles	.790
ag researchers	.768
hunt license	.744
extension agents	.738
hosp bassinets	.736
soil conservation	.615
interstate progress	−.629
road safety	−.720
rural roads	−.787

Public safety

rape	.894
auto theft	.890
larceny	.877
burglary	.857
robbery	.809
child health	.705

Twelve of the remaining service indicators contribute weakly to these factors, and 29 others relate together in scattered factors that include from two to four indicators. The three principal factors include most of the indicators that show, by themselves, significant relationships with spending. As noted below, each of the principal factors show some significant relationships with spending. The variety of minor factors show only weak relationships with spending. Like the analysis of separate service indicators, factor analysis reveals services that appear to be linked with government spending. In not every case, however, are the linkages in the direction expected by those who see services dependent upon expenditures. Also, factor analysis reveals that many of the present service indicators show little relationship with government spending.

Because several ingredients in the major factors are not available for 1957, the factor analysis was not repeated in the consideration of changes in services.

For 1962, coefficients of simple correlation between the principal factors and the spending measures are:

	Educ—welf	Highways—nat resource	Publ safety
Education spending			
a	.59*		
b	−.03		
c	.10		
Welfare spending			
a	.12		
b	−.25		
c	−.20		
Highway spending			
a		.67*	
b		.70*	
c		.64*	
Natural resource spending			
a		.44*	
b		.53*	
c		.43*	
Public safety spending			
a			−.57*
b			−.51*
c			−.39*
Total spending			
a	.61*	.34*	−.39*
b	−.09	.59*	.08

* Significant at the .05 level.

THE IMPACT OF UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE: A COMPARISON OF POPULAR AND PROPERTY VOTING*.

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The attainment of universal suffrage over various forms of voting restrictions has been one of the major accomplishments in the development of modern democratic institutions. Struggles for the vote have had to overcome restrictions based on factors such as sex, race and tenure of property. While gaps in the exercise of the franchise still remain, formal restrictions on voting in the United States have been largely removed.

However, an important question, largely uninvestigated, concerns the "costs" of the universal franchise in terms of the quality of government and its impact upon policy decisions. Do the disadvantages of universal suffrage offset advantages said to be gained, particularly in Western nations, such as increased legitimization of decisions and stability of regimes? Many of the past and present opponents of the extension of voting have argued that the poor results to be expected from the impact of universal suffrage far outweigh the advantages. Clearly, the problem of "costs" is important, for it is a crucial element in the argument over democracy and the vote.

In this paper we will investigate the impact of universal suffrage by comparing its operation with that of a propertied vote in the same elections. Property restrictions on voting are important both for the major controversy over universal suffrage they have created and because such restrictions still survive as legally significant categories in the electoral institutions of some states. Evidently, institutional divisions based on property qualifications were created in anticipation of behavioral differences between the two groups of voters, The question of whether such divisions are meaningful in behavioral as well as in institutional terms remains for analysis.

I. INTRODUCTION

By 1856 the last of the states, South Carolina, had abolished the property qualification for voting and thus ended the debate over property and the franchise carried on with such vigor and eloquence in the state constitutional conventions of the early nineteenth century. With the disappearance of the property limitation on voting it appeared that popular democracy had triumphed and the advocates of a priority for property in the franchise had lost the argument.

But while the advocates of a propertied franchise lost the important battle they later manged a limited victory in a minor sector of the electoral system. In twenty-six of the states, the properties interests have succeeded in instituting and maintaining various property qualifications for referenda dealing with bonds and other matters related to local government finance.[1]

Throughout American political thought the structure of the argument over property limitations on voting has shown consistency in the kinds of statements and predictions that have been made. Present from the beginning of the American Republic the debate reached its finest flowering in the state constitutional conventions of Virginia, Massachusetts, and New York in the first part of the nineteenth century where it commanded the attention of such political eminents as Kent, Webster, Story, and Marshall.[2] Particularly indicative of property interest attitudes is the clear and incisive statement of Chancellor Kent at the New York Convention in 1821. Arguing to retain the state's general property qualifications, Kent stated that:

> The tendency of universal suffrage, is to jeopardize the rights of property, and the principles of liberty. There is a constant tendency in human society . . . in the poor to covet . . . the plunder of the rich; in the debtor to relax or avoid the obligation of contracts; in the indolent and profligate, to cast the whole burthens of society upon the industrious and the virtuous . . . . It requires

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* We are particularly indebted to Professor Theodore J. Lowi of the University of Chicago for valuable comments on an earlier draft.

[1] Frank Starner, David Leuthold and John McCarty, *General Obligation Bond Financing by Local Governments: A Survey of State Controls* (Berkeley: Bureau of Public Administration, University of California, 1961).

[2] See the speeches cited by Alpheus Thomas Mason, *Free Government in the Making*, 3rd. Ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 404–440.

a vigilant government, and a firm administration of justice, to counteract that tendency.[3]

More than fifty years after Kent spoke, many of the same implications about the suffrage can be drawn from the comments of such reform groups as the Tilden Commission, requested by the Governor of New York to inquire into the problems and prospects of local government. The Commission found that many of the evils of local government resulted from irresponsible spending and financing by local political officials responsible only to the popular electorate. The non-taxpayers, reported the Commission, made up the bulk of the "unreflecting vicious population" which cared little for the prudent conduct of government.[4] A recent statement of the theory by the Louisiana State Law Institute contains similar implications of the presence in property owners of a "stake in society," prudence in government and responsibility in the management of political affairs:

> The property requirement is based on the close relationship between local improvements and the tax source for these local improvements. It has been considered a sufficient brake on local spending and indebtedness if the people who pay the tax bill have the power of deciding whether or not the tax is to be levied.[5]

All these statements imply predictions of voting under the unrestricted franchise. According to the advocates of restricted voting, popular voting results in: 1) irresponsibility and lack of prudence in the conduct of government; 2) the existence of a class vote; and 3) a lack of interest in government since the mass lack a "stake in society."

The questions raised by John Adams and Chancellor Kent about the effects of entrusting a capitalist society to a popular electorate and the fears they voiced concerning the character of the decisions made under universal suffrage have not been investigated by satisfactory empirical methods. Particularly, we are in the dark as to how decisions taken by a propertied franchise would differ from those made by an unrestricted franchise. Since the abolition of property qualifications have the popular voters indeed been less prudent in the conduct of government? Did John Adams prophesy correctly when he opined that to abandon the propertied franchise would be to violate his fundamental maxim of government: "never to trust the lamb to the custody of the Wolf."?

Whatever historical analyses of the consequences of property limitations are possible, i.e., comparison of periods when restrictive voting qualifications did and did not exist, there is a particular need for the study of such contemporary situations as may exist. Contemporary investigations not only can explore the relevance of other aspects of the current political context, but provide also the opportunity to utilize current empirical data. Contemporary analysis also furnishes a study in which property and popular voting can be compared during the same period of time and at work upon the same issues and problems of policy.

We are able to conduct such a study as a result of Louisiana's unusual system of voting for bond referenda. Originating in the Louisiana Constitution of 1890, the state system of voting for local bond elections provides that participation shall be restricted to property holders. Moreover, in each election the voter casts two ballots, one stating the amount of his property assessment and another counting as a single personal or popular vote. To pass, each proposal must receive both a majority of the popular and the property vote; less on either vote will defeat the issue.[6] The property vote corresponds to a vote reached by a property franchise while the popular vote corresponds generally to a vote reflecting an unrestricted franchise. Since the popular and the property votes occur simultaneously and refer to the same issues, we have an opportunity to examine their comparative effects under similar conditions.

Although the formal voting requirements restrict the election to property holders only, Louisiana bond referenda actually have developed into elections in which substantial universal suffrage and a property vote exist side by side. This has been accomplished by the widespread ownership of automobiles that becomes a means of qualifying a voter for participation without necessarily conveying a significant sense of "property-ness" to the individual. It is doubtful, for example, that property holders qualified to vote in bond elections solely through the ownerhsip of an automobile perceive or respond to issues in the

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[3] James Kent, "Against Universal Suffrage," *The American Political Mind: Selections from the Literature of the United States*, Harry Warfal, Ralph Gabriel and Stanley Williams (eds.), (New York: American Book Company, 1947), I, pp. 261–262.

[4] "Report of the Tilden Commission," *Municipal Affairs* III (1899), 435–454.

[5] Louisiana State Law Institute, *Project of a Constitution for the State of Louisiana with Notes and Studies* (Baton Rouge: 1954), III, 315.

[6] Louisiana, *Constitution*, Art, 14. sec. 14a.

TABLE 1. SUCCESS OF REFERENDA PROPOSALS ACCORDING TO PROPERTY AND POPULAR VOTING, 1932–64

	%	N
Both passed	87.7	(57)
Popular vote passed, property vote failed	4.6	(3)
Popular vote failed, property vote passed	0.0	(0)
Both failed	7.7	(5)
	100.0	(65)

same manner as do real estate or home owners. Therefore, even though automobile owners are property holders in the strict sense, we felt that the amount of property involved was so small that this large group of voters could be considered essentially "propertyless" and their votes considered as the decisions of what would otherwise be an unrestricted electorate. Of course, the ideal situation would be to compare a strictly propertied vote with a strictly non-propertied vote. But in New Orleans this ideal setting does not exist and hence, it is necessary instead to utilize the conditions which are available to explore effects of these two votes.

Considerable justification and support for this procedure exists when we survey the actual effect that "automobile franchising" has had in creating a large body of bond election voters who without the automobile, could not vote in these elections. In 1963, for example, 168,250 automobile tax assessments were mailed to New Orleans residents as compared to 111,317 real estate notices.[7] Assuming that most real estate owners also own automobiles, the difference of 56,933 is a large group of people enfranchised through the automobile. Although in some cases more than one tax bill was sent to individuals owning two or more cars, the number of tax bills can be taken as a rough estimate of the total number of persons owning automobiles. The number enfranchised by automobile ownership alone (56,993) is about one-third as many persons as are registered to vote in the city of New Orleans, a little less than 200,000. Another effect may be observed in the comparison of precincts in which little property is voted, where enfranchisement clearly is by automobile ownership, and those in which really substantial amounts of property are owned and voted. In one precinct, Precinct 14 of Ward 14, over $8,000,000 in assessed property was voted in 1964 while in several precincts in working class wards the total amount voted by a comparable number of voters was less than $50,000. Some voters cast a property vote of considerable substance while others vote negligible amounts; the latter qualify clearly by the automobile assessment.

To conduct the study we have collected election returns from 318 precincts in New Orleans for three separate elections; these returns represent both a popular vote and a property vote in each instance. We also have a variety of other social and political information from these precincts to enable us to examine various aspects of the problem.[8]

II. POPULAR AND PROPERTY VOTING COMPARED

Given the distinctive virtues that the propertied franchise purports to contribute, we would expect to see major differences in the kinds of decisions made by propertied and popular voters. In the case of bond elections where the bonds must be redeemed through the taxes collected from property holders, the nineteenth century theories suggest that popular voters would tend to favor expenditures for public projects which would likely benefit

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[7] Data obtained from New Orleans Board of Assessors.

[8] While the literature on bond and tax referenda contains no comparative studies of popular and property voters, certain other findings are relevant for the general theory. Perhaps the most common finding is a curvilinear relationship between social status (variously defined as income, class, and size and nature of property holding) and support of bond referenda. Greatest support is found among low status groups and highest status groups while lowest support occurs among middle status groups. The most explicit investigation of the problem occurs in James Q. Wilson and Edward C. Banfield, "Public Regardingness as a Value Premise in Voting Behavior," this REVIEW, 58 (December, 1964), 876–887, but see also: Robert H. Salisbury and Gordon Black, "Class and Party in Partisan and Non-Partisan Elections: The Case of Des Moines," this REVIEW, 57 (September, 1963), 584–593; James A. Norton. "Referenda Voting in a Metropolitan Area," *Western Political Quarterly*, 16 (March, 1963), 195–212; Alvin Boskoff and Harmon Zeigler, *Voting Patterns in a Local Election* (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1964), ch. 3; Oliver P. Williams and Charles R. Adrian, *Four Cities: A Study in Comparative Policy Making* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1963), ch. 5.

TABLE 2. PERCENTAGE OF PRECINCTS IN BOND ISSUE APPROVAL AND VOTE CATEGORIES (N-318)

% Support	Schools 1960		Streets 1963		Cultural Center 1964	
	% of precincts		% of precincts		% of precincts	
	Popular Vote	Property Vote	Popular Vote	Property Vote	Popular Vote	Property Vote
Vetoed (Below 50%)	3.1%	8.8%	34.0%	56.3%	33.0%	50.9%
Approved (Above 50%)	96.9	91.2	66.0	43.7	67.0	49.1
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

them without their having to bear the costs of increased taxation.

The subject-matter of the different bond proposals has apparently had little effect on the way in which popular and property votes have gone. Elections included in Table 1 dating from 1932 have included a wide variety of issues such as street paving and maintenance, airport construction, police protection, public parks and playgrounds, a civic center, and a cemetery for indigents. Not all of these proposals we imagine, would benefit all voters in the same way. For example, we suppose that increased fire and police protection and better airport facilities would benefit property owners more, while public parks and playgrouds and certainly a paupers' cemetery would provide more appeal for propertyless voters. But the city-wide vote in the eight defeated proposals does not follow a simple self interest pattern. The five issues defeated by *both* property and popular votes included proposals for parks and playgrounds, an indigent cemetery, money for a cultural center, municipal auditorium maintenance, and a branch library. The three issues defeated by the property vote alone involved a park proposal, an incenerator system, and additional police and fire protection. Thus, while the property electorate has been slightly more discriminating and negative than the popular electorate, the direction of the additional discrimination indicates no consistent pattern of evaluation. The popular electorate, on the other hand, has been almost as discriminating but also has followed no consistent pattern of appraisal of issues according to a plausible theory of economic self-interest.

Long term policy decisions reveal few differences, but these necessarily overshadow more specific variations which may exist in voting in individual referenda. Viewed according to whether issues are approved or vetoed, Table 2 indicates that in all three proposals more popular than property vote precincts are found in the bond issue approval category. This initially appears to support the Kent-Adams thesis concerning high government spending under an unrestricted franchise. However, Kent believed that voting would reflect a clearly defined propertied and non-propertied class conflict. Even though the precinct popular vote approves bonds with greater frequency than the property vote, no sharp cleavage of the sort that Kent envisioned is exhibited between the two votes. The conception of a class vote is blurred more particularly by Table 3 where the full range of responses in the popular and property vote is presented for the same three proposals. Although greater variation exists in the property vote, both the popular and the property votes are spread throughout the support continuum.

We observe that the popular vote exhibits considerable restraint in that in all proposals there are fewer popular vote than property vote precincts at the 80 and 90 percent and above levels of support; still others are scattered at the lowest levels of the popular support continuum. While it is true that greater variation exists in the property vote, it is not solely in the direction of opposition to the bond proposals. The property vote also provides examples of very high support by precincts. Some larger than average property owners are more reluctant than the average property voter to approve bond proposals, but other large property owners are clearly more eager than the average voter. To illustrate, in the proposal to issue bonds for street repairs in 1963, 13 precincts supported the proposals by less than 20 per cent favorable porperty vote while 15 other precincts voted more than 80 per cent property assessments in favor of bonds. What this means is that neither the popular not the

TABLE 3. DISTRIBUTION OF PRECINCTS IN BOND ISSUE SUPPORT CATEGORIES*

% Support	Schools 1960		Streets 1963		Cultural Center 1964	
	No. of Precincts		No. of Precincts		No. of Precincts	
	Popular Vote	Property Vote	Popular Vote	Property Vote	Popular Vote	Property Vote
0–9	1	2	1	4	0	1
10–19	0	0	0	9	0	3
20–29	0	2	5	17	1	13
30–39	5	3	18	52	17	50
40–49	4	21	84	97	87	95
50–59	25	48	118	67	128	84
60–69	100	93	54	32	47	40
70–79	125	86	27	25	25	18
80–89	49	42	8	10	11	9
Over 90	9	21	3	5	2	5
	318	318	318	318	318	318
Coefficient of Variation	15.6	20.9	22.4	34.2	20.7	29.3

* We have found it sufficient to use one proposal vote from each election because of the high correlation among proposals in the sam election. In all, our sample of proposals includes the school bond issue of 1960, four of the seven proposals in the 1963 election and two of the six in the 1964 election. We selected the proposals to give adequate representation for different kinds of issues.

property voters are united among themselves in a common purpose, either to spend lavishly or to choke off expenditures.

Neither the property nor the popular vote constitutes anything approaching a "class" vote. As a result, we could conclude that both groups are responding to motivations other than economic self-interest interpreted as either an increased tax burden by property holders or as free public facilities by the popular voters. Even if the property holders were to find that their self-interest were to be realized in favoring public projects for the benefit of all, regardless of cost to themselves, our data does not indicate that all property holders favor bonds. Neither are popular votes grouped only at high support levels. Regardless of how an economic interest is interpreted or postulated, we cannot point to well-defined patterns of voting based on property ownership.

Table 4 compares the property and popular voting within precincts by the use of coefficients of correlation. In election after election the two are rather highly correlated. Since the historic arguments against universal suffrage have concerned the damaging effects of popular voting as compared to property-restricted voting, the relatively close correspondence of popular and propertied voting seems quite significant.

Even though increased legitimacy and support for regimes could be anticipated with a broadened suffrage, the proponents of property restrictions have maintained that the costs, namely a lack of responsibility and restraint in government, would be too high. Much of the force of the argument evaporates, however, on the demonstration that popular voting corresponds quite closely to property voting; the two groups of voters approach the conduct of public affairs and view public policy in much the same fashion.

Viewed this way universal suffrage conveys important gains for the political system while

TABLE 4. CORRELATION OF POPULAR AND PROPERTY VOTING FOR SEVEN PROPOSALS

Proposals	Year	Coefficient of Correlation
School Bonds	1960	.70
Street Improvement	1963	.73
Court Construction	1963	.77
Park Improvement	1963	.74
Cultural Center Construction	1963	.77
Street Improvement	1964	.68
Cultural Center Construction	1964	.71

TABLE 5. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POPULAR AND PROPERTY VOTING *IN HIGH AND LOW POPULAR VOTE PRECINCTS*

Issue and Popular Support Level	Property Vote					
School Bonds (1960)	Below 40%	40–59%	60–79%	80–89%	90% and above	No. of Precincts
Highest Precincts (over 80%)	0	1	17	23	17	58
Lowest Precincts (below 60%)	3	22	8	1	1	35
Street Improvements (1963)	Below 40%	40–49%	50–69%	70–79%	80% and above	
Highest Precincts (over 70%)	1	2	11	14	10	38
Lowest Precincts (below 40%)	22	1	1	0	0	24
Cultural Center (1964)						
Highest Precincts (over 70%)	1	2	12	13	10	38
Lowest Precincts (below 40%)	15	3	0	0	0	18

at the same time displaying none of the costs in rationality and prudence in political attitude that critics have feared. The conclusions are comparative, of course, and are based on the fact that there are no overall differences between popular and property voting.

In Table 5 we have further investigated the relationship between the popular and the property vote by isolating two extreme groups of precincts. The significance of the relationships here is that even in extremely favorable or unfavorable vote precincts we continue to find a high degree of correspondence in the popular and the property vote. If differences were to be found in the two votes, we would expect them to show up more clearly in precincts which gave either very high or very low support to the bond issues. If for example, a precinct voted over 90 percent for bonds in the popular vote, we would expect to find, if property-based differences exist, that the property vote would be at least significantly less favorable to bonds.

Table 5 reinforces our earlier findings, showing that only very minor differences exist between popular and property votes. Although property voting lags somewhat behind popular voting in the highly favorable precincts, the trend definitely is toward a high degree of correspondence between the two. For example, in the school bond issue only 18 of the 58 precincts giving high popular support fell below the 80 percent level of support in the property vote. In the cultural center proposal, all 18 precincts giving low popular support gave equally low property vote support. Certainly differences exist between the precincts; the support continuum ranges from very low support to very high support. But the same sorts of variations are present in both popular and property votes. Furthermore, there is a high degree of correspondence between the two votes regardless of direction of support. Circumstances in each precinct or in individual areas of the city may predispose the voters to vote in a certain way, but the ownership of property itself is not a significant factor.

We next consider the possibility that large property owners may react differently from small property owners and that consideration of property voters as a single group may obscure contrasts with the popular vote. Certainly, divisions among members of the propertied class have been noted by political theorists and we would not expect large owners and small entrepreneurs necessarily to react the same. To determine what sorts of differences exist among property holders we have separated groups of precincts according to variations in the level of assessment.[9] In this way we are able to introduce a discrimination among kinds of property holdings according to levels of assessment, ranging in New Orleans from below $10,000 to a high of more than $8,000,000.

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[9] Assessment levels were derived by selecting the greatest amount of money voted in individual precincts in any of the elections. Precincts were divided into 26 assessment level categories. This form of estimation was required since no assessment figures are maintained by the city on a precinct basis.

TABLE 6. RELATION OF LEVELS OF ASSESSMENT TO SUPPORT FOR DIFFERENT PROPOSITIONS

Proposition	Year	Correlation with Popular Vote	Assessment Value Property Vote
School Bonds	1960	−.05	−.02
Street Improvements	1963	−.17	−.01
Court Constructions	1963	−.17	−.01
Parks Improvement	1963	−.17	−.02
Cultural Center Construction	1963	−.20	−.01
Street Improvement	1964	−.13	.01
Cultural Center Construction	1964	−.17	−.01

According to Table 6 precinct assessment level is not a determining factor in bond elections. Both popular and property votes correlate negatively with assessment level but the relationships are not significant. This analysis is important for several reasons. First, we see that no category of property owners, regardless of size of holdings, votes as a bloc for or against bonds and no standard of public conduct can be deduced from voting tendencies of either large or small owners. More importantly, we have noted before that universal suffrage, as represented by the popular vote, is closely related to voting decisions of property owners. Therefore, we can conclude from the findings in Table 6 that since neither vote relates to assessment level, popular voting relates to property voting regardless of the amount of property holding in the precincts. These findings again suggest that institutional requirements which divide the electorate according to property ownership do not produce meaningful divisions in electoral responses. The belief that political decisions diverge according to propertied and non-propertied interests in an oversimplification of political motivations and it is doubtful that aspects of elections and voting perceived as undersirable can be excised simply by excluding the propertyless from the electorate.[10]

Following the advocates of a restricted franchise, a propertied electorate should possess greater expertise and sophistication in judging public policy than an electorate operating under universal suffrage. In the generality of elections we would expect to see this greater sophistication evidenced not only by greater consistency in types of electroal choices made through time but also by greater discrimination among choices within the same election. In Table 7, where bond elections are compared with one another, we find very high correspondence in popular and property voting for propositions offered at the same election, but little relationship between voting at different elections. Within a single year, 1963 for example, the correlations among both the popular and property votes for different proposals ranged from .85 to .92. The relationships between votes on proposals for different years, however, were considerably lower, ranging from .04 to .14 for the 1960 and 1963 votes. Even when the proposals are exactly the same, as they were in the 1963 and 1964 elections, the correlations among the same propositions at different elections are only moderately high, ranging from .50 to .61.

The consistency of voting within elections suggests a large amount of straight ticket voting. Apparently neither popular nor property voters discriminate very much in bond referenda even when quite different issues are involved (as they were in the New Orleans elections). However, between elections, the character of the relationships indicates that little consistency exists in policy selections over time. A vote for street repairs in one year, on the part of either electorate, does not guarantee

TABLE 7. RELATIONSHIP OF VOTES WITHIN ELECTIONS AND BETWEEN DIFFERENT ELECTIONS

	Within Elections 1960 Election	1963 Election	1964 Election
	Range of Correlations		
Popular Vote:		.88–.92	.88
Property Vote:		.85–.91	.77
	Between Elections 1960 Vote	1963 Vote	1964 Vote
1960			
Popular vote		.10–.14	.17–.23
Property vote		.04–.10	.21–.24
1963 Vote			
Popular vote	.10–.14	—	.57–.61
Property vote	.04–.10	—	.50–.56
1964 Vote			
Popular vote	.17–.23	.57–.61	—
Property vote	.21–.24	.50–.54	—

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[10] Both popular and property voting exhibit curvilinear relationships with assessment level in that bond issues support is usually somewhat higher in both high and low assessment precincts than in middle range assessment precincts. In the 1960 school bond election the percentage of precincts in the 70 percent and above popular support category was: low assessment precincts, 73.2; high, 65.3; medium, 51.4 The relation is similar also for property voting. In both high and low assessment categories, 50 percent of the precincts were found in the 50 percent and above property vote support category in the 1963 Streets issue contrasted with only 40.4 percent of middle range precincts.

TABLE 8. CORRELATION OF POPULAR AND PROPERTY VOTE WITH SELECTED SOCIAL AND POLITICAL VARIABLES

	Schools, 1960		Streets, 1963		Cultural Center, 1964	
	Popular Vote	Property Vote	Popular Vote	Property Vote	Popular Vote	Property Vote
Republican Presidential Vote, 1960	−.03	−.06	−.03	−.07	−.06	−.08
Morrison Vote in Runoff, 1961*	.24	.18	.13	.14	.20	.15
% White Voter Registration	−.15	−.14	−.17	−.07	−.02	−.01
Socio-Economic Scale†	−.03	−.07	−.01	−.04	−.10	−.03
Median Education	−.04	−.18	−.09	−.03	−.06	−.03

* The Morrison vote refers to the vote in the gubernatorial primary cast for the reform, good-government mayor of New Orleans.

† The Socio-economic scale is constructed from a combination of median education and median dwelling rental figures for each precinct.

similar support at a later date. Therefore, contrary to the property qualification advocates, both groups of voters appear to be equally well (or poorly) qualified to decide on policy questions underlying bond elections. The institutional divisions resting on assumed differences between property and non-property voters seem to be artificial categories, but ones which have been maintained in many states for years, and nourished on traditional attitudes.

In Table 8 we compare the relationships of popular and property voting to several significant social and political variables. In voting studies such analyses have proved sensitive indicators of differences among patterns of voting. In New Orleans, for example, the Republican presidential vote in 1960 was correlated with socio-economic status .75 and related to median education level by a correlation of .76 while the Morrison vote was correlated −.71 with the percentage of white voter registration in the precincts. If popular and property voting produce significantly different support patterns, we would expect these differences to be reflected in different relationships with the matrix of social and political variables in Table 8.

It is clear, though, that unlike other elections voting in bond referenda is not significantly related to socio-economic or political variables in either popular or property voting. As a result we cannot point to any standard variables that differentiate popular from property voters and suggest that the two form disparate groups or share conflicting attitudes.

It is tempting to view bond referenda as examples of random behavior in the electoral system. A more reasonable explanation, however, is that none of our standard variables used in electoral analysis explain much of the variation which exists in electoral behavior in bond referenda. Given the strong linkages among the variables utilized in Table 8 and partisan choices in other elections, we might expect that either property or popular voting, which bear some resemblance in style and issue content to the national and local partisan positions, would show some correlation in Table 8. The fact that they do not indicates that both popular and property voting alike, fail to respond to the usual variables. This is a further example that the unrestricted electorate does not automatically align with existing partisan positions any more than does the property electorate. The low correlations with standard socioeconomic and political variables indicate that other factors are responsible for voting decisions. Opinion stimuli such as newspaper endorsements, information from other mass media and informal discussions among voters themselves may be important. These may be especially decisive in non-candidate, non-partisan elections where there is no opportunity for the voter to make a selection based on familiar personalities or party labels. Standard voting behavior models are not very useful for the study of these referenda and additional research is needed into non-partisan, non-candidate elections.[11]

Finally, more information on the comparative behaviors of propertied and popular voters in bond elections can be gained through a comparision of the turnouts in the two votes. Since each propertied voter votes the amount of his assessed valuation, it is possible to speak of a propertied vote turnout to mean the amount of property voted compared to the potential property that could be voted. Judging from the value perceptions of the Kent-Adam philosophy concerning the behavior of propertied and non-propertied voters, we might well expect quite different behaviors with respect to electoral turnout. With a "stake in society" we would expect that the property vote would produce a very high turnout since property owners would be led as a matter of course to participate in elections. With respect to property-less voting, moreover, we would expect more erratic behavior if the property theorists are to be believed. On the one hand we might watch for occasions on which popular voters would flock to the polls to endorse public expenditures for which they have little responsibility, but on the other hand we might predict also that popular voters would take little interest in electoral affairs as a result of their lack of stake in society.

On a city-wide basis property and popular vote turnouts compare as follows:

	1960 (School)	1963 (Average for all issues)	1964 (Average for all issues)
	%	%	%
Popular:	21.3	19.4	22.7
Property:	31.3	30.7	32.8

In all three elections property vote turnouts are significantly higher than popular votes. Both popular and property vote turnouts, however, rank considerably lower in turnout than other elections in New Orleans (presidential elections where the turnout ranges from 78% to 83% in recent years; gubernatorail elections where the range is from 73% to 80%; and school borad elections where the range is from 35% to 41%). It is clear that bond referenda are simply low-turnout elections, producing apathetic responses which lead to low participation on the part of both popular and propertied voters. Neither the popular vote nor the property vote produces turnouts within the range of participation in presidential, gubernatorial or school board elections. But it is equally clear that some of the voting prophecies made by the property theorists are, once again, not borne out. Although property vote turnout is higher than popular turnout, it is still so low that obviously a property stake in society has not led to responsible participation in electoral affairs; indeed, the propertied vote is almost as characteristically apathetic in bond referenda as is the popular vote. Also obvious is that popular voters have not rushed to the polls in great numbers to approve public expenditures. Both popular and property vote turnouts are within the same apathetic low turnout range, both encapsulated by a fundamentally low interest electoral situation.

III. CONCLUSION

In the previous pages we have carried forward the argument over property, democracy and the franchise, an issue of some importance in the development of democratic institutions. In addition to its importance as historic underpinnings for American politics the issue has continued to affect the manner in which some state electoral practices are institutionalized and to raise questions concerning the relevancy of the property and non-property categories in the exercise of the suffrage. By examining the operations of a popular and property vote we have evaluated the differences among property and popular voting and the impact of universal suffrage.

Our main question has concerned the significance of voting categories based on property ownership. Our finding is that they make a little difference, but not much—certainly not as much difference as property theorists have led us to expect. Using the property vote as a means of evaluation, we have found that universal suffrage, i.e. the popular vote, inflicts no damage even where the issues are most directly concerned with impact on propertied rights. In the context of New Orleans bond elections popular voting produces outcomes no worse than those that emerge from propertied voting. There is little evidence of a greater desire to raid the public treasury at the expense of property owners and there is also little indication of a class vote in the lower income precincts with little or no property. Our findings also suggest that, contrary to the Kent-Adams thesis, the property and popular vote categories are not really useful divisions. The voters simply do not align in such a fashion as to lend support to Kent-type fears of universal suffrage.

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[11] The importance of newspapers in local elections was suggested and analyzed early in Harold F. Gosnell, *Machine Politics: Chicago Model* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1937), ch. 8. In referenda involving issues such as the fluoridation controversy, opinion leadership such as newspaper endorsements are considered especially significant. See for example: John E. Mueller, "Politics of Fluoridation in Seven California Cities," *Western Political Quarterly* 19 (March, 1966), 54–67. The influence of other variables is suggested also in Henry Robert Glick, "Patterns of Voting in New Orleans Bond Elections," (unpublished master's thesis, Tulane University, 1965).

New Orleans citizens are not visibly distressed about the property limitations on voting, due probably to the fact that most registered voters may vote if they wish and also because most bond issues have passed, thus preventing a crisis in the availability of public facilities. But beyond the immediate case of bond elections restricted suffrage raises broader questions concerning the exclusion of certain individuals from equal participation in government. It could be argued that if the excluded are seriously affected by adverse decisions of those in power, they may lose confidence in the regime and develop values tending to undermine the legitimacy of the established order. To those advocating restricted popular participation the price is worth it; established interests of the community must be preserved. But our findings show that the "irresponsible" element of the population, the popular voters, can be just as responsible and restrained as the property voters. Decisions made by the popular vote have no dire consequences for the community in general or for the specific economic interests of the dominants in the society. If there is no need to fear the decisions made by a popular vote, as illustrated by our data, then the advantages of universal suffrage measured in legitimacy for regimes and stability are doubly attractive.

POLITICAL SCIENCE AND THE PROPOSAL FOR A NATIONAL SOCIAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION

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"Political scientists . . . are . . . ex-post-facto entrail watchers . . . after-the-event soothsayers," said the late Lucius Beebe.[1] Similarly, much of the general public has long felt that social scientists are not scientists at all[2] but deal in intuition and vague, unfounded generalizations, or are "proposition mongers," a threat to policymakers.[3]

These notions, together with the fact that social scientists work in sensitive, moral-charged subjects which frequently cause strong public reaction,[4] are partly responsible for the relatively small support the Federal Government has given to research and scholarship in the social sciences.

In 1965 basic research of all types funded by the Federal Government amounted to $1.69 billion, of which the social sciences received only $37 million, or 2.2 per cent. The estimated obligations for 1966 and 1967 were about the same, 2.5 per cent and 2.8 per cent. Nor is there much difference when Federal support for applied research is considered. For 1965, Federal social science expenditures for applied research amounted to only 2.8 per cent of the $3.16 billion the Federal Government spent for all types of applied research, and for 1966 and 1967, estimated expenditures, are only 3.9 per cent and 4.8 per cent.[5]

Even more revealing is the decline in the social science share of Federal research funds over the last thirty years. In 1938 the social sciences received 24 per cent of total government expenditures for research. By the early 1950's the percentage had diminished to about 8 per cent,[6] and for the last ten years "the share of the Federal research dollar (not including development) devoted to research in the social sciences and psychology has varied narrowly between 3½ per cent and 5 per cent."[7]

In addition to the imbalance of support between the natural and physical sciences and the social sciences, some disciplines, such as political science, receive only token support. Political science has only recently been added to those social sciences eligible to receive support from the National Science Foundation. Not until July 1, 1965, seven years after the Foundation began formal support of the social sciences, was a political science program begun by NSF. It was more than a year later, in August, 1966, before the Foundation appointed an Advisory Panel for political science,[8] though, to date, no director has been appointed for the political science program of NSF. While the Foundation and its outstanding Director, Dr. Leland J. Haworth, are certainly to be commended for the increased support and recognition being given to the social sciences, such support amounted to less than ten per cent of NSF's $222 million expenditure for basic research during Fiscal Year 1966, and of that amount, political science research received only $335, 650, a total of 17 grants, 8 of which were related to doctoral dissertations.[9]

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[1] Lucius Beebe, "Cafe Society Revisited," *New York Herald Tribune*, April 19, 1964, Sunday Magazine, p. 12.

[2] Harold Guetzkow, "National Foundation for the Social Sciences," testimony before the Subcommittee on Government Research, Committee on Government Operations, U. S. Senate, 90th Congress, 1st Session, June 27, 1967.

[3] Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., testimony before the Subcommittee on Government Research, June 2, 1967.

[4] Paul Bohannan, testimony before the Subcommittee on Government Research, July 12, 1967.

[5] "Federal Funds for Research, Development, and other Scientific Activities, Fiscal Years 1964, 1965, and 1966," Vol. XIV, National Science Foundation, NSF 66-25 (U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1966), pp. 12 and 17.

[6] Kathleen Archibald, "Federal Interest and Investment in Social Science," *The Use of Social Science Research in Federal Domestic Programs*, Part I, a Staff Study for the Subcommittee on Research and Technical Programs, Committee on Government Operations, U. S. House of Representatives, 90th Congress, 1st Session (U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.), p. 329.

[7] Henry W. Riecken, "Government-Science Relations, The Physical and Social Sciences Compared," *American Psychologist*, 22 (March, 1967).

[8] James D. Carroll, "Notes on the Support of Political Science Research Projects by the Division of Social Sciences of the National Science Foundation, Fiscal Years 1958–65," *The Use of Social Science Research in Federal Domestic Programs*, Part IV, pp. 88–89.

The critically small amount of support political science receives from NSF is more evident when the size of the political science field is compared to other social science disciplines. Political scientists rank second only to economists in the number of U. S. higher education faculty members in the various fields of social science,[10] and in the number of members in the major American social science professional associations.[11]

When the amount of NSF support for political science is compared to that for anthropology, for example, the ratio is about one to ten in favor of anthropology, even though political science has two to three times as many active scholars as anthropology. Political science receives from NSF only one-third as much as does history and philosophy of science,[12] though political scientists outnumber historians of science by almost seven to one.

In the related discipline of law, of which political science is in some degree a descendant, there are virtually no funds available for research and training, particularly research and training in law as a social science.[13] Nor is there support for research in the important field of the social impact of taxation.[14]

During the last two decades the existing federal structure for the support of science in general has been oriented toward the natural and physical sciences and related disciplines. The payoff has been unquestionably great. It might even be said that the return from the investment is unparalleled by any other field in which heavy federal expenditures have been made. Yet, while the natural and physical sciences have been at the center of the stage, the social sciences have been left out in the cold and, at best, have received only intermittent and superficial attention from the federal science establishment. And, because the R&D budget is no longer rising at the rapid rate of the early post-Sputnik years but is, rather, leveling off, and because competition for funds is much keener, the social sciences with their vague legislative mandate are in a precarious position. The National Science Foundation, for example, will find it increasingly difficult to justify expanding their social science program if such support must compete for funds with the physical sciences.

An indication of the relative status of the social sciences in the National Science Foundation was noted by Dr. Launor F. Carter, Senior Vice President, Systems Development Corporation, who testified before the Senate Subcommittee on Government Research that:

> . . . the National Science Foundation lumps together all of the social sciences; that is to say, economics, political science, sociology, anthropology, social psychology, etc., into one category to arrive at the total of $29 million. But, in the physical sciences each science is treated separately; mathematics receives $45 million; physics, $50 million; chemistry, $40 million; astronomy, $24 million; etc. In other words the level of support of the social sciences considered collectively

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[9] Leland J. Haworth, "National Foundation for Social Sciences," Hearings before the Subcommittee on Government Research, Committee on Government Operations, U. S. Senate, 90th Congress, 1st Session, February 7, 8, and 16, 1967, Part I (U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.), 1967, p. 105.

[10] The number of faculty members in the social sciences for the years 1962 to 1963 are as follows:

1. Economics	3,160
2. Political Science	2,870
3. Sociology	2,370
4. Anthropology	720

"Teaching Faculty in Higher Education, 1962–63; Primary Teaching Areas and Contract Salaries," Office of Education (U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1964), p. 7.

[11] Figures on the size of the memberships of major social science associations as of September 1, 1967, were obtained by contacting the administrative offices of each society and are as follows:

1. American Economic Association	15,149
2. American Political Science Association	15,000
3. American Sociological Association	10,327
4. American Anthropological Association	6,700
5. History of Science Society	2,250

[12] Grants approved by NSF for fiscal year 1966 are as follows:

1. Anthropology	$3,981,890
2. History and Philosophy of Science	1,023,000
3. Political Science	335,650

Haworth, op. cit., p. 105.

[13] Wex S. Malone, testimony before the Subcommittee on Government Research, June 21, 1967, and Myres S. McDougal, testimony before the Subcommittee on Government Research, June 27, 1967.

[14] Coreen Gilb, "Full Opportunity and Social Accounting Act," testimony before the Subcommittee on Government Research, Committee on Government Operations, U. S. Senate, 90th Congress, 1st Session, July 20, 1967.

was less than that of a number of other single disciplines in the physical sciences.[15]

Private foundations, although capable of supporting the broader, innovative research needed, have severely limited funds. In the field of international studies and foreign area research, funds actually are diminishing: the Ford Foundation and some other private foundations have either reduced or eliminated financial support for such research, because of the passage of the International Education Act by the 89th Congress, even though the level of operational funding of this new Act is as yet undetermined.[16] Add to this the miniscule support of foreign area research by the Department of State which, as Dr. Harold Guetzkow, Co-Director of the International Relations Program, Northwestern University, has said, is a "fantastically low $129,000 . . . each year," a figure which, he said, "in my book, is pretty scandalous."[17]

Other private sources of support for social science research, such as the Social Science Research Council, are able to finance only a small percentage of the good social science research applications they receive. Dr. Austin Ranney, Chairman of the Committee on Governmental and Legal Processes, Social Science Research Council, stated in his testimony that under a five-year grant from the Ford Foundation, the Social Science Research Council has only approximately $60,000 a year to allocate to all research projects under the jurisdiction of the committee he heads, and that for the year 1967 they had to choose from 53 meritorious applications for research funds, totalling $590,595.[18]

Dr. Vincent Davis, Associate Professor in the Graduate School of International Studies at the University of Denver and Executive Secretary of the International Studies Association, voiced the virtually unanimous view of political scientists concerning the level of Federal support when he said:

> We are starting from such a low base that almost any realistically foreseeable level of new financial support for the social sciences will still leave us short of adequacy for a number of years to come.[19]

The Senate Subcommittee on Government Research, of which I am Chairman, has held extensive hearings on the needs and promises of the social sciences and has found that, although significant and useful work is being done, there is much more which needs to be done and could be done if funds were available. Aside from the magnitude of modern social problems and the tremendous need to know more, pressures are mounting simply because of the present and projected increase in the number of students and Ph.D.'s granted in the social science disciplines. Dr. Gerald Holton, Department of Physics, Harvard University, has estimated:

> . . . that in the next thirty years there will be 10 to 20 times the number of people wanting to do basic research in the social sciences and that they will make a very good case for meaningful expenditures on the order of 20 to 50 times the amount of 1967 dollars.[20]

It can hardly be questioned, as Dr. Donald Hornig, Director of the Office of Science and Technology in the Executive Office of the President has stated, that the quality of education received by students is better in institutions where high quality research is being done.[21] Thus, if for no other reason than to improve the quality of education in the social sciences for the growing number of students in those disciplines, support for research and training in the social sciences must be dramatically increased.

But far more important to our country and to our world is the tremendous need for expanded basic knowledge about man and his relationships with other men, if we are to meet the enormous and growing problems of modern society. One facet of this need results from the dangerous imbalance between the development of the social sciences and the natural and physical sciences.

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[15] Launor F. Carter, testimony before the Subcommittee on Government Research, June 2, 1967.

[16] Gwendolen M. Carter, testimony before the Subcommittee on Government Research, June 21, 1967.

[17] Guetzkow, op, cit.

[18] Austin Ranney, testimony before the Subcommittee on Government Research, July 12, 1967.

[19] Vincent Davis, testimony before the Subcommittee on Government Research, June 21, 1967.

[20] Gerald Holton, testimony before the Subcommittee on Government Research, June 28, 1967.

[21] Donald F. Hornig, "Equitable Distribution of R & D Funds by Government Agencies," hearings before the Subcommittee on Government Research, Committee on Government Operations, U. S. Senate, 90th Congress, 1st Session, July 11, 1967.

Secretary of Labor W. Willard Wirtz spoke of the dangers implicit in this disparity when he said:

> I have tried to suggest what seems to be the point before the committee by reference to another classic and now very tired statement of H. G. Wells. You will remember that he said: 'Human history becomes more and more a race between education and catastrophe.' My guess is that the text is still good; but time has changed the emphasis very much. I am not sure any longer, frankly, and I say it at the risk of being misunderstood, which side education is on, and it seems to me that it is rather the possibility that catastrophe may develop as a consequence of the disparate outcome in the race between two kinds of education: one in the physical sciences and the other in the social sciences. I do not believe there is exaggeration in suggesting the larger danger, that one of those, the advance in the physical sciences, may get so far out in front of the advance of the social sciences that we will have to consider the possibility of a catastrophe as a consequence.[22]

Dr. Joe B. Frantz, Professor of History, University of Texas, made much the same point in a different manner when he testified:

> Now the last thing which we wish to do is to close the floodgate of scientific knowledge, but we have a crucial problem in bringing our environment forward to the point that it can absorb and understand what the scientist is turning loose all about us. For this reason. . . and I am quite evangelical on this—we need federal assistance in the social assessment of knowledge, to turn the raging flood into a controlled stream which can be handled and utilized to irrigate and cleanse the minds and spirits of harried men in a pell mell world.[23]

Moreover, policymakers are called upon to initiate action programs or make decisions about modern social problems with only limited basic knowledge. As Dr. Ross Stagner, Chairman of the Department of Psychology, Wayne State University, said:

> The most deplorable feature of the present situation is the very low level of support now available for the behavioral and social sciences. The magnitude of the problems of urban life, crime, education, industrialization, the aged, and group conflicts needs no emphasis. It seems truly incredible that the expenditure of funds to obtain knowledge of prevention and correction of these problems is so microscopic. We have been spending (justifiably) millions of dollars on urban renewal. But we have made little use of the expertise of economists, sociologists and psychologists with respect to planning for human welfare, not just for buildings. Again let me note that I do not suggest that social scientists should have final jurisdiction as to execution of such programs; I do, however, feel very strongly that the knowledge of social scientists ought to be given much higher consideration than it has. My main point, however, is that we simply have not investigated the problems of urban renewal from the viewpoint of neighborhood unity, of social supports for behavior codes, of communication networks, of leader-follower relations, and a mass of other important factors. There is still so much ignorance, and so much misinformation disguised as 'common sense,' that one can hardly be surprised at the unsatisfactory consequences of these programs.[24]

Dr. Gerald Holton, an astute observer and historian of science as well as a physicist, noted in our hearings that:

> If it took the atomic bomb and Sputnik to insure adequate scientific research money, and by no means all scientists were or are happy with this unforeseen turn of events, we cannot fail to notice that the same situation is already upon us in the social sciences. The social science equivalent of the atomic bomb and Sputnik is with us right now, in terms of our domestic as well as our international problems. Some of these problems are obvious and stark and some are hidden and subtle. The list is long. It has been mentioned in these hearings again and again.[25]

Even before the recent urban riots, policymakers were beginning to feel a real sense of frustration as they searched for more knowledge and better methodologies with which to attack a broad range of modern social problems, foreign and domestic. There is a growing awareness that the search cannot be successful without greater Federal support and recognition for the social sciences. Don K. Price, Dean, John Fitzgerald Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, underscored this point when he said:

> . . . I think that the social sciences have great room for potential development which has not been exploited and which will be in the great interest of the country if they are exploited. I do not think they imply any more danger of interfering with political authority or administrative discretion than the natural sciences, which are a

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[22] W. Willard Wirtz, "National Foundation for the Social Sciences," Part I., 8–9.

[23] Joe B. Frantz, testimony before the Subcommittee on Government Research, July 12, 1967.

[24] Ross Stagner, testimony before the Subcommittee on Government Research, July 13, 1967.

[25] Holton, op. cit.

very potent and dynamic force in our national politics today. If anything, I think the social sciences may well help responsible political authority gain a better general view of our problems and a greater ability to control our problems.[26]

NATIONAL SOCIAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION

The convergence of the many issues related to the future of social science research and training has brought us to a time of decision concerning the relationships between the Federal Government and the social sciences. With these problems in mind, and joined by 20 other Senators, I introduced in the Senate of the United States a bill, S. 836, for the creation of a National Foundation for the Social Sciences to encourage and support research, scholarship and training in the behavioral and social sciences. It would provide proper recognition for the social sciences at the Federal level of government, expand the research effort to meet the growing need for new knowledge on social and political processes, advance social science research by strengthening institutions of higher learning and non-profit research organizations and foster exchange of information on social science research. It is not to be an operating agency, concerned with the day-to-day problems of mission-oriented agencies, but would, rather, be charged with the responsibility of funding wholly unclassified research and promoting scholarship and training in the social sciences. The proposed legislation is directed toward increasing research capability and manpower in the fields of political science, economics, psychology, sociology, anthropology, history, law, social statistics, demography, geography, linguistics, international relations, communications and other social sciences.

Since June of 1966, the Subcommittee on Government Research has held sixteen days of hearings on the social sciences and heard testimony from more than ninety witnesses from the Federal Government, universities, professional societies and organizations, and other non-profit and private research institutions. All major disciplines in the social sciences and all geographical areas of the United States were represented.

Without exception everyone was in agreement with the basic purpose of the bill—to expand support of the social sciences and to promote scholarship, research and training in these fields. The overwhelming majority of the witnesses favored the approach of the bill—to establish a separate social science institution. Many scholars and other national figures who were not able to testify personally sent letters that strongly supported the bill. For example, Dr. Henry Steele Commager, Professor of History, Amherst College, wrote:

> I am tremendously impressed with your proposals for a National Foundation for the Social Sciences, and particularly with the safeguards which you have written into it against exploitation or misuse, or even the suspicion of these, by government or by any political body.[27]

Several changes in the bill have been recommended to the Subcommittee during the course of our hearings. Some have been accepted in principle, including: deletion of the section which authorized the Foundation to administer research funds transferred from other departments or agencies; addition of a clear mandate to support training and education in the social sciences as well as research; clarification of intention to coordinate NSSF activities with existing agencies; alteration of the section prohibiting research grants to former Federal employees for a two year period following termination of such employment; broadening of criteria for selection of members of the Board of Trustees; a declaration that it is the intent of Congress for the National Science Foundation and the National Foundation for the Arts and Humanities to continue their support for social science research; and addition of specific authority for long-term funding.

NSSF will provide a net increase in total funding for the social sciences because the basic Act would create a new authority and not transfer existing functions from other agencies. The social sciences would then have a strong legislative base and a Congressional mandate, something they have not had before.

Some have argued that a separate social science foundation would encourage existing agencies to decrease support for social science research and would, in fact, result in the diminution of available funds from the NSF and the mission-oriented agencies of the government. I believe this is a simplistic view of government. Though the recently created National Foundation for the Arts and Humanities shares legislative responsibility with NSF to provide project support in several fields, including history and linguistics, during the period that these two foundations have shared such jurisdiction,

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[26] Don K. Price, testimony before the Subcommittee on Government Research, June 20, 1967.

[27] Letter from Dr. Henry Steele Commager, Professor of History, Amherst College, to Senator Fred R. Harris, March 8, 1967.

NSF has actually increased its support for research in these areas.[28] Moreover, Dr. Leland J. Haworth testified before our Subcommittee that it is his intention to continue to increase and expand NSF's support for such research.[29] Similar intentions were voiced by almost every witness who testified before our committee on behalf of the mission-oriented agencies of the federal government.[30]

The operating agencies cannot be concerned with long-range development of social science research capability. Their social science programs must support their missions, and, therefore, the health of the social sciences has been and will continue to be only incidental to their primary interests.

Dr. Kingsley Davis, Chairman of the International Population and Urban Research Committee, University of California, Berkeley, elaborated on the need for a new and separate social science agency when he said:

> My belief is that a separate social science foundation would have every reason to cooperate with other scientific agencies but that it would do so with the confidence and strength derived from controlling its own affairs. Other agencies would deal with it as an equal, not as a poor stepchild. It would not be merely a branch or division of a larger organization, the main purpose of which is natural or physical science.
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> The existence of a social science foundation would indeed raise the issue of who would cultivate certain fields that naturally link various scientific levels, such as behavioral genetics, human demography, animal sociology. There are any number of specialties that involve both the social and the natural sciences, and many of these are at present rather poorly developed in spite of their great interest. In raising the issue of such interdisciplinary specialties, a social science foundation would not necessarily opt them for itself, but it would highlight their existence and help to push a sophisticated consideration of their social and behavioral aspects.[31]

To those who have argued that a separate social science foundation would divide the sciences into "science" and "social science," Dr. Fred Harvey Harrington, President, University of Wisconsin, has pointed out the important relationship between status and the unity of knowledge. He said:

> There are some who contend that the creation of a third foundation would destroy the unity of knowledge or impair the interrelationships of scholars in various fields. Quite the contrary, it would remove a source of irritation, improve interrelationships and interdisciplinary research efforts. There is no one so irrationally irritating at a family reunion as a poor relative. Raising the status and the funding of the social sciences would enhance the unity of knowledge.[32]

Moreover, science is already administered by different departments in universities, and indeed, is frequently found in different schools of the same university. This diversity of adminisstrative control is not what has kept the sciences separated, nor could the fact of separation be overcome simply by placing all science under one administrative heading.

The creation of the Foundation would bring to the social sciences an infusion of money, prestige and recognition at the national level and a continuing committment to support these disciplines.

If no one rocks the boat, another argument goes, the poor relative will eventually achieve equal status within the existing structure. This position favors maintaining the status quo and assumes that the social sciences, which account for only ten per cent of the National Science Foundation's budget, will somehow become co-equal with the natural sciences, which receive the other ninety per cent.[33] Such gradual equalization by beefing up the social sciences in the NSF is simply not a realistic aspiration. It will not alter the reliance of the future of the social sciences on the forebearance of natural and physical scientists and their limited understanding and insights into the potentials of the social sciences. This "other science" position of the social sciences in NSF will persist if the unity of science theme is interpreted from natural or physical scientists' point of view. Some have argued that a separate foundation for the social sciences would preclude cooperation between the sciences and further isolate social science. But experience has shown that such cooperation can be effective as it has between the NSF and the National Foundation for the Arts and Humanities. On this point, Dr. Haworth said:

> Well, certainly there could be cooperation, Mr.

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[28] Haworth, op. cit., p. 80.

[29] Haworth, op. cit., pp. 95–100.

[30] "National Foundation for the Social Sciences," Part I.

[31] Kingsley Davis, testimony before the Subcommittee on Government Research, June 2, 1967.

[32] Fred Harvey Harrington, testimony before the Subcommittee on Government Research, June 28, 1967.

[33] Haworth, op. cit., p. 81.

Chairman. There is cooperation between ourselves and many agencies. I feel that there is again a difference in the following sense: it is not simply a sense of cooperating but it is also a question of having an integrated point of view, of having people in daily contact with each other who cover this range of points of view. Cooperation between agencies doesn't adequately cover that, and I believe that the social sciences are, in fact, I know that the social sciences are an integral part of science.[34]

In my judgment, at least, it is better in this case to be "separate but equal," if an "integrated point of view" means relegating social science to "second class citizenship" among the sciences as has distinctly been the case within NSF.

The need to support all aspects of social science research, both existing and potential, is perhaps the best possible argument for an NSSF. Under present circumstances only that social science most akin, by virtue of methodology, to the natural and physical sciences is eligible for NSF support.[35] Dr. James A. Robinson, Director, Mershon Center for Education in National Security and Mershon Professor of Political Science, Ohio State University, identified three approaches to political science research, only one of which is supported by NSF:

> With all due respect to NSF, however, I think there are important reasons for establishing a separate NSSF. These reasons apply for several social sciences, but they have special pertinence to the field I know best—political science—so I shall illustrate them with that subject. Political science may be divided roughly into three parts: non-science, science, and policy. Some of our colleagues do not aspire to science in the narrow meaning of the word and in the usage associated with NSF. . . . The implication of this for political science is that research on *norms*, *science*, and *policy* ought to be integrated rather than separated. Colleagues ought to share in public support for their work on the basis of competence, not on the basis of what is available. Hence, it is regrettable that those concerned with norms are served by one foundation (Humanities), those concerned with science another (NSF), and those concerned with policy none at all.[36]

Though it is true that more social science research has been supported by NSF each year since 1958, the total is still miniscule, when compared with funds for other fields of science.[37] More money through NSF for social science is important, but so too is the new integral approach and the new emphasis on social science which only a new agency designed specifically for the support of research in these fields can give.

Dr. Warren E. Miller, Program Director, Survey Research Center, University of Michigan, and Executive Director, Inter-university Consortium for Political Research, identified the basic premise upon which the argument for innovation is made:

> I would agree that if there is no change in perspective, that if we presume that all that is needed is doing what is now done only somewhat better, then there is no need for organizational innovation within the federal establishment. If, however, one has a different concept of the scale of research that is needed, an understanding of the institutional contexts that must be created for the research, a comprehension of the magnitude of the problems that the research is intended to confront, then I think the very least that can be suggested is a major innovation in the creation of support from the federal establishment.[38]

Most importantly the NSSF will promote the innovative thinking and research we urgently need if we are going to confront and solve the myriad social and political problems before us. In my opinion the National Science Foundation cannot afford to foster the innovative and original research which will penetrate to the root causes of our social and political problems, because under the best of circumstances social science research is only ten per cent of the NSF budget and that ten per cent may put in jeopardy the ninety per cent of its budget which is spent on the natural and physical sciences, which, in large part, tend to be less controversial in the short run. And yet, it is clear that, if the social sciences are to develop to their full potential, it is precisely that kind of research which will have to be supported with federal funds. If the Congress passes S. 836, and I believe that is inevitable, it will be with the understanding of the clearly-stated intention that the NSSF is not only authorized, but mandated, to support innovative research.

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[34] Haworth, op. cit., p. 77.

[35] Haworth, op. cit., p. 94.

[36] James A. Robinson, testimony before the Subcommittee on Government Research, July 12, 1967.

[37] "Federal Funds for Research, Development, and Other Activities, Fiscal Years 1965, 1966 and 1967," Volume XV, NSF 66-25 (U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1967), p. 7.

[38] Warren E. Miller, testimony before the Subcommittee on Government Research, June 6, 1967.

As I said during the hearings on NSSF:

> . . . I appreciate (the) comments about the need to make clear, if not in the bill itself, at least in the report on this bill, that Congress intends to give a mandate for controversy to the National Social Science Foundation. I think if we do anything less than that, the Foundation will not fully realize the potential we hope for it. I think they are going to have to go into the sensitive areas mentioned. If the social sciences are going to be innovative and creative and original, as I think they must be in order to meet the problems of our day on the level of magnitude the problems demand they are going to have to, by definition, be controversial. And, I think if the Foundation starts out with the kind of legislative history we have made during these hearings, there is a better chance that they may do the kind of thing that you and I hope they can do.[39]

Mission-oriented Federal agencies are even less likely to support innovative research in the social sciences. Thomas L. Hughes, Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, isolated the reason for this when he testified before our Subcommittee:

> As the social sciences develop, it is particularly important that Government support not force them into an inflexible system inhibiting a variety of public and private initiatives. This can be avoided by deliberately fostering innovation, a function with a high risk but one which a foundation can better run than can an operating agency which must always keep its program supportive of its mission.[40]

Dr. Max F. Millikan, Director of the Center for International Studies, MIT, made the same point in his testimony when he said:

> Operational agencies quite properly feel that given the limited funds available to them for research, priority must be given to activities at the applied end of the research spectrum where fairly quick payoffs to the achievement of immediate agency missions may be expected. The conseqence of this is that the scholar or research center seeking government funds to finance research is under considerable pressure to focus his attention on applied or operational problems.[41]

A separate NSSF, as a new and additional source of funding for social science research, would tend to work against rigidity in social science thought. "It is often the case," Dr. Vincent Davis said:

> . . . in the social sciences and in all other fields of scholarly endeavor that some one school of thought or approach will become extremely fashionable and therefore dominant from time to time. If there were to be only one primary centralized source of research support, that source would likely be dominated by the prevailing school of thought and all who did not wholly subscribe to this school would find it difficult to gain support for their work. Diversified sources of support provide a number of places where the dissenting minority groups can seek help. Diversified sources, therefore, represent within the scientific and scholarly world a crudely approximate equivalent to the checks and balances provided within our political system by having more than one political party. This is especially important if the social sciences are to produce the kind of "innovative, bold, original and controversial" thinking that Senator Harris has repeatedly called for.[42]

There is no question about the critical need for more knowledge on our many social and political problems. Conflicts and tensions are constantly threatening to puncture the elastic perimeters of our democracy. We must find new and better ways to resolve these conflicts and increase the pace of social progress. We must also find a better way to couple social science research and knowledge to our national and international programs and activities. I believe these goals can best be reached by giving the social sciences separate recognition and increased responsibility and prestige by establishing a new institution, a National Social Science Foundation.

We can serve no higher purpose than to increase our knowledge of man and the world he has created. In effect, to do so would be to fulfill the moral of Alexander Pope's famous words: "the proper study of mankind is man."

(Editor's Note: The foregoing is a volunteered article by a distinguished public official on a topic of great interest for the profession. Other volunteered articles on this topic will be considered for publication.)

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[39] Fred R. Harris, hearings of the Subcommittee on Government Research, July 13, 1967.

[40] Thomas L. Hughes, "National Foundation for the Social Sciences," Part I, p. 130.

[41] Max F. Millikan, testimony before the Subcommittee on Government Research, June 27, 1967.

[42] Davis, op. cit.

COMMUNICATIONS

To the Editor:

The organization and conduct of the APSA Business Meeting of last September 6, in Chicago's Pick-Congress Hotel, bordered on the grotesque. If this is the way serious conflicts of views among APSA members on practical issues are to be dealt with, why bother with the pretense of free discussion and enlightened majority choice?

1) Certain issues of professional ethics have given rise to strong feelings in a significant fraction of the APSA membership. Why was no time set aside for meaningful discussion of these issues?
2) In true academic form, the appointed committee's Interim Report on Ethical Problems of Political Scientists had managed to bring up almost every conceivable ethical issue but the ones at hand, and to conclude with wholly noncommittal recommendations; yet Question was called before anyone could catch his breath. Now, many colleagues must have communicated on certain issues of ethics to the President; why did he not on this occasion invite one of those concerned up to the rostrum before a vote was taken?
3) Why were all the microphones on the rostrum, none on the floor, with the result that in the beginning of the meeting (when the ethics report was adopted) many members present could hear only the voices from the rostrum?

Next year I trust time will be set aside for meaningful discussion of issues affecting our roles and responsibilities as professional political scientists.

And I trust we will find a way to defeat or rise above the ban on the expression of political principle by the APSA. Obviously the APSA is not a proper vehicle for electoral politics, but when it comes to the basic issues of ethics and politics it should not only be the right but the responsibility of APSA members, as such, to enlighten each other in dialogue and to enlighten the powers that be with unsolicited advice. APSA has till now been altogether too solicitous; I take the calling of Politics not to be apologia or technical servicing of monstrous government policies, but to clarify political alternatives and promote a more enlightened Polity. We were solemnly told at the meeting that our tax exemption might be at stake and that APSA members might become divided by controversy should we permit political positions to be adopted; I rather believe our creature comforts could be saved even through the ordeals of politics, and that our annual meetings could become far more interesting with issues of political responsibility out in the open.

If the APSA cannot be moved to place concern for politics above a more convenient concern with public and governmental relations, then surely we need a new Society for the Study of Political Problems, for those of us who want to get out from under the wings of our own establishment.

Christian Bay

University of Alberta

To the Editor:

It is a tricky business to forecast the responses of an audience which holds such diverse viewpoints as does the readership of this Review—and is so ready to express them individually rather than as members of a "school." Thus I cannot share Professor Rosenau's confidence that he can not only predict but also categorize the reactions of readers who may be critical of my article. I shall therefore limit my remarks to Rosenau's own objections rather than comment on those he attributes to a variety of methodological quarters. These people will in any event speak for themselves.

Being preoccupied with setting forth his thoughts on the emerging "political science of adaptation," Rosenau has confined himself to critical comments which, although sweeping, are so brief that they hardly require summary. In his view, 1) the distinction between the observer and his subject matter has been lost; 2) there is no clear-cut indication of what is meant by compatibility and consensus; 3) my reformulation of the concept of the penetrated system is not sufficiently delimited and hence is confused; 4) I have extended the concept of penetration to cover both political and nonpolitical phenomena, and the concepts of consensus and compatibility obscure the boundaries between political systems and erase the boundary between a single political system and its nonpolitical environment.

1) I am persuaded that Rosenau's First Law of Social Dynamics—that people see what they want to see (or fail to see what they don't want to see)—is probably correct. In his own case, at least, some of his remarks provide a good deal of evidence for its plausibility. Nothing of what I say in my article lends itself to

the suggestion that the distinction between the observer and his subject matter is being lost. On the contrary, I stress this distinction on the two occasions when mention is made of an "outside observer": (a) I quote Harold and Margaret Sprout in footnote 3 to illustrate the difference between the external-operational environment and the internal-psychological environment—the former being a "capability setting" that determines a policy's success or failure and that consists of the "factors which an outside observer judges to be relevant and significant in explaining an event or state of affairs." (b) In defining compatibility I apply this notion of an outside observer to underline the point that compatibility is a feasibility relationship between a goal and its operational environment which exists independently of a decision-maker's perception of it. His perception (based on his psychological environment) may suggest to him that the goal is feasible; the operational environment (assessed by an outside observer) may make it unattainable.

2) In my article, I define the concepts of compatibility and consensus as succinctly as possible. I find it hard to believe that Rosenau does not know what I mean by consensus. Rather, I think he means to say that quantifiable indicators of consensus are hard to come by, and that I have not attempted to "operationalize" the concept—which is ture. His questions about whether 10 percent, or 51 percent, or 100 percent agreement among the relevant decision-makers is "sufficient," and whether percentage differences have "different consequences," seem rather rhetorical if not facetious. It is Rosenau's assumption, not mine, that a "head count" of individual decisionmakers might provide a means of measuring consensus. It is at least conceivable that in some societies the relevant elements of a national decision-making process cannot be reduced to clearly identifiable individuals or be made quantifiable in some other way. In that case we may have to resort to more old-fashioned methods and try to assess existing degrees of consensus by examining the attitude and influence of political parties, interest groups, church organizations, mass media, public opinion, and so forth. After all, "it is not enough simply to assert that national leaders are those persons who wield influence in the national community. For . . . there are many levels of influence and in this sense every citizen can be regarded as influential." (James N. Rosenau, *National Leadership and Foreign Policy*, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963, p. 5) One might also ask whether Rosenau—in spelling out his concept of a penetrated system—has himself adhered to very exacting standards for operationalizing a concept: how many nonmembers of a national society must participate in its value allocation to make the system penetrated? Ten? Fifty-one? A hundred?

3) Rosenau's First Law of Social Dynamics is certainly applicable to his criticism of my reformulation of the concept of a penetrated system. Here he did not see well at all: "Rather than delimiting such systems in some way, [Hanrieder] posits them as existing whenever decision-making processes are 'strongly affected by external events.' What might this mean? If the world is shrinking and interdependence is mounting, does it not mean all national systems are of the penetrated type?" I clearly state that the effect of external events on the decision-making process is *not* sufficient to make the system penetrated; it must also be able to command wide consensus in accommodating to these events. I considered this point so important that, in defining a penetrated system, I stressed these two necessary conditions by numbering them (1) and (2). There are many contemporary historical examples—Vietnam, for one—that illustrate the possibility that although the world may be shrinking, the impact of external events need not always elicit widespread willingness to adapt to them. Consequently, not all national systems are of the penetrated type or, in any case, they may be penetrated to a different degree.

4) This is not the time or place to discuss the old question of what is political or nonpolitical, but the issues raised here are important and one might wish that Rosenau—although impatient to get on with mapping out yet another trend in the discipline—had paused for a fuller explanation of his position. Developments in weapons technology may not be political in themselves, but the response they evoke in decision-making processes are surely political—not only on the "receiving" end (as a possible threat) but also on the initiating end (as an increment in power). Clearly, Rosenau's conception of an international system is different from mine, and part of our disagreement stems from these differing conceptions. To my way of thinking, capability patterns—coupled with motivational patterns of the major actors—are crucial elements in spelling out the attributes of an international system. Consequently, shifts in the power relationships among actors are important external events to which the decision-making process reacts one way or another —if these shifts are perceived a all. There is no easy answer to the question of which external

events are "strong" or "weak." In an operational setting, major shifts in power relationships are probably "strong" events and thus may lead to significant changes in compatibility relationships. Unless they are perceived as such by the relevant elements of the decision-making process, they cannot of course lead to readjustments of consensual patterns, since these are based on perception rather than actuality.

I also wonder why the application of the concept of consensus should erase the boundary between a single political system and its nonpolitical environment. As far as I know, analysts who have used the concept of consensus experienced no more difficulty in distinguishing between the political and nonpolitical than analysts who apply different organizing principles. For example, Rosenau was not unduly troubled when, in defining a penetrated system as one in which nonmembers of a national society participate authoritatively in its value allocation, he drew no clear distinction between "society" and the political system.

A brief remark on the "political science of adaptation." Here, as he has already demonstrated elsewhere, Rosenau shows his ability and readiness to perceive trends in the discipline, and, I am flattered that he considers the concepts of compatibility and consensus suggestive enough to say that they are applicable to adaptive problems on the national as well as on the international level. Yet I wonder if Rosenau, in his zeal to act as spokesman for it, has not made exaggerated avant-garde claims for a field of inquiry whose "distinctive subject matter . . . is the interaction between a political actor and its external environment." Has there ever been an inquiry into political processes with a different subject matter?

Wolfram F. Hanrieder
University of California, Santa Barbara

To the Editor:

In the September 1966 issue of the Review, the author of an article on Hawaiian judges[1] places some emphasis on the acquisition of knowledge by direct inquiry. One of his stated aims is to get "direct information about . . . judicial attitudes and orientations."[2] Elsewhere, he has explicitly approved the view of Gordon Allport that the way to find out why people behave as they do is to ask them. Essentially the same posture is assumed in *HJ*. Since I believe the emphasis here overdone, I am moved to comment. A few remarks on other aspects of the article will also be offered.

In a 1955 study, Max Gluckman attempted to explain jucicial decision-making among the Barotse of Northern Rhodesia. In seeking such explanation, Gluckman eliminated from consideration those motivating factors not manifested by the judge himself and those reasons not pleaded by the litigants to establish the validity of their claims. Taken this position at face value, Gluckman's reviewer found it "incredible . . . unless one is willing to reject out of hand virtually everything that is known about human motivation."[3]

The view expressed in *HJ* seems biased in the same direction as that of Gluckman. Indeed, it is more restrictive since the relevant manifestation is limited to the responses made by the judge to a small number of survey questions. Consequently, March's reaction to Gluckman is equally applicable here. The assumptions that what the judge believes is influential in his decisions is in fact the case and that if he has such information he will share it with the world, may be as questionable as those made by Gluckman. Personally, I am skeptical of the ability of individuals to explain their own decision-making processes. Freudian psychology teaches that what a judge says may be a confession. The determination of what he is confessing to, however, must be derived separately. The nature of the judge's role restricts severely the kinds of values he may articulate in explaining his behavior. In that regard citizen and judge are in quite distinct positions with citizen being much less circumscribed in articulating what moves him.

Moreover, a set of questions such as those put to the Hawaiian judges reflects a particular theory of the factors that determine decision. The questions used in *HJ* do not emphasize political considerations, the impact of interaction processes in collegial settings, and other sociological and psychological principles which behavioral science research has associated with human behavior. While the surveying and interviewing of judges may be a useful adjunct to other approaches, reliance cannot be placed upon that method alone for an understanding of judicial decision-making. Since in case of conflict, inferences drawn from observations of behavior in actual decision-making situations would be preferred to those articulated by the judge himself in hypothetical situations, survey and interviewing methods are likely to serve in a validating or confirming role.

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[1] Theodore L. Becker, "A Survey Study of Hawaiian Judges: The Effect on Decisions of Judicial Role Variations," this Review, 60 (Sept. 1966), 677–680.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 677.

[3] James G. March, "Sociological Jurisprudence Revisited, A Review (More or Less) of Max Gluckman," *Stanford Law Review*, 8 (1956), p. 505.

To move to the analysis provided raises more serious questions. Formally, the approach is to identify a set of judges with particular characteristics and predict a second set of judges with common attributes. In order to save space, I shall use the language of set theory to describe these procedures. In effect, a universal set, U, is defined as the Hawaiian Judges in the author's sample. Within the universal set three sub-sets are distinguished. Sub-set $A = \{a : a \in U \text{ and } a \text{ has the property } P\}$. Element a is the Hawaiian Judge. The property P changes with each of the three hypotheses offered. Using subscripts to designate the number of the appropriate hypothesis, P_1 is "considers the existence of clear, directly relevant precedent to be the single most important factor in influencing judicial decisions . . . ";[4] the definition of P_2 and P_3 may be obtained similarly from hypotheses 2 and 3.

Sub-set B, is defined as $B = \{b : b \in U \text{ and } b \text{ has the property } P\}$. In this case, the element b is a judge with the property P_a, P_b, or P_c. P_a is defined in hypothesis 1 as making objective decisions[5] or deciding consistently with precedent. P_b and P_c can be read similarly, from hypotheses 2 and 3. It is hypothesized, in each case, that the elements of sub-set A which fall in sub-set B will exceed the elements in A which do not fall in sub-set B. Or, to express it another way, the conjoint set $C = \{c : c \in A \cup B\} > \{A - C\}$. Should the presence of P_1, be determined by the presence of P_a or P_2 by P_b or P_3 by P_c, the author would be guilty of circularity. While this trap is avoided, a question remains as to the substantive success of the avoidance strategy as opposed to its formal or logical correctness. The identification of a judge with the property P_1, is based upon answers given by the judge to direct-survey questions. The determination of P_a, on the other hand, is based upon observed decision in a hypothetical case. We may ask whether the behavior of the judge (in deciding consistent with or in opposition to precedent) was influenced by the fact that he had informed the investigator of the value he placed on precedent prior to deciding the case furnished him. The avoidance strategy fails precisely to the extent to which such influence is operative.

An additional comment may be offered on methods. Tests of significance are eschewed in *HJ* because six of the twelve cells in the tables contain entries of four or less. Nevertheless, greater use of inferential statistics has been made than is conceded. It is suggested that only a "simple comparison of percentages" is made. But these percentages are compared in four cell tables and it is the cross products from these tables that are assessed. This is necessary since the judges who value precedent highly and do not value personal factors highly split between *objective* and *subjective* decisions four-two, seven-ten, and four-four. Only the first of these splits is consistent with the hypotheses offered. This finding must be related, therefore, to the decisions of those judges who do not value precedent highly and those who place great value on personal factors.

The differences in the cross products which result from such comparisons are in all three cases consistent with the hypotheses offered. The differences found, however, could be due to chance. Perhaps the recognition of this fact is responsible for the computation of significance coefficients even after conceding their inapplicability. But were this defect not present, the author's statement that such tests "demonstrate significance in the specific distribution in the tables" appears incorrect.

When Chi square is applied to a problem with one degree of freedom and the entry in any of the four cells is less than ten, Yates correction for continuity should be used. The appropriate formula[6] incorporating this correction is:

$$\chi^2 = \frac{N\left[\,|AD - BC| - \frac{N}{2}\right]^2}{(A + B)(B + D)(C + D)(C + A)}$$

Since each of the author's three tables contain cell entries of less than five and since four-cell tables such as these incorporate one degree of freedom, this formula is applicable to the author's data. Subsequent computations show that the differences in the cross products from tables 2, 3, and 4 are in no case significant at .05.

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[4] *Op. cit.*, p. 679.

[5] Since objective decision is defined as a decision consistent with the requirement of precedent but contrary to the judge's own "enlightened" view, it is necessary to know whether all judges perceive the requirement of precedent in a given hypothetical case in similar terms. Although the author does not go into this question, consensual cognition must be assumed in his model. Such an assumption may be questioned.

[6] See: J. P. Guilford, *Fundamental Statistics in Psychology and Education* (New York: 1956), p. 237.

Finally, assuming contrary to what has been shown, that *HJ* is free of defects, an alternanative theory might be offered to explain the author's data: to wit—that strong ego judges make "objective" decisions while weak ego judges make "subjective" ones. A breakdown of the data in *HJ* into these categories shows that, on the author's test,—consistency of data and hypothesis—we may claim as much for our psychological explanation of the behavior observed as can the author for his precedential belief explanation.[7] Thus we are left with the question: Hawaiian judges—what really moves them?

S. Sidney Ulmer
University of Kentucky

To the Editor:

Professor Ulmer's criticism of my Hawaiian judges study (HJ) is a timely one. It is also complex. Unfortunately, since *APSR* groundrules severely limit the length of reply, I am unable to address myself to more than a few of his points. The first of these concerns Ulmer's fears about the validity of HJ. His point is well taken and I will elaborate on some measures actually implemented during the execution of the study that I neglected to mention in the article in question. A second issue raised by Ulmer's commentary is more fundamental, and I am apprehensive that it augurs a behavioral revisionism originating with a founding father. But first things first.

Ulmer raises the question of the reactive effect of one part of a study design upon another. He observes, with good cause, that the Hawaiian judges' responses to the hypothetical case may have been conditioned by their previous responses to the role questionnaire. This has worried me as well (see pp. 136–137 of my *Political Behavioralism and Modern Jurisprudence*), so I took an additional step in the Hawaiian study to try to ameliorate the degree of influence that the role questionnaire might have. The questionnaire was divided into two parts, the hypothetical case being the second portion. The interviewers informed each judge of this and also told him that he would get the second part upon completion and collection of the first part by the interviewer. Thus, one can hope that a few days elapsed between the filling out of the judicial role section and the deciding of the hypothetical case. Of course, this is only a minimal time delay, but it may have helped reduce reaction. A future adjustment in this technique might be to give the role and attitude sets of questions to the judges without any mention of any latter part. Then, a year or so later, the researcher may return with a set of hypothetical cases for the judges to decide. I believe that this modification of design in the research strategy is quite feasible and would substantially reduce, if not eliminate, the reactive effect built into the design as reported in HJ originally.

It is good that Professor Ulmer brought this matter into the open. Still, I feel he misses the point that this was simply a research note designed to inform my colleagues of an attempted refinement of an earlier, coarser study. The entire tone of Ulmer's critique seems to me to manifest an insensitivity to the arduous process of the sharpening of social scientific instruments. But his tone is only one of many indicators that lead me to sense a strong antiscientific bias in his analysis. I know this sounds odd, for Ulmer is widely known as a mover in the behavioral study of courts and judges—and this implies at least a sympathy for Matters-Scientific. However, a mere acquaintance with diverse statistical techniques and abstruse jargon is a far cry from understanding them and applying them properly. One wonders, for example, about the necessity of Ulmer's usage of the conventions of set theory in his critique. But let me be more specific on my anti-science charge.

(1) Ulmer states that HJ is of limited worth since only certain factors were selected for study and many other potentially influential factors were omitted from consideration. This is true, but what empirical study in the sciences does not do this? Isolation of a few variables is the very essence of such inquiry. No one with sympathy for Things-Scientific should fault him who limits the focus of his study in order to obtain as precise a measurement of interaction among only a few of the variables generally theorized to be germane and significant. To do so is to fault science primarily and the researcher only as a dupe.

(2) He also seems to imply that when a researcher opts to study the interaction of some factors over others that this manifests bias. In a sense, this is true too. His inference, if I am not mistaken, is that the researcher has a preference for how the research turns out. Isn't Ulmer implying that I have a vested interest in some theory on the importance of precedent and judicial role? I admit that I have a hunch that such factors may be operant in the "ju-

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[7] A more detailed explanation of this "theory" and the data breakdown used are available on request.

dicial process," but this is no more of a notion than that which various scientists had about the feasibility of an atomic bomb. Some preferred that such a device might not work well, knew that it would, and worked on the project anyway. If the concept of judicial role is a fruitless one, I hope to be the first one to demonstrate it. To imply ideological biases to the scientific researcher only on the basis of what factors he chooses to study, once again, seems tantamount to impugning scientific study.

(3) There are some internal inconsistencies in his statement that make the explanation of a judicial behavioral revisionism by Ulmer all the more plausible. First, he states that he believes in Freudian theory wherein people "confess" their true motives to others. On the other hand, he professes a lack of faith in methods of direct questioning of respondents through questionnaires. Can Ulmer believe sincerely that a psychiatrist's interpretation of response is less subject to error and bias and less dependent on the candor of the subject than the interpretations of questionnaire researchers and analysts? Furthermore, how can he doubt what judges tell researchers but believe what judges tell the public in their opinions about the basis for their votes? The judicial opinion, after all, is the data source relied upon by Ulmer to categorize the votes he analyzes in his own work. Strange that he would believe a public, individually signed, politically-oriented judicial statement, but disbelieve one made in private with assurances of anonymity.

I conclude with the thought that I have never claimed privy to any "explanation" of the judicial process in Hawaii or elsewhere. It is Professor Ulmer who offers to provide such upon request. But, then, that is only the final indicator of his confusion about the practice of social science. It is only one more indication of his reaction against the growing use of a whole arsenal of techniques capable of testing theory, whereas his own techniques are utterly incapable of doing so.

Theodore L. Becker
University of Hawaii

To the Editor:

In his article, "The Deradicalization of Marxist Movements" (this Review, June, 1967, pp. 343–358) Professor Robert C. Tucker formulates a series of generalizations on the processes and causal factors of deradicalization of Marxist movements on the basis of his examination of the history of Soviet Communism after Stalin and the German Social Democratic Party around the turn of the century. When I review in my own mind the history of the Chinese Communist movement and regime, I find some of Professor Tucker's concepts and generalizations very illuminating but others difficult to apply.

Let us start by asking a basic question which looks simple but is actually difficult to answer in terms of Professor Tucker's categories: Can one regard the Chinese Communist movement in the period 1935–1946 as an historical instance of deradicalization in terms of the "symptoms" and "causal factors" suggested by him? During this period the Chinese Communists modified the tactical part of the ideology by stressing short-term objectives and non-radical means of attaining them. The CCP adopted the policy of establishing a united front against Japan which at first excluded Generalissimo Chiang and later included him. It replaced the policy of confiscating the land of landlords by a program of reducing rent and interest rates. It put forward the theory of New Democracy and gave outsiders the impression that the New Democratic society and "state form" would last for a long time. It advanced the policy of establishing a coalition government. In their informal remarks, Chinese Communist leaders gave certain hints that the CCP might come to power through peaceful means. They made conscious efforts to adapt Marxism-Leninism to Chinese conditions. These and many other facts support Professor Tucker's assertions about the first symptom.

But with regard to a second symptom, i.e., practice or pattern of action, the evidence points both ways. Reformist patterns of action were adopted in the base areas and within the Kuomintang territory, but revolutionary patterns were continued in the form of limited war behind the Japanese lines against both the Japanese and the Nationalist forces. Even here, however, one could define the transition from all-out war to limited war against the Kuomintang as a manifestation of deradicalization, although the over-all pattern of action was still more revolutionary than reformist.

True to Professor Tucker's description of a third symptom, there was a conflict within the movement over the question of deradicalization. But in contrast to the cases of the SPD and Soviet Communism, this attack came from the right wing rather than the left wing of the Chinese Communist movement. The struggle was between Mao Tse-tung and the minority of "right opportunists," notably Chang Kuo-tao and Wang Ming. The criticism of the Party Center's policy stemmed from a feeling that deradicalization in the form of cooperation with the Kuomintang did not go far enough.

Finally, the CCP affirmed its ultimate goals. Mao declared in his famous speech, "On Coalition Government," in April, 1945: "We communists do not conceal our political views. Definitely and beyond all doubt, our future or maximum programme is to carry China forward to socialism and communism." Professor Tucker's discussion of the deradicalization of radical movements implies that in the process of deradicalization, the affirmation of the radical goals is hypocritical and has no operational consequences. But it can be argued that the continuing desire of the one-time radical movement to change the existing society is itself a necessary factor in the process of tactical deradicalization. If this desire is absent, the radical movement may adhere to its fundamental tenets without change and remain a permanent and insignificant minority as is the case with many fundamentalist religious sects.

Professor Tucker's formulation of two causal factors, i.e., "leadership change" and "worldly success," also leads us to conflicting conclusions. Just prior to the inception of the process of deradicalization, there was a change in leadership. Mao captured the party apparatus at the Tsun-yi meeting in early 1935. But in 1946 Mao himself inaugurated the process of reradicalization which, in spite of its fluctuations, is still going strong. At this point, one cannot help but think of the case of Tito's Yugoslavia in which a process of deradicalization was accompanied by continuity of leadership.

Professor Tucker's second causal factor, "worldly success," deserves more lenghty comment. To me, the most interesting statement made by Professor Tucker is the following one: "It appears to be the fate of radical movements that survive and flourish for long *without* remaking the world that they undergo eventually a process of deradicalization." But in the case of the Chinese Communist movement, the process of deradicalization was greatly accelerated during the Long March when the fortunes of the CCP were at a low ebb. In China, it was worldly failure rather than worldly success which led to a process of rapid deradicalization. This development shows, to use Professor Tucker's terminology and method, that "it appears to be the fate of radical movements that cannot survive and flourish after a period of attempting to remake the world by radical methods that they will undergo a process of deradicalization." Thus, the juxtaposition of the two cases examined by Professor Tucker to the case of the CCP in 1935 shows that two diametrically opposite conditions, i.e., worldly success and worldly failure, can produce a similar result, deradicalization. Moreover, a process of re-radicalization began after 1946 in the Chinese Communist movement in the form of open civil war which began after the CCP had survived and flourished under its deradicalized program. To put it simply, worldly success was followed not by deradicalization but by re-radicalization. This development suggests that under certain circumstances, radical movements that survive and flourish will undergo a process of re-radicalization. Thus, the juxtaposition of Professor Tucker's two cases to the case of the CCP after 1946 shows that a similar condition, i.e., worldly success, can lead to two diametrically opposite results: deradicalization on the one hand and re-radicalization on the other.

The attempt to apply Professor Tucker's concepts and generalization has thus led us to a dilemma. If one wants to uphold the universal applicability of Professor Tucker's theory, one must take the position thet the history of the Chinese Communist movement from 1935 to 1946 does not represent a case of deradicalization, despite the existence of some of the symptoms described by Professor Tucker. But if one admits that it represents a different type of deradicalization, i.e., a tactical change and a forced adjustment to political reality, three additional intellectual tasks must be undertaken. First, we must formulate concepts and generalizations applicable to this type of tactical deradicalization as distinguished from the genuine cases of deradicalization cited by Professor Tucker. Second, since these two different types belong to one general class of phenomena, i.e., deradicalization, we must formulate concepts and theories applicable to this class of phenomena as a whole. Third, if it is true that a process of genuine deradicalization or a decline in revolutionary commitment is usually preceded by deradicalization of a tactical nature forced by circumstances, we must raise a significant question as to the conditions under which the latter becomes or leads to the former.

To carry out these tasks, we would have to stress other variables which Professor Tucker mentions explicitly in his narrative or implies in his discussion but which he does not single out as "causal factors." I shall mention two of the most obvious ones. The first is the strength of the existing social order as perceived by the radicals or the one-time radicals. If the existing social order is perceived by the radicals as so strong that they cannot survive and flourish by the use of radical methods, the process of deradicalization will set in. This variable must be taken into account to explain the deradicalization of the Chinese Communist movement in 1935. It also sheds some light on the contrast between the deradicalization of Soviet Communism and the radicalization of the Chinese Communist movement on the question of world revolution. On the one hand, the Soviet Union sees the United States as so strong militarily that she could not be challenged by revolutionary methods. On the other hand the Chinese Communists believe that she can eventually be defeated by a global strategy which is essentially a projection of their revolutionary strategy employed in the Chinese civil war.

The second variable which comes readily to mind is the presence or absence of a well-defined and stable political system in which a radical movement can find its place. This variable is implicitly recognized by Professor Tucker in his phrase, "stake in the *status quo*." In contrast to the SPD, the Chinese Communist movement in 1946 could see no stable and well-defined political system in which it could survive and flourish. Therefore, the deradicalization process could not be continued. At the present moment, the Soviet Union has a recognized and respected place in what she considers to be a relatively stable and well-defined international system whereas the Peking regime is an outcast and considers the international system as unstable and evil.

I have merely given two very simple examples for the purpose of illustrating the need to identify other important variables in a very complex situation besides the two "causal factors" mentioned explicitly by Professor Tucker. But the identification of additional variables and the discovery of two types of deradicalization merely mark the beginning of the far more difficult task of formulating a theory of deradicalization. The value of any concept or theory varies with its generality. The more generally applicable it is, the greater its explanatory power. Professor Tucker's concepts and generalizations derive much of their appeal from the universality claimed for them. But as we discover historical cases of deradicalization which do not fit the generalizations, we are forced to distinguish particular types of deradicalization. If we then proceed to compare the different sociopolitical contexts from which the different types of deradicalization emerged, we discover additional variables which must be taken into account. As we proceed to construct a typology of many different types of deradicalization, compare the many different socio-political contexts, and discover many more variables, we obtain propositions of a decreasing order of generality and lower level of abstraction. By moving closer and closer to the uniqueness of history, we shall be able to explain the individual cases more adequately, but in the process our concepts and generalizations will have lost much of their explanatory power. Thus, the task of formulating a theory of deradicalization will not be complete until we can formulate a set of propositions which can explain all types of deradicalization and which, with the addition of specified variables, can be used to differentiate one type of deradicalization from another. These difficult intellectual tasks must be performed in the construction of theories of this type. These are the problems which we must resolve in order to pursue further Professor Tucker's germinal ideas.

Tang Tsou

University of Chicago

To the Editor:

In their article, "Public Opinion and the War in Vietnam" (this Review, June 1967) Sidney Verba and his associates quote from their original Stanford report as follows: "The American public is clearly concerned about Vietnam. . . . But their opinions appear to be moderate and *responsible*. . . . They reject those solutions that require *irresponsible* abandonment of our commitments." (emphasis added)

The authors are certainly entitled to their own opinion, but it should not be interjected into what purports to be a purely descriptive presentation of scientific findings. There is nothing in the authors' data to indicate that a "moderate" (i.e., middle ground) opinion which advocates maintaining the present level of military involvement is "responsible," while an opinion which advocates withdrawal as an immediate policy objective is "irresponsible." Indeed, nothing in the measurement of an opinion distribution provides us with evidence for labeling one opinion more or less responsible than another unless the concept of "responsibility" itself were operationalized and given an empirical meaning pertinent to the data—something the authors do not do.

Those of us who believe it is possible to arrive at scientific, value-free findings—and this, I know, includes Verba and his associates—would do well to choose our terms with more care.

Michael Parenti

Sarah Lawrence College

To THE EDITOR:

Mr. Parenti is right. Whether one considers a position on Vietnam "responsible" or "irresponsible" depends upon one's values.

But Mr. Parenti is quoting our "original Stanford report" which, as we point out in our article, was a policy-oriented document into which we thought it not inappropriate to inject our own opinion.

And let us be precise about what our opinion was. The pattern of public attitudes we found and to which we applied the term "responsible" was not one that advocated maintaining the level of military commitment at that time. Rather, we found majorities in favor of a reduction of the war and a negotiated American withdrawal—through negotiations with the Vietcong, through free elections even if the Vietcong won, through U.N. supervision, or through the formation of a coalition government with the Vietcong. On the other hand, majorities rejected alternatives that called for sudden withdrawal with no conditions attached. In the original report quoted in the REVIEW article (but not in the body of the article itself) we labeled that pattern of public opinion "responsible."

That is our opinion. Mr. Parenti may agree or disagree. It is not a scientific finding. We did not present it as such.

SIDNEY VERBA, RICHARD A. BRODY, EDWIN B. PARKER, NORMAN H. NIE, NELSON W. POLSBY, PAUL EKMAN, AND GORDON BLACK

To THE EDITOR:

In his review of Alfred de Grazia *et al.*, *Congress: The First Branch* (this REVIEW, September 1967, p. 777), Nicholas Masters calls some of my statements (in my essay on "Check and Balance Today: What Does It Mean for Congress and Congressmen?") "nonsense" and "ridiculous." May I return the courtesy by suggesting that Mr. Masters has demonstrated that either he is or I am extraordinarily ignorant (or that he is extraordinarily unimaginative and unable to read clearly). Unlike Mr. Masters, however, I shall try to demonstrate why I use the abusive terms I do; he is content merely to use them—generally a misfortune in reviewing!

He quotes what he calls the most ridiculous statement in the book. My statement is based upon the value judgment that there is danger that the Congress be overwhelmed by the bureaucracy and the specialists and that this danger should be reduced. (Mr. Master's inattentiveness is suggested by his general assertion in a preceding column that the book is based upon "the notion that the Executive Branch, including the entire bureaucracy, is a monolithic force, dominated by a central figure"; yet my paper, like several others—mine perhaps more explicitly—makes the meaning of check and balance today dependent upon protection from the specialist, the expert, the bureaucrat, as much as or more from the President.) This judgment is based on the hypothesis that Congressional staff are, like other people, influenced by their immediate primary groups, including those with whom they dwell. The statement, to translate it out of context, says merely "some attention should be called to the danger that Congressional staff may be over-influenced in those instances where they live with a group of bureaucrats; one way to call attention to such a danger is to propose regulations making it somewhat difficult." Mr. Masters, to be sure, has snatched the statement out of context to make it sound like some horrendous threat or absurdity—but unless he is really unable to read, or prepared to assert that primary group theory is not relevant to Congressional staff, although the proposal may be erroneous or unnecessary (a matter for study) it is not ridiculous nonsense.

To put the matter in terms of vivid illustrations: (1) Has Mr. Masters ever lived with a bunch of employees, properly indoctrinated, of the Strategic Air Command and seen them influence their associates? I think they would do the same thing, even more, with Congressional staff. (2) Does he have any recollection of the missionary enthusiasm some New Deal agencies used to have and which was generally manifested by their employees? Does he seriously believe that this enthusiasm did not over-influence some Congressional staff who lived with those people?

LEWIS A. DEXTER

Belmont, Massachusetts

To THE EDITOR:

In our Communication appearing on p. 761 of the September 1967 issue of the REVIEW, the following 11 words should be deleted from the second-to-last paragraph: "A cycle is virtually certain with more than ten individuals."

RICHARD NIEMI and HERBERT WEISBERG

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BOOK REVIEWS

The Managing of Organizations. By Bertram M. Gross. (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964. 2 vols., Pp. xxviii, 971. $25.00.)

One must honor the time and effort which have gone into this encyclopedic work on administration in its many forms. Using almost a thousand pages, Professor Gross attempts, with consummate eclecticism, to synthesize both the methods and the substance of social science as these relate to the managing of organizations. Written in a provocative and lucid style, the analysis ranges through the rise of the administrative state, the emergence of administration as a focus of attention, people in organizations, organizational purposes and objectives, and ends with some normative judgments about administrative imperialism, tensions between opposing conceptions of the best ways to study it, and the directions administrative science should take in order to insure survival, wisdom, and an international community.

The section on the "gospel of efficiency" and the "new pioneers" is especially useful, providing an excellent overview of the historical evolution of administrative thought in the United States. That the resistance to Taylorism came from higher management as well as from blue-collar workmen shows again that everyone finds change threatening. Equally suggestive is the section dealing with the organization's environment and its diversified client groups. Multiple constraints impinge upon the organization, and its efforts to accommodate them provide a useful framework for conceptualizing organizational behavior. The unexpected consequences of co-optation are seen in the danger that organizations may find themselves the instruments of such "outside" interests. Such a focus helps us overcome any tendency to view organizations only in their internal context, a perspective which usually overestimates their autonomy and neglects the political role which their leaders necessarily play.

Perhaps the main thrust of Professor Gross' work is suggested by the space given to discrete areas of the field. Regarding, for example, the "organizations without people" v. the "people without organizations" dichotomy, we find 114 pages under the latter rubric contrasted with 300 under the former. Both areas are of course touched upon elsewhere but one feels the author is somewhat more comfortable with the "management science" side of organizational life than with its "human relations" aspects.

A related characteristic of the analysis is an extensive use of economic constructs and language. A section on the purposes of organization, for example, is replete with economic symbols: output-input values; internal pricing systems; output mix; product characteristics; efficiency ratios; quality facets, etc. While Gross carefully notes that organizations have many goals, "efficiency" and "rationality" are central among them and considerable time is spent discussing their various meanings. These concepts, however, are not always tightly integrated into the analysis. They are presented well and clearly, but their significance for understanding and explaining management processes is not always made clear, and perhaps especially in the chapters on "Output: Operations and Functions" and "Efficiency."

Although my own approach to organizations may be too centered on political and sociological questions of authority, hierarchy, and power, this emphasis upon the language of economics often seems strained. It may be germane to private management, which has the purpose and the performance measures required to make at least some economic constructs viable. In the public sphere, however, it seems to reflect mainly an inapposite management-consultant *legerdemain,* if only because public government really isn't very "efficient" and perhaps cannot be, given the welfare and warfare purposes that dominate it. The preoccupation of public administrators with "management" techniques may reflect their inferiority feelings *vis-à-vis* private business more than the adaptability of such techniques to government operations. One is reminded of the much-bruited costing expertise of MacNamara's "whiz-kids" or an ironic Bureau of the Budget pamphlet (1964) called *War on Waste.* Contrast these with the Defense Department's recent 10 billion dollar underestimate of the costs of the Vietnam War or the Comptroller General's annual catalogue of the Department's overbuying, gold-plating, excessive stock-piling, etc.

The tendency to impute too much rationality to administrative processes is also apparent in the conclusion that a "realistic model" of decision making may now be set forth. It seems, on the contrary, that there has been some disenchantment with decision making models because they are often unable, even with the help of computer simulation, to comprehend enough of the variables and alternative solutions related to problems of any magnitude to make possible very imposing levels of rationality. Indeed, so-called decision "theory" really lacks the most significant ingredients of theory in its failure to differentiate relevant variables in terms of their relative weight and "causal" associations. The result is usually some highly abstract set of rules admonishing the decider to determine what his problem is, scale his values, consider several alternative solutions, trace out their consequences, etc. So far it has proved difficult to go much beyond this simplistic model.

Regarding power within organizations, Professor Gross is, I submit, unconvincing in arguing so categorically that such power is not centralized. "Large-scale organization itself," he maintains, "inevitably results in the dispersion of intra-organizational authority and power among many centers, rather than in their concentration at any one point" (p. 69). Michels' "Achilles Heel," he believes, is his failure to "penetrate sufficiently into the internal operations of organizations." It is of course a matter of judgment whether Michels "penetrated sufficiently" into such, but the fact remains that the burden of his analysis deals with the conditions of internal governance in political party organizations. Such conditions, he found, culminate in rule by the few. Marx and Mills are briefly mentioned as being similarly wrong, despite the fact that their formulations relate to social classes and the international arena rather than to the intra-organizational sphere. It is surely true, as Gross points out, that specialization has brought some dispersal of intra-organizational influence, yet decisions involving the major allocations of organizational resources remain in the hands of hierarchical elites. The specialist's role is often one of rationalizing the policy determinations of his line masters.

A similar mystique characterizes a section devoted to "exploding fallacies." Gross believes for example, that the manager is not the man on top; boards of directors, legislators, etc. will always be found above him. Yet professional managers in a variety of administrative settings, we are often told, are responsible to their boards in only a formal way. But isn't one's answer to this question vitally a matter of his level of analysis? If one generalizes at the level of intra-organizational relations, managers are often at the top. Item: a persistent theme in current criticism of the State Department is Dean Rusk's failure to exercise a decisive role in internal departmental management. There is apparently an unusual power vacuum at the top. Critics also maintain that the least used words at State are "I disagree." If power is really atomized within organizations, as Professor Gross maintains, why should this condition persist?

Gross also insists that authority and power in organizations do not flow from the top downward. One could equally maintain that the opposite is the rule, a condition for which several thousands years of hierarchy in organizational relationships provide impressive evidence. Indeed, organization *is* the differential allocation of power and authority. *Herrschaft* is the essence of bureaucratic relationships. As Max Weber put it, "all administration means domination" (*On Law in Economy and Society*, p. 334).

The great value of these two volumes is in providing a compendium of much of what is known today about administration. The major relevant areas of development, knowledge, fact and fiction in the social sciences are mentioned, interpreted briefly, and tied to some aspect of administration. We learn again about Gulick's POSDCORB, Weber's categories of authority, Taylor's contributions to work methods, Simon's "satisficing" man, Barnard's wise observations regarding authority and status, Maslow's need hierarchy, Mayo and the Western Electric research, Orwell's *1984*, Follett's "law of the situation," etc. A good bibliography of "Research Studies in Organizational Behavior" is appended.

Yet the author aimed to do more: to achieve an "action-theory marriage" between the "art and wisdom of seasoned administrators" and the major questions asked by scholars and, presumably, the findings of relevant research. His role as public servant, management consultant, teacher, and writer in the field provides all the gains that varied experience can bring to this aspiration. Nevertheless, one cannot say that he has brought a new synthesis to the field. There is no systematic working theory of administration running throughout these almost 1,000 pages, to which the mass of empirical observations and information is harnessed. There is no unifying central theme or nest of hypotheses which might give us a seminal new generalization. The function of theory is to order facts and to explain relationships between them, but valuable as the present work is as a synthesis of knowledge about the field, it lacks any selective apparatus which might have restructured its mass of data to set administration in a new context. We have instead a *taxonomy* of administrative, economic, and political variables which, in the end, do not and cannot tell us which administratively-relevant variables are most crucial and how they affect each other. Such a theoretical perspective would require the one-eyedness of a Veblen, a Weber, a Marx, or a Homans who, while using a similarly broad compass, ruthlessly ordered their data to the elucidation of a crucial hypothesis.

The broad substantive drift of the analysis is matched by its methodological eclecticism. "Every situation is unique . . ." (p. 10). But surely if this is true, systematic research with the hope of building generalization is futile. Yet, generalizations are said to be valuable, and the work of Merton is mentioned to support the search for them. Regarding tensions between behavioral and rationalist bases of knowledge, the author has "one foot planted in each camp" (p. 27). Administrative knowledge rests on many disciplines and stems from many sources. The novel holds special promise: "The literature of greatest significance for the understanding of administration . . . [is] found mainly in the work of the greatest dramatists and novelists, such as Shakespeare, Tolstoy, Dostoevski, and Mann" (pp. 209, 210). No supporting documentation is offered for this claim other than citations from two book reviews which argue similarly. In all sincerity one wishes that someone would give us an analysis in which the lessons of literature for administration are set down in some systematic form for the improvement of both practice and teaching of administration. On the other hand, if such wisdom is not transmittable, we might as well forget about it.

Despite these strictures, Professor Gross' work is of permanent value. He has set down much of the best thought and research about administration in clear and evocative language. The complexity of organizational life has been fully documented. A major check-list covering almost every aspect of administration is now available. Students and practitioners who digest this material will know a great deal about the managing of organizations.

Finally, the handsome production job done by the Free Press should be mentioned; the binding, type, and layout of these volumes are elegant indeed.

ROBERT PRESTHUS

York University

The American System. BY MORTON GRODZINS. Edited by Daniel J. Elazar. (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1966. Pp. xviii, 404.)

Normally a reviewer is expected to proceed direct to his chore. The circumstances here, however, are not normal, for this is a posthumous publication. It will help to know how the book came to be produced. As early as 1958, the editor informs us (p. viii), Morton Grodzins conceived this work and laid out its general plan. At his death in 1964 the volume was still unfinished. The task of completing it fell to Grodzins' sometime student and long-time friend, Daniel Elazar. On examining the author's materials, Elazar found a few chapters in virtually final form, a number of articles that either were designed for or lent themselves to inclusion in the book, several fragments in the form of lecture notes or abridged manuscripts, and, fortunately, a detailed outline of the book Grodzins had planned (p. ix). From these materials, Elazar fashioned *The American System.*

The author early set down the plan and purpose of his work in explicit terms. He conceived it as organized in three major segments. The first addresses the questions *what* and *how*? The central proposition explored in these early chapters, as stated by the author (p. 13), is this: "All levels of government in the United States significantly participate in all activities of government." A second major body of material shifts the emphasis from *what* to *why*? Why does the system operate the way it does (p. 14)? The chief explanation is found in the American party system. The third principal question asked is *with what result* (p. 15)? One acquainted with Grodzins' optimism is quite prepared to hear the answer: with results that, given the complexities of the American system and the society it serves, are surprisingly satisfactory.

The book is devoted to elaboration of the issues suggested by these major questions and to exploration of the many ancillary ideas to which the central concepts gave rise. To one reader, who confesses to general sympathy with the views expressed and argued, Grodzins' analysis is almost uniformly persuasive. One is familiar by this time with the author's "marble cake" conception of the federal system and with his doctrine of shared powers and responsibilities in the American practice of federalism, though it is useful to have his interpretations restated in their present context. That same reader found the book's highlights in Chapter 7, "Local Is as Local Does," which comes through as a perceptive comment on the notion of localness; in Chapter 10, which relates American parties to the federal system more expertly than I have seen done elsewhere; and in Chapter 12, where centralization and decentralization are examined and placed in proper perspective. Nowhere is the author's fresh, imaginative, inquiring mind more in evidence than in these sections.

Morton Grodzins, a professional to the core, would not wish his reviewer to gloss over what seem to be imperfections. The chapters written by Grodzins expressly for this book are excellent by anybody's standards; the parts that were prepared for other purposes and other audiences, however, seem uneven and not always clearly related to their present surroundings. The variety in origins, and more particularly the span of time covered by the writing, likewise cause portions of the book to suffer from lack of contemporaneity. The editor has attempted to bring the volume into focus through numerous notes and emendations, with what must be judged less than complete success. Finally, it must be recorded that the book suffers from some little repetition. Examples are found on pages 57, 88, and 375, where the same passage from a supreme court case is found with closely comparable introductory comments; and on pages 272 and 377–8, where the same quotation appears in virtually identical contexts. The editor speaks of the author's "concern for perfection," observing that "always he felt that the work needed 'just a bit more polishing'" (pp. viii and ix). Morton Grodzins would surely have written a tighter book had not its completion been (as the editor puts it) removed from his hands.

Let these critical comments not obscure the value of this book. As to form, Professor Elazar undertook an extraordinarily difficult task: that of weaving the materials, some of them fragmentary in character, some dated, left by his friend and teacher into a systematic whole. Given the circumstances, he has done this job well. As to substance, it is my opinion that Morton Grodzins' views of federalism were as sound and as closely reasoned as those of any scholar of his generation. The author and his editor have combined to produce a thoughtful and imaginative book on American federalism—the best in my judgment that has appeared in some years.

Roscoe C. Martin

Syracuse University

On the Uses of Military Power in the Nuclear Age. By Klaus Knorr. (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1966. Pp. x, 185. $5.00.)

Escalation and the Nuclear Option. By Bernard Brodie. (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1966. Pp. 151. $4.50.)

These two books have a number of similarities—besides price, size, and publisher. Both attempt to cope intellectually with the impact of nuclear weapons on military and political calculations, both have been written by experienced practitioners in the field, and both abound in carefully formulated insights.

Klaus Knorr's book is the broader of the two in subject matter. He attempts to assess the value of military power under current conditions when nuclear weapons seem to be dominating all considerations. Somewhat clumsily applying an expected utility framework (probabilities are mixed in with costs as "risks" rather than inserted as continually recurring factors affecting all calculations of gain and cost), Professor Knorr argues that both the use and the threat to use national military force has generally decreased in value. This has come about largely because the danger that nuclear weapons may become involved has caused the costs of such use to become "grossly disproportionate to any rational objects of foreign policy." However, the value of military force in the "essentially defensive purpose of deterrence"—a "use" of a different sort apparently—may have risen. This eventuality has had, in his view, numerous and far-reaching consequences in the conduct of diplomacy, in the relations between states of various sizes, and in the development of international norms of behavior. The book is often best (and most provocative) when changes not particularly linked to the development of nuclear weapons are being discussed: the diminished value Professor Knorr sees to have come to be associated with territorial conquest, the decline in the legitimacy of most kinds of war, the restraints posed by international community and world opinion.

Bernard Brodie's theme is much more specific. He is largely concerned with the recent emphasis placed by American policy makers on preparing NATO to fight a large scale conventional war in Europe. In a view which has been partly developed in previous essays and reviews, Professor Brodie argues that such preparation is principally directed at breathtakingly improbable eventualities—a Soviet conventional invasion of Western Europe or the process leading to "accidental" war—and in addition is debilitating to the alliance since it tends to weaken in European eyes American determination to defend the continent, and may, at the extreme, reduce the deterrent effect of American nuclear capability.

The argument sometimes—as in the discussion of accidental war—suffers from a certain fleshlessness imposed it seems by clearance complications and discontinuities resulting from Professor Brodie's move from RAND to UCLA. Nevertheless the case is impressively presented, again and again illustrating the author's ability to hack through argumentative shrubbery exposing to view the reality previously obscured. Ultimately, of course, a personal decision on the NATO debate rests on a series of subjective estimates of a number of imponderables: how much one is willing to pay in alliance strain for increased "flexibility" in Europe, for example, or how one feels the probabilities of major war alter when one prepares for minor war.

Curiously, while both books stress the differences nuclear weapons have made in the international environment, some of their observations can be used to reinforce the view that in many ways the world would not really be very much different had these weapons never been invented. Both authors are impressed by the restraint shown by the great powers in the nuclear era regarding major war, Professor Brodie convincingly arguing that Soviet behavior has been characterized by "extreme military caution." What needs to be added is that a similar characterization could be made for Soviet actions *before* World War II as well. Thus the caution antedates the technological change.

Furthermore, the books note that the major powers basically favor the status quo and are unable to visualize any gains worth the costs of a major war. In this, the nuclear world resembles more the world of 1815 than of 1918. A horrible war was fought, those who sought to upset the status quo were thoroughly and unambiguously defeated and, most importantly, were willing to accept reduced status. The powers most able to start another war were those most content with the world that emerged from the last one and thus entertained no intention of letting things so deteriorate that they must pay again the tremendous cost to maintain it. It is this memory of the horrors of the last war which today, as in the 19th century, probably forms the major deterrent for the victorious powers. The Russian slogan is inclined to be "we must never let it happen again" rather than "we must never experience something even worse."

This argument—together with the observation that the Soviets have always approached cautiously the subject of war with other great powers—helps to explain the restraint Professor Brodie finds in Soviet behavior in the early years of the "nuclear era" when a) the U. S. had very few bombs and b) Soviet Military thinking seemed to discount the importance of the new weapon.

(If there is a specific impact of nuclear weapons, then, it may not be because they increase *even more* the costs of a major war, but rather because they make it possible for the tremendous destruction to occur in a short period of time. This reduces presumably the rationality of hopes—like those held by the Japanese in 1941—that the war can be terminated before it escalates to an intolerable level.)

If these thoughts are valid, they suggest that part of the reason nuclear weapons are found by Professor Knorr to be in some sense "useless" is because they are irrelevant.

JOHN E. MUELLER
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Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations. BY RAYMOND ARON. (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1966. Pp. xi, 820. $10.00.)

The intellectual historian of a future age, looking back on the America of the first two decades following the Second World War, can not help but wonder what accounted for the sudden search, undertaken by hundreds of academics and supported by millions of foundation money, after precision, certainty, and predictability in a field such as foreign policy, whose very nature has always appeared to be hostile to such qualities. He might particularly marvel at the persistence of these efforts in the face of persistent and, so it may seem to him, preordained failure. And he might well conclude that three basic factors are responsible for this extraordinary phenomenon: the American folklore of politics which conceives of the political world not in terms of intractable conflicts but of technical problems susceptible to rational solution; the sudden confrontation of this folklore with a hostile international world which could no longer be evaded; the risk of total destruction implicit in the failure to bring this world under rational control. Thus the search for a pervasive theory of international relations might present itself in retrospect as the Utopian quest for a rational substitute for the traditional manipulation of political forces with its attendant ambiguities, uncertainties, and risks. The results of the search will then appear to the historian not as theoretical propositions discovering the truth about reality, but as ideological disguises, rationalizations, and justifications which give the appearance of precision, calculability, and predictability to a field of knowledge which is still as imprecise, incalculable, and unpredictable as it has always been.

This search for a pervasive theory of international relations, which performs a social function within the American context, has become fashionable abroad, where it performs no such function. The new book by Raymond Aron is a case in point. Aron presents his thoughts on the current problems of international politics within an ambitious conceptual and theoretical framework. He divides the book into four parts: theory, elaborating concepts and systems; sociology, analyzing determinants and constants; history, dealing with the global system in the thermonuclear age; and praxeology, discussing antimonies of diplomatic-strategic conduct. He has elucidated his theoretical propositions in an article, "What is a Theory of International Relations?" in the *Journal of International Affairs* (vol. XXI, no. 2, 1967).

Yet perusing Aron's substantive propositions without reference to the conceptual organization and theoretical framework, one realizes that these substantive propositions have only a very tenuous relation to the theoretical concepts and framework. They are the result of the author's practical judgment; they owe little to the theoretical concepts and framework. The substance of the book is very much in the tradition of *Century of Total War* and *On War*, works which did not use the conceptual and theoretical apparatus of the present book. In other words, this apparatus is essentially the frosting on the cake, a tribute to intellectual fashion rather than a contribution to the advancement of theoretical knowledge. Thus the book must be judged by its substance rather than by its theoretical appearance.

The substance of the book is indeed superb. It impresses by the comprehensiveness of the issues, theoretical and practical, it deals with, by the brilliance and elegance of both argumentation and presentation, and by the general soundness and frequent profundity of its judgments. This is political analysis of the very first order. It must be said, because it cannot always be said of books of this kind, that the book is a joy to read, and the literary and intellectual qualities of the French original have been faithfully preserved in the translation. What sets this book apart is the breadth and depth of its intellectual culture. Mr. Aron is not a technician or a specialist; he is a historian and a political analyst, and the book testifies to it.

Take as one example among many the chapter "On the Strategy of Deterrence." A whole literature, generally technical and frequently esoteric, has dealt with this problem, and many authors have concluded from the novelty of the nuclear instruments that the issue itself is novel and that traditional categories, such as the balance of power, are irrelevant to it. Mr. Aron starts out by stating that "Deterrence, a mode of relation between two persons or two collectivities, is as old as humanity." And he asks, "Does deterrence, regarded as the supreme concept of diplomatic-strategy in the thermonuclear age, belong to the traditonal theoretical and practical categories of international politics?" He answers that question in the positive: "The difficulty of integrating the realities of the thermonuclear age into classical theory exists only for those who fail to distinguish resources, military strength and power, and identify power politics with the politics of military action." The whole chapter is a marvel of lucidity and good sense.

However, strangely enough, the chapter and others as well leave the reader somehow dissatisfied. He has witnessed a brilliant and stimulating exposition of the problem and now he wants to know where we stand and where we go from here? He will be disappointed. For Mr. Aron has the disconcerting habit of raising fundamental questions without answering them. Thus Mr. Aron asks:

> In order to maintain a "plausible first strike" capacity, should not the United States maintain a certain counterforce capability and improve its civil defense? Lacking this plausible first-strike capacity, ought not the United States to acquire more weapons applicable in limited wars, either conventional weapons or tactical atomic weapons? Should the objective be the stabilization of mutual deterrence at the strategic level, even though this entails reinforcement with weapons adapted to limited warfare, or on the contrary, should it be the maintenance of an effective threat at a higher level?

If these questions are worth raising, they are also worth answering, but we are left without answers.

This deficiency is not accidental but has a philosophic root. Mr. Aron reveals his philosophy in his polemics against "political realism," as practiced by Reinhold Niebuhr, George Kennan, and myself. He finds the main weakness of that school in that it is a reaction to a preceding one; hence, according to him, it is an ideology rather than a theory. If the argument were valid it would indeed dispose of all political philosophy. For all political philosophy is "standortgebunden," that is, it arises out of a concrete political situation with which it tries to come intellectually to terms in a new and meaningful fashion. Because it does this, it is bound to be used by certain groups within the political situation as a rationalization and justification of a particular political position, that is, as ideology. Political philosophy is by its very nature "committed" and hence susceptible to ideological misuse. Mr. Aron may escape this liability, but he pays for this immunity with a lack of that ultimate relevance that sets political analysis apart from political philosophy.

HANS J. MORGENTHAU
The University of Chicago

Modernization: Protest and Change. BY S. N. EISENSTADT. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966. Pp. ix, 166. $4.95, cloth; $2.50, paper.)

This latest book by S. N. Eisenstadt will be considered a welcome addition to the expanding theoretical literature on national development. The central focus is on the relationship between the development of patterns of protest and modernization. Very roughly the author suggests the following: the process of national modernization begins with the weakening and disorganization of established patterns of behavior and the erosion of established commitments. It begins, in other words, with what Karl Deutsch has (perhaps somewhat misleadingly) dubbed social mobilization. Thus disorganization is part of modernization. A second central element of modernization, according to Eisenstadt, is the movement of protest and the orientation toward change which are made acute by the misery of those caught in the social disorganization, i.e., caught between the erosion of one set of commitments and the establishment of new patterns of feeling and behavior. Social mobilization, however, may lead not to growth but in the opposite direction. The direction that change will take in each specific case depends of course upon a large number of important variables, for example, the degree to which protests manage to be heard, the orientation of the elites toward change, the depth and scope of the protest, the realism of the demands, and the timing and sequence of modernization patterns.

The material in the book is organized in such a way as to offer a natural division into three parts. The first part contains an essay on the fundamental characteristics of modernization, an essay on the role that dislocation and assimilation play in the process of growth, and a third chapter on the role and function of institutions in absorbing change. A second part of this volume includes two long discussions which seek to apply the theory developed in part one to specific cases of modernization. The cases studied include nations that modernized in the first phase of modernization (i.e., Western European nations in Europe and overseas, and Japan) and nations that have or are still seeking to modernize in the second wave of modernization, i.e., most of the new nations. The third portion of the book contains a comparative analysis of the settings within which national decay and national growth occur.

In passing, I should like to express my disappointment that political modernization has not received more attention in this book, particularly in view of the fact that the author promised it special attention in the preface. On the other hand, I should like to register my approval of the fact that the author insists not only in specific places but throughout the book that modernity is at its core the ability to change and that no better measure of the modernity of a system exists than the capacity of that system to change.

Minor comments aside, what interested me most in this book was the discussion of split level modernization which in one way or another can be found throughout this book. By split level modernization Mr. Eisenstadt means modernization that first of all has been imposed from above, and often from the outside, as it was, for example, in all the colonial cases. Second, by split level modernization he means modernization where the motive power for change comes from different groups among the broader elites who desire different kinds of modernization. Third, the governing elite often has inconsistent desires itself in regard to modernization. While favoring strictly limited modernization for such purposes as increases in national power or riches, it does not want to see the major social and political consequences of sustained modernization. As a result, the elites of modernizing countries often attempt to limit and suppress the consequences of their policies. These attempts are not successful in the long run, but they tend to shape the pattern of modernization. At least in part they have made for a slower, more spasmodic expansion of the modern sector punctuated by major eruptions. A crucial result has been a weak and imperfect integration of much of the nation into the modern sector. It seems to me that this is a useful model for those interested in the present pattern of development in a major fraction of the nations of the world today.

The reader versed in the literature on national development will find little that is entirely new to him in this little volume. But problems are stated in a fresh and suggestive way, the author has a number of new ideas and useful insights, and he does have a different angle of vision. This reviewer has found very worthwhile what he has read of Professor Eisenstadt's work in the area of development. This book is no exception.

A. F. K. ORGANSKI
The University of Michigan

The Stages of Political Development. BY A. F. K. ORGANSKI. (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1965. Pp. xiii, 229.)

Political development is a new concept referring to the dynamic process of nation-building and modernization in which many states, both developed and emerging, are engaged. In this timely work Professor Organski launches an ambitious project of constructing a paradigm to study different patterns and experiences of political development in the modern era.

The central theme of the book is clearly and simply stated. Modern nations since the sixteenth century have undergone four distinctive stages of political development: stages of (1) the politics of primitive unification, (2) the politics of industrialization, (3) the politics of national welfare, and (4) the politics of abundance. Since all countries must proceed according to this pattern and cannot skip any stage, they must be at any given historical moment in one of these four stages. Today only the U.S. has entered the final stage of political development, and the U.S.S.R. is trying to fulfill its task in stage three and preparing for entry into stage four. The other west European countries plus Japan are comfortably situated in stage three, while the bulk of developing and underdeveloped countries are hovering in stage one or two.

As soon as the modern state graduates from stage one, during which the primary function of government is "the creation of national unity," it will soon find itself involved in the colossal battle of economic development and political modernization. The scope of governmental function, Professor Organski believes, is largely conditioned by the necessity to manage the economy. Thus, in stage two government tries to promote economic modernization by way of facilitating "a shift of political power from the hands of the traditional elite to the industrial managers," permitting "the accumulation of capital . . . by holding down mass consumption," and forcing "a large-scale migration of people from country to city" (pp. 10–11). In stages three and four the primary function of government is, respectively, "to protect the people from the hardships of industrial life" by means of the welfare state policy, and "to cushion the adjustments of social reorganization . . . to make an automated economy politically responsible" (pp. 12–14).

For setting up a conceptual framework for the study of political development, the author must be congratulated for his originality and creativeness. But the reason why he chose only a four-fold scheme (and not a three or five for example) has not been explained, nor has the basis for assigning countries to different developmental patterns been presented. Furthermore, his whole concept of political development is influenced by a similar pattern of economic progress developed by W.W. Rostow. As in his earlier work (*World Politics*, 1958), Professor Organski, according to this reviewer, gives undue emphasis to the economic and industrial factor in political development. There is a sense of monocausality and an air of economic determinism prevailing throughout the entire book. For example, the three interesting sub-systems of bourgeois, Stalinist, and fascist politics, which the author says are the three patterns of political development in stage two, are characterized not as attributes of a political system but as "three alternative ways of dealing with industrialization" (p. 57).

The author is imaginative in describing the state of affairs that prevails in different stages of political development. For example, he coins the term 'syncratic' politics in reference to political practices of compromise and bargaining in the process of industrializing society. Although one wishes that he had avoided some repetition, his argument seems basically sound and sustained by his deductive method of reasoning. It will be interesting to test Organski's proposition by means of an inductive method, with the help of empirical data and statistical facts, which the author regretfully does not at all employ in the present study.

For a long time students of international relations have felt the need to develop a framework which will establish a linkage between the study of comparative politics and that of international system. Judged from this standpoint Organski's work may be regarded as a pioneering work in trying to lay the bridge between two interrelated yet mutually exclusive subfields in political science.

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Politics, Economics, and the Public: Policy Outcomes in the American States. BY THOMAS R. DYE. (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1966. Pp. xv, 314. $5.00.)

Professor Dye's excellent book is another from the admirable series of empirical studies of American institutions, processes, and policies edited by Aaron Wildavsky. Its thesis is that characteristics of political systems (e.g., division of two-party control, interparty competition, voter participation, and legislative malapportionment) predict less of the variation among the 50 states' policies (e.g., education, welfare, highways, taxation and revenues, and regulation of public morality) than does economic development (i.e., urbanization, industrialization, wealth, and education). This study happily joins two streams of research—that emanating from the hypotheses developed and tested from experience among the 50 states by V. O. Key, Duane Lockard, Richard Dawson and me, John Fenton, David Derge, Herbert Jacob, and Richard Hofferbert with certain themes in recent transnational research by S. M. Lipset, Robert Alford, Lyle Shannon, and Phillips Cutright.

The intellectual history of this topic extends over a twenty year period. In *Southern Politics*, Key observed that states with bifactional rivalries in the dominant party were more favorable to the interests of the "have-nots" than states with multifactional rivalries. To explain the apparent association between intraparty competition and policy, he hypothesized that bifactional parties in one-party states resemble competitive parties in two-party states. Identifiable and reasonably permanent factions contend with each other for party (and state) control by promising have-nots larger welfare and other social programs. Because the winning factions in legislative and gubernatorial elections usually can be identified in the next election, it is to their interest to fulfill their campaign promises with the expectation of being rewarded with victory again. In contrast, the several factions in the fragmented parties are less permanent, coalitions are more often reforming, and hence the winners in one contest are difficult to identify, reward and punish in the next. Consequently, the demand to fulfill commitments to greater welfare efforts is less in multifactional than in bifactional systems.

Lockard extended Key's theorizing to predict that two-party states are more liberal than one-party states in tax and welfare programs. He compared 3 competitive and 3 one-party states in New England with results that coincided with predictions about 6 policies. Fenton similarly compared 6 states in the Middle West and reached similar conclusions. Dawson and I undertook to use more states (46) and more welfare and related policies (6 and 9) and to test the hypotheses at 3 different times (1941, 1950, 1961). Moreover, we introduced "competing hypotheses" to see whether partisanship is as strong a factor as economic capability. Our results differed from Lockard's and Fenton's: we concluded that economic capacity is more closely related to variations in welfare policies than are party competition and other political variables. Owing to different indexes among the several studies, however, one was entitled to suspend judgment between the claims of "economics" and of "politics."

Thanks to Dye's extensive efforts, I believe judgment may now be rendered with persuasiveness if not conclusiveness. ". . . correlation analysis reveals that these system characteristics have relatively little *independent* effect on policy outcome in the states. Economic development shapes both political systems and policy outcomes, and most of the association that occurs between system characteristics and policy outcomes can be attributed to the influence of economic development. Differences in the policy choices of states with different types of political systems turn out to be largely a product of differing socioeconomic levels rather than a direct product of political variables. Levels of urbanization, industrialization, income, and education appear to be more influential in shaping policy outcomes than political system characteristics" (p. 293). What lends credence to Dye's interpretation is the comprehensive basis on which it is founded: 50 states (not 46 or 6); 4 measures of economic development (not 2); 4 political system characteristics (not 2); 3 measures of each political system characteristic (not 1 or 2); 5 sets of policy outcomes (not 1) and several measures for each set so that more than 90 different outcomes are described and analyzed. The time base is a single period, the early 1960's.

If one were asking for more, he would like similar analysis for one or two earlier periods, but replication of this study after 1970 will serve just as well for establishing trends and identifying conditions underlying them. Dye's lucid and careful analyses deserve continuing updating and application to values other than the five most important ones he has selected. On its face, this brilliant effort appears to have been pretty much a one-man job. I hope that Dye or his students or others will keep us current with the factors and relationships so inclusively presented in this important book. And I also hope that universities and other research institutions will prize this stream of analysis highly enough to support replication in the future.

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The Puritan Ethic and Woman Suffrage. BY ALAN P. GRIMES. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967. Pp. xiii, 159. $4.75.)

It has become a cliché to ascribe the origin and adoption of woman suffrage in the United States to the egalitarianism of the western frontier and to affix to that movement the label of liberal reform. In a concise and well-written monograph based on the records of state legislatures and Congress and on voting behavior, combined with a reexamination of the ideas of the suffrage movement, the author demonstrates that women achieved the vote in the west, not as an outgrowth of equality but rather as a "by-product" of the struggles for power to continue or to impose Puritan strictures principally behind the frontier. Instead of being part of the liberal tradition, woman suffrage in the west reflected a strong conservatism, a way of preserving the status quo, and indeed of maintaining inequalities. The nineteenth amendment enacted in a thrust of patriotic fervor just after World War I, was in reality the same old Puritanism in disguise writ large.

To sustain his thesis, Grimes begins with the first enactment of full equality of suffrage which occurred in the territorial legislatures of Wyoming and Utah during the winter of 1869–70. In Wyoming, the earliest support for woman suffrage was almost fortuitous. But once made law, woman suffrage was championed by the community building interests (Republican) as a device to ensure more order and sobriety and a balance against the weight of gun-happy, lawless transients. In Utah, the Mormon hierarchy approved woman suffrage for two reasons: as a hedge against congressional prohibition of polygamy and as a new supply of voters to outvote the fortune-seeking "gentiles" averse to the Mormon's established, pious and sober society. Both Wyoming and Utah (notwithstanding an interim of federal disapproval) carried woman suffrage into their state constitutions in the 1890's.

In spite of the mounting campaigns of the suffragettes, the nineteenth century saw adoptions of woman suffrage in only two other states, Idaho and Colorado. The major parties gave tacit approval, but the author demonstrates that particularly in Colorado, responsibility goes to the Populists who needed the votes of like-minded women. In the many other contests where suffrage per se was the goal, the battles were lost over differing social views. The women and their supporters—Protestant churches, the WCTU, and third parties—could not overcome the opposition of major party leaders and their allies—wets, new immigrants, and male status-seekers.

The author clinches his argument in an analysis of the winning of the western states finally in 1910–14. In this period, woman suffrage, along with the direct primary and direct elections, became a political mechanism to save the social status of the Progressives by solidifying their political power. Suffragists and Progressives alike sought a resurgence of values symbolized by the word Puritanism in opposition to the values symbolized by the boss, the ignorant foreigner, and the saloon. Woman suffrage was closely paralleled to victories for direct legislation and prohibition in western states and became associated with racism and nativism, presaging the eighteenth amendment and national origins act of the 'twenties. In effect, it contributed "not so much to expand the base of political power as to change its locus" to the white Protestant Anglo-Saxons.

This is a significant book. The author succeeds in removing woman suffrage from the realm of historical conjecture. He does not overlook the fact that some political and social equalities eventuated from woman suffrage. He performs a service in discriminating the origins of feminism in the eastern United States with equalitarian ideas of abolition, for instance, from its western version related to Puritanism. What one seems to miss is a more satisfying definition of the philosophical characteristics of Puritanism which Grimes specifically does not equate with Calvinism, and why it should have proved to be the pervading influence in the history of the movement.

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Politics in West Africa. BY W. ARTHUR LEWIS. (Toronto & New York: Oxford University Press, 1965. Pp. 90. $3.50.)

This essay, originally delivered as the 1965 Whidden Lectures at McMaster University, should be required reading of every African student and most African politicians. Only such an eminent man of colour and distinguished scholar as W. Arthur Lewis could hope to reach the hearts and minds of those responsible for the future of democracy in Africa. His writing is direct and relatively unencumbered by abstract models or jargon. While the conceptual baggage is minimal, the theoretical and practical implications of his thesis make it profitable perusing for the African specialist and the political scientist alike. It should not be read for information, but rather for its creative interpretation, biting criticism, and salutary suggestions.

There are painful truths for all in this short work. Lewis writes, "As for our political scientists, they fall all over themselves to demonstrate that democracy is suitable only for Europeans and North Americans, and in the sacred names of 'charisma,' 'modernization' and 'national unity' call upon us to admire any demagogue who, aided by a loud voice and a bunch of hooligans, captures the state and supresses his rivals" (pp. 89–90). For the African leaders themselves harsh rebukes: "... most of the new politicians have no commitment to democracy; have never experienced democracy, and know neither its philosophy nor its history.... To survive, these politicians feel that they have to destroy the independence of the farmers, the unions, the churches, the universities, and all the other social institutions, by bringing them under party control. They make a desert of democracy, and then call it social peace" (pp. 32, 44). For the Africanophiles and phobes some interesting asides: "Experience suggests that the main effect of people persuading themselves that Africans are different from other people is that they abandon normal standards of decent human behaviour and end by thinking that anything is good enough for Africa, even though they would not for one moment consider it for Europe or North America.... The idea that ... something will emerge that is universally or uniquely African seems highly improbable—whether it be 'negritude' or the 'African personality' or some distinctly African political system" (pp. 35, 36). And, finally, for everyone: "The history of democracy is a history of the efforts of good men to hold bad men in check, and this is a process which West Africa will have just as much diffculty in learning as men in any other part of the world.... Besides, West Africa has its share of good men ..." (pp. 33, 34).

However, this is not a collection of aphorisms, but is a well thought out and studied attack on the single-party system and its philosophy. The first two-thirds of the work are devoted to a discussion and interpretation of the recent political history of twelve West African states. According to Lewis, the intense pluralism and economic underdevelopment of the area make it difficult for any class to become dominant or for strong central leaders to emerge naturally. He credits the systematic elimination of opposition and the growth of one-party systems to a simple love for power on the part of some rogues and to a deeper conviction of some sincere statesmen. The serious arguments are examined in detail.

First, as a development economist, Lewis finds that the one-party system is irrelevant to the economic problems in West Africa. It does not accelerate growth or manage the tensions arising from rapid social change. It may actually create instability by channelling diverse streams of hostility against the leaders. The presupposition that an opposition provides an entree for foreign influence is rejected since government parties may also sell out to alien powers.

The main problem as the author defines it, as do most other analysts, is the unification of the country, the building of the nation. The natural pluralistic cleavages should be reflected in a multi-party system which represents the different regions and interests of the country. A federal distribution of powers should be institutionalized to prevent the poorer areas from over-taxing the richer and the parties must learn to tolerate each other and to form coalitions to control the central government. The single-party system, Lewis asserts, has not served as a mechanism of conciliation and coalition in West Africa—although he admits it would be possible to do so in the style adopted by President Nyerere of Tanzania. But this exception is qualified by emphasizing the lack of strong traditional political systems and the even distribution of poverty throughout that East African nation.

The remaining third of the book consists of an examination of the plural society in West Africa with suggestions for the building of democracy through instruments of representation and coalition. Citing examples from the American Congressional committee system, coalition theories of Duverger and Riker, and predicting the destruction of civil rule in Nigeria, Lewis concludes by damning the Western style of 'zero-sum' politics bequeathed to Africa.

One can only hope that the publisher will bring out this simple, brilliant analysis in a cheap paper edition for wide distribution throughout Africa. Tragically, it may already be too late.

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Governments and the University. By William Mansfield Cooper, William G. Davis, Alphonse-Marie Parent, Thomas R. McConnell. (Toronto, Canada: Macmillan Company of Canada Limited and New York: St. Martin's Press, 1966. Pp. x, 92. $3.25.)

The Managerial Revolution in Higher Education. BY FRANCIS E. ROURKE & GLENN E. BROOKS. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1966. Pp. viii, 184. $8.00.)

Political scientists who are also members of the academic community will be especially interested in these two volumes that focus on governmental-university relations and the internal management of universities. *Governments and the University* consists of lectures by an English academic administrator, Vice Chancellor William Mansfield Cooper of the University of Manchester; a Canadian academic administrator, Vice-Rector Alphonse-Marie Parent of Laval University; a Canadian governmental official, William G. Davis, Minister of Education and Minister of University Affairs of the Province of Ontario; and an American professor, Thomas R. McConnell of the University of California, Berkeley. These lectures make it clear that the character of university-governmental relations does not substantially vary among the three nations, despite a variety of institutional relations, and also that how one views the issues is colored by his responsibilities. University authorities, although reconciled to the fact that governmental authorities will be increasingly involved in the affairs of universities, view the trend with some apprehension. Despite similarities, it is clear that English universities have more independence from governmental authorities than do their American counterparts. Sir William Cooper tells of his experience in appearing before the Public Accounts Committee of the House of Commons to explain why a radio-telescope built by his University with public funds had cost more than estimated. "No one," he said, "could meet the committee without respecting the probity, integrity, and sincerity of its members, and their determination to see that public monies were well spent, but few if any amongst them were capable of determining what 'well spent' meant in a scientific context. Little men moving in a world manifestly beyond their comprehension." Undoubtedly there are American college presidents who are equally presumptuous, but it is doubtful if any would dare to express so publicly his intellectual contempt for members of a congressional committee. In America, at least, university authorities do not ordinarily feel it wise to call stupid those who vote the funds on which universities depend.

The Honorable William G. David, speaking from the perspective of a representative of the public, argues persuasively that even if universities were independently wealthy and had no need to rely on public funds, the public would still have valid reasons to be concerned with university affairs. Now that higher education has become a secular religion and universities have become major dispensers of the world's values, it is unlikely that university administrators and faculties will be able to ignore public wishes with as much ease as in the past. There may be a lesson for university people in the political ineffectiveness of the medical men's cries that they alone are competent to determine how medical care shall be financed and organized and to whom it will be made available and on what terms.

For my own tastes, I prefer to avoid such imprecise labels as "the university" and "the government." These categories are more often than not camouflages to legitimize the claims of more specialized concerns. Sometimes the clash between "governmental accountability" and "university autonomy" amounts to a dispute as to whether the third assistant in the department of finance or the head of the department of theatre is to decide whether or not to spend $100,000 for lighting in a new theatre; sometimes it refers to a dispute between the staff of a state coordinating committee and the faculty and administrators of Up-and-Coming University over the right of UCU to inaugurate a new Ph.D. program. Sometimes "university autonomy" means that a weak department is trying to tell students and administrators that no one has any right to inquire into what they are doing or how they are doing it; sometimes it means that a university administrator is trying to defend an unpopular professor or football coach from outside pressures.

Francis E. Rourke and Glenn E. Brooks, in *The Managerial Revolution in Higher Education*, provide hard data and careful analysis of recent trends in university management. This useful and suggestive study is improperly titled and Rourke and Brooks, in places, appear to believe that there has been a revolution in the management of institutions of higher education even though their own evidence and their own conclusions point to the contrary view. True, within the last decade the larger universities have adopted such features as program budgeting, computer-based informational systems, bureaus of space analysis, institutes of institutional and instructional research, and have moved to adopt formulized rationales to support their requests for funds. Yet, as Rourke and Brooks point out, the central decisions of universities—who shall teach what to whom and how—today are decided by the same people and in the same fashion as they were prior to the "management revolution." Support dollar formulae, faculty-student FTE's, performance budgeting, computer print-outs, are now part of the environment of central administrators. The discourse between these administrators and coordinating committees and departments of finance now takes place in the language of the management sciences. But at the departmental level where the real business of the university takes place, life goes on as before. Nor is there any evidence that the "management revolution" has altered the internal power relations between administrators and faculty members. Any advantage that superior information about university affairs may give to administrators has certainly been more than offset by the faculty members' access to outside grants and to the capacity of professors to pick up and move any time they wish. And also as Rourke and Brooks point out, despite the claim that the growing size and complexity of universities would lead to the development of a new kind of "men of power" within the universities in the form of management experts, so far, prestige universities continue to recruit their key administrators from among the ranks of the academicians. University administration may require knowledge of management sciences, but the fastest way to get there remains scholarly publication.

Rourke and Brooks speculate that the faculty, in contrast to the member of the faculty, has lost its impact on university policies and they attribute this decline in influence to the retention of the town-meeting mode of faculty government. They predict that unless the faculty develops representative institutions, control over university policy will be left entirely in the hands of business-oriented administrators. Yet it is difficult to support such a prediction from the evidence they produce. Moreover, I would guess that there are other factors that will have more impact on the internal politics of our universities than the adoption of newer management techniques. For example, the events at Berkeley, and whether future incidents will align students and faculty against administrators, or faculty and administrators against students, seem to me much more significant than whether computers are more extensively utilized or performance budgeting adopted. Within the university as within any free society, politics determines administration, not vice versa.

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NOTES

POLITICAL THEORY, HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT, AND METHODOLOGY

Benjamin Constant et sa Doctrine. By Paul Bastid. (Paris: Armand Colin, 1966. Vol. I, pp. 5–485; Vol. II, Pp. 495–1112.)

It is very appropriate in this bicentennial year of the birth of Benjamin Constant that the most exhaustive study of his political theory since Edouard Laboulaye's effort a century ago should have appeared in 1966. It has been undertaken by Paul Bastid, who published in 1939 a thorough analysis of the political ideas of Abbé Sieyès, the thinker having probably the greatest influence on Constant next to Montesquieu.

Bastid's two volumes are solidly based not only on printed works but also on such recently available sources as the *Oeuvres manuscrites de 1810*, containing the original text of Constant's *Principes de Politique, applicables à tous les gouvernements représentatifs* and the *Fragments d'un ouvrage abandonné sur la possibilité d'une constitution républicaine dans un grand pays.* Although, as Pozzo Di Borgo observed in 1964 in his edition of Constant's *Ecrits et Discours Politiques*, these unpublished manuscripts have not added too much to what was already known about his political theory, we now realize from a study of these documents that brochures like his hastily written masterpiece of 1814—*De l'Esprit de Conquête de l'Usurpation dans leurs rapports avec la civilisation européenne*—had been conceived and drafted as early as 1800–1806.

Bastid marshals the evidence to prove, therefore, that Constant was right when he wrote in 1829 in the preface to his *Mélanges de Littérature et de Politique* that he had consistently "defended for forty years the same principle—liberty in everything, in religion, in philosophy, in literature, in industry, in politics." But the legend of Constant as the political opportunist, created by Sainte-Beuve in the Nineteenth Century and perpetuated by Henri Guillemin recently in ours, remains so powerful that Bastid's first volume is devoted to a political biography of Constant—*L'Homme et le Citoyen*—during the Directory, the Consulate, the first Restoration, the Hundred Days, and the second Restoration. He concludes from this detailed study of his life that Constant's "thought remains as firm as his conduct is equivocal and uncertain" but it is going too far to say that his "political action was always consistent with his doctrines."

Constant's ideas—philosophical, religious, literary, political, economic, and social—are the subject of Bastid's second volume—*L'Oeuvre et les Idées*. The most important part deals with "the central theme of the political writings: the individual and his liberty." Bastid correctly criticizes those, like Faguet, who viewed Constant's individualism and liberalism in egoistic terms. To use the words of Sartori in his *Democratic Theory*, for Constant "liberalism meant the rule of law and the constitutional state."

In Constant's system "there are two dogmas equally dangerous—the one, divine right and the other, unlimited popular sovereignty," which must be "circumscribed by justice and the rights of individuals." Liberty is defined as the "triumph of individuality as much over a government which seeks to rule by despotic methods as over the masses who wish to render the minority a slave to the majority." In Constant's view, Rousseau only had the "feeling for liberty but not the theory"; in fact, his "*Social Contract*, so often invoked in favor of liberty" was instead "the most vicious auxiliary of every kind of despotism."

Bastid gives an interesting but incomplete analysis of the contrast Constant drew between ancient and modern liberty; military and commercial societies; and traditional absolutism and postrevolutionary dictatorship. It would have been enhanced if he had referred to the distinction drawn by Sir Isaiah Berlin between negative and positive freedom in his *Two Concepts of Liberty* and to the difference between liberal and totalitarian democracy examined by J. L. Talmon in his *The Rise of Totalitarian Democracy*. As Plamenatz points out, "to us Constant often sounds as if he were speaking of Hitler's Germany" instead of Napoleonic France.

As Sismondi observed, Constant "in politics created many more doctrines than those called the Doctrinaires," like Royer-Collard and Guizot. But, as Bastid concludes, Constant's political views were closer to those of Tocqueville, long before whom Constant had said that the desire for symmetry and uniformity "had never met with more favor than in a revolution made in the name of the rights and liberties of men." In fact, in the history of French Liberalism Constant remains the most profound thinker between Montesquieu and Tocqueville and we are greatly in Bastid's debt for his monumental effort in restoring him to his rightful place.

These volumes suffer from the lack of footnotes and an index and there are some significant omissions in the bibliography, such as Lothar Gall, *Benjamin Constant. Sein Politische Ideenwelt und der Deutsche Vormärz* (1965) and Antonio Zanfarino, *La Liberta dei Moderni nel Constitutionalismo di Benjamin Constant* (1961).

Finally, the influence of Constant on American Transcendentalist circles, including Orestes Brownson and George Ripley, is not mentioned and it requires more attention than William Girard gave to it in 1916. But what is most needed now is a full treatment of Constant's political theory in English, which this reviewer hopes to provide with his forthcoming book on *Benjamin Constant's Constitutional Politics*.—GUY H. DODGE, *Brown University*.

The Sociological Tradition. BY ROBERT A. NISBET. (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1966. Pp. xii, 349. $7.95.)

Apparently the social sciences go through similar stages of development or change but at different times and at a varied pace. Not so long ago many sociologists took a dim view of political science, contending that it was not very scientific and overly concerned with the history of ideas and philosophy and formal institutions. Today, we find that behaviorism rules political science and that economists and mathematicians will soon overthrow the behaviorists while sociologists seem to be rediscovering predecessors, their basic concepts and the historical development of societies and ideas. Witness the new concern for cross-national and historical studies; and witness, too, the rapidly increasing number of critiques and commentaries on the history of sociological theory. Gouldner's *Enter Plato*, Martindale's *The Nature and Types of Sociological Theory*, a new edition of Sorokin's *Contemporary Sociological Theories*, Bendix's *Max Weber*, various studies of Simmel, Durkheim, Pareto and anthologies of several American greats including Cooley and G. H. Mead and a proliferation of textbooks on the history of social thought. Now we have another volume of appreciation of the greats and their ideas: Robert A. Nisbet's *The Sociological Tradition*.

Nisbet's study is not a textbook either in content or appearance; on the contrary it is both a beautifully written and appreciative examination of "the sociological tradition" and a very handsomely-produced book. Instead of writing a purely chronological essay or organizing his material into several complex and partially overlapping schools of thought or theories, Nisbet has chosen to follow the suggestion of Lovejoy and shape the sociological tradition in terms of certain basic "unit-ideas." These unit-ideas include "community," "authority," "status," "sacred," and "alienation." Such unit-ideas continue to form the basis of current sociology even if disguised in the garb of technical jargon and empirical research. The sociological tradition or the development of these unit-ideas took place primarily during the period of 1830–1890, or what Nisbet calls the "Golden Age of Sociology." The theorists mainly responsible were Weber, Durkheim, Simmel, Marx, Tocqueville, and to a lesser extent Le Play, Comte, Toennies, Taine, de Coulanges. Each of these unit-ideas is considered in a single chapter. My count shows that Weber, Simmel, and Durkheim are considered to have made major contributions in the development of all five unit-ideas, while Tocqueville and Marx had important things to say on four. Marx apparently had little to offer on the "sacred" while Tocqueville had little to contribute to the use of "community," the most important of the unit-ideas.

What seems particularly interesting about the sociological tradition and these men, according to Nisbet, is the fact that they were all reacting against the effects of the Industrial Revolution, Capitalism, and the democratic movements of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Nisbet claims that the basic unit-ideas as developed by Weber, Durkheim, and Simmel, especially, are deeply conservative in a philosophic sense. These men were liberals in everyday politics but their analytical schemes, questions, and concepts reflect a concern for order, community, tradition, and the sacred, all conservative preoccupations. These conservative responses were engendered by a conflict between two social orders—the feudal and democratic capitalism. Nisbet's examination of these men and their ideas is a most sympathetic one, as we might expect from the author of *Power and Community*. While he asserts that present day sociology is intimately connected to the early statements, he does not illustrate or demonstrate that connection in any detail; but readers of sociology could easily supply many of the links themselves.

One interesting omission in the analysis is the name of Pareto. He certainly responded to the conflicts between feudalism, capitalism and democracy but unlike his fellow theorists took the side of capitalism and the antidemocrats. Apparently Pareto was a political but not a philosophic conservative. And, obviously, Nisbet does not credit him with having made contributions to the unit-ideas.

Nisbet's quiet and elegant observations make good reading but he does leave us with one very disquieting conjecture at the end of the book: he wonders whether our inheritance of the great unit-ideas is about exhausted. Their relevance to a new world is questioned. We are no longer, at least in the West, confronted by a conflict between a social system characterized by communal-traditional ties and one in which secular norms prevail; instead the conflict is over and we live in a secular world. How can concepts and theories formulated to deal with that conflict cope with the victory of one side? Nisbet doubts that they can but ends with a cautious hope that perhaps some unrecognized genius is this very day building new tools that will one day enable us to see ourselves as the Webers, Durkheims, and de Tocquevilles did in theirs.—William Mitchell, *University of Oregon*.

Political Anthropology. Edited By Marc J. Swartz, Victor W. Turner, and Arthur Tuden. (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1966. Pp. viii, 309. $8.95.)

In reviewing the anthropological literature on "primitive" political systems, David Easton has indicated that "if there is any central problem with which the discipline [of anthropology] is confronted, we can find it in the failure to develop an adequate type of conceptualism of or broad theoretical orientation to politics." Although the number of political studies by anthropologists has increased enormously in the nine years since Easton's critique was written, a systematic theoretical framework for the anthropologica. study of politics is yet to appear. *Political Anthropology* seeks to move in this directionl

Anthropologists have turned with increasing sophistication "away from their earlier preoccupation with taxonomy, structure, and function of political systems to a growing concern with the study of political processes." It is the aim of *Political Anthropology* to explore these new winds of change and to offer a conceptual framework for the diachronic analysis of political systems. In the Introduction, the editors seek to construct out of dialogue "between anthropology and other disciplines concerned with comparative politics" a conceptual framework of general applicability, one which will allow "recognition of diversity of political systems." Although "system" is here used, Swartz, Turner, and Tuden reject the concept of the political system as characterized by an "absolute or rigid quality." As an organizing concept, they take the "political field," stating that for political anthropology, the unit of space is no longer the isolated "society," but rather has come to be the political "field." While *field* is not explicitly defined, it is suggested that what has been called a political field "is not necessarily a closely integrated system, but a spatial-temporal continuum with some systematic features" (p. 30). Elsewhere we are told that the study of politics "is the study of the *processes* involved in determining and implementing public goals and in the differential achievement and use of power by the members of the group concerned with those goals"—and that "the groups within which these processes occur are important because they constitute the 'field' of political activity." If this seems to involve some confusion, we are then informed that the important point is that "since politics is the study of certain kinds of processes, it is essential to center our attention on these processes rather than on the groups or fields within which they occur" (p. 8).

The basic concepts of the Swartz-Turner-Tuden framework are derived largely from the works of Easton and Parsons. These concepts—support, legitimacy, power, etc.—are then related to the diachronic analysis of the political field, the examination of "changes in the relationships between significant parts of the preliminary situation . . . over time, in a succession of phases." These phases tend to occur in a patterned sequence. The unit of political action, essentially oriented to conflict, is termed a "political phase development."

In the preliminary phase of the processual pattern, the groups and persons who will occupy leading roles in the anticipated struggle attempt to maximize support in mobilization of political capital, (a) to build up their ranks and resources and (b) to deplete those of their anticipated adversary. The second phase, the encounter or "showdown," is initiated when one of the major parties, feeling itself to have acquired decisive advantage, precipitates a crisis. This takes dichotomous form as the field as a whole becomes an arena in which the contenders are arrayed in two factions. Countervailing tendencies, however, act to inhibit the development of radical cleavage, and adjustment or redressive mechanisms are brought into play. These mechanisms for conflict resolution may range, as Turner states, from "personal and informal arbitration to formal and legal machinery, and, to resolve certain kinds of crisis, to the performance of public ritual." With the restoration of peace (leading either to rapprochement or final schism), "the nature and intensity of the relations between the parts, and the structure of the total field, will have changed."

The phase development model of conflict resolution is presented as a device for the study of changing political systems. It does not, however, meet Easton's demand for a broader orientation to politics, nor does it provide theoretical guidance as a conceptual framework for the various papers included in the volume, as evidenced by the lack of congruence between the papers and the model. Although apparently not the fault of the contributors, the concepts and processual model simply disappear in the pages beyond the introductory chapter. The papers themselves vary considerably in their potential interest to political scientists. Some seem barely to rise above ethnographic minutia. Others, however, notably the papers by Nicholas, Swartz, Cohen, Turner, and Fried, should be of particular theoretical interest to those in comparative politics, especially those concerned with the problems of conflict and conflict resolution.—ROBERT L. HARDGRAVE, JR., *University of Texas.*

Empirische Wahlforschung: Konzeptionen und Methoden im internationalen Vergleich. BY NILS DIEDERICH, (Köln und Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1965. Pp. xii, 240. DM 24.50.)

This eighth volume in the *Staat und Politik* series represents a summary of the basic approaches and methods of the major existing schools of elections behavior research, and a running comparison of their respective findings and methodologies. Each approach is examined according to the extent to which it grows out of and promotes understanding of the processes of democratic politics in mass society, which is posited by Diederich as the ultimate relevance of electoral behavior studies and which gives every school its basic orientation.

Following a chapter that generally describes elections analysis in terms of democratic research, each of the major contributing schools is given a separate chapter. French electoral studies and the particular contributions of André Siegfried and "electoral geography" are the subject of Chapter Two. This is followed by examination of the American contribution, especially in the behavioral study of politics, in the multiplying uses of statistical correlations, and through the methodological advances of the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan. British elections analysis, and specifically the work of David Butler and the Nuffield College group, are the subject of Chapter Four, followed by a short chapter dealing with the increasing significance in the use of electoral statistics in West Germany. There is a bibliography that includes major studies in several languages of electoral and other empirical phenomena.—EDWARD L. PINNEY, *Washington & Lee University.*

Basic Tactics. BY MAO TSE-TUNG. Translated and with an introduction by Stuart R. Schram. Foreword by Brigadier General Samuel B.

Griffith II, USMC (Ret.). (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966. Pp. viii, 149. $4.95.)

The production graphs are up again, and another cultural victory has been won on the guerrilla-literature-in-translation front. The heroes of the battle are Dr. Stuart R. Schram, author of the recent political biography, *Mao Tse-tung*, and, in lesser degree, General Samuel B. Griffith, one-time commander of the First Marine Raiders on Guadalcanal and himself a translator both of Mao Tse-tung and of the ancient Chinese military philosopher, Sun Tzu, who so influenced that Communist leader.

Chi-ch'u chan-shu (*Basic Tactics*), the text with which this pair concern themselves, is ascribed to Mao Tse-tung, a transcript of a series of lectures delivered in 1938 at the Anti-Japanese Military-Political University at Yenan. Although the Chinese Communists have not published the text, a copy exists in Taiwan, and Schram has worked from a hand-written replica of that booklet deposited in the Harvard-Yenching Library.

While its authorship alone would commend *Basic Tactics* (hitherto untranslated either in or out of Peking) to Western attention, the pamphlet is made doubly significant by the specificity of its discussion of guerrilla organization, operations, logistics, intelligence, and related topics. Too often Peking's translations on politico-military affairs, like much of the official *Selected Works* of Mao, are concerned with cosmic topics such as the pattern of world history, with the tactics of revolutionary warfare apparently being left to such as Che Guevara. That propaganda does not reflect reality may be seen in the existence of such little-known Chinese treatises as *Basic Tactics* (or similar documents translated fifteen years ago by Gene Z. Hanrahan in a mimeographed collection, *Chinese Communist Guerrilla Tactics*, which included writings by Chu Teh, Hsiao K'o, Kuo Hua-jo, and others). Nor are details such as those provided in *Basic Tactics* of interest only to professional military officers. By a feedback process, knowledge of operational techniques may throw light on larger strategic policy analogs. A few illustrations suffice:

Topics covered in *Basic Tactics* (BT)	Strategic generalization
1) Ruses and strategems (e.g., BT, 60, 84, 102)	Manipulation of the opponent's information set in a context of dyadic strategic interaction
2) Correspondence network of a guerrilla unit (BT, 111–114)	Information organization and flow
3) Tactical retrograde maneuvers (BT, 59–63)	Optimization strategy in a differential game evasion problem

In his introduction, Schram comments on the somewhat rudimentary nature of the presentation in *Basic Tactics*. Unfortunately, a similar charge might be made against the 50-page foreword and introduction to this important essay. The discussion is a potpourri of political history, speculation on the future of Chinese Communism, and—where the discussion touches military operations—routine observations on the fluid, ambiguous, complex character of guerrilla warfare. Both Schram and Griffith offer the now-customary general comparison of Maoist tactics with those of Sun Tzu and other traditional Chinese sources but fail to offer adequate identification and analysis. No attempt is made to relate Mao's *Basic Tactics* to such analogs as the Viet Minh manual on partisan warfare first published in French in the *Bulletin Militaire* of June-August 1955. No recognition is granted to the growing body of literature by D. B. Bobrow and others which attempts to place Chinese Communist strategy in a systematic behavioral context.

Western students of war, politics, and power can only be grateful to Schram for discovering and providing a first English translation of a Chinese Communist work which provides potentially deep insights into the Maoist strategic system. Interpretation, however, remains largely a task for the future.—SCOTT A. BOORMAN, *Harvard College*.

Armed Force as Power: The Theory of War Reconsidered. BY WENDELL J. COATS. (New York: Exposition Press, 1966. Pp. 432. $10.00.)

Armed Force as Power was originally a Georgetown University doctoral dissertation. Now it is a judicious, sage, erudite essay, which is a singular credit to the policy of detaching officers for academic studies, establishing its author as an important military historian and critic whom students of traditional political thought and international relations will also find stimulating. To show how force functions as a political instrument Coats isolates its manifestation in selected concepts, i.e., battle, war, peace, strategy, tactics, and justice. He does not prescribe; the use of force is a *prudential art* and a theorist only suggests principles and dilemmas. More clearly than most contemporary civilian "military intellectuals," the general grasps the relevant political and philosophical considerations.

Coats reconsiders Clausewitz's theory of war, a typical achievement of the nineteenth century—a century which distinguished a variety of social activities for systematic analysis. It should be emphasized, now that interdisciplinary studies have become too fashionable, that Clausewitz's labors were immensely rewarding. Knowing that every war had had a political element, he still saw that the military dimension could not be mastered until it was conceptually isolated. He did this, unfortunately, by distinguishing between the political object of war—"to impose our will upon the enemy"—and the purpose of military action—"to destroy or disarm him." Ultimately a paradox ensued; from the soldier's perspective the political aim could be "something not belonging to the war itself." In its "absolute" or "pure" form war was simply unlimited force. Thus, although there might be good political reason for the eighteenth century general to limit war, the practice did not make military sense. For good reason Liddell Hart condemned Clausewitz's influence as pernicious, encouraging more intense decisive wars which created obstacles for subsequent firm peace settlements. Victory is not always a substitute for a treaty both parties will accept.

Delbrueck, the West's greatest military historian, criticized Clausewitz's basic assumptions. War and politics were linked historically because they were logically inseparable. He distinguished two types of war, each requiring appropriate military and political actions: limited, when we deny the foe specific objects, and total, when we demand unconditional surrender. The practical significance of this formulation became obvious in 1917; Delbrueck insisted that particular offensives would fail unless the Allies understood the limited German war aims, but "everyone who counted" thought he was confounding war with politics.

Coats refashions the argument impressively, though one wishes he could have concentrated on primary sources. (When will someone translate Delbrueck?) He traces Clausewitz's confusion to a failure to separate war and battle, treating both as *acts* of force. Hobbes and Grotius knew better; war is a political condition, a state of anticipation over time where acts of force (battle) can be expected. This makes clear the context in which Clausewitz is relevant; in battle military considerations are paramount because there we do aim to destroy an enemy army. War, however, must be governed by politics.

Important strategic consequences flow from this view and Coats illustrates the governing considerations in historic campaigns. The successful soldier is sensitive to the reciprocal effect of military and political actions in shaping the will of each protagonist to fight harder or make peace. The concluding chapter assesses contemporary doctrines of limited war and indicates that we overemphasize technology and mistakenly equate politics with deterrence. Instead of making the enemy yield, deterrence sometimes induces him to make more military effort than he originally intended. Vietnam?

A valuable feature of this book is its discussion of the idea of "just war"—virtually forgotten since the French Revolution. It is no accident that Coats makes political contact with theologians here. He may be unaware of it, but the Christians first talked about limited war because in contrast to the Greeks and Romans they knew *they* could undertake unjust wars.

One can find shortcomings but do they matter? His discussion of primitive war suffers seriously because he overlooks Turney-High, the most prominent authority. He obviously overvalues technological considerations despite his concern for politics. Finally, the Clausewitz discussion would have been more useful if he had consulted Liddell Hart and had recognized that the concept of "absolute war" partly trapped Clausewitz because he used a Weberian ideal construct for an intellectual problem where other conceptual forms were more appropriate—a lesson, alas, many contemporary social scientists still have to learn.—DAVID C. RAPOPORT, *University of California at Los Angeles.*

Nomos IX: Equality. EDITED BY J. ROLAND PENNOCK AND JOHN W. CHAPMAN. (New York: Atherton Press, 1967. Pp. xii, 313. $6.50.)

The word equality is often used in the arenas of political rhetoric and political ideology, but too seldom has it been placed in the glaring light of careful scholarly analysis. This volume, the ninth yearbook of the American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy, attempts to do just that through eighteen essays. The essays are grouped into three sections, "Concepts of Equality," which primarily deals with definitional problems, "Egalitarian Implications and Consequences of Belief Systems," which should appeal to the historian of political thought, and "Political and Legal Equality," which is sort of a catchall.

All the authors in the first section agree that the term equality needs very careful definition. Two of them, Hugo Adam Bedau and Richard E. Flathman, are concerned with such definition separate from normative content. The other authors in this section, notably Stanley I. Benn, John Plamenatz, and George E. G. Catlin, attempt to develop more explicitly normative definitions. Bedau's definition, "*Persons have* (*received*) *an equal distribution, equal rights, etc., if and only if they have* (*received*) *the same distribution, treatment, rights, etc,*" (p. 7., emphasis in the original), can be contrasted with Benn's attempt to establish a principle of equal consideration of interests as a patently normative proposition. All the authors with the possible exception of Flathman would, I think, accept Bedau's definition. But they are bothered by the problem of applying the abstract principles to real situations; and all, but Benn in particular, view the problem of equality as a segment of the problem of social justice. This section may disappoint some political philosophers who would like to see more space devoted to precise definitional considerations and a more careful delineation of normative and empirical propositions.

The second section considers the idea of equality in Christianity, the Middle Ages, Judaism, Hinduism, and Existentialism. This mixed bag is the most uneven part of the book, varying from Paul E. Sigmund's excellent essay on Medieval Christian thought, through Sanford A. Lakoff's rather mediocre history of Christian equality, to Herbert Spiegelberg's weak discussion of existentialism. The major weakness in Lakoff's essay is the all too common one of attempting too much in too little space. What results is a cursory survey of selected aspects of the Christian notion of equality and its effect on Western political thought. Although he generally selects well, I miss a consideration of *Philemon* or the *Apocrypha;* on balance, the essay could serve well as an introduction to the problem of equality in Christian thought. Spiegelberg's essay, though, raises a host of problems, only a few of which can be discussed here. First, he must be praised for recognizing the relevance of existentialism to the problem of equality. But, even though he sets himself the limited task of collecting "some of the relevant evidence and discussing its significance critically and reconstructively," he fails to achieve his own goals. He pulls together a few passages from Sartre, de Beauvoir and Merleau-Ponty which indicate some concern with equality. Unfortunately, he fails to deal, for example, with Sartre's political works such as *Sartre on Cuba* (1961), which indicate a passionate concern for equality. The problem for the analyst is to attempt to deduce from the wide variety of Sartre's writings a theory of equality. Spiegelberg makes no attempt even to collect a minimum of the data from Sartre, let alone the other existentialists. One of the reasons may be found in his implication that he is not at home with literary analysis, a skill that is essential to any student of existentialism. In Spiegelberg's "reconstructive" discussion of existentialist equality, one finds a few interesting hints at a normative theory, but existentialism as a philosophy seems to have disappeared altogether.

The third section contains a wide variety of short articles dealing with equality in international law, the United Nations, comparative law, criminal law, and politics. Although all the articles are sound scholarly works, only one seems to merit special attention. In "A Brief Discourse on the Origin of Political Equality," Carl J. Friedrich imaginatively explores the problem of the degree of political inequality necessary in any political system. In doing so, he saves the volume from committing the grievous error of completely ignoring the recent literature on elites. But Friedrich's main point is to attempt to discover the origin of the drive for equality. He claims to have found it in ". . . . situations and constellations in which *disbelief* prevails concerning any manifest innate qualities justifying political inequality" (p. 220, emphasis in the original). As an hypothesis this conclusion merits further consideration for the light it might shed on the development of ideological movements and belief systems, but as yet Friedrich has failed to explore it fully enough to be convincing.

Although generally this is a strong collection, there are certain flaws that must be mentioned. First, there is no representative of an anti-equalitarian viewpoint. Second, the literature on elites is only mentioned once. Third, although belief systems are discussed at length there is no systematic consideration of equality in contemporary belief systems. The literature on equality has been surprisingly weak until recent years. This volume will not only add significantly to the growing list of titles, but it will do much to begin the task of clarifying the conceptual muddle that surrounds so many terms in political philosophy.—LYMAN TOWER SARGENT, *University of Missouri at St. Louis.*

The Theory of Democratic Elitism: A Critique. BY PETER BACHRACH. (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1967. Pp. xiv, 109.)

In the course of this essay Peter Bachrach remarks (p. 62) that, "The capacity to think philosophically lends itself to discerning fine distinctions in substance and approach, and thus opens an inexhaustible source for disagreement and argument." Bachrach demonstrates his capacity to think philosophically by discerning a distinction between alternative definitions of democracy, on the one hand, as a political method for maximizing popular access to power, popular sovereignty and political equality, and on the other as an ideal of widespread participation in political decisions as the central means for maximizing human dignity by "enhancing the self-esteem and development of the individual" (p. 94). Bachrach classifies a very large number of contemporary political theorists—Schumpeter, Truman, Mills, Berle, Lasswell, Kornhauser, Sartori, Plamenatz, and Dahl—as elitist because they unidealistically consider only the first of these dimensions of democracy and not the second. These theorists reveal their unconcern with popular participation to Bachrach in a number of ways, in particular by their attention (which Bachrach grants is empirically justified) to the fact that most people in the western democracies are not highly politicized and by their inattention to the possibilities (if any) for increased popular participation in the decison-making of large-scale entities in the private sector.

Bachrach scores a number of shrewd points, more or less at random, against theories that rely heavily upon political elites for maintenance of basic conditions for democracy, instancing the indifferent performance of many elite groups during the heyday of Joseph McCarthy. But on the whole, empirical considerations are introduced ad hoc, and clothe Bachrach's argument rather thinly.

The basic method of the book is the introduction of a few short quotations from a theorist tending to show his preoccupation with the role of elites in democracy. Bachrach then interposes observations about internal contradictions or other purported inadequacies in the theorist's approach, and then passes on to the next theorist. The final chapter is an attempt to lay out systematically Bachrach's own "two dimensional" position, which is supposed to escape all the difficulties found in the works of our shattered idols.

But it does not seem to me that Bachrach makes a particularly strong case for his position. To strengthen his case, he would have to adopt the very means-ends perspective he rejects, and demonstrate the empirical connections between the democratic goals he posits and various political methods for achieving them. The outcome might still be a considerable dissatisfaction with the extent of political participation in western democracies, but I doubt that he would be quite so hard on theorists who find it useful to distinguish and describe political systems on some grounds other than those embodied in his preferred (but largely unproven) method for enhancing the self-esteem of the individual.—NELSON W. POLSBY, *University of California, Berkeley.*

Ironies of History, Essays on Contemporary Communism. BY ISAAC DEUTSCHER. (London & New York: Oxford University Press, 1966. Pp. 278. $5.75.)

Few can remain objective about Isaac Deutscher as a political essayist. Within the confines of a single page he can infuriate a reader, yet leave him full of insights; he can hold him spellbound with his prose, yet jar him into violent disagreement with his conclusions. Deutscher is at once a stimulant and an irritant. Though an exile of communism, he is a devout Marxist. A convinced believer in the Marxian timetable of history, he is a pessimist of the present, but an optimist of the near future. In sympathy with the fundamental goals of the Russian Revolution, he is repelled by Stalinism, yet confident that sooner than later the working class will wrest control from the party leadership and will assert its political and economic rights. Residing in England he is appreciative of the political freedom found in the Western world, yet a harsh critic of capitalism and Western cold war politics. This basic outlook governs all his writing and provides a unity to the third collection of his essays (written over a ten year period) to appear in book form.

Deutscher's comments on contemporary political events, which make up half of the book's contents, have suffered most with the passage of time. When they originally appeared, they were of interest mainly because Deutscher's viewpoint is so different from that of most Sovietologists. In re-reading them, however, we see the historian turned journalist dealing with events as they happened (Khrushchev's "secret speech," de-Stalinization, the turmoil raging within the communist bloc, Khrushchev's over-throw), but lacking the perspective of time and the availability of facts to give depth and accuracy to the analysis. For example, few analysts today believe with Deutscher that Khrushchev's secret speech, a detailed but circumspectively worded account of Stalin's crimes, delivered at the 20th Party Congress in 1956 was an impromptu performance (p. 4). And few will accept Deutscher's statement written in 1965 that "major decisions of policy are taken not by Khrushchev alone and not even by the eleven members of the Presidium but by the Central Committee which consisted of 125 members (or 225 if alternate members are included)," (p. 39) which was simply not true of the Central Committee.

Deutscher's Marxist orientation consistently drives him to espouse the cause of the working class, even when it is absent. In wrestling with the old but consistently troublesome question of how a revolution could be considered socialist when the working class was not involved, Deutscher, in his long essay, "Maoism—Its Origins and Outlook," attacks even an ideologically friendly writer as the late C. Wright Mills for concluding that it is not the working class but the revolutionary intelligentsia who is the real historic agency of socialism. Not so, says Deutscher, splitting a fine hair, the revolutionary intelligentsia acts merely as a "substitute." "Even in such nations [as China] the working class remains the chief 'agency' of socialism in the sense that fully fledged socialism cannot be attained without industrialization, without the growth of the working class and its self-assertion against any post-revolutionary bureaucracy, in a word, without the real, social and political ascendancy of the 'proletariat' in post-capitalist society" (p.111). The fact that this "self-assertion" has been consistently delayed in Soviet Russia is a recurring complaint that appears in most of his essays. His belief that it will take place soon never falters.

Of greater interest than his political commentaries are Deutscher's biographical, historical, and literary essays, to which the second half of the book is devoted. He rehabilitates Marshal Konstanty Rokossovsky, at that time a member of the Polish Politburo and Defense Minister, who ironically was ousted as a Stalinist during the Polish October uprising of 1956, as an *anti-Stalinist* of much longer standing than Gomulka. A protege of the purged Tukhachevsky, Rokossovsky spent four years in forced labor camps until Stalin's need for experienced tacticians brought about his release in the summer of 1941. In a review article of George Kennan's *Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin*, Deutscher briefly, but pithily, analyzes the impact of Allied intervention during the civil war—a controversial question to this day. "Unpremeditated, unconcerted, and relatively feeble though it was, its impact on a starving, exhausted and disorganized Russia was devastating" (p. 230). His analysis, incidentally, is contrary to Kennan's. In his literary criticism Deutscher is highly negative towards Pasternak's *Doctor Zhivago* because he rejects the revolution, stern with Ehrenburg, "not so much that he lacked the character to resist Stalinism, but that he submitted to it so completely and even zealously that he thereby corrupted his own work and nearly destroyed himself as a novelist and poet," (p. 271) and highly encouraged by Yevtushenko's *Precocious Autobiography* for its frankness and courage.

"A curious tangle of right and wrong ideas," Deutscher's verdict of Kennan's work applies to his own as well. His essays are immensely readable and charged with ideas, but always colored by his orientation which is simultaneously his advantage and disadvantage.—HENRY W. MORTON, *Queens College of the City University of N.Y.*

Science and the University. ED. BY BOYD R. KEENAN. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966. Pp. x, 207. $5.95.)

The Politics of Research. BY RICHARD J. BARBER. (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1966. Pp. vi, 167. $4.50.)

These volumes are not unrepresentative of the rivulet of publications on government policies toward science and technology issuing from academic, commercial, and author-subsidized presses. One is a collection of papers in which genuine light alternates with that glossy optimism or generic dullness that are the protective coloration of so many administrators; while the other falls in the unmuffled tradition of populist dissent, unfortunately it is not less dull for being less sound.

If its opinions were presented with verve and illustrated with meaningful anecdote and evidence, *The Politics of Research* would fit comfortably on a shelf beside Ralph Lapp, Robert Jungk, Seymour Melman, H.L. Nieburg and other sometimes useful partisans more concerned to convict the leaders of our scientific affairs than to give them a fair trial. As it stands, it belongs to the larger and less useful company of books fabricated by the repetition and misuse of a few thin facts. Thus, the breathless revelation that the Federal government either spent $15 billion on research and development in 1965 or more than $15 billion in 1966 is imparted at least 16 times in 118 pages of text and four times in ten pages of tables. Indeed, the National Science Foundation's milk and water statistics on R&D expenditures provide Barber's main factual nourishment. But miscalculations, misstatements, or misconstructions of these statistics appear on pp. 17, 23, 24, 38, 41, 43, and 73, and other patent errors or misstatements on pp. 48, 57, 58, 66, 78, and 115.

All told, it is difficult to regard *The Politics of Research* as a triumph of either scholarship or argument. And this is regrettable, because though Barber's argument may prove to be wrong at key points, this can only be established after a better case has been made for it.

He believes that government R&D expenditures have been concentrated in too few companies, universities, and regions; not enough have been spent on basic research, the social sciences, or civilian technology; and—a refrain familiar on Capitol Hill, where Barber became interested in the subject—R&D planning and coordination are sadly deficient. Small companies have been diddled out of their share of R&D funds; the government has unwisely given to private interests patents and copyrights on ideas and materials developed with public funds, and has relied excessively on private contractors instead of strengthening its own R&D capacity. R&D allocations should better represent "a set of priorities that embodies our social preferences." To promote such priorities, the Bureau of the Budget should annually prepare a comprehensive analysis of proposed R&D expenditures by function; each functional budget should be reviewed on a government-wide basis by at least one Congressional committee; and a Department of Science should be created to absorb and enlarge the functions of the National Science Foundation and related agencies. R&D contracting should be removed from the three armed services and given to a new agency reporting to the Secretary of Defense; massive R&D contracts should be broken up and awarded to many more contractors; and an Inventions Development Agency should be formed to stimulate new civilian technology based upon government-owned patents.

Most of these proposals are already in general circulation and it is unlikely that all are equally sensible or misguided. What we need is not to assert how wise (or foolish) they may be, but to subject them to fair and hard-headed evaluation. In short, Barber should start where he now finishes.

The papers edited by Boyd Keenan (who has just moved to the University of Illinois' Chicago campus) in *Science and the University* were originally given in April 1965 at a symposium marking the initiation of Purdue's new program in science and public policy. The principal luminaries of current government policy toward university science, Donald Hornig, Leland Haworth, Frederick Seitz, and Harvey Brooks, are represented, as are three of their most important public critics, Alvin Weinberg, Philip Abelson, and Edward Teller; Indiana Congressmen Roush and Brademas and delegates from two of the region's largest laboratories, William Harris of Battelle and Albert Crewe of Argonne, speak for the Midwest; encouragement is brought from the borderlands by Beardsley Graham of Spindletop and James Triolo of the Graduate Research Center of the Southwest; and the whole is introduced and concluded by that impeccable international academic intelligencer Eric Ashby.

An instrument that affords transitory men transitory truths does not suffice for certain speakers who inhabit more vainglorious realms. According to Crewe, science has "transformed" almost all fields of human endeavor; "if we do not have the knowledge to solve a particular problem, then soon . . . we *shall* possess that knowledge . . ." (Vietnam, death, and taxes depart!) Of course, science is the new savior not only of man but of the economy. Triolo echoes Lloyd Berkner's refrain that "the Ph.D." (in Sanskrit, too?) is "the key" to economic growth and employment "so that we may count at least 100 persons of high skills unemployed in the future for each Ph.D. we fail to educate today." The reed of truth in Seitz's assertion that "the strength of our society is now very largely based on the practical fruits of fundamental science" can hardly withstand the weight of gold he would put on it; and Hornig makes a similar careful error.

As Keenan observes, the university came under sharp attack during the symposium for neglecting its unique function of undergraduate education for a competitive role in research that other establishments were well qualified to conduct. Graham bluntly advises universities "to get back into the business of education and leave ingenuity and cleverness to other organizations"; Seitz acknowledges that government research funds have "had the effect in many universities of removing many of the most distinguished faculty members farther away from the undergraduate student"; Haworth suggests that future federal assistance "will have to be less research-oriented and more concerned with the combined teaching-research function of the college and university."

But the most trenchant criticism of scientific research and education at our great universities comes from Teller and Weinberg. In his committee's 1945 contribution to *Science—The Endless Frontier*, Isaiah Bowman wrote that "applied research invariably drives out pure." Teller argues that this situation has now "been turned upside down . . . the present fashion at all our universities . . . 'puts in the doghouse' anyone who is interested in applications and focuses completely on the pursuit of pure science." As a consequence, the best science graduates forsake application and the nation has failed to reap sufficient industrial and practical returns from its large R&D expenditures.

In his paper "But Is the Teacher Also a Citizen?" which is worth the price of this volume, Weinberg observes that the contemporary distinction between pure and applied science is more pronounced than it was to Newton, Pasteur, Maxwell, Kelvin, Poincaré or von Neumann. Rejecting the problems of society for those of the intellect, university science is driven continually "toward greater purity and remoteness." Unfortunately, the world is not pure and society requires not interminable research but action even on intractable problems. Where research scientists who have initiated major curricula reforms would breed a generation of specialists in their own image, society requires students who are broadly and flexibly trained. "Our society is not a university. . . . If the university takes undergraduate education seriously, and does not look upon it simply as attenuated professional education, the university community will be forced to broaden its outlook. The university professor would . . . surely be obliged to relate his narrow professional interest to the rest of the world. And in the process, as he becomes part of the interdisciplinary real world, the teacher ought once more to become a citizen." —HAROLD ORLANS, *The Brookings Institution.*

Guide to Reference Materials in Political Science. A Selective Bibliography, Vol. I. BY LUBOMYR R. WYNAR. (Denver, Col.: Bibliographic Institute, 1966. Pp. 318.)

Dr. Wynar's bibliographical work is intended for practical guidance in the rapidly growing literature of political science and related disciplines. The first volume includes four major subdivisions:

I. Social Science General Reference Sources
II. Political Science General Reference Sources
III. Political Theory
IV Ideology.

The volume on hand reflects a broad scope and variety of literature, ranging from bibliographical works, encyclopedias, and monographs to standard works of political science and related disciplines. The author has listed side by side American, British, German, and French publications, and occasionally also Italian, Soviet, Latin American, and Indian publications. The annotations accompanying the individual listings are very helpful, especially as regards foreign publications.

About one-third of this volume is dedicated to general reference sources, which are conscientiously subdivided in disciplines related to political science. This approach betrays the author's broadmindedness, and it underlines the current trend of interdisciplinary studies. On the other hand, it might raise the question whether such extensive listings in the neighboring disciplines are really necessary in a guide that is a selective bibliography. A political scientist might possibly dispense with such entries as "Child Development Abstracts and Bibliography," or "Business Periodicals Index," but instead, he might prefer, for example, a more complete bibliography on Pan-Slavism, Pan-Germanism, and other "Pan-" movements under the categories "Political Theory" and "Ideology." Also, one may wonder whether the topics "Babylonia," "China," "Egypt," and "India" should be grouped together with the topic "American Political Theory" under the heading "Special Subjects," within the section of "Political Theory."

On the whole, however, this *Guide* represents a truly pioneering work of its kind, and it provides a handy world-wide source of reference materials to political science and related disciplines.—IHOR KAMENETSKY, *Central Michigan University.*

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM

Metropolitan Transportation Politics and the New York Region. BY JAMESON W. DOIG. (New York: Columbia Univerity Press, 1966. Pp. vi, 327. $7.50.)

The Metropolitan Transportation Problem, rev. ed. BY WILFRED OWEN. (Washington, D.C.; The Brookings Institution, 1966. Pp. xiii, 266. $6.00.)

The reissue of Wilfred Owen's book *The Metropolitan Transportation Problem* is a welcome step. This is unquestionably the classic in the field, and its first edition (1956) has had a profound influence on the approaches that are being taken in Washington and at the state and local levels to this important urban problem. His basic thesis, analysis, and conclusions remain essentially unchanged; they are still sound and relevant. Regrettably, despite progress, the accomplishment of his recommendations seems still to be far off. The problem is all the more urgent in 1967 than in 1956.

Owen's basic thesis is that we must attack the problem of transportation more from the demand side, an aspect that has been neglected. Only if demand is controlled and channeled through strong metropolitan land-use planning, can a viable transportation system be economically developed. To regard it simply as a supply problem, in which transportation facilities are provided to meet whatever demands arise out of our unplanned metropolitan areas, is a hopeless objective. In addition, he points out that urban transportation must be organized as a "system," i.e., it must be fully coordinated, preferably in a single institution, and that it must be metropolitan in scope.

The author feels that municipal governments must be relieved of the burdens of subsidizing transportation, and that if the above objectives can be met, it is feasible to make it self-supporting. On the question of rail transit vs. highways, he states first that this is an unrealistic dichotomy, but makes his position clear that in most metropolitan areas there is likely to be little feasible role for rail transit because of its inherent inflexibility. For those cities that already have a rail transit system, it should be retained and improved, since it is cheaper to do this than to replace it with a roads-oriented approach. However; he adds that all metropolitan areas must develop a full expressway system to serve adequately the needs of our auto-oriented economy.

Ten years after its first appearance, Owens' book remains an important contribution. While his conclusions remain sound, and indeed have become widely accepted in principle, the work is subject to two criticisms. First, in both editions, the work relies somewhat too heavily on New York examples, which are atypical of the American transportation scene. The other problem is that this new edition is not really that. Readers seeking an up-to-date discussion of transportation developments in the nation will be disappointed because there has not been a full-scale research effort to draw on the vast new developments since 1956. Most of the illustrations are pre-1956, which means that they largely ignore the important structural and programmatic changes that have occurred in transit at the national, state, and local levels since that time.

Metropolitan Transportation Politics and the New York Region by Jameson W. Doig focuses on the politics of transportation at the local, regional, and state levels. It is an in-depth study of the period 1951-58, with particular attention being given to the efforts of the Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission to develop an integrated program for the New York-New Jersey area. It is followed by a brief summation of the events through 1965.

The book is thus primarily a case study of functional decision-making in what is undoubtedly the most complex and fragmented metropolitan area in the world.

The author finds that political controversy in the transportation field tends to revolve around two coalitions, those of "roads" and "rails," including both public and private groups. The roads coalition is dominant at the beginning of the period studied, and while that period is marked by efforts to consolidate the loose-knit rail coalition and to increase its relative power, the roads coalition remains the most potent force in 1965 as the study ends.

During the period 1951–58, efforts are made by regional actors to find regional and comprehensive solutions, i.e., to accomplish some first steps toward the kinds of solutions Wilfred Owen prescribes. Following their complete failure the second period is one in which the states step in and achieve some positive but fragmented solutions to the immediate problems, and in which most efforts at "regional" and "comprehensive" solutions are abandoned. The author attributes this failure to powerful opposition from the roads coalition, to the fragmentation of government, and to the unwillingness or inability of the only "chief executives" of the metropolitan area—the state governors—to face the issue squarely and take the necessary steps to right the balance. Thus, the study serves as an interesting case example of the problems Owen points up and of the difficulties of achieving the kinds of solutions he proposes.

The story is a discouraging one. New York, more than any other city in America, is dependent upon rail transport, but during the period studied by Professor Doig, the competing political forces in the region succeeded in preventing any truly comprehensive approaches. The political structure seemed almost to be rigged to prevent such solutions.

Since its publication, however, New York State has taken significant legislative action to rationalize the decision-making process, at least in New York City, and to reduce the degree of competition between rails and roads. In taking these steps, New York has begun to follow the lead taken in recent years in such metropolitan areas as Philadelphia, Boston, San Francisco, Washington, Baltimore, Pittsburgh, and Los Angeles. While none of these has yet fully achieved Owen's model, nor are they likely to in the foreseeable future, there has nonetheless been substantial progress in creating the necessary structures and opposing political forces to assure at least some semblance of comprehensiveness and balance.

Professor Doig's study is valuable in identifying the political impediments to achievement of program innovations in our fragmented urban areas. All of these are present in the New York area in their most extreme form. Such studies fill a real need for empirical research into the ways that metropolitan areas confront the urban problems that simply cannot be handled at the municipal level. They also illustrate the heavy dependence these areas still have on the often unresponsive state political systems, despite the growing role of the national government in urban affairs.—FRANK C. COLCORD, JR. *Massachusetts Institute of Technology.*

Politics and the Regulatory Agencies. BY WILLIAM L. CARY. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1967. Pp. 149. $5.95.)

United States Merchant Shipping Policies and Politics. BY SAMUEL A. LAWRENCE. (Washington, D.C.; The Brookings Institution, 1966. Pp. xiii, 405. $8.75.)

These two books are useful additions to the literature on administrative regulation, one offering an overview of the political relationships of six prominent independent agencies, the other an intensive analysis of regulatory and promotional activities in a single, less visible, policy area. Despite some obvious differences in scope and approach, a comparison of the two is instructive. The experiences described illustrate the rich diversity of regulatory relationships, while the commentaries betray an impulse to generalize from single cases. The discrepancy may help to explain why even good books in this area can improve our understanding of administrative regulation yet fail to contribute directly to a more accurate conceptualization of the regulatory process.

Professor Cary served as Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission from 1961 through 1964. *Politics and the Regulatory Agencies* is derived from his Cooley Lectures at the University of Michigan in spring of 1966, which may account for its mixed blessings of fluid prose and diffuse organization. The theme is agency viability in a political context, and the discussion is shaped by two questions posed in the opening pages: what political forces are at work on the regulatory commissions, and what reasonable standards of effective performance should the commissions be expected to meet?

The degree of sophistication with which Cary approaches the first of these questions is indicated by his treatment of primitive notions regarding the "independence" of the regulatory commissions. For a crude characterization of the status of these regulatory agencies, Cary prefers the figure of a stepchild "whose custody is contested by both Congress and the Executive, but without very much affection from either one." Having substituted a more accurate but no less gross characterization, Cary explores some of the subtleties it obscures, distinguishing between agency independence and the personal independence of its individual members, and between the use of independence as a descriptive term and as a functional myth. The myth helped to secure enactment of regulatory legislation which Congress might otherwise have rejected, and continues to provide a shelter to which agencies can repair when confronted with politically-oriented "suggestions" from the White House or Congress.

The problem of defining a workable zone of agency independence is the dominant concern of the chapters on the White House and Congress. Through reference to a set of hypothetical and genuine cases, Cary endeavors to describe a line separating improper interference from legitimate guidance and oversight. Acknowledging the difficulty of generalizing at the margin, Cary is inclined to reject arguments favoring increased Presidential control—on grounds that they are politically infeasible and philosophically incompatible with the pluralism characteristic of American economic policy. He is also critical of the present extent and undiscriminating use of Congressional power. But Cary's brief for a substantial measure of agency autonomy does not reflect the administrative lawyer's common concern for insulating quasi-judicial functions; it derives from his conclusion that in general neither the President nor the Congress stands to benefit politically from a regulatory agency's dynamic performance. The White House is primarily interested in avoiding or correcting unsavory administration, the Congress in particular policies or actions to which its constituents object. In the absence of some widely perceived crisis of administration or policy, these interests will exert a "conservatizing" influence on the commissions.

Given a political context in which there is little incentive for the White House to concern itself with invigorating and coordinating the activities of the regulatory agencies, it is not surprising that Cary is sceptical of the Hector-Minow proposals for concentrating policy-making responsibilities in a single executive responsible to the President. However, the main force of his criticism is directed at the assumed incompatibility of judicial and policy-making functions: "The interaction of informal administrative decisions, formal cases, and rule making is both fruitful and necessary. . . . Mr. Hector's own examples of the CAB's procedures provide an argument not for separation of functions but against the overjudicialization of the administrative process." Professor Cary's thorough rebuttal of the case for separation of functions is among the most convincing passages of the book.

What should we ask of the regulatory agencies? According to Cary, the avoidance of scandal or controversy is expecting too little, although it is frequently sufficient to satisfy the President and Congress. Conversely, the maintenance of consistent momentum is expecting too much, although this would appear to be the implicit standard of critics who have characterized the development of regulatory agencies in terms of a life cycle moving rapidly from youthful vigor to senility. Cary prefers the metaphor of ebb and flow, and does not presume that the agencies can play Canute against the tides of industry resistance, congressional jealousy, presidential indifference, and public apathy. He suggests that a realistic standard of effective performance should measure an agency's ability to capitalize on the occasional convergence of circumstances affording an opportunity for innovation.

The chapter on agency vitality is perhaps most revealing of the strong and weak points of Cary's analysis. He is at his best when concentrating on obstacles to vigorous administration, including: (1) the concept of a balanced commission, which is coincident with perceptions of regulatory agencies as judicial bodies, and most acute where conflicting interests are sharply defined and accurately reflected in the composition of the agency (e.g., producer and consumer interests on the FPC); (2) a tendency toward overjudicialization, with decision of cases displacing concern with national policy, and (3) the "claim" that an agency has become the captive of industry. Again displaying that appreciation for subtlety which is one of the book's many virtues, Professor Cary observes that allegations of capture are often made more damaging by their failure to discriminate among lack of initiative in developing new programs, sympathy for an industry whose problems are the agency's daily concern, and lack of personal independence on the part of individual commissioners (who may have been appointed to a balanced commission for the very reason that they were acknowledged "captives" of a particular viewpoint). These problems have been frequently discussed in the literature on regulatory administration, but seldom with so skillful a blending of the practitioner's experience and the scholar's perspective.

Although the SEC figures prominently in the discussion, Cary's analysis of obstacles to administrative vitality draws extensively from the experience of other agencies. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said of his suggested remedies. Cary gives an illuminating account of the rejuvenating devices employed by the SEC (with emphasis on the Special Study of Securities Markets completed in 1963), but he does not show that these devices would be appropriate for the variety of agencies with which he is ostensibly concerned. In his discussion of techniques for preserving agency vitality and in the chapter on the tactics of "Shepherding an Agency-Sponsored Bill through Congress," *Politics and the Regulatory Agencies* becomes politics and the SEC. Indeed, the clear narrowing of focus in these passages suggests the most serious weakness of the book as a whole. Cary's analysis is informed by the experience of the SEC, and the SEC enjoys substantial advantages in terms of the level of consensus supporting its mission, and the attitude of its clientele toward regulation. These advantages are acknowledged by Cary, but the central role of the SEC nevertheless softens his treatment of certain problems more vexing to other regulatory agencies, including potentially conflicting responsibilities for promotion and regulation, conflicting objectives among the major interests subject to regulation, and the absence of incentive for self-regulation.

Samuel Lawrence's detailed analysis of *United States Merchant Shipping Policies and Politics* offers a sharp contrast to the format of the Cary book. Concentrating on a single program in a book nearly thrice the length of Cary's, Lawrence has an opportunity to examine the substance of merchant marine policy as well as the political context in which it has been administered. The opportunity has been fully realized: Lawrence combines lucid history with persuasive policy evaluation and perceptive political analysis. Among the refinements permitted by Lawrence's sharply focused study is a penetrating analysis of congressional committee roles, suggesting—to give but one example—that the peripheral status of the House Merchant Marine Committee has contributed significantly to its excessive caution.

The pitfalls of generalizing from the experience of a single agency are forcefully demonstrated by a few comparisons between the SEC and the several agencies responsible for guiding U. S. merchant marine policy. Given certain characteristics associated with the SEC—a relatively clear and current legislative mandate, substantial consensus regarding agency objectives, and the absence of industry dependence on governmental subsidy—a good case can be made for agency independence. Given certain characteristics of the merchant marine program—an extraordinarily complex, ambiguous, and dated mandate, lack of consensus within government and among industry segments regarding program objectives, dependence of the best organized elements of both industry and labor on governmental subsidy, and widely dispersed administrative responsibilities creating a strong incentive for coordination—a good case can be made for executive control.

While remedies projected from the limited experience of the SEC or merchant marine often contradict one another, many of the obstacles to agency vitality which Cary has abstracted from the experience of six different agencies play an equally important part in Lawrence's analysis of merchant marine politics: (1) the dominant concern of all parties with maintaining the program's public and political acceptability, which in the absence of public controversy amounts to avoiding scandal and conserving a rigid structure of accommodations; (2) episodic presidential initiatives generally frustrated by the continuing but narrow interests of congressional committees, protected under pressure by Congress' instinctive defense of its regulatory stepchildren (seen most recently in defeat of the President's effort to incorporate the Maritime Administration in a newly created Department of Transportation), and (3) the avoidance of policy rationalization by identifying regulation with adjudicatory procedures and promotion with administrative activities, when in practice both programs draw upon both processes.

Despite its virtual invisibility to the general public, the U. S. merchant marine program has been subject to intensive scrutiny by a variety of individuals and groups representing both public and private sectors. Although their diagnoses and proposed remedies vary, it is commonly recognized that the program has failed to meet modest standards of effective performance—most emphatically including Professor Cary's measure of success in capitalizing on opportunities for innovation. In summarizing the program's deficiencies of policy and administration, Lawrence stresses the ambiguity of its 1936 charter, the discrepancy between prewar objectives and postwar environment, and the substitution of proliferated indirect aids for reevaluation of the direct subsidy program which was intended to provide a clear focus for broad policy determinations. He shares Cary's premise that the major political obstacles to program reorientation ultimately depend upon its isolation from the mainstream of national concern. But where Cary argues that numerous and varied pressures will contribute to agency responsiveness, Lawrence demonstrates that these forces may simply produce a more complicated form of inertia; where Cary's focus on the SEC accentuates the promise of special studies as a means of keeping Congress informed and the agency alert, Lawrence's analysis of the merchant marine program underlines the conditions which may prevent that promise from being fulfilled. Yet their assumptions are not so far apart as these specific comparisons may suggest, for as Lawrence points out, the lethargy of the merchant marine program is uncommonly dependent upon public ignorance (as distinguished from apathy): the industry's political support "rests on so narrow a base that it might be swept away by a shift in the political wind."—JOHN E. MOORE, *University of California, Santa Barbara.*

The Struggle for Equality. BY BERT E. SWANSON. (New York: Hobbs, Dorman and Company, 1966. Pp. 146. $4.00.)

School desegregation no longer occupies the center stage in the continuing drama of race relations in this country. Our attention has shifted in large part to the issues of "black power" and urban rioting—issues that more immediately impinge on the wish for racial harmony, if not racial justice. Still, as this brief monograph on the unresolved New York City school integration controversy indicates, the basic structure of race relations changes very little, even when the realm of conflict moves from the schools to the streets or to some other locus. The participants described by Swanson and the nature of their participation seem to be standard ingredients of all racial controversies—indeed, of liberal-conservative controversies in general.

First, there are the "have-nots," who, with their allies, seek redress from some aspect of their inferior status. Underlying their actions is a wish to affect their environment—to overcome the sense, and reality, of powerlessness in their lives. This is true whether the specific goal is increased school integration (as a means of upgrading education for Negroes), or an impovement in the material level of living, or the eradication of alleged police tyranny, and whether the tactic is lobbying for new or amended governmental action, or boycotting, or looting, or fighting the police.

In opposition are the bulk of the "haves." Most acknowledge some justice in the aims of the "have-nots." But they are unwilling to support measures necessary to achieve these aims, when these measures might threaten the comfortable and insulated conditions of their existence. Swanson illustrates this in his description of the resistance mobilized against specific proposals for ending *de facto* segregation in New York City. Further illustration can be found in the widespread opposition to many anti-poverty programs in this country.

Between the "haves" and the "have-nots" are those in government who see themselves as mediating between pressure groups. Governmental officials, such as school administrators and policy-makers in New York City, have been publicly committed to aiding the cause of Negro advancement for some time. But when opposition to specific measures is strong—as shown by a boycott of schools involving 275,000 white pupils—officials shrink from translating this commitment into the kinds of meaningful action that might really end racial and class disadvantages in our society.

Swanson's description of school integration problems in New York serves as a fine model of this continuing political struggle between the "have-nots" and the "haves." The cast of characters is well delineated—even to the point of insightful portrayal of the cleavages *within* contending sides on the questions of specific goals and tactics. The relationship of various interest groups to the core of decision-making power is also clearly spelled out, as is the sequence of events in the New York case.

But the book's value beyond the purely descriptive level is questionable. For example, the author is weak in specifying conditions under which the balance of pressures on decision-makers will tip one way or the other—toward satisfying demands of civil rights advocates or toward protecting whites from these demands. He mentions some of the variables important in the New York situation, but he avoids any real attempt to tie these variables together in a prediction model. He is also far from convincing in a major conclusion that resistance to change would have been minimized if opposing factions had been included in school planning sessions from the beginning. As it was, plans were formulated initially through negotiations between Negro leaders and school officials, and this reviewer suggests that inclusion of anti-integration white leaders at the start might have immobilized school officials from making even the few steps toward integration that were undertaken.

As the above comments indicate, Swanson has succeeded in contributing another interesting, but incomplete case study to the race relations literature. He is willing to treat his book as merely exploratory. But one might wish, at this point in time, that we could move beyond the descriptive and exploratory. Perhaps a more valuable book could have resulted if the author had chosen to delay publication until he could more conclusively answer this question: How can sufficient change be brought about through the political process so that the "have-nots" will not feel compelled to resort to violence and destruction in order to gain "equality."—M. Richard Cramer, *University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.*

Freedom and the Court: Civil Rights and Liberties in the United States. By Henry J. Abraham. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967. Pp. x, 335. $7.50.)

With demonstrations occurring in many cities of the United States frequently accompanied by lawlessness and violence, with the burning and sacking of a considerable portion of the city of Detroit fresh in the minds of citizens, attention has been directed not only toward the securing of constitutional rights to all but also to the limitation of the exercise of rights when they conflict with the rights of others and the action of the state. The question is also asked, what has been the role of the Supreme Court of the United States in determining limits to be placed on individual action when it conflicts with the interest of the community? Professor Abraham's volume goes far toward answering these questions.

"There can be no compromise in securing equal and exact justice for all." So said Lydon B. Johnson in 1964. Equal justice has not yet been secured for all, but Professor Abraham's volume points out the efforts the Supreme Court has made to secure equal justice to all and the degree of success it has had.

All too frequently the rights of the individual conflict with those of the community. When this occurs it is the duty of the Court to resolve the differences. According to Professor Abraham, the Court has done its work reasonably well during the past two decades. There is no doubt that this requires considerable work in this day and time. In the 1935–36 term of court only 2 of 160 written decisions concerned basic freedoms while in the 1965–66 term the number was 54 out of 120.

How has the Supreme Court gone about meeting this difficult responsibility? In the early pages of his book, Professor Abraham considers a "double standard" that has been set up by the Court—a "double standard" based in general on the premise that the least favored in life should be the most favored at law. The acceptance of this view has made the Court willing to give a more searching judicial inquiry to those incidents involving members of this group. This has been done because these persons are seriously restricted in their use of political processes. Also, as Justice Frankfurter has remarked, the litigant is frequently "not a very nice person." In addition, many citizens are not aware of their rights and liberties, although I would venture an opinion that citizens today are more aware of their rights, both substantive and procedural, than at any other time in our nation's history.

After introductory chapters and a consideration of the Court's definitions of the broad meaning of due process of law, the author in three succeeding chapters gives a detailed and critical account of the Court's work in three important fields. These are the fields of expression and communication, religion, and the vexing problem of race.

Having first established the importance of the preservation of our rights and liberties, the volume becomes an analysis of line drawing or the establishment of limits upon the exercise of individual rights. Unwilling to accept the absolutist approach of Justice Black and others, Professor Abraham approves the action of the Court in establishing reasonable, understandable and generous limits to the exercise of these rights. For instance, the author points out that "democratic society has the right to maintain concurrently both freedom of expression and national security."

The proper branch of the government to determine conflicts which result from the establishment of limits upon the freedom of the individual is the Supreme Court. It the reader should ask why, the answer would be that the Court is the most competent body to do this and also because "all too easily do the legislative and executive branches yield to the politically expedient and the popular."

With the use of background material, comments by those on and off the bench, and an analysis of the most important decisions, the work of the Court is commended and criticized. The author's analysis shows that it is not easy to draw pre-conceived limits upon the exercise of rights but that the establishment of lines comes case by case. The job has been a difficult one but the author concludes that on the whole it has been done well. Line drawing within the broad meaning of due process of law will always be difficult because of the ambiguity of the term. In the area of expression, limits must be established whether based on the clear and present danger rule or that of clear and present danger plus imminence. In the field of religion, difficulties arise because of the delicate and emotional nature of religion. With respect to race, line drawing should, in theory at least, be easier, but the practical application of Court limits has been most troublesome because of sentiment and prejudice. Yet, Professor Abraham concludes that the Court has on the whole done its work well and has remained true to its acquired role as our national conscience.

This volume will prove to be of real value in the classroom. The reader is impressed by the information and analysis that has been crowded within its covers. However, he also has a strong feeling that the author could have used three or four times the number of pages in doing justice to the subject. Its value is that it not only gives information and conclusions but that it gives perspective to the work of the Court in the field of civil rights.—ROBERT S. RANKIN, *Duke University.*

Benchmarks. BY HENRY J. FRIENDLY. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967. Pp. viii, 324. $7.95.)

These occasional papers of Judge Henry Friendly of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit amply indicate that the tradition and distinction of that bench continues unabated. A fitting successor to the Hands, Swan and Clark, Judge Friendly demonstrates exquisite style, mastery of legal niceties, catholic interests and sympathy for the behavioral sciences and other fields, all yoked to an impressive statesmanship or sense of the practical.

It would be extraordinary if these qualities were all present in all these variegated papers—and unflawed. These are offerings prepared under diverse circumstances for divergent purposes. Basically they fall into four major divisions: (1) reflections on judging, especially the relative merits of legislative as against court initiative; (2) the heart of Judge Friendly's well-known 1962 lectures on administrative agencies, together with recent assessment of half a decade's progress; (3) consideration of federal-state problems raised by the Erie and Miranda decisions; (4) tributes to Friendly's legal and judicial mentors—Holmes, Cardozo, Frankfurter, and Hand. Only in the last category do the essays fall short of demanding reprinting. Duplication is on the whole avoided, although the third retelling of the familiar Holmes reaction to a Brandeis summer course on economics is a trifle wearying.

The first two groups of papers are the most relevant to the political scientist, as well as the most successful essays. Evaluation of the process of judging by an appellate judge rooted in the jurisprudential literature of the time is rare. Judge Friendly candidly discusses the possibilities of creativity and the degree of freedom available to the judge. He argues the inherent advantage of legislative rule-making power, which can above all choose arbitrarily from equally plausible formulations where a court cannot. Some of his comments on the extent to which appellate courts must throw out lawyers' briefs and decide cases on their merits are particularly interesting. His litany of legislation which at the same time preempts the field from the judiciary, but is so poorly drafted as to answer few questions, is amusing as well as instructive.

His call for greater exercise of rule-making authority by administrative agencies, a greater emphasis on policy rather than adjudication, together with greater Congressional legislative support for the agencies was the heart of his 1962 lectures, his solution to the malaise of those times. Looking back over the events since, he finds the administrative agencies have improved—not merely survived public criticism—but almost exclusively through an infusion of able personnel. Alone among the agencies, he finds the NLRB has lost some ground in these years.

The two essays on criminal law seem to me to miss the mark. They are elegant enough, and the analysis of the logical and legal contradictions involved in the notion of "incorporation" of the Bill of Rights is penetrating. It might have been more effective as an argument in the late 1940's—although the Judge might well regard this comment as adherence to the "domino method of constitutional adjudication" he condemns.

In discussing *Miranda* he seems more wedded to narrow legalism and rather more willing to use cliched emotionalisms then one might have expected. There is no effort to cope with the egalitarian arguments on criminal procedure, nothing of the toughness of thought of the Katzenbach-Bazelon exchange on the issue. His view of federal interference with state courts is the standard one and no effort is made to combat either the argument of Attorney Fortas in the Gideon case that the "interminable process of exclusion and inclusion" was a *greater* incursion on state procedure because of its unpredictability or Justice Douglas' notion that the revolution in counsel requirements was brought about because of a threatened flooding of courts caused by evanescent doctrines of due process. Especially in light of his views on generalized non-ad hoc rules in other domains, at least discussion of these propositions would seem in order.

Be that as it may, page for page this is a most profitable volume. Indispensable reading for any student of administrative law, it is also useful for less specialized political scientists as well. I sleep better knowing American courts can still attract men of Judge Friendly's caliber.—SAMUEL KRISLOV, *University of Minnesota.*

Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in the United States. BY GEORGE F. BREAK. (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, Studies of Government Finance, 1967. Pp. xv, 273. $6.75.)

The current revival enjoyed by the field of political economy has been associated with a spate of articles, monographs, and books. Until the publication of *Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in the United States*, however, no single broad-gauged survey of fiscal federalism has existed. George Break has touched on and examined in moderate depth an imposing array of fiscal problems presented by our multi-jurisdictional political system.

The author's information-issue or descriptive-problematic approach is organized around four topical chapters that constitute the core of the study: tax coordination, functional grants-in-aid, unconditional grants, and metropolitan problems. The spin-offs from each of these broad topics are extensive and are replete with well-digested tabular data and thoughtfully mature analysis. The author grinds few, if any, personal axes. There is no "one best way" for resolving intergovernmental fiscal ills. For example, the currently popular unconditional grant (Heller tax-sharing) idea is examined dispassionately and the state-by-state effects of five different possible distribution formulas are identified and evaluated.

For political scientists and governmental officials with more than a passing interest in political economy this is a must book. Its breadth is greater although its theoretical punch is less than Musgrave's editing of *Essays in Fiscal Federalism.* Similarly, its solid and extensive data base makes it less free-wheeling and less normative than Heller's *New Dimensions of Political Economy.* Political scientists and administrators concerned with federalism and intergovernmental relations should also consult this volume. It will not provide solutions to immediate problems but it should sharpen their perceptions of basic economic and political problems with which they must contend.

One note of forewarning to prospective readers: the economic rather than the political component is the fulcrum on which the bulk of Break's analysis turns. This is perhaps most prominent in his discussion of functional grants-in-aid (Chapter III). Such grants are first justified on the hallowed economic grounds of spillover benefits and thereby become "optimizing grants" (p. 77). To anyone familiar with the politics of grant-in-aid enactments and expansions such "optimizing" carries a ring of unreality.

The confrontation of economics with political realities and normative preferences is admirably demonstrated in the final chapter of the book. This portion contains the digest of discussions at a two-day conference held by Brookings and for which Break's essay served as an outstanding background paper. Thirty participants—economists, political scientists, and public officials—wrestled with many of the issues posed by Break. Needless to say, full accord was not reached but the group did "counsel patience and frantic work on the part of all."—DEIL S. WRIGHT, *University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.*

Public Finance in Democratic Process, Fiscal Institutions and Individual Choice. BY JAMES M. BUCHANAN. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1967. Pp. x, 307. $7.75.)

Surely Buchanan is right that "scholars need to pay more attention to the working out of rules or institutions" from which collective decisions emerge (p. 300), and surely political theorists could greatly strengthen analyses of political institutions by intelligent use of some of the economist's ways of thinking and constructing theory about institutions for social choice. This book, not quite a model of economic thinking on the topic (nor of economic writing—simple ideas clothed in prolix and ambiguous language throughout), does present theory and empirical research relevant to students of policy processes generally as well as to experts in public finance.

Buchanan has a unique approach. He is not analyzing the politics of budgeting and taxation, not dealing with the effects of alternative political institutions on governmental revenue and expenditure decisions. The book is instead a discussion of two aspects of *individual* decisions—decisions about public goods and expenditures, given an existing mode of taxation (Part I), and decisions about future methods of taxation (Part II). Buchanan argues in justification of this focus that "the individual citizen must, ultimately," make decisions about public expenditures (p. 4). A more convincing rationale and one more fruitful to theory, might simply assert the usefulness of studying the pattern of collective decisions that would result (under certain assumptions) *if* individual citizens made such decisions directly, without intervention by leaders.

Some topics are likely to be closer to a political scientist's interests than others. Buchanan argues that it is easier to obtain collective decisions for public goods that are funded by existing taxes than it is to get approval for policies requiring change in taxes (Ch. 5)—change increases uncertainty and raises decision costs (only individuals' information costs are mentioned). Public spending is larger and taxation smaller than they would be in the absence of the public debt and currency-creation alternatives to taxation (Ch. 8). Some methods of taxation (e.g., withholding) produce a fiscal "illusion" of nonpayment for public goods (Ch. 10) and lead to "nonoptimal" levels of public expenditure.

Separating decisions on taxation and expenditures produces irrationality in individual choice (Ch. 7). There is no treatment of issues raised in recent literature on the subject, no mention of Lindblom's work, for example. This is of course a limitation imposed by Buchanan's approach. He is not just analyzing fiscal decisions from the individual's point of view, he is analyzing them as if they were made directly by individuals. Aside from a brief argument to the effect that simple majority rule focuses attention on the median individual (Ch. 11), real-world institutions for aggregating preferences in collective decision-making are virtually ignored. (Buchanan actually does not quite ignore these institutions. He makes unanalyzed statements about them from time to time in the book.)

The analysis of individual decisions about methods of taxation (which comprise the "constitutional" framework for future public goods decisions) is founded on the assumption that the individual cannot predict "with any degree of accuracy" (p. 219) his own future fiscal position. Therefore, his own private interest will dictate that he favor a set of tax institutions that seems generally fair and just. To state it more bluntly than Buchanan does, because the individual is assumed not to know whether he will be rich or poor in the future, he will not be concerned about distributional effects of different future taxes and will want only to establish a tax structure that will be fair to him no matter what his personal economic status, hence fair to all.

Buchanan summarizes (Ch. 13) some interesting published and unpublished research (the latter by doctoral candidates at the University of Virginia) that scholars of the policy process should look at—e.g., empirical findings that proposals for government spending secure approval more often (in referendum elections and in legislatures) when explicit references to tax cost are not attached to the proposals. In a section discussing research on individuals' tax information and preferences, there is no reference to results of the Survey Research Center's election studies (e.g., *The American Voter*, p. 196).—RUFUS P. BROWNING, *Michigan State University.*

The Government of Associations. ED. BY WILLIAM A. GLASER AND DAVID L. SILLS. (Totowa, N.J.: The Bedminster Press, Inc., 1966. Pp. vii, 264.)

This book is a collection of 47 articles dealing with the subject of voluntary associations. The editors have done an extremely thorough job in that virtually all of the published literature relating to voluntary associations is included here. Consequently, it is extremely difficult to provide a critical evaluation, for to do so would require the reviewer to retrace the steps of the editors and work with a decade of behavioral science literature. Nevertheless, it is certainly true that such a collection of essays has been needed for some time and should find a receptive audience among political scientists. Unfortunately, very few political scientists are included among the contributors to the volume. This is largely due to the fact that political scientists have neglected the study of voluntary associations. On the other hand, there are some indications that political scientists are becoming interested in the empirical study of voluntary associations, and some of their work might have been included in the book. I am thinking especially of Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba's *Civic Culture,* which contains a chapter on organizational membership and civic competence. Since the Almond-Verba study includes data from five nations, it would have been a helpful addition. Most of the essays are drawn from American voluntary associations. There is one section dealing with voluntary associations in other societies, but it is limited to an essay on Japan and one on France. Neither essay is comparative.

It is unfair to the editors to castigate them for what they excluded, rather than to praise them for what they included. The essays are organized into four general sections and 14 subsections. The first section, consisting of an overview of voluntary associations, contains a crucial introductory comment by the editors. Addressing themselves to the question of why some societies have few voluntary associations whereas others have many, they conclude that the flourishing of voluntary associations depends largely upon societal characteristics. These characteristics are: (1) A tradition of limited central power, (2) the absence of a tradition of governmental control of private organizations, (3) a value system which accepts the responsibility of community service, (4) a value system which is optimistic in that it assumes that man's condition can be improved by collective activity, (5) the existence of upper and middle classes who have enough time and money for association activity. Granted that these generalizations are primarily intuitive, they seem to be suggestive of fruitful avenues of comparative research. Indeed, the Almond and Verba data are supportive of these generalizations. Voluntary association membership is greatest in the United States (a majority of respondents belonged to at least one organization). Next come Great Britain and Germany, where a substantial minority belong. Finally, less than one-third of the Italian and Mexican respondents belong to voluntary associations. Further, participation in voluntary associations increases with education in all societies, thus supporting the notion of a link between the class structure and activity in associations.

A truly comparative analysis would have been helpful also in that it might have removed some of the ambiguities which exist between the introductory essay by the editors and some of the data reported in the book. For example, in the editors' essay we read that the social conditions in the United States have "resulted in the strong tradition of voluntary service association activity" (p. 3). Yet, the first article included in the second section (Voluntary Associations and Their Environment), written by Charles R. Wright and Herbert H. Hyman, reports two-thirds of the respondents in a national sample belong to no voluntary associations. They thus conclude that "these findings hardly warrant the impression that Americans are a nation of joiners" (p. 32). Reconciling this conclusion with the earlier statement of the editors and with the Almond-Verba findings is a problem which might have been explored. An immediate answer is that the Wright and Hyman survey excluded union membership, where the Almond and Verba survey did not. When trade union membership is subtracted from the Almond-Verba total, the two studies are virtually identical in their findings.

Part three consists of three essays on the nature of leadership and seems unusually sparse in view of the relatively high volume of literature available on the subject. In contrast, part four (Problems of Government) includes about two-thirds of the essays in the book. Part four is not only the most inclusive section, it is also the most valuable one. It is not possible here to comment on each of the individual contributions. Most useful for political scientists are Sills' essay on goal succession, Gusfield's study of the Women's Christian Temperance Union, and Lipset's well-known study of the international typographical union.

One might raise the question of the general utility of any study of voluntary associations for political scientists if one takes some of the findings in the book literally. For example, Murray Hausknecht's essay reports that four per cent of a national sample belonged to "political and pressure" organizations. If so few people are active in pressure groups, why do political scientists bother to study them? The answer is that such a categorization of organizations is unrealistic. Among the other kinds of associations classified are veterans, military, patriotic, civic and service, church and religious, economic, occupational, and professional. Each of these kinds of associations has at one time or another engaged in "pressure politics." Studying the internal dynamics of such organizations would be a useful task for political scientists to undertake.—HARMON ZEIGLER, *University of Oregon.*

Party Loyalty Among Congressmen. BY DAVID R. MAYHEW. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966, Pp. xiv, 189. $4.50.)

If, as is often said, parties are important instruments whereby mass publics can have some measure of control over public policy, it is important to know what difference it makes to have one party in office rather than another. When parties are "responsible" it is easy to identify a governing party's record; it is the same thing as the government's record. It is schoolboy knowledge, however, that in the United States members of both parties are found on both sides of most legislative issues. Schoolboy knowledge also includes some basics about the "tendencies" of each party on most major public policy issues, but such knowledge is rarely precise even for the schoolboy's teachers.

We do not know very clearly what to expect from a Democratic or Republican majority. We know that there are differences between Northern and Southern Democrats and between Eastern and Midwestern Republicans, and that Congressmen can buck their party when it is in the interest of their constituents, but we do not know much about what sorts of constituencies produce given votes regardless of the party of their Congressman or what kinds of constituencies are most likely to produce party votes on given issues. It is to this general problem that this book is addressed, and it provides an extremely valuable contribution to our understanding of what to expect from different kinds of Republican and Democratic legislators on various issues.

Professor Mayhew addresses the problem by identifying four sets of issues, and "interested" and "indifferent" Congressmen on each. The issues are those between 1947 and 1962 regarding the farmer, the city, the worker, and the West, and the interested Congressmen are those from districts which are defined as having a particular stake in the outcome. Party pressures are operationalized by identifying the votes of party leaders. The votes of party leaders and of interested and indifferent Congressmen from each party are analyzed regarding the question of who can be expected to vote for or against given issues and regarding their indices of cohesion and likeness.

The major conclusions are that on all four issues the Democrats supported the relevant programs, with the interested Democrats being most cohesively in favor of them, and that the Republicans opposed them, with the interested Republicans being less cohesive in support of their party than their indifferent colleagues. Northern Democrats were considerably more regular than their Southern colleagues in supporting programs they were indifferent to, and Southern Democrats were more like Republicans than Northern Democrats on city and labor, but not farm and Western issues. Consequently, farm and Western programs were easier to pass than city and labor programs.

Another interesting point is that the districts which are indifferent on all four issues usually elect Republicans. The evidence reinforces the viewpoint that while all Congressmen are more or less representative of their districts, Democrats are the party of the multiple special interests and Republicans are by and large negative on such interests unless their district gives them special reason to be for them. It also reinforces the viewpoint that who wins in indifferent districts is more important for a given legislative program than what happens in the interested districts.

These arguments are well researched and supported by illustrative quotes from the Congressional Record. It would have been useful for the author to have included an appendix which listed all of the districts, which issues they were "interested" in and what parties had represented them. It would also have been instructive for Professor Mayhew to speculate on what other issues could be handled in this way.

Indeed, the results are striking enough to suggest that more sophisticated quantitative analysis would have been profitable. Such analysis might have permitted a calculation of who must be elected in order to pass given legislation. The data are treated as nominal when ordinal or interval scales would have been possible. For example, districts are "interested" in farm issues if they had more than ten per cent of their 1950 population in agriculture, when with such a measure it would have been possible to have an interval scale of "interest" in agriculture. Similarly, the issues might have been scaled, giving an ordinal measure of the difficulty of passing a given proposal, or they could have been given scores based on the percentage of the House in favor of them, for an interval measure.

Correlating the measure of interest in agriculture with that of the percentage of farm issues voted for would have permitted an assessment of the proportion of the variation in farm policy votes explained by the number of farmers in the districts. The same kind of analysis would have been possible for urban and labor districts although less clearly so for Western districts. Such a figure would be useful to our understanding of representation. Such a figure coupled with a cumulative scale might permit some calculation of how large a Democratic majority is necessary to pass a proposal that has a given scalar level of difficulty.

Were such an analysis to be successful, it would be one of the most important steps yet taken toward an understanding of the mystifying relationship between Congressmen and their constituents. Even without such analysis, Professor Mayhew has made an important contribution to that understanding. This in an original, imaginative, well-conceived and well-executed study of one of the most crucial and yet most elusive problems of the study of democratic political systems, the linkage between elected officials and their constituents.—William R. Keech, *University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.*

Ballots and Bandwagons. By Ralph G. Martin. (New York: Rand McNally and Co., 1964. Pp. 480. $5.95.)

Students of the American presidency have had no shortage of first rate biographies of the nation's first citizens nor has there been a paucity of good analytical materials about the duties and powers of the President and his relationships with his Party, the Congress, his Administration and the Public.

Until recently, however, little systematic work has been done on presidential elections per se. The David, Moos, and Goldman volumes on *Presidential Nominating Politics, 1952,* the David, Goldman, and Bain, *Politics of National Party Conventions* (1960), and the collection of essays on *The National Convention, 1960,* edited by the late Paul Tillett, are all landmark studies of the processes, personalities, and performances at the National Conventions.

The financing of presidential campaigns is given extensive treatment in Alexander Heard's definitive work on political finance, *The Cost of Democracy*, and in Herbert Alexander's series of Citizens Research Foundation publications in this field. Ogden and Peterson, *Electing the President, 1964*, analyzed the electoral process as seen through the eyes of those responsible for the administrative management of the entire campaign.

But none of the above has dealt as ably with the nominating convention, as an eminently important human drama, as has Ralph G. Martin in his *Ballots and Bandwagons*. Martin's exhaustive research and superb writing skill enable the author to place clearly before his readers the background planning, strategies and tactics, personalities, power drives, color and excitement of five nominating conventions: the Republican Conventions of 1900, 1912 and 1920, and the Democratic Conventions of 1932 and 1956.

This book is far more than an interesting anecdotal account of these conventions. It is a searching examination of motives and manipulations. It clearly demonstrates basic lessons of politics and principles which should be a part of every undergraduate Parties course and of every course on the Presidency.

Illustrations of the critical importance of key "candidate" speeches, contested delegate votes, and careless diction are skillfully woven into a text full of humor and pathos. Moreover, Martin has given the reader a fairer and more accurate description of important political relationships (such as Hanna and McKinley) than do many professional journals or textbooks.

Martin illustrates:

1. Political leaders seldom tolerate receiving the "bad news" from subordinates. Often campaign workers thus fail to pass on important negative reports from the field. (Theodore Roosevelt in 1912).
2. Political leaders of both parties have often been willing to lose an election to avoid losing control of the Party. (Boies Penrose in 1912.)
3. One unguarded word or one particularly poor speaking performance can prove extremely damaging and sometimes fatal to an aspiring candidate. (La Follette's New York Periodical Publishers speech in 1912; Hubert Humphrey's speech before the Political Science Association meeting of 1965; Taft's statement "Even a rat in a corner will fight," 1912; Theodore Roosevelt's legislative recall of judicial decision speech, 1912.)
4. The thin veneer of civilization can quickly disappear in heated political conventions. (The Missouri ball-bat Convention of 1912.)
5. The price of articulating one's morality can be very high. (Theodore Rossevelt in 1912 and General Leonard A. Wood in 1920.)
6. The American President, although often "made" by a strong, behind-the-scenes personality, must establish clearly his leadership after the nomination and election (as Roosevelt had to do with Louis Howe) or suffer severe repercussions (as Harding did because of Daugherty).
7. The new world of television-politics, particularly in the setting of the national convention, requires far more attention to detail and timing if disaster before a national audience is to be avoided. (In 1956, for example, teleprompter scripts were ready only minutes before air time at the Democratic National Convention.)

Martin, whose order of chronological events sometimes gets confused, generally succeeds well in covering his own biases as a Democratic Party leader. One bias he does not attempt to hide is his admiration of the thousands of volunteers who are "the special people of the world who are tied together by the tightest thing there is—a dedication so deep that they deprive themselves of family, friends, love, sleep, time, memory . . . people who think more of America than themselves, those people who ultimately are the ones who make Democracy work."

If there is any striking omission, it is the lack of attention given to the platforms in the five conventions covered. Regardless of this weakness, however, *Ballots and Bandwagons* could be extremely useful and enjoyable collateral reading for any basic American Government course. It should be required reading for any Parties or Presidency courses in which the instructor seriously desires to give his students a vicarious appreciation of and an empathy with political party leaders and presidential and vice presidential candidates and nominees.—ARTHUR L. PETERSON, *The American Institute for Foreign Trade.*

Presidential Greatness: The Image and the Man From George Washington to the Present. BY THOMAS A. BAILEY. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1966. Pp. xi, 368. $3.95, paper.)

They Also Ran: The Story of the Men Who Were Defeated for the Presidency. BY IRVING STONE. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1966. Pp. xi, 434. $5.95.)

The question, "What makes a President great?" has long fascinated students of the office. Thomas A. Bailey, a distinguished historian, has addressed himself to the subject, and the result is a book remarkably perceptive and informed, sparkling with wit, and graceful in style.

To be President of the United States is to invite comparison with other Presidents. The Presidential "rating game" is almost as old as the office; anyone can play it and it can be done in a variety of arenas. We see historians and biographers making their judgments of Presidential performance, poll-takings by Arthur Schlesinger, Sr., Gutzon Borglum choosing four from among the Presidents to commemorate in the granite busts of Mt. Rushmore, New York University making selections for its Hall of Fame, the allocation of national holidays.

Mr. Bailey leads us through the maze of factors which seem to govern the ratings, acquaints us with the ground rules, and the idiosyncracies of the raters. He describes the many imponderables, the role of luck, and the tendency of judgments to undergo revision. He moves sure-footedly through all this maze, and does not flinch from making his own hard judgments concerning the factors that count most in raising a President to greatness. Above all, he must build a striking record of success in the nation's domestic affairs. "The basic obligation of the Executive," Bailey writes, "is to manage the bread-and-butter concerns of tens of millions of fellow-Americans." He acknowledges that in recent decades these concerns have reached increasingly into foreign affairs. Of eleven "Great" or "Near Great" Presidents, in Bailey's own ratings, only two served in time of economic panic; the rest enjoyed reigns of prosperity.

A reliable indicator is what Bailey calls "the abuse-in-office test." The greater the President, the more he is vilified by at least a substantial minority of his people. The absence of criticism or outcry signifies that little that is important is being done. Among recent Presidents, the press conference has emerged as a respected test of competence. The spectacles of a President answering off the top of his head questions on complex subjects, often put artfully, gives the onlooker a revealing closeup of the Chief Executive without the interventions of speech writers, idea men and subject matter experts. Stressful times and the President's creative responses to them are a dependable route to greatness. The rock-bottom test is the President's impact on history, both in the short run and the long run, on his own time, and on the more removed ears of history. Bailey finds no particular correlation between eminence and popularity. "Generally speaking," he writes, "the most eminent Executives have not been unduly popular."

Presidents are also open to comparison with the men they defeated for the office. Are the men who won, in the main, superior to those who lost? Is the popular judgment, which has not been faring well lately in political science research, shown to be competent in the choices it makes to fill the Presidency? These issues are presented quite starkly in *They Also Ran*, by Irving Stone, the popular biographer. His book first appeared in 1943, and this reissue adds chapters on the losers since that day. Mr. Stone's book is based on light research and is not in the same league with that of Mr. Bailey, who has brought together the fullest bibliography this reviewer has yet seen on the Presidency.

Mr. Stone finds that the popular voters have done a better job of choosing in the second half of the Presidency, compared with the first half. In the era since Rutherford Hayes, where, in contrast to the earlier period, the voter has been aided by an ever more capable communications system and the enlargement of his own political rights and effectiveness, Mr. Stone finds that voters have been discerning in nine elections, derelict in four, with one contest a dead heat. In some elections popular judgments which Stone rates as wise, were determined by narrow margins. Lincoln did not get a majority of all the votes cast; Cleveland defeated Blaine by only a few thousand margin which threw him New York's electoral vote. The most grievous errors, in the author's judgment, were the rejections of Cass for Taylor, Seymour for Grant, Davis for Coolidge, and Stevenson for Eisenhower, at least in the second election of 1956.

Mr. Stone's criteria for judging Presidents and "also-rans" harmonize well with the trend of Professor Bailey's analysis. Stone prefers the Presidential aspirant who is an activist in his approach to affairs, is constructive and effective in dealing with the problems of the day. In general, the "liberal"-inclined Presidential candidates are preferred to the "conservative"-inclined. The author brings to his subject his gifts of readability, and remarkable skill at selecting apt detail, and of making matters of some complexity simple. The comparison of Presidential winners and losers deserves to be taken up by political scientists and to have applied to it the most sophisticated analytical techniques of the profession. Louis W. Koenig, *New York University*.

The Tweed Ring. By Alexander B. Callow, Jr. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966. Pp. ix, 351. $7.00.)

Most Americans know something about the Tweed Ring in a vague sort of way. Now they can get the whole story in a carefully documented, well-written account. Callow has listed a terrific number of sources, most of which I have seen—if the material was available in the magnificent archives of the New York Public Library, university libraries and special collections, during the time I was trying to discover what was special about New York many years ago—some of which I never heard of, and some that I had found, after a rapid inspection, wouldn't help very much.

Nevertheless, Callow has done an excellent, painstaking job of winnowing a real story out of all these materials. He tells enough about the early Tammany which came into existence to explain that it gained authority only gradually before the Civil War, and for long periods, it was torn by internal dissensions as was the larger "Democratic" party organization of which it came to be the ruling force. Before 1857, when Tweed became a member of the Board of Supervisors, most of the power in New York politics was wielded by luminaries of the Anglo-Saxon Protestant monied aristocracy. But the techniques of political machine control were already being invented, developed, and systematized. In 1959, Tweed moved ahead to get the power to name the Election Inspectors; in 1861, he was elected Chairman of the New York County Democratic Committee, in 1863, Chairman of the General Committee of Tammany Hall, and, later in the year, Grand Sachem. In the next three years, Tweed and his lieutenants, Sweeney, Connally and Hall, reunited the scattered fragments of the Tammany Democratic organization, reduced Fernando Wood's Mozart Hall to impotence, and the Tweed Ring was firmly established in power.

For five years, from 1866 to 1871, the Ring was firmly imbedded in power. It controlled elections, used the patronage shamelessly, extorted pay-offs and rebates from law-breakers, contractors, and recipients of favors. It stole millions of dollars (how many millions? some said 200; others 300). The leaders of the Ring lived in baronial castles and mansions, spent money lavishly on themselves. They also helped the poor, whose ranks were swollen with Irish, German, and miscellaneous other immigrants. To the Yankee Protestants, whether informers or crooks, the immigrant classes and the poor were stupid, corrupt, and alien. Callow, like D. G. Thompson, in 1897, takes note of all the measures Tweed took to "recognize" the poor and to give them a share in the government—the right to vote, hold jobs, and get some redress for their grievances. But, unlike Thompson, he doesn't condone the corruption. He acknowledges merit in Thomas Nast, the *Harper's Weekly* cartoonist, and the *New York Times*, whose campaigns brought down the House of Tweed. He respects the decent reformers—but he cannot avoid making some acid comments on the financial and industrial interests who shared in the spoils and pretended to be opposed to corruption in politics.

Callow explodes one myth—that Tilden destroyed the Tweed Ring. The eminent and wealthy New York statesman, who was not elected Governor until after Tweed's downfall, did nothing to prevent Tweed's Tammany from taking over the state, which he might have done in the sixties. I thought he might have given more attention to affairs in Washington, which in Tweed's time had reached what one historian called *"the nadir of national disgrace."* On the other hand, this is an artistic work. The author can't be expected to put in everything. What he has produced is a story—a tragedy, if you will.

Some reviewers have said there is a lesson here. They are not very clear about what it is. My own view is that chronicles about bosses and machines should teach us to frustrate evil when it is growing. For a city, I see no hope but an intelligent, humane, moral, and democratic fusion society—such as we once had in New York under LaGuardia's leadership—and which they tell me prevails now under Lindsay. On the other hand, as scholars from the time of Merriam and Buttenheim to Goodman and Palmieri have observed, we may have to alter the structure of "the city" if such a government is to be able to function.—ROY V. PEEL, *San Fernando Valley State College.*

In the Nation: 1932–1966. BY ARTHUR KROCK. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966. Pp. xvii, 455. $7.95.)

This is a collection of about 175 of Arthur Krock's columns, culled from three decades of close observation of the national scene from his vantage point in the Washington bureau of *The New York Times*. The essays are organized on the basis of the Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson Presidencies. The author has supplied introductions to each of the major sections, and Tom Wicker has written an appreciation of one of his most distinguished predecessors in the *Times* bureau.

It has long been difficult to assess Arthur Krock's contribution to Washington journalism, and this collection makes the task no easier. For years he waxed in turn grave, analytical, portentous, mildly sardonic, slightly hectoring, and even humorous, as in his marvellous "Tale of One Thousandth and Second Night" of how Lyndon the Compassionate, the Beneficent, the Well Publicized, in the days of Kennedy the King, befriended a poor camel driver of Karachi. There were few memorable feats of journalism, analysis, or prophecy during all these years, but Krock did win exclusive interviews, both of which are printed here, from Presidents Roosevelt and Truman. Some columns border on the eloquent, as in Krock's report of Roosevelt's death, and he writes with a magisterial style that easily commands attention. Yet the book lacks focus and direction because the author, for all his sharp intelligence, lacks a set of coherent values or organizing principles that would enable him to see his men and events as part of a broader and more meaningful pattern.

The main quality that holds his book together, indeed, is the author's blandly tendentious style. He irritated Roosevelt and other Presidents by the Olympian and slightly disdainful tone in which he threw his digs and jabs. Thus in 1941, when Roosevelt haters were whispering that the President would suspend the elections of 1942, Krock (in a column not included here) solemnly examined the question of whether it was practically possible for Roosevelt to take such a step; he should have demolished the silly rumor. Krock's seeming lack of deep, strongly held political values may also have accounted for the blind eye he turned for years toward the developing problem of civil rights in America; here again he dealt with many peripheral issues but ignored the central and persisting ones.

This book is carelessly edited, with a number of errors. The criteria by which the columns were selected are not stated. There is no index. A full study of Arthur Krock, using his correspondence as well as his columns, would tell us a good deal about the battle of Washington in recent decades, the role of the press, the public relations of Presidents. This is no substitute for such a book.—JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS, *Williams College.*

The Intruders: The Invasion of Privacy by Government and Industry. BY SENATOR EDWARD V. LONG (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967. Pp. viii, 230. $5.95.)

The focus of this study of the "invasion of privacy by government and industry" is upon the new science of eavesdropping, particularly the use of wire tapping by law enforcement officials. The author, Senator Edward V. Long of Missouri, is chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure. In that capacity he has been a steadfast foe of activities by government agencies that intrude on individual privacy.

From Long's account, the national agencies most often involved in bugging and wire tapping are the F.B.I. and the Internal Revenue Service. Wire tapping in national security cases was first authorized by President Franklin D. Roosevelt prior to World War II. Although still used heavily in that area, it has also found extensive employment in recent years in the drive against organized crime and in the detection of fraud on the part of taxpayers.

The legal status of wire tapping today is unsatisfactory from the point of view of both its supporters and opponents. The law does not prohibit wire tapping, although the Federal Communications Act of 1934 does forbid the public disclosure of information obtained in this way. The Supreme Court has never found wire tapping *per se* to be unconstitutional. What the courts do not allow is the use of wire-tap evidence against defendants in criminal cases, since this would be a disclosure of the kind prohibited by the Federal Communications Act.

Nevertheless, executive agencies tap away. Perhaps the most egregious practice in which the government has been caught is the interception of phone conversations between defendants and their attorneys, or in the case of the Internal Revenue Service, the bugging of a room in which alleged tax evaders were closeted with their lawyers.

The book deals briefly with several other areas in which problems of privacy have arisen, including the use of "mail covers" by the Post Office Departemt, the establishment of a central data bank, and the use of questionnaires on captive audiences. From the social scientist's point of view, some of Long's strictures on the invasion of privacy represented by centralized information systems and inquisitive questionnaires come perilously close to home.

Like any well-socialized legislator, Long is a great deal more sensitive in invasions of privacy by executive officials than he is to similar activities by congressional committees. He is highly critical of efforts by the State Department to keep tabs on an official accused of leaking information from personnel files to a congressional committee, but betrays no concern over the invasion of privacy such leaks may well represent for the affected employees.

Long concludes his book with what seems to be an eminently sensible design for improving existing practices with regard to wire tapping. Understandably enough, the book is tailored for broad popular consumption. It is written in a breezy style with relentless superficiality in the treatment of its subject. The scholar with a serious interest in the problem of privacy would do well to repair to the invaluable source from which the book is drawn, the hearings of Senator Long's Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure.—FRANCIS E. ROURKE, *Johns Hopkins University.*

FOREIGN POLITICAL SYSTEMS

The Downfall of the Liberal Party, 1914–1935. By Trevor Wilson. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966. Pp. 416. $7.50.)

This is a provocative study of the politics of breakup. On the eve of the First World War there were 261 Liberals in the House of Commons, a Liberal government in power, and a long tradition of governing success on which to draw. By 1935, when Wilson's account ends, the party in Parliament had faded to 21 MPs without the faintest hope of achieving office or influencing policy. It had, in the author's words, "exhausted all avenues to revival." The recent Liberal "revival," it might be added, still produced only twelve MPs in the 1966 election, the same number as in 1945. The story of how this once great governing party and its tradition petered out in the space of a few short years has been the subject of many books and much polemic. None of the previous efforts, however, compares in depth with Wilson's fascinating account. His evidence is convincingly mustered and economically presented, his analysis reasoned and firm, his treatment of the principal actors fair and perceptive.

The general outline of the narrative is a familiar one: the weakness of Liberal governments in the early years of the First World War, the vacillations of Asquith and the ruthless conniving of Lloyd George, the Liberal catastrophe in the coupon election of 1918, the internal strife and schisms of the twenties, the ill-fated parliamentary support of the MacDonald governments, the depths of despair reached in the thirties. What is different, and compelling, is how Wilson goes about explaining and interpreting each turn of the screw. He has chosen not to write a history of party politics in these two decades, but of the Liberal party in these politics, from the inside looking out. This requires both empathy and critical objectivity. A measure of Wilson's success is that the reader gets the sense of being at the center of the party's decisional agonies without losing his grasp of the overall context in which they are embedded. While his chief aim is to construct a coherent narrative, in doing so Wilson demonstrates that political scientists have no monopoly on the skillful use of electoral and organizational analysis, or of the psychology of political leadership. These he uses sparingly and in *ad hoc* fashion. But it is no good pillorying historians for "having no theory" if they have insight and contribute to our understanding of general problems (in this case, how a seemingly viable political party in a stable democracy undergoes rapid disintegration).

What killed the Liberal Party? More than anything else, Wilson argues, it was the First World War and the Liberals' uncertain response to it. Nearly half of his book is devoted to a close examination of the events of 1914–18. While admitting that in the years immediately prior to Sarajevo the party had hit a patch of troubles, he refuses to credit the interpretation that by then it was inherently incapable of adjusting either to industrial society, the changing international economy, or the challenge of Labour. What it could not survive was having to lead Britain to war and directing a wartime administration based on the negation of traditional Liberal principles. No other issue was so guaranteed to tear apart the diverse groups and leaders that made up the prewar party; none was so successful in enabling the Conservative and Labour parties—for quite different reasons—to emerge with new strength in 1918.

Once the party's giant weakness became apparent in these years, it was a comparatively easy thing for its enemies, and for some of its own misguided leaders, to take full advantage of the confused and rudderless state of Liberalism to advance their own power. Though no determinist, Wilson believes that by 1918 the Liberals had painted themselves into an impossible corner, from which none of their leaders could, and none of their rivals wished, to extricate them in the following years. For this reason the events after 1924 are presented hurriedly and cryptically, and the maneuvers of Samuelites and Simonites made to look like intramural games between the survivors of Pompei.

Political parties are made and unmade by men as well as events and forces, and Wilson's account shows the extent to which the Liberals were badly served by their leaders in this period. His picture of Asquith is the familiar one of the high-minded man of inaction, personally endearing and capable of moments of insight, but hopelessly ill-equipped to understand a nation at war, the true nature of the Conservative Party, or Lloyd George. Wilson essays a more controversial, but to my mind convincing, interpretation of Lloyd George, who more than anyone else set the seal on the Liberal Party. He acknowledges him as the undoubted architect of wartime victory and as one of the few men of ideas (if not ideals) the party ever had. He analyzes in full detail the long string of pitiless plays that brought Lloyd George to power in 1916, his shabby treatment of colleagues, and his mercurial attachment to Liberal principles. Yet in his summing up, as in his presentation of events, Wilson pictures the man as essentially deficient in political judgment and self-knowledge, missing countless opportunities to advance both his own and his party's cause. "We err," he concludes, "in calling Lloyd George a Machiavellian, if we mean a man of deep purpose and ruthless practice. At times he came nearer the Machiavell of the Elizabethan stage, who revelled in intrigue for its own sake and indulged in duplicity so palpable that only the exigencies of plot caused anyone to be deceived by him. Frequently [his] political manoeuvrings suggested that he knew neither his ultimate objective nor the means of attaining it. And if he was often unscrupulous and disloyal, these qualities were so apparent that they defeated their own ends."

This book is highly recommended for students of political pathology, a subject no less important today than "development."—JAMES B. CHRISTOPH, *Indiana University*.

Wirtschaft und Politik in Deutschland. WERNER KALTEFLEITER. (Cologne: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1966. Pp. 170. 29DM.)

West Germany: Politics of Non-Planning. HANS-JOACHIM ARNDT. (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1966. Pp. xxiii, 162. $3.95, paper.)

It is a common-place to say that West German democracy is a result of the economic miracle, just as it is generally accepted that the demise of the first German Republic was a result of the depression. Some observers call the West German system a "good weather"-democracy. Kaltefleiter's paperback is a scholarly examination of this thesis. He compares political election and survey data with economic data, such as unemployment statistics and growth rates. The author, a political scientist at the University of Cologne, attributes the rise of political stability to economic stability and minimizes the impact of institutional arrangements, such as the five-percent-clause and the constructive vote-of-no-confidence. He concludes that the possibilities for party fragmentation and radicalization have not diminished. He believes that certain institutional reforms, such as electoral reform, are still worthwhile, despite the fundamental relation between economic and political stability.

If the stability of the political system is dependent upon steady economic growth, the politics of the economy become extremely important. It is here that Arndt's excellent pilot study is very useful. One of Arndt's theses is that political power in Germany has been inadequate to force economic measures which step on the toes of powerful economic groups. His interdisciplinary study of economic practice and policy in Germany provides the first detailed analysis available in English of the economic measures undertaken in recent years by the West German Government, and places them in a broad historical perspective.

Arndt gives major attention to the problem of broad macroeconomic planning based on cooperation and integration, effective by mutual consent and contract, rather than by force and coercion. In his preliminary appraisal, he makes it very clear that macro-economic planning is primarily a political, not a technological issue, and this opens the way for a thorough discussion of the entire subject of the politics of nonplanning. Arndt's presentation includes a stimulating and impressive form of social-psychological inquiry into certain shared attitudes and values of the various generations of politicians, labor leaders, and, most importantly, businessmen. Despite broad differences between the generations it is clear that there exists a philosophy of German business which gives the German business elite an overwhelming leadership role in German society and its political institutions. While it is clear that the new "Grand Coalition" government will not carry on "social market economy" policies quite as dogmatically as heretofore, it is evident from Arndt's analysis that even a purely Social Democratic government would not easily cross the Rubicon of national planning.

Yet, despite the ideology and slogans of nonplanning, there has been a great amount of government intervention and guidance in economic affairs in Germany, especially in the major aspects of growth policy: management of demand and maintenance of competitiveness and fostering of output potential by policies promoting high investment and foreign trade. Unfortunately, the examples of Nazi Germany and East Germany lead to misunderstandings of economic planning, which is seen as a system of controls and coercion. This misconception seriously hampers the debate on the issue in the Federal Republic. It is to be regretted that Arndt's book will apparently not appear in German, for the new generation of German managers could profit from it.

The books by Arndt and Kaltefleiter both contain excellent notes, bibliographies, and statistical information. For the student of German politics they are also testimony to the increasing originality and profundity of young German social scientists.—CHARLES R. FOSTER, *Washington, D.C.*

Revolutionary Hamburg: Labor Politics in the Early Weimar Republic. BY RICHARD A. COMFORT. (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1966. Pp. x, 226. $6.00.)

The author states that this monograph can best be described as "social history—the history of a social class and the development of its role in politics" (p. viii). The social class involved is the labor movement in one city, Hamburg, during the early period of the Weimar Republic (until 1924). It is a study of the intense factionalism and constant internecine combat that hopelessly divided the forces of labor during this traumatic period of German history and which "destroyed the effectiveness of organized labor as a political force" (p. 130). The forces of labor were divided into two broader "camps," the majority force, the "right," consisting of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the (socialist) Free Trade Unions (ADGB); the designation "left opposition" is used by Comfort to refer "to the entire spectrum of left-wing opposition to the majority positions of the SPD and the ADGB"—the Independent Socialists (USPD), the German Communist Party (KPD), and the leftist opposition in the trade unions, including the workers' council movement. The author is critical of what might be called the "organizational conservatism" of the SPD and union officials who, according to Comfort, lost touch with a sizable and important segment of the working class, namely the industrial workers who were expanding rapidly in numbers during this period. The SPD and the ADGB represented primarily the "labor aristocracy," the skilled craft workers. The SPD was not successful in winning over the men who represented the newly important industrial trades who drifted instead to the USPD and, later, to the KPD; the ADBG *was* successful in winning this group at first, but was unable to hold them, due to a refusal to make organizational reforms (in the direction of more intra-union democracy) or to integrate the new labor leadership into the union hierarchy. The shifting fortunes of the parties of the left (SPD, USPD, KPD) in Hamburg during this period can be understood to a considerable extent, according to Comfort, by the political behavior of the "alienated" younger industrial workers, whom the SPD failed to integrate politically. Whether the SPD *could* have successfully done so is, the author admits, an open question; the point he makes is that the party (and more especially the trade unions) did not really try: the SPD was limited by the eagerness with which they sought "acceptance" by the traditional economic elite in Hamburg and also by the party's participation in the national government; the unions were restricted by the organizational conservatism of the union hierarchy. In this failure, the author places more blame on the unions than on the SPD.

Most of the book is taken up with a chronology of Hamburg labor politics during the early Weimar period and the author does a competent job (based on solid research) in sorting out the enormous confusion of the times—the aftermath of revolution following the war, riots and demonstrations, economic crisis, uprisings on the right and the left, strains between the Hamburg and Berlin governments. Political scientists, however, will probably be more interested in the two chapters which describe the social background characteristics of leaders and members of the SPD, USPD, KPD, and the Free Trade Unions; reasonably adequate data, however, were available only for social democratic and union officials. The author makes imaginative use of data sources and presents a fascinating brief account of the political socialization (although he does not use this term) of some communist officials, based on court trial records of these leaders. The author also includes a chapter analyzing the sources of electoral support of the parties of the left in Hamburg during this period, using aggregate election returns on a district basis. Comfort acknowledges that his use of statistical techniques leaves much to be desired, pleading lack of funds and time. The author is aware of the research potential of this kind of quantitative analysis of German politics and is generally conversant with the political science literature. The study would have been greatly strengthened had the author been more analytical and less descriptive in the first two-thirds of the book, where he periodically commented on, but did not adequately come to grips with, such problems as factionalism in political parties and trade unions, the organizational conservatism of the SPD and the unions, the beginnings of the transformation of the SPD from a "workers' party" into a "people's party," and the "respective roles" (i.e., division of labor) between the SPD and the trade unions with regard to the integration of the working class politically and socially. It goes without saying that the book would have been more valuable had it treated the entire Weimar period. In general, the book is an informative case study and a welcome contribution to the politics of the German left.—William E. Wright, *University of Georgia.*

Private Interests and Public Policy: The Experience of the French Economic and Social Council. By J. E. S. Hayward. (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1966. Pp. vi, 215. $2.75.)

A growing number of books dealing with the political economy of France that are written for a British audience begin, as this one does, on an off-note of half amazement and half confession. "The French may perhaps, after all, have something to teach us about the machinery of government" (p. v). It may be hard to imagine, yet some day Americans might find themselves making similar statements. The marriage between politics and economics, analyzed by Dahl and Lindblom (*Politics, Economics, and Welfare*), apparently has proceeded further and been more successful in France than in other western countries. Thus we may indeed be able to learn from our French friends.

Mr. Hayward is concerned with what the French call "the concerted economy." This concept involves a distinctive orientation toward the formulation of public policy. It stresses "the interdependence of the government and the interest groups and the interpenetration of 'public' and 'private' decision-making characteristic of a mixed economy in which an increasing measure of state intervention has to be reconciled with an increasing measure of interest group intervention in all spheres of social activity" (pp. 3,4).

The concerted economy also involves a set of institutions which tend to break down the standard distinctions between political parties and interest groups, geographical and functional representation, and legislative and consultative bodies. One such institution, which provides the focus for this study, is the Economic and Social Council.

The book is divided into four substantive chapters that deal with the origins, the organization, the impact, and the future of the Economic and Social Council (the ESC). The idea of a council which would represent occupational groups can be found in various strains of French thought, e.g., Saint Simon, Proudhon, and the Social Catholics. The author stresses, with considerable justification, that the Facist influence was secondary and ephemeral. The formal and informal organization of the ESC is hard for the uninitiated to comprehend, since it is both complex and constantly changing. In this book it is discussed with about as much clarity as one could expect. In an interesting section devoted to the voting behavior of ESC groups, the author concludes that the most significant pattern at the moment is the apparent alliance between farmer and business groups.

The impact of any institution is exceedingly difficult to calculate, but in the case of the ESC the volatility of French politics adds additional barriers. One is thus confined to rather broad generalities. In the discussions of 1945–1946 the ESC figured prominently. It was intended to be an important institution of the Fourth Republic, but the author notes that it was usually ignored. Under the Fifth Republic the ESC has been alternately blessed and threatened. Debré showed a keen interest in making the Council a technical advisor to the Government. During the last few years, however, the Council has been of more service to the Government's opposition. Since the Bayeux speech of 1946, General de Gaulle has been talking about combining the ESC and the Senate. This and other proposals for reorganizing the ESC are discussed in the final chapter.

The study is inconclusive and contributes no new suggestions regrading the problems and possibilities of assimilating a functionally based deliberative body into the traditional parliamentary system. Still, it adds to our descriptive knowledge; and it provides a reasonably fair survey of the literature. There is no bibliography, however. The American student of the mixed economy could profit from a reading of this and other good studies of the French experience. We have been too slow in discovering this literature.—JOHN T. BATCHELDER, *University of Iowa*.

The French Prefectoral Corps, BY NICHOLAS RICHARDSON. *1814–1830.* Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1966. Pp. viii, 263. $9.50.)

This book deals with the French prefectoral corps during the period 1814–1830 from the point of view of personnel administration. It describes how Restoration prefects were recruited, promoted, transferred, and dismissed and compares them in these respects with the Napoleonic prefects as well as with Restoration subprefects and other subordinate personnel. The change from what Richardson calls the "monolithic military dictatorship" of Napoleon to the oligarchic parliamentary regime of the Restoration (with its 90,000 eligible voters) involved, as far as the prefectoral corps was concerned, three major changes: (1) the politicization of the prefectoral role, the prefect now having to contend with, as his major preoccupations, the winning of elections and the survival of frequent ministerial crises; (2) increased instability of tenure within the individual prefectures and within the corps, resulting from the difficulties of coping with these new hazards; and (3) the large influx of noblemen into the prefectoral corps, deriving from, among other things the new requirements of dynastic loyalty.

In the prefectoral system of the Restoration, there were no formal requirements for entry to the corps and none for promotion within it; there was, as yet, no hierarchy of ranks or of prefectures for career purposes. There was, moreover, a notable gap between the prefects and their subordinates, the subprefects. Prefects were more likely than subprefects to be noblemen and to be outsiders in the districts they administered: they were far more liable to transfer and dismissal. Subprefects tended to be local influentials and to remain in their native locality despite changes in regime and ministry: they seemed to have been chosen for their family's local standing, an asset they would lose, if transferred. The prime requirement for appointment at both the prefectoral and subprefectoral levels, however, was the same: family background and connections. Without an appropriate genealogy as support from the past and a set of patrons as support from the present, it was difficult, if not impossible, to obtain an appointment; once obtained, to hold on to it; and once lost, to secure a pension.

Explorations into the intricacies of Restoration politics and society allow Richardson to establish that the distinctive traits of the Restoration prefectoral corps derived from its having been based on a service nobility. For a brief period, 1815–1830, the provincial nobility of France, the rural squirearchy, occupied the machinery of the state in the service of their legitimate monarch. As prefects, the legitimist nobility could serve their king, and also re-establish their right and duty to govern. After 1830, this connection of the nobility with responsibility and reality was lost, together with the legitimist principle, the service ideal, and power within the machinery of the state.

This is a well-written, carefully and richly detailed monograph, which assumes a more than nodding acquaintance with nineteenth century French history. A chart of "Ministries and Ministers of the Interior, April 1814– July 1830," on page 207, will help to refresh the reader's recollection of Restoration cabinet crises and thus assist him in relating those broader events to the vicissitudes of prefectoral personnel management of the period. ROBERT C. FRIED, *University of California, Los Angeles.*

The Searchers: Conflict and Communism in an Italian Town. BY BELDEN PAULSON, WITH ATHOS RICCI. (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, Inc., 1966. Pp. vii, 360. $6.95.)

In this volume Belden Paulson and Athos Ricci undertake to explain why the majority of citizens in Castelfuoco, a pseudonym for a medieval hill town 30 miles from Rome, have supported and continue to support the Communist Party. But in their attempt to probe into the origin, exercise, and meaning of Communism they frequently go beyond Castelfuoco to explain present-day Communism in all of Italy.

The authors approach their research task by employing a variety of materials. The most important source of data is attitudinal material gathered through tape-recorded interviews with samples of the local citizenry. An attempt is made to detail the perceptions of some of Castelfuoco's "central characters" as selected by Ricci, a lifelong resident of the town and himself a former member of its Communist Party. Interviews are conducted with forty of these "central characters" who presumably "made" local history or typify members of important historical groups: old aristocracy, Fascists, Communist idealists, Communist practitioners of power, churchmen, Christian Democrats, bourgeois, youth, and representatives of the old rural civilization. Additional interviews are conducted with a set of "supporting actors," who are representative of local interests, and also with an anonymous two hundred of the three thousand local voters compiled by picking every fifteenth voter from the electoral lists.

The bulk of the book is composed of selected interviews which are utilized to form chapters in combination with largely excellent historical introductions. Hence we have Geppone Bostoncini, a former Blackshirt, speaking about Fascism, and Spartaco Lotta, a Communist idealist, on the role of the party, etc. This combination of historical and attitudinal data is handled most satisfactorily in the chapters concerned with the end of La Civiltá Contadina, the decline of the aristocracy, the coming of Fascism, and the advent of post-war Communism. Particularly insightful is the chapter entitled: "The Politics of the New Status Quo: The Communist Organization Men."

But in their attempt to give the reader a unique insight into the human condition of their respondents the authors commit several fundamental errors. First, and most crucial, the authors give little or no structure to their open-ended interviews: important dimensions related to hypotheses are not isolated beforehand and then systematically followed up. Instead of incisively employing the depth interview technique as does for example, Robert Lane in *Political Ideology,* Paulson and Ricci have each respondent (and some are resplendent), be he youth, priest, or bourgeois, give his own highly personal view of the world that is his Communist governed village. This procedure leads to repetition, confusion, and, most frequently, irrelevancies. At best these reports are fascinating insights into the respondent's definition of situation and his web of group affiliations. At their worst the interviews descend to the level of detailed descriptions of sex orgies among the degenerate aristocracy or rebel priests.

The logical conclusion of this poor research design and procedure is compounded when the authors become so infatuated with the responses that they fail to analyze them. At no time do they present one chart or table which might aid any reader interested in the percentage of the total sample who hold a particular attitude. Moreover, no information is presented regarding the voting behavior or party affiliations of the total sample. Hence it is impossible to tell how many respondents have changed their affiliations, e.g., how many former Fascists now vote Communist.

In their last chapter, "The Search for Commitment," Paulson and Ricci make an attempt to impose some theoretical framework on the interview material. There the argument is built around the extremely crude concept of "Searching." We are told that the people of Castelfuoco are Communists because they are searching for a way out of the *status quo* and toward a new order. Such severe problems as poverty, the failure of the church, incompetent government, and uncertain status positions are offered as reasons for the disenchantment which forms the precondition for searching. The people vote for the Communists because the other parties are less viable: the Christian Democrats are seen by the inhabitants as corrupt opportunists; the Neo-Fascists do not win because they represent a traumatic connection with the Mussolini regime, and the Socialists are simply ineffective. In short, the Communist Party is the only articulate promoter of the new order.

While the foregoing argument undoubtedly has much validity, the reader cannot help but be uneasy since Paulson and Ricci nowhere give an operational definition of "Searching." This omission renders any attempt systematically to test their hypotheses virtually impossible, which in turn severely reduces the scientific utility of the whole enterprise.

Paulson and Ricci are obviously sensitive and concerned observers of Italian society and politics and therefore it is regrettable that they do not attempt to structure their study along more theoretically fruitful lines. Because they do not, *The Searchers* at no point approaches the theoretical sophistication of other studies concerned with similar phenomena, such as Banfield's *Moral Basis of a Backward Society* or Cantril's *The Politics of Dispair.*—TIMOTHY M. HENNESSEY, *Michigan State University.*

Poland's Politics: Idealism vs. Realism. BY ADAM BROMKE. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967. Pp. x, 316. $9.95.)

Western political scientists specializing in the treacherous subject of the communist systems, hindered in their research by the unavailability of hard data and often unprepared because of their area oriented training to utilize more sophisticated modern tools of inquiry, gravitate in their writings toward either a historical interpretation of politics or toward political journalism concentrating not on the inner-working and dynamism of the system, but speculating on the personalities of various leaders and shifts of power among them. Professor Bromke is an exception only to the degree that he skillfully combines political historicism with political journalism.

The last two hundred years of Polish politics, including the present communist phase, can best be understood, Bromke argues, within the framework of oscillation between political idealism and political realism. The political idealism is defined as a moralistic interpretation of international relations in which Poland's absolute independence is viewed not only as practically desirable by the nation itself, but above all as just in accordance with the universally recognized standards of morality. Hence Poland's freedom has to be attained despite sacrifices, including constant, often hopeless but always bloody armed struggles against oppression, with the assumed assistance, on moral grounds, from the Western nations who share the Poles' ideas of the morality of freedom and self-determination.

The political realism has adopted a more pragmatic attitude, advocating certain reconciliation with the existing system of the international structure, denying validity to the moral stand and concentrating instead on an attempt to improve Poland's internal and external position within the framework of the immediately obtainable possibilities.

The oscillation between idealism and realism has resulted from Poland's extremely disadvantageous geographic location between two strong and vigorously expansionist nations—Germany and Russia, which at times have cooperated in the partitions of the country and at times have viewed it as the battle-ground between themselves. As long as Poland was powerful enough to wage war on two fronts, until the seventeenth century, the external events affected only to a degree its internal development. Once its strength was lost Poland's foreign policy became inseparably mixed with her domestic affairs. The idealists have argued a fight to the death with both opponents and alliances with the West—France, England, or the United States; the realists, accommodation with Russia, but significantly not with Germany, and a course of "organic reform" designed to improve the internal social and economic position. Few nations have debated their foreign policy with such passion and in such depth as the Poles.

On balance, in the last two hundred years, the philosophy of political idealism held sway over the Polish mentality as exemplified by the series of eighteenth and nineteenth century uprisings against the occupation by Russia, Prussia, and Austria. There were individual statesmen who carried the torch of political realism and there was an important period of "organic reform" after the disastrous anti-Russian uprising in 1863. This *enrichissez vous* and *laissez-faire* attitude contributed considerably to Poland's social and economic modernization. The dominance of idealism revived just before the 1st World War and persisted, according to Professor Bromke, through Poland's twenty years of independence, 1918–1939, and the underground fight against the German occupation, 1939–1945, to be finally and perhaps forever crushed by the staggering World War II losses culminating in a blood bath of yet another disastrous uprising—the Warsaw Rising of 1944—and aggrandized by what many Poles considered to be Western treachery at Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam.

After the war the sorrowful and beaten nation embraced realism as the only possibility of survival, led by the communists—the realists *par excellence*, disturbed only briefly by the dying pangs of idealism in the form of the anti-communist armed struggle of the nationalist diehards and the political opposition of Mikotajczyk's pro-Western and prodemocratic Peasant Party.

The communist-sponsored realism did not succeed any more than the previous "realistic" orientations for the simple reason that Stalinist Russia was not interested in the promotion of a viable, independent Poland existing within its orbit of influence any more than its Tsarist progenitor. Professor Bromke's realist hero, the immediate post-war first secretary of the communist party, Gomulka, paid for his "unrealistic national realism" with a purge from his office and a sojourn in jail for many years. Stalin was not about to diminish his power by engaging in yet another philosophical nicety à la Tito. "The Soviet Communists like their tsarist predecessors were not really interested in cooperating with the Poles. They treated Poland simply as a Russian dependency" (p. 85).

The true victory of realism came about in 1956, when the Soviet empire, shaken by Stalin's death and the resulting struggle for power in its top leadership, permitted Poland to undergo a peaceful revolution bringing Gomulka back into political control and to obtain the maximum degree of independence from the Soviet dominance possible within the existing international force alignment.

From then on Professor Bromke switches to what I have called earlier political journalism. He analyzes with painstaking care the public pronouncements of the leading Polish politicians, spiced sometimes with the less reliable, but nevertheless intellectually juicy political gossip, in relationship to their stand on political realism. His band of political "pragmatists" include not only Gomulka and his communist entourage, split into liberal and the hard "partisan" groups, but also such anomalies of Polish politics as the leaders of the two minor parties, the United Peasant Party and the Democratic Party, the communist supported progressive catholics of Pax, lead by a pre-war fascist and the opposition of the small, but vocal catholic ZNAK group, which no doubt speaks for the masses. The discussion of the last two groups and Pax's splinter derivatives is done with special care and intellectual verve. In the final analysis, Bromke claims, Poland rose from the ashes and became viable and strong again through the happy synthesis of political realism and political idealism; idealism of Gomulka's communism with his realistic assessment of Polish nationalism, idealism of catholicism with the realistic acceptance of communist rule, but above all the idealistic-realist nationalism of the desire by the Polish people to prove that "Poland will not perish, as long as we are alive" (a verse from the Polish National Anthem).

The professional reader will in vain search in *Poland's Politics* for the system analysis, the multi-factor analysis of the decision-making process or public policy formulation, and in that sense the book is a disappointment. It is basically a work of a historian in which events are fitted, often with great skill and considerable careful documentation, not devoid however of intelligent speculation, into a historiographic framework. Bromke's thesis, that the communists are as much a part of Polish tradition as other previous realist groups is challenging and polemically stimulating. Bromke's greatest contribution lies in the forceful illustration, even if only by the example of the author's approach to his subject, that Poles are prone to justify their political actions on historical grounds as much as Americans tend to use the moral coverage. And as such *Poland's Politics* is a must for the serious student of Polish political culture.—Jaroslaw A. Piekalkiewicz, *The University of Kansas.*

Politics of Socialist Agriculture in Poland: 1945–1960. By Andrzej Korbonski. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965. Pp. xii, 330. $7.50.)

The title of this book is somewhat ironic. As Korbonski convincingly demonstrates, there has been very little "socialism" in Polish Communist agricultural policy. The brief effort at Stalinist-type collectivization, begun in 1949, was essentially played out well before Gomulka's virtual invitation to liquidate the collective farms in 1956.

Much of the book is a history of the peasant movement as a political force in Poland. The author gives a good capsule summary of peasant Party politics in the interwar and wartime periods, showing that the disgrace of much of the prewar elite left the People's Party (PSL) as the only truly popular political force in postwar Poland. This summary is useful background for the subsequent analysis of the processes by which the **Communists** gained a monopoly of power.

The tragic fate of PSL and its leader Mikotajczyk are portrayed in rather less heroic colors than one usually finds in most previous Western accounts.

By contrast, Gomulka is given much (perhaps too much) credit for his realistic assessment of the possibilities of social and economic change in the village. Korbonski's well documented account of the intra-Communist Party debates on collectivization throws additional light on the profound differences between the "domestic" and "Moscow" elements within the PUWP. Gomulka, perhaps the archetype of "domesticism" in the People's Democracies in the early postwar period, is depicted as an outright opponent of collectivization right up to the time of his ouster in 1948. His public utterances made it appear that the "Polish road to socialism" might not necessarily include collectivization at all. Korbonski seems to give too much credence to these public statements, implying at times that Gomulka's stand was more than merely tactical.

In any case, the catastrophic failure of collective farming in Poland soon provided ample empirical support for Gomulka's position, whatever his real motives. For a number of reasons—political, economic, geographic, and socio-psychological (not all of which are satisfactorily illuminated by the author)—the "Muscovites" were unable to replicate their cherished Soviet model. Korbonski's analysis of Gomulka's post-1956 agricultrual policies is very nicely done. While giving due attention to the relative moderation and *laissez-faire*-ism of these policies as they affected the individual peasant, he also notes the apparently firm commitment of Gomulka to the eventual socialization of Polish agriculture. Few Western commentators have given proper attention to this long-term commitment. In this and many other respects the book is admirably perceptive and well balanced.

Nevertheless, the book has its weaknesses. Like many other works on Communist politics, it limits its focus largely to the level of high policy. Not nearly enough attention is given to the effects of national policy at the local level. The reader may feel keenly the lack of a detailed treatment of the actual practices of collectivization and the operations of the collective farms themselves.

The occasional attempts at comparative analysis, especially with Soviet patterns, are sometimes rather superficial. For example, the distinction between Polish and Soviet handling of the "kulaks" ignores significant Soviet experiences during the 'twenties. Also, the author might have done much more with the question of comparative farm-machinery policies, particularly the similarities and differences between the Soviet MTS and the Polish POM. (Might Gomulka's experience have influenced Khrushchev's decision to abolish the MTS?) Similarly, the analysis of Gomulka's long-term program of socialization might perhaps have benefited from a comparison with the so-called "Leninist Cooperative Plan" in the USSR during the 'twenties.

Finally, it is unfortunate that Korbonski was unable to cite a few of the more recent developments in Polish agriculture, such as the increasing age level of the farm operator and the apparent general stagnation of crop yields. Clearly the existing small private farm is not the answer to Poland's agricultural problems.

On the whole, these weaknesses are minor indeed. Dr. Korbonski has made a worthwhile contribution to our understanding of the politics of Communist ruling systems.—ROBERT F. MILLER, *SUNY*, *Stonybrook*.

Soviet Agriculture and Peasant Affairs. ED. BY ROY D. LAIRD. (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1963. Pp. xi, 335. $7.00.)

Soviet Agriculture: The Permanent Crisis. ED. BY ROY D. LAIRD AND EDWARD L. CROWLEY. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965. Pp. 209. $7.00.)

Both volumes under review comprise papers delivered at conferences on Soviet agriculture, one at the University of Kansas in September 1962, the other at the Munich Institute for the Study of the USSR in February 1964. The majority of articles in both books are appraisals of agricultural performance. This is particularly true of the Munich collection in which plans are compared to actualities and Soviet hopes are juxtaposed to foreboding predictions: the virgin-land project (disastrous), chemical fertilizers (problematical), peasant incomes (increasing slightly), the output of foodstuffs (goals beyond reach, prognosis poor). Papers delivered at the Kansas conference are more general, e.g., "The Soviet Apporoach to the Good Earth," "Low and High Yield Crops in the USSR," and "Soviet Statistics of Agricultural Output." In sum and substance, the extent of the Soviet agricultural crisis is persuasively documented.

Often stated, ill defined, but never proven, is the thesis of both volumes that the permanent crisis in Soviet agriculture stems from a "fundamental flaw" in the Soviet political system: (1) the contradiction between the Party's commitments to direct control when the prerequisite of productive agriculture is operational autonomy, and (2) the contradiction between the Party's commitment to collectivist values, particularly the "new Soviet man," when only individualistic incentives will give the peasant a stake in the system. The agricultural crisis is, then, rooted in the conflict between Party and peasantry values.

As was true in many of Khrushchev's plans, professor Laird's introductions promise more than is delivered:

> Agriculture is far more than a matter of farming technique. It is a way of life. If one is to have the best opportunity to understand the nature and problems of Soviet agriculture, not only are the analyses of the agronomist required, but also those of the anthropologist, the economist, the historian, the political scientist, and the sociologists. (*Soviet Agriculture and Peasant Affairs*, p. vii.)

Unfortunately, agriculture as *a way of life* is nowhere defined as a conceptual approach. From various papers and conference comments, it would appear that the notion refers to a value orientation—a set of shared attitudes which differentiates the peasantry from proletariat, rural from industrial life, and most important, the peasant from *apparatchiki*. With two exceptions—A.E. Gaev's "The Kolkhozy and Kolkhoz Worker in Soviet Literature" in the Munich collection, and Demitri B. Shumkin's excellent paper, "Current Characteristics and Problems of the Soviet Rural Population," in the Kansas volume—no concerted effort is made to define the distinctive character of Soviet agriculture as a way of life. An interdisciplinary approach might profitably focus on such key variables as how peasant values are formed, maintained despite Party efforts to transform them, and change over time. If Party-peasant values are in conflict, how is this conflict articulated and politically manifested? Without such data, and Shumkin's articles proves they can be collected, how credible is the volumes' underlying theme that the permanent crisis in Soviet agriculture is unsolvable within the boundaries of the political system? While not impugning the competence of the papers in demonstrating the extent of the agricultural crisis, the issue of contention is this—the Soviet agricultural problem is political, yet no concerted effort is made to analyze the politics of Soviet agriculture.

Without a theory of the Soviet political system it is impossible to collect, sift, and organize data on Soviet political behavior. Without such data it proves impossible either systematically to analyze the decision-making process or to build theory. This dilemma, not unique to Soviet studies, is unsolvable without the self-conscious effort of scholars to break the contradiction—to place their analysis in an explicit theoretical framework, demark the boundaries of the political arena, and determine the style of interaction between political actors. Admittedly, this is no small task. Anything less, however, reduces the significance of the contribution to our understanding of Soviet agriculture and politics.

While these remarks relate to political science generally, and to Soviet studies in particular, the criticism is specifically applicable to the volumes under review. In a lead article to the Kansas collection, Howard Swearer's paper, "Agricultural Administration under Khrushchev," raises the pertinent questions and advances a tentative framework for analyzing Soviet agriculture in the context of the Soviet political system. Synoptically, the Soviet Union is portrayed as a bureaucracy writ large. The Soviet political process is one of bureaucratic infighting in which the *dramatis personae* are the subunits of the total bureaucracy, where the executive has extensvie powers as a result of control over strategic points in the bureaucracy, and in which the sub-units lack bases of independent support in the population. Despite our sparse knowledge of the decision-making process. Swearer concludes that "recent administrative reforms in agriculture are difficult to understand without postulating that, in part at least, the leadership has been attempting to adjust interests among several competing bureaucracies, each group presenting its case as that best suited to meet national goals" (p. 14).

Obviously rudimentary, this analytical framework could lead to a theory of "bureaucratic pressure groups" and a conflict theory of Soviet politics. Regrettably, neither the potential strengths nor weaknesses were tested in either volume.—MILTON G. LODGE, *University of Iowa.*

Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership 1957–1964. BY CARL A. LINDEN. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1966. Pp. ix, 270. $7.50.)

Some time has passed since the late Victor A. Kravchenko justly regretted "the profound ignorance among alleged 'experts on Soviet Russia' about the nature and organization of power in the U.S.S.R."* Nevertheless, few political scientists have proved sufficiently gifted to capture and transmit a sense of the vital political process in the upper circles of Soviet society. Despite the revelations of former insiders such as Kravchenko and Walter G. Krivitsky, as well as the notably predictive analyses of the European observers Franz Borkenau, Isaac Deutscher, Ernst Kux, Boris Meissner, and Boris I. Nicolaevsky, most of our academics have until now been unmindful of the cardinal importance of *la politique* on the Soviet scene. The preoccupation of the vast majority of American Sovietologists with institutional and ideological themes may be largely explicable in terms of their engrossment by individual disciplines such as public administration, political theory, or, it would even appear, farm economy. It is breadth of intellect, and foremost a historically-grounded understanding of power and process as a clash of subjective desires which shapes and is shaped by the environment, that distinguish the enduring writings of Borkenau *et al.* from those professorial treatises on Soviet government which are elegantly geometric in exposition but require periodic revision of concept rather than mere detail.

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* *I Chose Freedom. The Personal and Political Life of a Soviet Official* (New York: Scribner's, 1946), p. 471.

Carl A. Linden admirably succeeds in conveying a sense of the Soviet political process in this brilliant interpretation of first-rank importance. Using as his methodological tool a scrutiny of the public utterances of leaders, against the background of history, Dr. Linden examines the character of Khrushchev's direction of policy. The main theme is accordingly stormy dispute over policy alternatives which confront the handful of figures who run the dictatorship. The range of choice in decision-making is shown to be much broader than might be expected of politicians who never tire of mouthing deterministic verbiage. Dr. Linden gets behind the wordy facade of legitimation and lays bare the not-so-unique spectacle of practical men trying to cope with practical problems. Indeed, the cynical manipulations of doctrine which are graphically illustrated usefully remind us that Communist ideology is ambiguous and must be interpreted before it gains operational significance. Moreover, the weighty evidence of Khrushchev's improvisations, and conflict-bound immobilism in policy-making, tend to cast doubt on the soundness of trying to distinguish between Communist "grand design" and the living reality called "tactics."

Still another virtue of this impressive study is how it lucidly traces the interaction between domestic and foreign policy. We see how the leaders of different schools of thought conveniently fabricate images of the outer world which accord with the ambitions of divergent interests in the power structure. In short, there is no static definition of "national interest," but arbitrary estimates which must somehow be harmonized with a view toward the changing configurations of power at home and abroad. Here the essential comparability of policy-making in Moscow and Washington is striking. It is a matter for further investigation in which city ideological interests are more regarded as a basis of statecraft.

As Dr. Linden says, differences are likely to arise over particulars in his study. The root of the cleavage between reforming and orthodox tendencies in the elite might have been located in varying appraisals of the society's cohesiveness, with innovative rulers less fearful of promoting the growth of centrifugal forces below. The adverse effects of the Cuban failure on Khrushchev's personal prestige in early 1963 may be slightly overstated insofar as the premier apparently instigated controversial decisions to allocate millions of rubles to build new poultry factories (January 8, 1963), revamp industrial planning (January 11, 1963), and oust the chief of the General Staff (March 1963). Also, the descriptions of Brezhnev as a Khrushchev "protégé" in 1960 and "ally" in 1963 might have been justified by recalling that in the meantime Brezhnev had deplored "anger" in politics, and that suggested misgivings about his original patron.

Such minor reservations can in no way detract from the great value of this highly sophisticated analysis, which merits the closest attention by interested scholars.—Sidney I. Ploss, *The George Washington University.*

The Mongolian People's Republic. By Robert A. Rupen. (Stanford: The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, 1966. Pp. 74. $2.00.)

For a good time there has been a need for a fairly short paperback on this little known country often referred to by its historical and geographical name of Outer Mongolia, but which has been called officially the Mongolian People's Republic since 1924; actually, it was the first of the People's Republics, all the others having been created since World War II. From this point of view Professor Rupen's booklet is very welcome, especially as the author has written many articles on the subject in recent years and also published a book, *Mongols of the Twentieth Century* (Bloomington, Ind., 1964), which contains many important documents.

However, the study before us is Volume II of a series entitled *Integration and Community Building Among the Fourteen Communist Party-States,* edited by Jan F. Triska, who assures us in his preface that "the symposium is not planned to be yet another collection of writings about Communist countries." The author is therefore forced to present his material and, partly his interpretations, under the same prescribed sub-headings in more than one chapter (The Belief System; the Social System; Degree of Integration with Other Systems). Though it is not the author's fault, in a short, tightly conceived work of this kind, given the limited approach, the impression of a certain artificiality in the design could not be avoided since a good number of facts, aspects, and also some qualifications had to be omitted.

The Mongolian People's Republic is in many ways *sui generis,* not only due to its large size, sparse population of about one million, isolated yet exposed geographical position between the two giants, Russia and China, but also due to its special long-standing relationship with Soviet Russia. Some of the vicissitudes of this relationship are discussed. Without Soviet advice, help, and pressure the radical political, social, economic, and cultural changes could not have been carried out. The Russians must have had great difficulties in finding the human "instruments" to execute their policies, especially those which reflected major policy changes in the Soviet Union. In the all-important economic sector of livestock, progress has been slow and difficult. The elite, which runs the affairs of the country, is still very limited in number. In view of the fact that interpretations of developments in Mongolia have to rely nearly exclusively on Soviet Russian sources and visits on the spot are severely limited as to time and scope, our knowledge of the attitudes of the Mongols themselves will consist mainly of individual inferences and impressions, a factor which will remain a drawback of any study of the country.

Rupen mentions that there has been a certain relaxation toward the use of the old Mongolian script which was officially replaced by the cyrillic script in the 1940's. Personal information confirms that a number of educated Mongols correspond with each other in the old script.

In recent years the Mongols have been able to establish relations with some other countries. Rupen mentions Mongolia's membership of the Council of Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA) as "a new device for binding the M.P.R. even closer to the Soviet Union." It could be added that Czechoslovakia and East Germany have also been active, and presumably still are, in establishing industrial plants; a number of Czechs work at Darkahn, north of the capital Ulan Bator. Poles have been able to organize several scientific research projects, not only the Joint Polish-Mongolian paleontological expedition, but also others for which, according to information obtained, permission was granted more readily than to others, allegedly including Russians.

Chinese aid in loans and laborers, which reached its peak in the late 1950's, and which Rupen discusses in its main outlines, has been by now radically reduced. It was interesting to notice, in 1965, that the showcases in front of the Chinese Embassy in Ulan Bator contained only photographs relating to China's military strength whereas those of East European diplomatic missions were confined to economic and cultural activities.

Recent developments in the Sino-Soviet Conflict, together with a Chinese claim to the M.P.R. as "lost territory," have enhanced Mongolia's strategic key position in Asia. From the point of view of the scholar who is also interested in other aspects of the country, this does unfortunately not promise greater facilities for obtaining reliable data.—GERARD M. FRITERS, *Laval University, Quebec.*

The Arab Ba'th Socialist Party: History, Ideology, and Organization. BY KAMEL S. ABU JABER. (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1966. Pp. xvi, 218. $6.50.)

This book is an important study of the Ba'th party, written by a student of Middle East politics who can claim familiarity with the region. Dr. Abu Jaber was born and raised in Jordan before coming to the United States for his education. We, therefore, have the benefit of a "dual perspective," as the blurb on the jacket states.

As Philip Hitti indicates in the Foreword to this book, the Ba'th is one of very few organizations in the Arab world which can be given the designation of party. Its effective appeal to Arab intellectuals, its accession to power in Syria and for a while in Iraq, and its contributions to the ideology of Arab nationalism combine to underline the need for a good understanding of the Ba'th. Considering the limitations inherent in a study of this subject, Abu Jaber's book does a commendable job of presenting the history, ideology and organization of the party. But limitations there certainly are, and this is by no means a comprehensive or final history of the Ba'th, nor does the author claim it to be such.

One important limitation is the lack of an adequate analysis of the reasons and motives which have impelled certain intellectuals to join the Ba'th party, whereas other intellectuals, who have had similar backgrounds, have apparently been able to satisfy their search for identity and self-expression by joining other, even antagonistic, movements or parties. Perhaps one way to probe this question is to ask how the party came into being. The author is not entirely clear on this point. In one place (p. 19), he attributes the emergence of the Ba'th to the impact of Western civilization on the traditional societies of the area, and the desire to see the conditions in the Arab world improved. Later (p. 149) we are told that the party came about as a reaction to Communist gains in the Arab world. It may well be that both these factors are important. But we are still in the dark as to why this situation would engender a Ba'th party as opposed to a Moslem or a Syrian organization, for example.

Professor Abu Jaber gives an excellent picture of the in-fighting and splits which have plagued the Ba'th. Two issues have been most important. One pertains to the function of the party, especially once Arab unity is realized. The party, as the author points out, was unable to present a viable program for unification, despite its strong advocacy of a unified Arab world. This was to prove quite costly, not only for the party but for the Arab nationalist cause generally.

The other important issue is the party's stand on socialism. The reader is not quite certain just how important socialism is to the Ba'th. There is little doubt that the Ba'th, as the author argues, is primarily a nationalist party. But the very history of the party and the various polemics and splits within the Ba'th may be taken as a negation of the statement that "the Socialist aspect of the party is ancillary to its nationalism" (p. 147). Indeed, the author himself states that "the principal concern of this book is to examine the scope and substance of that brand of Arab socialism advocated by the Ba'th party . . . " (p. 8). Besides, Michel Aflaq himself talked of the idea of socialism as an eternal axiomatic truth, and argued that Arab nationalism, without socialism, ceases to exist. (*Fi sabil al-ba'th*, 1959, pp. 96, 233.)

The book would have benefited from a closer scrutiny of the references in the footnotes and one or two passages which are not clear. For example, Naji and Lusian are not the surnames but the first names of Allush and George (pp. 186, 187). The paragraph on pp. 63–64 is confusing in that it is not clear whether it is the National or the Regional command that is being referred to.

There are three appendixes, the most useful pertaining to the decisions of the sixth national convention of the Ba'th, held in 1963. A bibliographic essay is beneficial, particularly concerning Arabic sources.—MICHAEL W. SULEIMAN, *Kansas State University*.

Asian Bureaucratic Systems Emergent from the British Imperial Tradition. ED. BY RALPH BRAIBANTI. (Durham. N. C.: Duke University Press, 1966. Pp. xx, 733. $17.50.)

Administrative Problems in Pakistan. ED. BY GUTHRIE S. BIRKHEAD. (Syracuse, N. Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1966. Pp. xiii, 223. $5.00.)

Revolution in Pakistan. BY HERBERT FELDMAN. (London: Oxford University Press, 1967. Pp. x, 242. $6.50.)

The story of the British in India covers a period of over three centuries—starting with the traders of the East India Company, continuing with the development of a highly qualified British ruling elite belonging to the Indian Civil Service (ICS), and closing with the Indianization of the Service, the independence of India, and the withdrawal of the British. Less than 800 British members of this ruling elite controlled almost 400 million Indians. In his contribution to *Asian Bureaucratic Systems Emergent from the British Imperial Tradition*, Bernard Cohn skillfully surveys their recruitment and training from 1600–1860.

Hugh Tinker carries the account forward to the years of British withdrawal and differentiates the structure of this imperial heritage in India, Ceylon, Burma, and Malaya. This and other chapters clearly demonstrate that elite cadres are still in command today.

Ralph Braibanti presents abundant evidence that such is the case in Pakistan. Its elite cadres not only continue to occupy the older strategic posts, they have moved into key new posts: the chairmanships of public corporations and directorships of training institutions. He concludes that the elite cadre concept is stronger than ever; its opponents are in retreat, and Pakistan's politicization is sedated and controlled by institutional devices.

David Potter finds that in India (as in Pakistan) the old ICS dominates the Union (central) administration, while the younger Indian Administrative Service (IAS) holds key state and district posts and has moved into public corporations. Potter argues, not too convincingly, that the elite cadre in India is accountable to and controlled by non-bureaucratic political institutions.

James Guyot tells how the British control of Burma was less effective; their civil servants were less respected; they brought few benefits and undermined existing institutions that had served the Burmese well. The country was less impoverished, more literate, and more politicized than its neighbors to the west. In World War II the British lost status by fleeing as the Japanese occupied the country. When independence was granted in 1948, all British officers were given notice. The break with the past was abrupt. The indigenous political elite, according to Guyot, "then harassed the Civil Service until both elites were displaced by the Burmese army" which "set out to solve the problem of politics by casting out parliamentary democracy and attempting to establish a totalitarian system. . . ."

By contrast, careful preparation smoothed the transition to independence in Ceylon (related by Sir Charles Collins). After 1937 only Ceylonese were recruited into the Civil Service. Local self government and education were well advanced prior to the formal transfer of power. Robert Kearney explained the recent civil service reforms, trade unionism, and the explosive language controversy in Ceylon.

Robert Tilman's account of bureaucratic development in Malaya describes the rapid "Malayanization" of the services, the peaceful and friendly transfer of power, and the use of Whitley Councils. Malaya is not an "administered" state, "for there are elected and appointed politicians who guide the government just as much as does the bureaucracy."

Merrill Goodall ("Administrative Change in Nepal") describes the frustrations of administrative advisers in a country that was not a part of the British imperial tradition. The monarch and palace secretariat, supported by the police and the army, constitute the center of power. A separate "government secretariat" and a sizable (and competitive) foreign aid community also play active supporting roles.

As Braibanti admits, no consistent research design was imposed on the writers of this volume. The countries are not given uniform treatment nor are uniform data available. A focus is provided (except for Nepal) by the British ICS elite cadre heritage and the nature of political development since independence. The book is packed with significant data and well footnoted throughout.

Administrative Problems in Pakistan is a modest volume by six American professors—all of whom have served with the Administrative Staff College in Lahore.

Lawrence Ziring focuses on Basic Democracies—the four tiered system of local councils established by President Ayub Khan in 1959. He considers their organization, the lack of real authority at the lower levels where action is needed, the promising rural programs in East Pakistan, the frustrations of the neglected urban dwellers, and the ominous signs that President Ayub may be considering the development of a one party state.

Since the higher bureaucracy plays the dominant role in the Pakistani government and the elected assemblies a "rather inconsequential role," A. Lee Fritschler argues that the bureaucracy should take the initiative in developing procedures that will permit business and other non-bureaucratic groups to participate in the policy formation process.

George Platt examines the major obstacles to a more productive agriculture, among them: the absence of a satisfactory credit or marketing system; the lack of rural education; and the generalist civil service which discriminates against the agricultural expert and whose administrators are shifted too much ever to become committed to any particular agricultural program. Platt describes some of the efforts to overcome these obstacles: Agricultural Development Corporations, the Water and Power Development Authorities, and the Academies for Rural Development. He shares Ziring's enthusiasm for East Pakistan's development centers, but is critical of the lack of imagination and planning in the higher echelons of the agricultural establishment.

West Pakistan today has the largest irrigation works in the world, yet large supplies of both surface and ground water are unused, and salt accretion and waterlogging take 100,000 acres of land out of cultivation each year. Thus the West Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority devotes its major energies to irrigation and reclamation. Guthrie Birkhead gives the reader a close and most interesting look at the problems of this new (1959) and thriving public corporation.

For contrast, Raymond Miller focuses on a public corporation that dates from 1886: the Karachi Port Trust. It has been plagued with tradition, inertia, congestion from poor planning, slowdowns and work stoppages, elitism, the absence of middle management, pilferage, village and tribal rivalries among labor groups, and cumbersome procedures. In spite of it all, the Karachi Port Trust has been a fantastically valuable asset for Pakistan and manages to get its work done with comparative efficiency.

Finally, Albert Gorvine suggests that "administrative reform, to be successful, must be associated with a significant political, social, or economic reform which in effect 'cracks the power structure' of the bureaucracy." Citing many examples, he concludes that the Civil Service of Pakistan is still in control, screening out any reforms which might affect it adversely. Gorvine anticipates, however, that political and economic developments will ultimately result in administrative reforms.

Herbert Feldman's *Revolution in Pakistan* is a study of the 44 months of martial law administration (October 1958 to June 1962). Drawing heavily on newspapers and official publications, he considers economic reforms, land reforms, agriculture, reform in the public services and in politics, social reform, Basic Democracies, family laws, foreign policy, relations with India, the Constitution of 1962, and other matters. With so many topics it lacks depth; the author skims hastily over one subject and goes on to the next. It is, nevertheless, useful for one seeking a quick review of the topics mentioned above.

Feldman concludes that President Ayub Khan did not go far enough, that in carrying out his policies he was too conciliatory. The institution of Basic Democracies is described as "premature." The declaration of martial law was really "a simple reversion to paternalism" as practiced by the British a century before.

The first of these three books will appeal to South Asia specialists, all but the avant-garde in comparative government circles, and social scientists who study bureaucratic elites. The second book will interest public administrators with a developmental orientation. The third book is appropriate for the general reader who has a special interest in Pakistan or military rule.—HENRY F. GOODNOW, *University of Colorado.*

India's Roots of Democracy: A Sociological Analysis of Rural India's Experience in Planned Development Since Independence. BY CARL

C. Taylor, Douglas Ensminger, Helen W. Johnson and Jean Joyce. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966. Pp. xii, 694. $10.00.)

This study of national policy and performance in Indian rural development—only indirectly is it concerned with the basic problem of "grass-roots" perception of such development—begins with eight chapters which constitute an introduction of uneven quality to selected aspects of Indian history and social organization. This section is apparently intended to familiarize the expected audience of "planners and directors of development programmes" (p. viii) with some of the problems and exotic features of Indian society. For anyone familiar with India, most of these chapters are superficial, but the authors do bring together some useful materials on population structure and the economic condition of the Indian people around 1950, when the planning process got underway in India.

One might take specific exception, however, to the book's treatment of caste and the joint family. The authors insist too strongly upon the dysfunctional aspects of Indian social structure for development, but they never make a case based on hard evidence. They generally fail to take into account the flexibility of Indian society and the extent to which the joint family, in particular, has adapted to urban and industrial conditions. Indeed, it appears that joint families have been made *more* viable by the practice of sending younger brothers to work in the city, where they can earn money which can be utilized toward the support of the rest of the family.

The middle ten chapters of the book are considerably more valuable. They set down at some length the aims and accomplishments of planning for rural India in several fields: agricultural practices, land reform, cooperatives, rural industries, local government, education, health, and social services. The authors have a tendency to review these programs uncritically and to accept at face value the declarations of every study team or planning group involved in the development field, but it is useful to have all of these statements gathered in one place. This utility is somewhat flawed for the academic reader, however, by the absence of adequate footnotes.

If the middle section is concrete in its treatment of the values of the planners and their achievements in structuring programs, the final section consisting of nine chapters is disappointing. The authors are unable to come to grips with the problem of motivating the peasant. In their desire to identify themselves as "sociological scientists"—their term—they substitute too many pretentious generalizations drawn from the literature of social psychology for a practical set of ideas about ways of "catalyzing an upward socio-economic cycle" in India. Only in the last chapter, after nearly two hundred pages of pseudo-behavioral insights, do they admit that we still do not know much about the basic motivations of the Indian villager.

In the last section, too, the authors offer some minor prescriptions for changes in the emphases and organization of the rural development program. They advocate more concern with two way communications processes and the development of an administrative structure which can galvanize "team" efforts—in contrast to the present fragmented and over-bureaucratized system of administration. Such suggestions are not novel and do not warrant the muddy prose which precedes them, but they may point to the real problem with this book.

Given the concern of the authors with problems of involving the peasant in the development process, they are notably wary of saying anything meaningful about political life in India. In particular, they pay little attention to the role performed by practicing politicians as agents of social mobilization and upward communication. Like tourists visiting an exhibition of ancient artifacts, the authors are aware of the *formal* features of *panchayati raj*, but they are almost embarrassingly silent about the developmental implications of political conflicts as they manifest themselves at every level of Indian society. Typically, while they dwell at great length on the national goals enunciated in the Five Year Plans, they do not even mention the politics of planning nor do the authors recognize the discreet retreats from earlier policy stands made by national leaders in matters like cooperative farming because of political pressures from below.

The resultant appearance of naivete may, however, reflect the practical position of the authors. They have all been involved with technical assistance programs through various governmental agencies and foundations. Some observers have suggested that Douglas Ensminger's role as Ford Foundation representative in India has given him a very influential place in the planning system; this practical experience is not reflected, unfortunately, in the present study.

The ultimate difficulty is that professional advice-givers are not always in a position to provide valuable insights into how programs really operate. To be politic, it becomes necessary to overlook some obvious defects and to hedge criticisms with a more than equal dose of praise. Because the authors weave an unsteady course between repeating the platitudes of the Indian government and trying to expose to public view some of the real difficulties of administration and motivation in village India, the product of their effort is often unsatisfying. Until more systematic studies are available connecting national goals to local perceptions and motivations, however, we may still find value in this non-official technical assistance handbook, despite the fact that it too often settles for homily instead of trying to identify the grit of the system.—DONALD B. ROSENTHAL, *State University of New York, Buffalo.*

The Development of an Interest Group: The Philippine Medical Association. BY ROBERT STAUFFER. (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1966. Pp. ix, 192. P 12.00.)

In view of the importance attached to associational development by such scholars as Almond, Banfield, and others and the general recognition of the urban-rural, national-local, modern-traditional gap in the social and political life of the new states, case studies of interest groups are clearly to be welcomed. Properly chosen and carefully analyzed, such cases can tell us much about the political system of which they are a part and can contribute to a better theoretical understanding of the developmental process. It is with these objectives in mind that Robert Stauffer has conceived this analysis of the Philippine Medical Association. In his words, he has chosen to study a "single Philippine interest group from the point of view of using its changing response to the political community and its developing internal organization as indexes of change in the larger political system" (p. 6).

Stauffer's main findings are divided into two categories: the development of internal PMA organization and the changing patterns of PMA-government relationships. Internally, power is concentrated in the President and Executive Council, with the legislative body, the House of Delegates, serving a primarily legitimizing function. The last two decades have witnessed a considerable diffusion of political power within the PMA, once tightly controlled by government physicians working in Manila but now more broadly representative of private practitioners and provincial doctors as well. The election of leaders is highly competitive and heavily dependent on personal loyalties and alliances, an often-noted characteristic of Filipino political behavior in general. Voting blocs based on institutional loyalties are also numerous (and to some extent overlapping), including Manila vs. the provinces, government vs. private doctors, and University of Santo Tomas vs. University of the Philippines graduates.

In its relationships with elected officials, the PMA has moved away from a reliance on personalistic ties toward more impersonal and formal lobbying techniques. Where a decade ago the PMA relied heavily on its President's influence with the President of the Philippines and on the presence of physicians in Congress, it now makes more extensive use of such formal proceedings as Congressional committee hearings to present its views. The latter method, Stauffer argues, has been somewhat more successful, although the overall record of PMA influence with the President and Congress seems, on the basis of the evidence, to be only fair. In their relationships with administrators, the Association's leaders continue to use, and are very dependent upon, ties of personal friendship, particularly between the PMA President and the Secretary of Health. Stauffer concludes that the PMA in the post-independence era has become a much stronger organization, more influenced in its internal politics by private as opposed to government doctors (and thus more autonomous of the government), more nationally- (as opposed to Manila-) oriented, more systematic and impersonal in its relationships with the government, and more effective in its communications with the public, changes which reflect parallel developments in the political process as a whole.

At least two serious criticisms of the book should be made. The first is methodological, and relates to Stauffer's rather extreme reliance on interviews with present and past PMA officials. Surely for an organization as old and as highly developed as the PMA more quantifiable data, e.g., voting records for the annual national conventions, are available to test his hypotheses. Without such data, much of the argument is inconclusive, most notably the discussion of political blocs and shifting patterns of influence within the organization (Ch. 5, esp. pp. 59–71). A perhaps more fundamental criticism is the "so what" question, that is, what is the relevance of a study of the Philippine Medical Association for a deeper understanding of Philippine politics and/or the problems of associational development in general? In his conclusion, for example, Stauffer asserts that "the fact that the Association has been able to build a national network of provincial chapters suggests that organization skills are developing rapidly in the Philippines . . . " (p. 150). On the contrary, it would seem to this reviewer that medical associations in new states, consisting as they do of highly trained, highly modernized individuals, are likely to be unrepresentative of interest group activity in general. Analysis of such an atypical interest group, while containing useful information and some interesting insights about political leadership in the Philippines, is of only limited utility to the student of political development. What is needed (and what we do not yet have) are more broadly comparative (either within one country or crossnational) interest group studies which can suggest the range and importance of the various types of groups and the conditions under which they do or do not develop. R. WILLIAM LIDDLE, *The Ohio State University.*

Japanese Political Style: An Introduction to the Government and Politics of Modern Japan. BY WARREN M. TSUNEISHI. (New York: Harper's, 1966. Pp. viii, 226. $2.75, paper.)

The sub-title of this short text tells what it is. The title itself indicates Dr. Tsuneishi's approach. In general content and organization this is another addition to the growing set of mini-texts in comparative government, and should be compared with those of Professors Burks, McNelly, and Langdon. What makes Dr. Tsuneishi's work somewhat different is a point of view which becomes explicit only on the last page: " . . . the significance of the Japanese political experience of the past century lies precisely in the fact that apparently contradictory eastern and western approaches to the fundamental problems of government have been harmonized with surprising success. In particular, Japan has been able to adapt western parliamentary democracy to an eastern mold, and she has thus provided a government system capable of dealing successfully with the first problem of politics: the responsible use of power. . . . western democracy need not be copied entire but may be successfully adapted without complete denaturation to accord with national conditions and needs."

Lest this sound too syrupy, it should be noted that Dr. Tsuneishi eulogizes Japan no more than American texts eulogize the United States. Indeed, an outstanding feature of *Japanese Political Style* is its incorporation of the opinions of, and the research being conducted by, Japanese social scientists, especially in the areas of voting behavior, public opinion, and corruption. Nor does Dr. Tsuneishi pursue his conclusion blinkered by a narrow notion of government. His short chapter on "Political Economy" offers the conclusion "that the [financial and industrial] interest groups constitute an organic part of the government mechanism, with the political parties serving as middlemen." (Plural on parties in original.) A case study of the 1960 Security Treaty struggle, a sensitive discussion of the position of the Emperor and popular attitudes toward him, a summary of how the constitutional controversy around Article IX ("no war") became a political issue and was thereby gradually resolved, an examination of the process of Cabinet formation, a brief sketch of the budget-making process, an analysis of the two major parties' internal situation, and other interesting sections supplement—and over-shadow—descriptions of the "functions and powers" of the various organs of government. There is much information here, it is readable, and it is presented fully and honestly enough that a careful reader could even draw conclusions different from those of Dr. Tsuneishi himself (though this reviewer does not).

The major weakness of this book plagues *all* attempts to write textbooks on the government and politics of non-Western nations: we simply do not know enough. Not much can be done about it, in the short run. If one needs a text on Japanese politics, he must be aware that the standards of evidence underlying conclusions reached in any of them are simply not very high.

All this aside, there are still a surprising number of minor factual errors and of highly debatable judgments passed off as fact within these 226 pages. (Fujiyama Aiichiro was not appointed to the Cabinet in the early 1950s, and was not a favorite of ex-Prime Minister Yoshida, contrary to p. 49; all of Japan's best universities are not state operated, contrary to p. 72; participation of the Liberal-Democratic Party in budget policy-making is not "from time to time" and "formal," contrary to p. 85; and so on.) Moreover, although Dr. Tsuneishi's study is more up-to-date than the texts of Burks and McNelly, to say nothing of those by Professors Yanaga or Quigley and Turner, this book has already fallen somewhat behind the rapid pace of political changes in Japan. For example, the *Komeito* (a religiously-based political party with voter support and Diet strength equal to or greater than the Democratic Socialists' today) is dismissed here as a "fringe group." The ruling, Liberal-Democratic Party (which obtained less than one-half of the popular vote in the January, 1967, general elections) is predicted here to remain in power indefinitely, barring some major "catastrophe."

But even with these minor defects, Dr. Tsuneishi has given us a highly readable, informative, sympathetic, and useful introduction to politics and government in Japan.—MICHAEL LEISERSON, *Tokyo.*

Communist China in World Politics. BY HAROLD HINTON. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1966. Pp. xiii, 506. $7.50.)

After a decade of intensive cultivation and extensive fertilization by universities, foundations, and governmental agencies, the field of Communist Chinese studies is gradually bearing fruit. It has attracted a rapidly growing body of scholars with impressive linguistic skills and solid training in the various substantive disciplines. They have brought into the field their particular talents and specialized knowledge. They have endeavored in their own way to overcome the serious difficulties presented by the limited amount of factual information available and to achieve originality in their work. The blooming of empirical theories in the social sciences has enabled some of them to link seemingly unique and superficially insignificant facts about China to basic concepts and generalizations on human behavior developed in the western world. The persistent and energetic search for fresh, detailed, and reliable information through interviews with refugees and in published or reproduced source materials, some not easily obtainable, has made it possible for others to undertake microscopic studies of industrializing, modernizing urban areas or of specialized agencies and activities of the regime.

But whatever the research, the availability of factual information and source material is decisive for its success; and depending on the nature of the subject, skill in examining esoteric communication or "kremlinology" is more or less essential, while the degree of theoretical sophistication in the analysis of the data varies with the preference, interests, and approach of the individual scholar. The limitations imposed by the lack of data, particularly stringent in the study of the foreign policy and political-military strategy of Communist China, can be more easily overcome by scholars associated with government research agencies or government-sponsored research organizations. In such environments, open or classified source materials are more readily available, and the art of analyzing esoteric communication and intelligence research is developed to perfection in day-to-day activities. Thus, they have given us many of the better writings on the foreign policy of Communist China.

This book by Harold Hinton of the Institute of Defense Analyses falls into this category. Its coverage is comprehensive, ranging from a discussion of the roots of Peking's foreign policy to the relations between China and sub-Sahara Africa. A vast body of the best published works on specialized subjects, the major newspapers, research memoranda, memoirs, Peking's and Moscow's official publications, etc., has been consulted and fairly effectively used. Complex historical events are clearly and concisely described; particularly impressive is the chapter on the Sino-Indian border. The volume is evidently the product of a scholar who has followed the events closely over a number of years from the vantage point of Washington. It is an informative general survey which is highly useful as a text or a general reference work both for scholars and laymen.

Hinton relies almost exclusively on the method of "kremlinology." He rejects theories of social and political action as "vague and pretentious." Thus, he deprives himself of the opportunity to adopt an approach which has made the writings on Chinese politics of G. William Skinner, John W. Lewis, Franz Schurmann, Chalmers Johnson, and Ezra Vogel, novel, stimulating, and provocative. Nor does he attempt to provide a broad, general, systematic interpretation of Peking's foreign policy. There is a section on the rise of the Chinese Communist movement, but the significance of this revolutionary experience and strategy of the Chinese Communist Party for understanding Peking's international behavior is not adequately discussed. In a "postscript" chapter dated October 1, 1965, Lin Piao's important article of September 3, 1965, on People's War is not mentioned.

Hinton has striven after originality in his analysis and interpretation rather than after judicious and balanced judgment such as A. Doak Barnett provided in his *Communist China and Asia*. He comes to conclusions, sometimes credible, sometimes merely plausible, and at other times so startling and highly speculative as to stretch one's imagination to the breaking point. In his analysis of the origin of the Korean War, he rightly stresses the North Korean interest in bringing about reunification through full-scale invasion. But in discussing the respective roles of the Soviet Union and Communist China, he argues for an interpretation diametrically opposite to the generally accepted view of Allan S. Whiting in *China Crosses the Yalu* that the Soviet Union played the primary role in planning the attack while China lacked direct responsibility for its initiation or outcome. According to Hinton, it was probably Mao who at the Moscow conference urged a reluctant Stalin to reverse his earlier decision and give the North Koreans the permission and logistical support necessary for a formal invasion. This is a plausible interpretation, but it is offered with less supporting evidence than Whiting's. Less plausible is Hinton's view that after Eisenhower threatened in February, 1953, to extend the war to the Chinese mainland and to use nuclear weapons, Stalin was prepared to take drastic military action of some sort in support of Communist China because he intended a preemptive attack against Yugoslavia (the primary evidence given by Hinton consists of an article in *Pravda* and a *New York Times* report that the Yugoslav government was seeking western collaboration in defense), and that he "was therefore killed on the initiative of elements in Soviet military high command and civilian leadership." Hinton also ventures the theory that Khrushchev decided in 1964 to knock out China's nuclear installations with a missile strike and that his colleagues removed him to prevent him from carrying out his plan. On the basis of these and other interpretations as well as through a series of inferences, he draws the conclusion that "the American containment of the CPR, and in particular the denial of Taiwan to the CPR, has been a major factor . . . in fact in bringing down both Stalin and Khrushchev." Hinton's speculation may turn out to be correct, but a more cautious man would wait for more evidence before formally expounding his views and linking them with American policy. One may perhaps suggest that in the field of scholarship a respect for the limits imposed by the method used and the evidence available is analogous to a recognition of the limits of power in statecraft.

Yet in spite of these lapses, the great bulk of the book is based on a wealth of materials and solid research. It is a valuable contribution to the growing body of literature on Communist China.—TANG TSOU, *University of Chicago.*

Student Nationalism in China, 1927–1937. BY JOHN ISRAEL. (Stanford Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1966. Pp. ix, 253. $7.50.)

The explosive force of student nationalism—most recently seen in the frenetic behavior of Mao's zealous young Red Guards—has had a long, and at times profound, influence on modern China's political development. John Israel's fascinating account of the Chinese student movement in the decade 1927–37 makes a substantial contribution to our understanding of the role of student political activity during this crucial period. It also provides new insight and background for interpreting later developments.

In broad outline, Israel sets out to examine the "changes in the quality of the party-student relationship" over the ten years from Chiang Kai-shek's victorious Northern Expedition, which brought the Kuomintang to power as a national government, to the outbreak of war against Japan in 1937. He asks why these changes occurred and how they affected the course of political history.

Noting the contribution of intellectual discontent—born of nearly a century of imperialist humiliation, ideological bankruptcy, and inept and rapacious warlord rule—to the Kuomintang's triumph in 1927, the present study traces the attempts of the Nanking government to harness and control the volatile, erratic student radicals in its service. It suggests that from the start this task was complicated, if not rendered ultimately impossible, by Chiang Kai-shek's break with the Communists, which brought the Kuomintang under conservative control and deprived it of much revolutionary appeal. "Having turned against the social revolution in April 1927, the Kuomintang had to base its appeal to the younger generation on its reputation as *the* nationalist party of China."

Japanese aggression, beginning with the Mukden Incident in 1931, presented the frail, new Kuomintang regime with a thorny dilemma. It could either attempt to honor its nationalist (i.e., anti-imperialist) reputation by immediate, full-scale armed resistance (for which China was woefully unprepared) or it could try to appease Japan, at least temporarily, while simultaneously striving to build up China's strength and to eliminate the major sources of national disunity—the Communist revolutionaries and dissident warlords. A commitment to the first alternative would have threatened military disaster. However, election of the second was to lead almost inevitably to the alienation of impatient patriotic elements, including much of the younger generation, and to a suppression of the student nationalism which the Kuomintang had once fostered.

From mid-1932 to mid-1935 a combination of circumstances temporarily dampened the fire of student discontent. "Increasingly settled conditions in the economy and education, a temporary lull in Japanese aggression, and the absence of the radical leaders who had been purged by the White Terror" helped keep student political activity in check. However, the Kuomintang did not succeed in winning back the younger generation despite a variety of efforts to inspire and discipline it ranging from the imaginative rural reconstruction program to the New Life Movement, and even the militaristic Regeneration Society (popularly known as the Blueshirts). The immediate consequences of this failure might have been worse had not Communist efforts also been hamstrung by conflicting goals and inopportune tactics.

In the face of renewed Japanese pressures in 1935 and Nanking's continued appearance of humiliating impotence and obsession with Communist-suppression, the latent force of student nationalism burst forth again across the land. The December Ninth Movement of that year saw the beginning of a decisive trend toward the left among student groups. From that time on "Communist techniques shaped raw nationalism into a purposeful political force." In the Sian Incident and subsequent Kuomintang-Communist United Front against Japan the student movement became the pawn of the two dominant political parties, torn apart and purposefully bled to serve their particularistic interests. Subsequently, the Kuomintang's failure to provide a sufficient revolutionary appeal and outlet for student nationalism—which had proved to be an increasingly powerful force in mass mobilization—helped pave the way for Mao Tse-tung's victory.

Professor Israel's analysis is both well written and impressively documented—two qualities not often found in the same volume. Although he modestly describes it as a "pioneering effort" rather than a "definitive" work, *Student Nationalism in China, 1927–37* is the product of nearly a decade of research and thought on the subject. It is solidly based on an investigation of the principal relevant documentary collections in the United States (the Hoover and Harvard libraries in particular), Japan, and Taiwan (including the Kuomintang Archives and the Bureau of Investigation collection). In addition to the written record, important information has been gleaned from interviews—in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and elsewhere—with actual participants in the student demonstrations of the 1920's and '30's. To be sure, as Israel notes, "much information remains hidden in libraries and archives on the Chinese mainland, and in the memories and memoirs of thousands of men there and abroad." However, it is doubtful that access to these sources would significantly alter the validity of the general interpretation, although it undoubtedly would help fill in gaps and clarify details.

Despite his wealth of information, the author has managed, by and large, to produce a crisp, light, and concise narrative. The style is flowing and interest is enhanced by colorful descriptions of key events, such as the violent student attack on Foreign Minister Wang Cheng-t'ing following the Mukden Incident. Recollections of eyewitnesses are often employed to add detail and enrich the content.

Although the analysis is perceptive and generally balanced, this reviewer would question—if not quarrel with—a few points. The account appears to be a bit uneven in its geographic coverage, emphasizing developments in Peiping and Shanghai—admittedly the scene of most of the action—but sometimes, perhaps, neglecting the student role in such places as Canton, Wuhan, Nanking, and Szechuan. Occasionally, inferences are drawn from dubious evidence. For example, one wonders whether a Japanese source published in 1941 is the best evidence that could be found for "anti-Japanese bias" in Chinese educational policy in the early 1930's (p. 49). Discussion of the Communist role in the initial stages of the December Ninth Movement tends to be somewhat rambling and disorganized and the attempt to minimize Communist influence seems overdrawn and less than convincing.

Perhaps stronger exception should be taken to Israel's treatment of Communist tactics under the "United Front from below." It is easy, in hindsight, to condemn the CCP leadership for "inept" action in not immediately adopting a broad united front policy after the Mukden Incident to maximize student appeal. However, this criticism ignores several other important considerations: The Comintern, not the CCP, was ultimately responsible for the policy and the Chinese leadership was not entirely free to deviate from it. Moreover, a fair evaluation of the policy would have to weight the value of student appeal—theoretically maximized by an anti-imperialist "United Front from above"—against the value of peasant appeal—maximized, at the time, by a more exclusive policy of social and economic revolution. The lack of peasant receptivity to the anti-imperialist issue even in the "exposed" province of Hopei is shown to persist as late as January 1936 (pp. 135–37). Given the situation in China before August 1935 (when both the Comintern and CCP shifted to a "United Front from above"), criticism of Communist "militancy and exclusiveness" for failing to maximize student support, as well as the loss of sympathy occasioned by "the Red Army's continued insurrection during a period of foreign aggression" (p. 85), seems both unfair and a distortion of existing priorities. One should not forget that it took a large-scale Japanese invasion of China Proper in 1937 and prolonged occupation of large areas to make anti-imperialism a burning issue for the peasantry. This, in turn, enabled the erstwhile student demonstrators to make use of the experience gained in such operations as the December Ninth Movement to assist the CCP to take over the wartime Border Area governments later called "Liberated Areas." Even after the shift to a broad United Front, the CCP never espoused the "unconditional unity" advocated by one student leader—for which, Israel sadly notes (p. 141), he was expelled from the Party.

It is hoped that these relatively minor criticisms of points in Israel's analysis will not obscure the very substantial overall contribution made by his book. As suggested above, it not only provides new historical insights, but furnishes a valuable background for later developments. Thus, students of today's Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution will find some interesting phenomena for comparison and contrast. Take, for example, the experience of the anti-imperialist "rural crusade" launched by student activists from Peiping and Tientsin in the wake of the December Ninth Movement of 1935–1937:

> About five hundred students made the pilgrimage, walking in long columns across the frozen countryside of northern Hopei during the first three weeks of January. . . . Patriotic songs, didactic plays, and impassioned speeches in a babel of dialects filled the air of winter-bound villages. Students distributed an impressive array of propaganda written in simple vernacular. . . . But the North China peasant's traditional suspiciousness and lethargy were not easily overcome.

The villagers proved stubbornly unresponsive and heard the students out in an atmosphere of "frigid curiosity"—a reception perhaps not unlike that given Mao's Red Guard evangelists in many rural areas during the winter of 1966–67.—WM. F. DORRILL, *The RAND Corporation.*

The Korean Communist Movement 1918–1948. BY DAE-SOOK SUH. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967. Pp. xix, 404. $12.50.)

As polycentric tendencies in the communist world become increasingly manifest, more and more scholars turn their attention away from the Soviet Union to other communist nations. The recent declaration of the North Korean regime that it would pursue an independent policy in the face of the Sino-Soviet dispute is another testimony to the existence of a variety of communist nations, whose relations with Moscow and Peking change from time to time. Viewed against this background, Dr. Suh's book, one of the Studies of the East Asian Institute of Columbia University, is a timely effort to illuminate the interplay between domestic and foreign forces in the formation and development of a communist movement.

The main objective of this study is "to demythologize the history of communism in Korea" by challenging the claim of present North Korean leaders that they played a central role in the modern history of their country and that they came to power only after decades of revolutionary struggle under the leadership of Kim Il-sŏng. Suh's approach is basically historical. The book is chronologically divided into five parts, beginning with the origins of the Korean communist movement and ending with Kim Il-sŏng's seizure of power in North Korea. In each part a vast array of hitherto obscure facts are carefully dissected and analyzed to depict the nature, scope, and direction of the communist movement.

Suh shows that the Korean communist movement first originated and developed abroad among Korean immigrants in the Russian Maritime Province and Manchuria following the Bolshevik Revolution. However, the movement quickly degenerated into factional strife between the Irkutsk and Shanghai groups. Failing to achieve unity in spite of the Comintern attempt, both factions soon established their own rival groups in Korea. To further weaken the movement, another group of communists, students returning from Japan, appeared on the scene. These three groups nonetheless participated in the founding of the Korean Communist Party (KCP) in April 1925. Yet they suffered so many defeats that the KCP's autonomy was brought to an end by 1931.

From 1931 to 1945 the communist movement lacked any central leadership or organization. Those communists who remained in the country engaged in only sporadic propaganda activities while Korean communists abroad struggled under the tutelage of foreign communist parties without much accomplishment. Thus, the Korean communist movement from its inception to the eve of the liberation was marked by a series of failures. Throughout the book Suh suggests various reasons for the failures of the old communists: the factional strife; the shortage of funds; the constant change in the organization and leadership; the lack of training in the basic ideological discipline of communism; the strategic blunders; the efficiency of the Japanese police; and the indecision, ineptitude, and ignorance of the Comintern.

The last part of the book focuses on the rise of Kim Il-sŏng in the North following the liberation. Suh evaluates the alleged facts concerning Kim's obscure background to substantiate his thesis that Kim was alien to the old communist movement. Kim's success in seizing and consolidating the power in the North was explained by strategic blunders of the old communists, who were concentrating their post-liberation activities in Seoul only to suffer another, alas the last, defeat. The conclusion of the book is obvious: the failures of the old communists paved the path to power for a new group of communists led by Kim Il-sŏng, who, contrary to their claim, were unrelated to the original communist movement in Korea.

Suh's book is the first major work on Korean communism and, in this reviewer's opinion, will remain a standard work on the subject. It makes an extensive yet careful use of hitherto untapped sources in Japanese, Korean, Chinese, Russian, and English. It clarifies many obscure points on the Korean communist movement, especially on Kim's revolutionary background. It also evaluates the significance of the communist movement from various perspectives: its contribution to the literary and intellectual movement; its role in the national independence movement; and its relationships with foreign elements—the JCP, the CCP, and the Comintern. The unique strength of this work lies in its meticulous research, scholarly detachment, and dispassionate analysis. Many works on Korea by Korean writers, communist or anti-communist, suffer from partisan distortions and exaggerations. Suh's work sets a high standard of scholarship in the field of Korean politics.—SAMUEL S. KIM, *Monmouth College.*

Nationalism in Contemporary Latin America. BY ARTHUR P. WHITAKER AND DAVID C. JORDAN. (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1966. Pp. ix, 229. $6.95.)

The study of nationalism, while among the older concerns of traditional political science, has continued to attract attention in recent years, as witness the contributions of Emerson, Deutsch, and the 1964 publication of Snyder's compilation, *The Dynamics of Nationalism.* Belatedly, students of Latin America are turning to the subject. From 1959 to 1964 a continuing study at the University of Pennsylvania was directed by Arthur P. Whitaker, distinguished dean of Latin American historians. He has co-authored the present volume with Professor Jordan, a participant in the undertaking. The result is stimulating yet disappointing, provocative yet puzzling. Adopting politics as their central theme, "for nationalism is an essentially political concept," the authors first analyze nationalism as a concept and a mobilizing force for change. The first two chapters, primarily the work of Whitaker, present a sketchy summation of earlier comments on nationalism, including the obvious warning that problems of definition are substantial. The reader is asked to be content "with broad and general definitions, such as those given in a dictionary: 'National spirit or aspirations; devotion to the interests of one's nation; desire for national advancement or independence.' "

A dictionary definition for the central theme of a book, I would submit, is inadequate. No one questions the conceptual problems inherent in the definition of any such term, but that does not excuse the authors from making the effort. The absence of a precise statement is rendered more serious by the terminology which subsequently characterizes different manifestations of nationalism. At an early juncture (p. 14) a five-fold classification is preferred, with nationalism being traditional-rural, old bourgeois, new bourgeois, populistic, and Nasserist. Yet this is largely forgotten in later pages, although it might have been fruitful to apply this taxonomy in a systematic fashion during discussions of individual countries. Instead, there is an unending variety of adjectives describing forms of nationalism, including the following: benign or aggressive, nostalgic or dynamic, left wing or right wing, ideological or pragmatic, populist or comprehensive, revolutionary, evolutionary, defensive, restrained and progressive, catholic, polycentric, and canonical. The impression is given that every significant political movement in Latin America is predominantly nationalistic, and that this is the overriding consideration.

It is this, perhaps, which proves the most troublesome implication of the work. For it suggests that there is nothing but nationalistic sentiment in Latin America; while in a broad sense this may be true, it is difficult to concede that nationalism is the *only* meaningful force, and that it must be the central concept in any understanding of the politics of the area. To be sure, nowhere do the authors make this explicit claim, and one individual reading of the volume may have inferred too much. However, there is a definite feeling that one is reading a compendium of Latin American nationalisms—decidedly in the plural—and that there is little else. Nationalism, however defined and whatever its configurations and permutations, is but one of many diverse attitudinal factors in contemporary Latin America. When it is suggested, in the concluding chapter, that the objectives of nationalism include modernization, social justice, independence and sovereignty, territorial integrity, effective occupation of national territory, national unity, and national defense, it can only be wondered what could possibly remain.

If the preceding appears unduly critical, this is in part a function of the expectations with which the volume was approached. Certainly it is a useful and frequently insightful book, but it is far from definitive. The country chapters are sound, while Whitaker's analysis of Argentine nationalisms is brilliant and Jordan is particularly good on Mexico. The description of "defensive nationalism" in the cases of Colombia and Peru is more sanguine than it might be, although knowledgeable. The chapter on "continental nationalism" examines an important set of attitudes which has been too little studied, and the correlation of nationalism with problems of modernization has intuitive wisdom. The book is more useful than Gerhard Masur's recent *Nationalism in Latin America,* especially in analyzing the wide range of nationalisms and their multi-faceted implications. Moreover, the serious student will need to consider the research questions raised by the authors in the final chapter. The political scientist will find this work less suggestive heuristically than the more sociologically-oriented writings of Silvert on the same subject. But despite reservations expressed, there is much insight in the historical analysis of Whitaker and Jordan, and it deserives a careful if critical reading.—JOHN D. MARTZ, *University of North Carolina.*

Elites in Latin America. ED. BY SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET AND ALDO SOLARI. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967. Pp. xii, 531. $9.50.)

Now that the great debate over which is the true motor of history, great men or classes, has dissipated somewhat, the time seems ripe for more detailed and careful consideration of the many insights and hypotheses left by such debate. However, it seems there are great difficulties in carrying the work of these pathbreaking sociologists beyond the point where they left it. These difficulties can be seen more clearly in elite studies than in any others. Social scientists, armed with modern techniques, have been stopped short by the near impossibility of getting more than a few background characteristics of men occupying "those positions in society which are the summits of key social structures." Perhaps it is because of these difficulties that the term elite has increasingly been used to refer to any leadership position in society, no matter how low this position is in the total pyramid. This being the case, elite analysts have almost naturally drifted toward the consideration of broad issues such as social, economic, and political development. A basic assumption here is that "one of the requisites for development is a competent elite, motivated to modernize their society" (p. viii). Such is the theme of *Elites in Latin America.*

The first chapter, by Lipset, "Values, Education and Entrepreneurship," is a skillful threading of more than 200 relevant pieces of work about elites. What comes out of this bibliographic essay by a seasoned social scientist is in fact a condensed set of hypotheses about the social and political development of Latin America. The basic argument revolves around the controversy of structural versus cultural factors of development. To the favorite examples of the structuralists (South vs. North U. S. and North vs. South Brazil) Lipset brings the case of French vs. English Canada to conclude that " . . . structure and values are clearly interrelated. Structure such as plantation systems combined with a racially based hierarchy is functionally tied to a given set of 'aristocratic values', and antipathetic to an emphasis on achievement, universalism, and hard work. But any value system derived from given sets of historical experience institutionalized in religious systems, family structures, class relations, and education will affect the pace and even direction and content of social and economic change" (p. 12). He then goes on to review specifically the relationship between values and entrepreneurial behavior.

The conclusion of his search is that Latin American entrepreneurs are bound by family particularisms, lack of national interest or institutional development, traditional attitudes toward money, and the like. These values are, of course, powerful limiting factors to economic development in Latin America. However, as one looks toward other key roles in Latin America one realizes that businessmen, "and particularly those involved in large-scale enterprise, tend to be the carriers of modern 'values'." This statement is substantiated by a review of works written about the *pensadores* (intellectuals), educators and other key roles. But since some change has taken place in Latin America a dynamic factor must exist. This factor is the deviants, marginal men such as immigrants who "may be outside of many of the networks of the nation and freer to engage in entrepreneurial activity" (p. 23). Considerable data exist showing that foreigners are obviously over-represented in entrepreneurial positions in many Latin American nations (in contrast to the U. S. or other protestant countries). The problem is, of course, that many of these deviants seem to come from countries which are Catholic, and thus particularistic, ascriptive, and diffuse. Why, then, do these people behave so differently? This question is not adequately answered in the book.

But then, what hope for development has Latin America? Lipset suggests three avenues: nationalism, educational reforms, and social revolution. These avenues, of course, are not mutually exclusive, but the road to be taken will depend on which elite group directs the process. Almost all chapters in the book give, in one way or another, an answer to this question. The answer, unfortunately, is not very optimistic. Cardozo (Ch. 3: "The Industrial Elite") tells us that "the permeability of the traditional dominant classes and the special circumstances in which the industrialization is taking place in Latin America, make it difficult, if not impossible, for industrialists and businessmen to play the same dynamic role that they have sometimes taken up elsewhere . . . " (p. 113). Ratinoff (Ch. 2: "The New Urban Groups: The Middle Classes") persuasively argues that the sort of reforms that the middle sectors are likely to implement have already exhausted their possibilities for spurring basic changes. We are also told that "the so-called *politicos* have less influence within the national political system than their public role indicates" (Scott, Ch. 4: "Political Elites and Political Modernization," p. 120). Horowitz (Ch. 5: "The Military Elites") tells us that the idealistic goals of national salvation and redemption, so dear to Latin American men of arms, are being undermined by U. S. influence in such a way that "the concept of development as an instrument of national interest has given way to development as an instrument of American (U. S.) interest" (p. 175). As for the intellectual, we are told by Bonilla in his penetrating essay (Ch. 7: "Cultural Elites") that he "has by and large never abandoned his middle-class roots. His political rebelliousness and protest, even his acts of insurgency and terror, are forays from a private world of submissiveness to the heavily sentimentalized bourgeois concerns with family life and social decorum as well as material comfort" (p. 249).

The chapters on the university (Ch. 10: Ribeiro: "Universities and Social Development"; Ch. 11, Scherz-Garcia: "Relations Between Public and Private Universities"; Ch. 12, Walker: "Political Socialization in Universities"; and Ch. 13, Soares: "Intellectual Identity and Political Ideology among University Students") show that there is little hope for change coming from higher learning institutions. The same, though much more clearly shown by the analysis of Gouveia (Ch. 15: "Education and Development: Opinions of Secondary Schoolteachers"), may be said of the ever-expanding (Ch. 14, Solari: "Secondary Education and the Development of Elites") secondary schools which, if anything, help to preserve the traditional-religious, ascriptive, particularistic, and diffuse values that hamper change and development.

The chapter on the workers (Ch. 8, Landsberger: "The Labor Elite: Is it Revolutionary") shows that labor leaders have lost their revolutionary fervor and ideological sensitivity, in favor of more mundane aims. Finally, if it is true that substantial change has taken place in the rural areas as a consequence of peasant movements, it is also true—as Quijano tells us (Ch. 9: "Contemporary Peasant Movements")—that "what seems to be clear is that the future success of peasant movements depends entirely on the success of other forces with similar objectives, that by their own means they are not capable of modifying the national situation and even have difficulty in making short-range reforms work" (p. 334). But as we just saw, there is little hope that the "other forces" will spur change. In contrast, the excellent analysis of Vallier (Ch. 6: "Religious Elites: Differentiations and Developments in Roman Catholics") tells us of the various tendencies within the church and gives at least some hope for change coming from the "pastors" and "pluralists," the growing and more liberal of the priest groups. Ironically, at the end we are left with the thin hope that the only group from which some change is to be expected is—of all the elites! —the Catholic elite, the one which, according to Lipset, is the principal one responsible for the present value system, inadequate for development, of Latin America. What, then, is to be done? This question, of course, cannot be answered by a book such as this, wherein each author isolates a group and, logically, is left bewildered by its impotency. A less fragmented analysis could, perhaps, thread the seeds of change found in each of these groups, and then a more optimistic alternative may emerge.—JOSÉ A. SILVA MICHELENA, *Centro de Estudios del Desarollo.*

A Village Economy: Land and People of Huecorio. BY MICHAEL BELSHAW. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967. Pp. xxiv, 421. $10.00.)

This study of a small rural Mexican community on Lake Pátzcuaro, about three miles from the city of the same name in Central Mexico, is an example of the newly developing "behavioral economics." The author is a professor of economics, but also had considerable training in anthropology. He and his assistants not only consulted statistics collected by governmental and other agencies, but also "went into the field," became acquainted with the people and their situation, and got to know at first hand a considerable range of customs as well as those having to do with the economy. On the other hand, the report does not pretend to be a study of the total culture such as an ethnologist would carry out.

Huecorio in 1962 had a population of 844 primarily dependent upon the cultivation and grazing of an insufficient amount of land. Chicken raising was also important. The average household income was the equivalent of $657, with a range from $173 to $2,092. However, as the author points out, the local buying power of the peso is much higher than its equivalent in the United States; therefore, the dollar equivalents should be multiplied by about three in order to give a realistic idea of living standards. The total amount of land in the community area amounts to 1,426.2 acres, of which only 914.6 acres are arable —slightly more than one acre per person.

Politically the community is a part of the municipality of Pátzcuaro and a local chief and four ward chiefs are elected in Huecorio itself. However, various ostensibly nonpolitical organizations and individuals exert a good deal of influence.

Although the Mexican government has offered the Huecorio people land in other parts of the country, up to the time of the study they had not accepted it and did "not want to leave home." A few men have worked in the United States as *braceros* in order to earn money, but apparently most would not care to live permanently in our country, not because of ill treatment here, but because the customs are different. Nonetheless, the people are entering the modern world. About 85% of male adults are literate and about 63% of the females. The older social stratification has mostly melted away and wants for better housing, sanitation, and manufactured consumers' goods are increasing.

The author has the opinion that the community should not be part of the municipality of Pátzcuaro, but should have paid officials and a decision-making body of its own. Thus, leadership which is now shunned could develop.

The book is an interesting attempt to collect and analyze data on economics of a type not familiar to most economists of modern countries. It could have been improved if the author had given at the start a comprehensive sociocultural sketch of the community and its people. Those familiar with the region know that most of the people are probably Indians or at least have some Indian ancestry. But the reader is not told this; are there any mestizos or mixed-bloods? What survivals of aboriginal economics are there? Much work is on a family basis, but what is the typical family like? And so on. I am afraid that many readers will have trouble visualizing these people whose economics the author has so skillfully dug up and analyzed.—JOHN P. GILLIN, *University of Pittsburgh.*

Political Parties and Political Development. ED BY JOSEPH LAPALOMBARA AND MYRON WEINER. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966. Pp. viii, 487. $8.50.)

The editors introduce this collection with the conviction that "parties are the outgrowth of a development process" as well as that parties are "an independent institutional force affecting political development itself", and a "hope that the following discussions will help to clarify" both phenomena. Over 400 pages later they conclude: "we do not know yet which types of parties or party systems will prove capable of dealing with the central tasks or crises of political development . . . . "

Despite this somewhat pessimistic conclusion, reflecting the frustrations of the discipline at the results of developmental-comparative research, this volume should be judged by the twelve scholarly contributions which make up the heart of the book. Each author attempts to deal with the two theoretical convictions with which the editors introduce the work. And since they have free play to present their own interpretations about particular societies, interesting insights, new formulations, even specific hypotheses emerge which can only enrich research designs which in the future will get down to the serious work of empirical exploration and verification.

Each chapter is a unique interpretive effort, valuable because the author has summarized his own perspectives on the central questions of the volume. Hans Daalder seeks to discover generalizations relevant to the emergence of parties in Europe, which he says at the outset is "an exercise in the impossible." Nevertheless, he writes a highly suggestive paper in which he weaves together the different elite settings, the different patterns of socio-economic change and cleavage, and the different cultural traditions as explanations for the emergence of parties assuming different roles with different degrees of "permeation" of the society. William Chambers restates his now familiar theory of the factors associated with the rise of American parties in the 1790's, specifying what seem to him to be the conditions in American political development which explain the appearance of our pragmatic and accommodationist early parties, which brought new order to our government. The article by the late Morton Grodzins disputes Chamber's theory in part, maintaining that "the parties were primarily vehicles through which other moderating factors made themselves felt." Our parties accentuate conflict, rather than resolve it, he contends. Dankwart Rustow writes a fascinating piece on Turkey's unique party development, using the concept of "rhythm of diastole and systole, of expansion and contraction" as a framework for his discussion. Giovanni Sartori presents a new taxonomic approach to party systems and then develops a theory of the "mechanical tendencies" of systems which are "multipolar, polarized and centrifugal," using the Italian case as an example. It is a tightly-reasoned model of the consequences of such a center-based system with anti-system parties maintaining a significant and irresponsible oppositionist status within the system. His discussion of the meaning of "peripheral turnover" and his argument for manipulative control and revision of such a system are intriguing. He feels that "the developmental role of Western parties is a comparatively minor one . . . ."

The article of the late Otto Kirchheimer is probably most useful for its theoretical exploration of the changing characteristics of the old bourgeois and mass integration parties in Europe primarily after World War II. The forces leading to the phenomenon of the "catch all party" in Europe recently are emphasized. Immanuel Wallerstein discusses the decline and transformation of the party in single-party African states, identifying three stages in this decline, and indicating that ideological specificity, national isolation, and the organizational recruitment and mobilization strategies of the parties are critical. Leonard Binder's discussion of Egypt narrates the factors explaining the successive emergence of the Liberation Rally, the National Union, and the Socialist Union and the purposes and strategies of the power elite in permitting or ordering their creation. Empirical evidence is presented to demonstrate the achievement of elite objectives. Stein Rokkan has a very enlightening article in which he shows by reference to the analysis being done in Norway how one can document a variety of phenomena, such as the spread of partisan competitiveness over time from the central to the peripheral localities, as well as the levels of class polarization by region and community. His presentation is particularly useful for those interested in developing paradigms for cross national analysis.

While Rupert Emerson asserts that parties are vital as agencies for political socialization in Africa, he points to the divisiveness of tribalism, the disjunction between government and party (the former created by colonial regimes and the latter created by indigenous nationalists) and the obstacles to national consensus as major impediments to the development of competitive party systems. Turning to Latin America, Robert Scott develops the thesis that the environmental conditions and crisis patterns in these less developed countries are such that a type of party structure has emerged—a "personalistic following" "not intimately related to public power"—which cannot perform the critical integrative functions which need to be performed. He concludes that the function of Latin America's party system in the developmental process "is largely negative." Finally, Lucien Pye discusses Asian party systems and poses the basic dilemma for these societies—"they can neither get along well without parties nor work well with them." He presents an incisive analysis of the environmental factors inhibiting the development of modern competitive *party systems* while encouraging the formation of *parties* with their own operational styles.

No student of comparative parties should overlook this book. True, the articles are special studies and not really additive theoretically. One even gets the feeling that the "party" phenomena examined are structurally and functionally so different that we are comparing "peanuts and apples." True also that the concepts utilized are often unclear and the operationalization of key variables left to the imagination of the reader. There is no systematic empirical analysis attempted. Finally, the authors do not even agree that parties are central to the development process or that a comparative study with this orientation is feasible. Nevertheless, for those committed to a study of the relevance or irrelevance of systemic or cultural conditions for understanding party behavior, these contributions are significant theoretical starting points. In addition, the editors have discussed the four key development crises at length and presented a new party typology, which subsequently some day may provide the foundations for a useful model for analysis.—Samuel J. Eldersveld, *University of Michigan.*

Dreams and Deeds: Achievement Motivation in Nigeria. By Robert A. LeVine with the assistance of Eugene Strangman and Leonard Unterberger. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1966. Pp. 123. $3.95.)

The title of this book suggests a large dose of Freud and a whiff of McClelland. The study, in fact, does not use psychoanalytic techniques, but it does borrow heavily from David C. McClelland in both theory and method.

The authors present a comparative analysis of achievement motivation amongst Nigeria's three major tribal groups: the Ibo, Yoruba, and Hausa. They focus on the status mobility system as the first independent variable in a causal chain which results in the molding of personality characteristics including achievement motivation. According to their analysis, the status mobility system of the Hausa rewards loyalty and obedience to highborn persons who may become powerful office holders. The mobility system of the Ibo rewards people who make money and encourages "enterprise, diligence and independent efforts on a man's own behalf." The status mobility system of the Yoruba encourages both sets of characteristics, but to a lesser degree. From the differences in the mobility systems, the authors predict that the largest proportion of individuals with high achievement motivation will occur among the Ibo the lowest among the Hausa, with the Yoruba in between. Their predictions are supported by research which includes a content analysis of written reports of dreams made by school boys in the fifth and sixth forms, and adult responses to questions on a survey conducted by Lloyd A. Free.

The book is short and deals with a limited topic, but it is a model of excellent reporting on research. Rather than simply presenting a theory and testing it, the authors systematically evaluate a wide range of rival theories which might also explain their findings. In the same spirit, they use several sources of data quite different from their own, arguing that if the same results emerge from many different methods, the findings must be accurate. The high quality of reporting is, however, marred by inadequate proofreading. Usually the errors are trivial, but on page 58, 50 is divided into 20 to yield 35% rather than 40%. If the error is in calculation, not in reporting the raw figures, the authors' discussion of the table is in error, though not seriously.

A more substantitive criticism involves what appears to be conceptual confusion regarding the variable "achievement motivation." Borrowing from McClelland, the authors define *n* Achievment as "a latent disposition to compete with a standard of excellence." Yet the assumption is made that *n* Achievement is a "dimension inconsistent with strong obedience values," and "closely linked to self-reliance and individualism as personal attributes." This assumption is raised to the status of an operational definition of achievement aspiration when, in establishing coding categories for their second content analysis, the authors specify self-reliance as part of the criteria for identifying "Achievement Motifs."

Findings presented by the authors demonstrate that in Nigeria groups high on obedience values are low on self-reliance and low on *n* Achievement. Their assumptions are thus supported in their case study as well as in earlier studies. Yet we would probably find that in communist countries achievement values and obedience values occur together frequently, and that in traditional nomadic cultures many individuals combine high self-reliance with low achievement motivation. With a strong argument remaining for logical and empirical distinctions among *n* Achievement, obedience and self-reliance, it seems premature to merge them into one concept in either theory or method. In this study, the merger does little harm. This reviewer turns purist only because we need a body of country and area studies to build comprehensive and valid comparative theories. Therefore, authors capable of executing studies as good as this one should be especially careful to employ variable definitions which are applicable to all existing social systems.—TRUDI MILLER LUCAS, *State University of New York at Buffalo.*

African Law: Adaptation and Development. ED. BY LEO AND HILDA KUPER. (University of California Press, 1966. Pp. viii, 275. $7.50.)

Even the best revolutions have to come to an end, and as the initial enthusiasm and revolutionary fervor fade, the energies and imaginations of its new leadership must turn to confront the need for order and stability. The editors of this volume have characterized the problems confronting the newly independent States of Africa as "adaptation and development"—the inevitability of modernization in Africa and the increasing irrelevancy of much of the past which is its inexorable concomitant. Thus Professor Anthony Allott describes the impact of the search for the "Africanization" of court procedures in terms of the paradox that:

> It now seems to be taken for granted that African courts, and the African style of adjudication, are to disappear from Africa (p. 231).

Prof. Allott's essay on "The Future of African Law" is by far the most valuable treatment of the specifically legal concerns of post-independence Africa. It is to be regretted that he did not, in his concise review of the problems and areas of policy conflict necessitating decision, explore the growth of African constitutional ideas and principles. This aside, however, his treatment of the problems for decision in terms of the polarity of modernity and tradition, is in sharp contrast to the stress on the past pervasive throughout the book.

One of the conceptual frameworks within which policy decisions can be made by the new African leadership is obviously in terms of the polarity between modernity and tradition. Pragmatically viewed, the problem is reduced to a question of design. The problem for decision is whether the structure of government of the future will be molded in the forms of the past, or whether the shapes of the past are irrelevant to the decision process of the future. While this approach does not explain everything, it does provide an opportunity for the decision-makers of today to evaluate and express their assumptions towards African history, and how much it symbolizes for the future of Africa.

One of the less contentious yet significant areas of decision lies in the realm of judicial function of the State. As Professor Allott points out, the new governments in Africa have three tasks, to 1) modernize their legal systems in line with current economic and social needs, 2) unify their legal systems, 3) Africanize their legal systems. Whether these goals are potentially conflicting or can be reconciled is a matter for resolution, presumably on a trial and error basis, by each state. In any event, the purpose of the essays collected in this volume is to focus on the problems for resolution, and the complexities confronting decisionmakers. The value of the essays, then, must be determined, both in terms of their utility for decision-makers and in terms of the depth of the conceptual framework for grappling with complexities which they disclose. Unfortunately, while there are exceptions, notably Prof. Gluckman's polished analysis of the concept of the "reasonable man" in Barotse Jurisprudence, and "Land Law in the Making," by Philip and Iona Mayer, many of the essays reveal too heavy an investment in the past to be of great guidance to the scholar or administrator concerned with the present. Anyone in search of elucidation concerning the nature of the legal problems and techniques developed for their resolution in Africa since independence, will have to look elsewhere.

The stress on "law" and society creates the suspicion that, to the Editors at any rate, society adapts to law as much as law adapts to society. There is no other way to understand the remark of the Editors, Professors Leo and Hilda Kuper, that:

> Further difficulties in assessing the consequences of a theory of law arise from the complex relations between a theory of law and its practise. According to Anderson, it is impossible to discuss Islamic law, in any context, with clarity or precision without making a clearcut distinction between a theory of law and its theological concepts, on the one hand, and the realities of that law, as it has evolved in history and is administered in practise on the other. "The theory is rigid, monolithic, uncompromising; the facts are often much more flexible, syncretic, and equivocal" (p. 14).

The only response to this would be to suggest that *a priori* theories of law be discarded—compelling an attempt to develop a theory more relevant to perceived reality, and more descriptive of the system as it operates. The literature of legal realism has accomplished much in the past thirty years, and the lessons of the Realists are crucial to an understanding of the nature and function of law in society. The failure of too many of the essays to reveal any overall understanding of the function of law, its limitations, and the complexities and problems which must be taken into consideration during an arduous process of adaptation, constitute acute limitations on its value as a manual for reformers.

In conclusion, the stress on Africanization, at the expense of modernization, leaves an overall impression of the contributors looking back to a time rapidly passing into memory rather than undertaking to solve problems of more immediate currency.—MICHAEL KATZ, *University of North Carolina Law School.*

The Rise of Nationalism in Central Africa. The Making of Malawi and Zambia, 1873–1964. BY ROBERT I. ROTBERG. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965. Pp. xviii, 362. $8.75.)

Dr. Rotberg's book is not what its title implies; it neither analyzes the growth of nationalism in, nor narrates the history of, Malawi and Zambia. Rather, it lists in chronological sequence a series of incidents which occurred in those two former British colonies and which revealed African dissatisfaction with white rule. To this extent, it is consistently interesting for those with no knowledge of the two countries, while offering a certain amount of new data not to be found in the books and articles of Gann, Shepperson, Hall, and Van Velsen.

Future scholars will therefore find in Rotberg assorted useful information to help them account for the rise of nationalism in Central Africa. Rotberg himself, however, only minimally illuminates this process. His book gives no indication that he has considered the problem of social change; there is no conceptual framework within which isolated protest movements are shown to be related to each other, and to the ultimate emergence of an organized nationalist political party. Indeed, the lack of any methodological technique is unmistakeably signalled in his failure even to define the concept of nationalism. He means by this term, he says, "a redress of grievances" (p. 2)—no more, no less.

Similarly, there is little indication that Rotberg has heeded Gluckman's warning that, "Unless the historian knows something of tribal politics and organization, he cannot even evaluate the records left by travellers, missionaries and others." Rotberg's bibliography conspicuously excludes most of the indispenasble monographs written by social anthropoligists for the Institute for Social Research (formerly Rhodes-Livingstone Institute) over the last three decades.

Unaware of or uninterested in tribal structures and politics, Rotberg fails to account for the varied responses by different tribes to early white missionaries, commercial agents, and administrators. Lacking a framework by which to determine which manifestations of anti-white sentiment may legitimately be included in a book on the phenomenon of nationalism, he was free to include in or exclude from it such episodes as he fancied. Rotberg thus offers some fascinating material on religious expressions of black dissatisfaction with white rule. But he does not explain why certain peoples were more susceptible than others to such forms of protest; he does not explain the relationship of messianic cults to the mainstream of political nationalism; and he does not explain why he excludes such obviously critical political-religious movements as Alice Lenshina's Lumpa Church. For the Lumpa sect, he directs us to an article he has written elsewhere (p. 273), but he fails even to summarize its rolé in the development of African political self-consciousness.

Moreover, while Rotberg's whims lead him to edify us with such dubiously relevant data as Livingstone's explorations in Central Africa and Dr. Banda's grades when he graduated from a Tennessee medical college, they lead him to ignore almost totally the critical role of trade unions in the drive toward self-government in Northern Rhodesia. Without the active cooperation of the African Mine Workers Union on the Copperbelt, U.N.I.P.'s campaign for independence would have followed a very different course. Yet there was no trade union movement at all in Nyasaland, but the Malawi Congress Party achieved power before U.N.I.P. did. Here, Northern Rhodesian white settlers and mineworkers, about whom Rotberg does write, were clearly a crucial factor in tempering the influence of the African trade unions. But so, surely, were the vastly powerful mining concerns which, quite extraordinarily, are never mentioned at all.

Under Dr. Banda, independent Malawi has been transformed into Africa's closest equivalent of a Latin American banana republic, while Zambia, under the humane and decent Kenneth Kaunda, remains an economic colony of the copper companies, the aim of his government being merely the Africanization of colonial structures. It is Rotberg's quintessential failure that these developments were wholly predictable before independence, yet no one could deduce as much from his book.—GERALD L. CAPLAN, *School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London.*

South Africa, A Study in Conflict. BY T. L. VAN DEN BERGHE. (Middleton, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1965. Pp. x., 371. $8.95.)

South Africa is a country which defies easy placement within the analytic categories commonly used in American social science. Its political system, while not unique, is a curious amalgam, with a white settlers' democracy (involving some 20% of the population) ruling as a colonial power over the rest of the population. Economically, it is "at once an underdeveloped colonial area and an industrial power." It is a highly stratified society based on four colour castes within which both objective and subjective characteristics of class differ markedly. Despite the rigidity of the stratification system the society is acutely conflict ridden since three of the four colour castes regard the stratification system as illegitimate. Conflict is the key to both the descriptive and theoretical understanding of the South African situation. It is the great merit of this excellent study by van den Berghe that it provides for the first time a tightly organized conceptual framework for handling the mass of descriptive material available on South Africa. It is, in fact, the first systematic, sociological study of the South African social and political system.

This is not its only merit. The study provides a wealth of comment, directly pertinent to the problems of comparative analysis. It is particularly important in pointing to some of the limitations involved in the comparative application of the structural-functional approach. The crucial question that South Africa poses for the functionalist model of society is, as van den Berghe points out, how is it possible for a society in a state of "acute disequilibrium to continue to exist for long periods without showing any tendency towards adaptive change"? He suggests that the functionalist model of society as characterized by a high degree of "integration, normative consensus and equilibrium" needs considerable modification since the South African case shows that a society can exist despite a very high degree of tension and disequilibrium.

South Africa is a clear-cut exception to the functionalist prerequisite of value consensus as a crucial source of social integration and maintenance. In the South African case maintenance and integration of the society depends on "political coercion and economic inter-dependenec." To call the latter functional equivalents of consensus would reduce the term to meaninglessness.

Nor is it possible in the South African case to speak of a "dominant" as opposed to a "deviant" sub-culture. These concepts, van den Berghe argues, do not apply to the pluralist society (one which is "compartmentalized into quasi-independent sub-systems each of which has a set of homologous institutions and only specific points of contact with the others") which we find in South Africa. This is a different and perhaps more efficient use of the term pluralism which is usually applied to de Tocqueville's description of a society based on value consensus within a framework in which different interests compete and bargain. South Africa as an example of a pluralist society is "low both on 'mechanical' and 'organic' solidarity": the country has neither the "organic solidarity of complementary parts nor the mechanical solidarity of self-sufficient parts united by adherence to a common system of values and norms."

What, then, makes this society hang together? Van den Berghe lays stress on the tremendous dependence on the white economy of the Africans at starvation or near starvation level. Whatever integration there is takes place at the level of the economic division of labour.

This is not to say that structural-functional analysis is irrelevant to the South African case. Once one has analyzed the pluralistic features of the society and eliminated the need for consensus as a prerequisite for the maintenance of the society, and once one has also eliminated the notion of a tendency towards "equilibrium" in the society, functional analysis, particularly as dealt with by Merton, remains useful.

Van den Berghe's discussion of the "South African Dilemma," which he contrasts with Myrdal's analysis of "The American Dilemma," is a particularly fruitful application of functional analysis. The white group in South Africa is also beset by internal value conflicts. There is in the white-value framework a strong attachment to "frontier individualism, egalitarianism and love of freedom (or, at least, impatience with authority in the Africana ideology)." There is, also, "the nineteenth century British ideology of individualism, liberalism, democracy and fair-play, together with Christian values, which contributed to shaping the outlook of English South Africans." However, white racialism conflicts with these values. Since, however, racial prejudice is "functionally necessary to his (the white South African's) self respect and ego integrity," the whites resolved this dilemma not by dispensing with either set of values but by delimiting their applicability. The discriminatory applies to the non-whites and the egalitarian applies to the whites. This moral schizophrenia is ably documented by van den Berghe.

The central focus of the study is naturally the conflict between and within the colour-castes which have both integrative and disintegrative effects. In this respect van den Berghe's work complements theoretical studies of conflict such as those by Simmel and Coser. The degree to which conflict binds the antagonists is of crucial importance in South Africa. While the effects of conflict *between* the white and non-white colour castes are having the obvious effect of increasing solidarity *within* the castes (thus, for instance, resulting in greater solidarity among the Africans and a greater acceptance by them of the doctrines of black racialism), it is perhaps more important to focus on the links established between the castes by the fact of conflict. Conflict implies relationship and interaction and thus provides linkages between groups which may either decrease or increase antagonism and tension. Conflict then becomes the focus for the understanding not only of perceptions and motivations but also of forms of associations and institutions and the patterns of norms and values developed within a conflict society.

Van den Berghe's major contribution from a theoretical standpoint is his ability to link conflict quite comfortably to the functionalist and pluralist frameworks of analysis. He does this by astutely combining analysis in terms of consequence with analysis making use of the Hegelian-Marxian notion that change is "an internally generated process of conflict and contradiction between opposites." (Van den Berghe sees this as a useful analytical tool, not as a positive description of reality.) This permits him to avoid any tendency to view coercion as a source of equilibrium and stabilization. Instead, it makes him sensitive to patterns of action and reaction which are constantly at work even within a society which seems on the surface stable and unchangeable.—MAGNUS GUNTHER, *York University*.

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

International Financial Aid. BY WOLFGANG C. FRIEDMANN, GEORGE KALMANOFF, AND ROBERT F. MEAGHER. (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1966. Pp. xiv, 498. $13.75.)

Aid for Development: An Economic Study. BY H. J. P. ARNOLD. (Chester Springs, Pa.: Dufour Editions, 1966. Pp. 256. $5.00.)

These two books conform nicely to popular stereotypes of American and British social science. The first volume is the product of prolonged teamwork by scholars working on a Columbia University Law School project with the assistance of a number of scholars in other countries; the second is the handiwork of an individual writer, working largely alone. The Americans made considerable use of field studies in the underdeveloped countries, as well as official and unofficial sources in the donor countries; the British writer depended upon a relatively smaller number of sources published for the most part in Great Britain, and on selected interviews in the United States and Europe. There is a much greater solidity to the economic data presented in the American volume, whereas its English counterpart displays the somewhat greater flexibility that an essentially personal project provides. In comprehensiveness, as well as length, the American volume offers much more to the reader, but it is also somewhat more forbidding in the manner of its presentation.

Friedmann and his associates have prepared something approaching an encyclopedia of economic aid. They carefully present and differentiate the range and extent of aid offered through national, multilateral, and private sources. The book is especially valuable for its freedom from conventional sources and ideas, and its attention to such new developments as international consortia and other multilateral activities and procedures. Although the work is essentially an economic analysis, it considers political and social factors as well, at least as obstacles to progress. In the selected country studies, these issues are treated quite differently, however, Mr. Meagher's discussions of Senegal, Sudan, India, and Thailand being somewhat more concerned than the other sections with political and administrative considerations. The country studies are supplemented by case histories of loan projects of various types, of which the best and most comprehensive is an examination of highway programs in Thailand. The volume also pays some attention to technical assistance, favoring a broad conception of the role of technology in development, and urging the need for improving the processes involved, without giving any precise suggestions as to how this end might be accomplished. The principal weakness of this book is the absence of a comprehensive or systematic effort to treat non-economic factors in development assistance.

Arnold's book is the work of an enthusiast, resembling a Victorian clergyman's writing about antiquarian finds: generally competent and informative but essentially descriptive. Like the American book, it makes a serious effort to provide up-to-date figures about the dimensions of aid offered by Western donors, China, the Soviet Union, the Eastern bloc, international organizations, and private agencies. It supplements the author's 1959 study by introducing new facts, largely in the original context. Unfortunately the most useful parts of the book are precisely those most likely to become dated, apart from a good discussion of the equal irrelevance of Western, Soviet, Chinese, and Japanese experience in approaching the problems of the underdeveloped countries (pp. 26–32).

Perhaps the greatest weakness in the presentation arises from Mr. Arnold's search for ideology; although he never quite finds it in the air programs of either East or West, he persists in believing in its existence. Thus the "bloc" appears as a unity, especially in its contrast with the generosity and long-range perspectives of the West. Arnold interprets both Soviet and Chinese activity in much more ideological terms, for example, than does Marshall Goldman in his analytical study, *Soviet Foreign Aid.* The French aid program is also made to appear ideological, even when, as Arnold believes, the French are seeking to reduce the erstwhile colonial dependence on the "French way of doing things," a conclusion for which he offers no evidence (p. 104). But the most unfortunate consequences of his ideological assumptions are in the description of American aid, which he interprets as being essentially a cold-war effort. Other political and diplomatic purposes of U. S. aid are grouped together as "humanitarian" and dismissed as relatively unimportant. This interpretation is understandable, given the author's dependence on the Kennedy administration's interpretations, the Clay Committee's unfortunate rationale of 1962, and the arguments presented annually for Congressional delectation. Thus he sees a great change in U. S. aid policies with the coming of the Kennedy administration, which he believes reorganized the Agency for International Development in order "to make it easy for the leaders of the less developed countries to pursue the correct channels of approach in seeking U. S. assistance" (p. 73). He finds reassuring the supposedly newly-found U. S. patience in waiting out the Communist initiatives in Tanzania, even suggesting (p. 11) that a few years earlier the U. S. would "doubtless have shown its concern by rushing in with promises of increased aid." A few years earlier, in fact, the United States had displayed almost identical degrees of patience in Ghana and Guinea, where Communist aid initiatives were not greeted by competitive giving from Washington.

Mr. Arnold offers few recommendations that are not generally accepted by students and practitioners of foreign aid. Similarly, the recommendations and conclusions offered by Friedmann and his colleagues contain few surprises, although they are often in sharp contrast with recent developments in the United States. The authors call for more grant-like aid, more attention to technical assistance broadly conceived, a less doctrinaire approach to private enterprise, and the "untying" of aid from donor country purchases. The reliance on cold-war ideology as a rationale for aid comes in for well-deserved criticism in both volumes, as does the recent decline in effort in the U. S. and other industrialized countries.

None of the economic conclusions in either volume is startling. The authors cannot be faulted for this fact. They rightly argue that continuity, not novelty, and persistence, not dogmatism, are the necessary components for success in stimulating economic development. But neither of these volumes reaches far enough beyond the economics of foreign aid to provide much insight into its present inadequacy.—JOHN D. MONTGOMERY, *Harvard University.*

Foreign Aid in International Politics. BY JOHN D. MONTGOMERY. (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967. Pp. 118 $4.50, cloth; $1.95, paper.)

Un Administration of Economic and Social Programs. ED. BY GERARD J. MANGONE. (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1966. Pp. xiii, 291. $6.95.)

Not so long ago it was generally assumed that the states which emerged from former colonial territories were intrinsically viable. Whatever doubts may have existed were promptly overwhelmed by the heady enthusiasm of new-found independence. The last decade, however, taught a bitter, contrary lesson. While the international boundaries of new states remained on the whole stable, their political systems demonstrated a singular lack of long term persistence. Unrest, riots, coups, even revolutions have apparently become endemic to political processes in most of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, demonstrating regularly and dramatically that the capacities of political control are severely limited while political demands are formidable and accelerate rapidly. It should be clear by now that the viability of most independent states depends significantly upon external inputs. In any case both Professors Montgomery and Mangone must endorse this conclusion, for their recent works share this focus.

John Montgomery's *Foreign Aid in International Politics,* part of Prentice-Hall's "America's Role in World Affairs Series," is apparently designed to be a clear and definitive but introductory statement. Accordingly, he organizes his presentation by positing three "roles" for our external assistance program. *Diplomatic Aid* serves to create and perpetuate an American presence in other regions; *compensatory aid* repays past favors and sustains current privileges; and *strategic aid* stimulates those conditions which are favorable to a world order and at the same time enhance the security of the United States.

In order to carry out these foreign policy objectives, the United States government relies on three major instruments: the transfer of capital resources, the training of indigenous human resources, and the support of nation-building. These instruments in turn are integrated into alternative tactics. The tactics of stability are inputs which stimulate the forces of order within a country, the tactics of development are designed to accelerate economic growth, and the tactics of reform concentrate on programs and projects which "involve the effort to influence the direction of change, either by introducing reforms or by discouraging tendencies considered harmful to the purposes of the aid program." The concluding portions of the book are addressed to the problems of assessment and suggest discernible trends.

Central to the entire presentation is the conclusion that "the elements of possible success in foreign aid may be classified according to purposes even if they cannot always be precisely measured." Here indeed lies the problem. The troubling fact remains that, when applied to specific newly independent states, these "purposes" may actually be contradictory. For instance, short term diplomatic advantages to the U. S., while actually legitimate objectives of national policy, may undermine the precarious viability of the recipient's political system, and thus be dysfunctional to the strategic goals of foreign aid. Professor Montgomery freely concedes this. Unfortunately, this is not quite enough. We simply cannot leave it at that and still claim that an evaluation of the program is meaningful, let alone significant. The United States does not have unlimited resources, and, even if it did, the exigencies of domestic politics would not permit unrestrained external transfer. Foreign aid must necessarily operate under market conditions where supply is extremely scarce and demand nearly insatiable. Thus priorities are imperative. Somehow, somewhere, in the State Department, or at universities, we must develop a calculus which reveals with some accuracy the comparative price a recipient must pay in the viability of its political system for its support of the United States in the councils of nations, for granting military bases, or for entering into formal treaty relationships. In turn we must develop a hierarchy of goals which reveals just how important political stability and international order are to American national interest.

Turning to the trends in our foreign aid program, the author observes that recent years have witnessed the emergence of new rationales: "development of new forms of aid and . . . tightening standards of fiscal management." This is perfectly true. Yet what seems more significant, at least to this reviewer, is that after all these years *political* marginal analysis has made so little progress and we are still evaluating the program in terms of such *economic* indicators as increments in gross national product, growth in industrial capacity, or marginal rates of saving. Given the political character of goals posited by Professor Montgomery, the improvements made still seem to miss the point.

Whereas Professor Montgomery's primary concern is American foreign aid, Gerard Mangone had edited a book which concentrates on the technical assistance programs of the United Nations and its affiliates. Specific contributions focus upon the role of the Secretariat, the Economic and Social Council, the General Assembly, the Regional Economic Commissions, and the Resident Representative. The studies show clearly that it has become extremely difficult to evolve an overall rational program when so many entities are now participating in the process. The rivalries among the United Nations and Specialized Agencies, the desires of developing states to decide for themselves what assistance they want, the reluctance of the donor nations to release funds without retaining a considerable say in the allocation of these resources, the growing pressure from regional commissions for an increased role, all add up to confusion. Techniques, agencies, and institutions have been created and adapted pragmatically and with varying degrees of success.

Each contribution is limited to the internal process of coordination. Only the chapter on the Resident Representative considers in some detail the relationship to the governments of member states. None devotes major attention to the problems of coordination between the various levels of program administration. This does not impair the competence of the studies—they are indeed careful and thorough efforts. It does, however, in my view, detract from their significance. More important, these studies avoid the more perplexing normative problems. To be sure, a clear statement of tables of organization and operating procedures is of some help in understanding the administration of a program. Yet a most crucial question of international technical assistance is whether the criteria for such an effort should be *world* health, *international* labor, and *human* welfare or alternatively it should be designed to fit neatly into the specific national priorities of the recipients. And, clearly, the most fundamental question of international cooperation remains whether the emergence of viable and self-conscious nation states is after all functional to its objectives.—ALEXINE L. ATHERTON, *University of Pennsylvania.*

The Challenge of Foreign Aid: Policies, Problems, and Possibilities. BY JACOB J. KAPLAN. (New York, Washington, and London: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967. Pp. xxviii, 405. $8.50.)

When an ex-bureaucrat decides to write a book, he is usually well advised to stick to what he knows best—personal experiences, anecdotes, the worm's-eye view of day-to-day administration. Scholarly documentation matters little in such a book, and a valuable service is performed by sharing experiences with outsiders, such as academics. Unfortunately, Jacob Kaplan has attempted the kind of detached, broadly conceived, analytical approach to foreign aid that is better left to the academics. Instead of trying to detach himself from twenty years of involvement in aid administration, he should have capitalized on it by writing a personal memoir. The nice thing about books written by men of experience, however, is that they are always useful—if not because of what they say then because of who wrote them.

In one sense this book is depressing. Relative to other foreign aid literature Kaplan's book is especially good in ways that one would not expect. Broad scope, analytical sophistication, and healthy skepticism should be the earmarks of academic writing when compared to works based on experience. Yet, when we compare *The Challenge of Foreign Aid to* academic writing on foreign aid, we find that Kaplan uses a broader concept of "foreign aid," is more aware of the link between foreign aid and foreign policy, is more aware of the "substitution effect" and all of its ramifications, and has a more skeptical attitude toward both scholarly and official writings than most academics. Because so much nonsense has been written about foreign aid, the ex-bureaucrat has been able to beat the academics at their own game.

There are some major weaknesses in this book which diminish its utility to both scholars and policy makers. The first weakness is the simplistic concept of the foreign policy making process that underlies most of the discussion. The "public" is treated as a monolithic rational being with a single will. Policy making is seen as a process in which "Congress" and "the public" engage in rational calculations of the "national interest," based on information furnished by the executive branch. If foreign aid lacks domestic support, it is because the program has not been adequately "explained," "clarified," or "justified" to Congress and the public (cf. pp. xiii–xxviii, 246, 393). Roger Hilsman's view of policy making as politics, Aaron Wildavsky's concept of budgets and bargaining, Gabriel Almond's description of an aphathetic, ignorant public—all conflict with the implicit assumptions of this book. Instead of Hilsman's inevitable "untidiness and turmoil," Kaplan depicts a utopia in which the prerequisites for an effective aid program abroad are also the preconditions for support at home (cf. p. 393). I suggest that the reader stop and think about this as it relates to expensive vs. cheap programs, loans vs. grants, surplus food vs. money, and long term financing vs. annual appropriations!

A second weakness stems from careless and abundant use of the concept of "national interest" (cf. pp. 107–221, 249, 321). Writing as if this term had a self-revealing definition, Kaplan argues forcefully for an aid program that is in the "national interest"—whatever that is. "It is indefensible," he tells us, "to deploy U. S. foreign aid resources as though they had no relation to the nation's international concerns" (p. 249). No one, of course, has ever disputed this. The real debate is over what constitutes the "nation's international concerns." Many students of American foreign policy might agree with Kaplan that aid should serve the national interest; yet they might disagree with his definition. For example, Kaplan cites the withholding of aid from Brazil while such "unstable" and "demogogic" characters as Quadros and Goulart were in power and the subsequent massive injection of aid after the military coup as an example of aid in the "national interest" (pp. 210–214). This reviewer is not prepared to accept as self-evident truth the proposition that using aid to support military coups in Latin America is in the American national interest.

This book shares a third weakness with most other books on foreign aid—a failure to clarify the relation between aid and influence. For Kaplan and most other writers on aid, to "use" aid as an instrument of influence means to "give" aid. Thus, he notes that nations in which there is much American private investment receive relatively little aid, and he concludes that this shows that the United States does not allocate its aid funds so as to further the interests of its private investors (p. 179). Precisely the opposite conclusion can and should be drawn, however. For twenty years American private investors have been exhorting the government to withhold aid funds from areas where they might compete with private capital. Official policy statements have repeatedly committed the government to comply with this exhortation. The empirical evidence seems to indicate that the U. S. has indeed shaped its aid distribution policy so as to help its private investors; that is, it has used "non-aid" to influence foreign investment climates. When will we ever see that withholding aid is as important as giving it in the wielding of influence!

The fourth weakness suffices to remove this book from high priority on anyone's reading list. The turgid bureaucratic prose makes reading the book an endurance contest. I cannot recommend this book to the general reader because of the many misleading half-truths, the important hidden assumptions, and the lack of documentation. The foreign aid specialist who has a lot of time will probably be able to separate the wheat from the chaff, however. The book is unique in criticizing the aid program for not having been "fulsome enough" (p. 74). This intriguing observation, however, is apparently due to archaic diction rather than to extreme subtlety.—DAVID BALDWIN, *Dartmouth College.*

De Gaulle and the World: The Foreign Policy of the Fifth French Republic. BY W. W. KULSKI. (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1966. Pp. xvi, 428. $8.50.)

This is the first full-scale study of French foreign policy since de Gaulle's "second coming" in 1958. It is a long and fairly detailed exposition, without a thesis or a particularly evident point of view. Professor Kulski has written a balanced account of the main lines of Gaullist foreign policy and the sources of its strength and weakness. He draws for most of his analysis upon a vast array of commentary by other writers, as well as upon the familiar primary and secondary sources for de Gaulle's words and acts. If the book has no central argument, it surely does not lack a sharp critical edge in its evaluation of both Gaullist policy and that policy's reception by other powers. Kulski's book, while hardly an apologia for de Gaulle, is nonetheless an excellent "lecture" to Americans on what de Gaulle represents of worth to Frenchmen, to Europeans, and to much of the "Third World." It is one of the most conscientious and fair-minded efforts at answering the question raised so often by scholars, journalists and policy makers concerning de Gaulle's policies: why does a clearly second-rank power strive so desperately for world power status in an international environment for which it is so poorly equipped?

To answer this question Professor Kulski is absolutely right to begin with the basic relationship underlying both foreign and domestic policies in France today. This is that vital link de Gaulle summed up by the "*vous et moi*" he cried out to the French over the air waves in one of his famous direct appeals for support during the Algerian crisis. French foreign policy is indeed the product of an equation composed of the "Charismatic Leader" and "His People," the titles of Kulski's first two chapters. Although I strongly object to the idea of charisma applied to a leadership that is so obviously subject to repeated, formal, and, indeed, recently tenuous, renewals of popular support, I must say that Professor Kulski's synthesis of de Gaulle's thought on world politics, his analysis of the man's authority *vis à vis* the French and the enduring qualities of what might be called France's foreign policy personality, are all very convincing. They are especially worth reflection on the part of those prone to dismissing de Gaulle as simply a European nationalist of the old school.

It is the trauma of France's defeat and occupation in World War II that Kulski isolates as the origin of both the Gaullist "therapeutic myth" of a victorious France and the related myth of a France in "pursuit-as-usual" of traditional rank among the powers. These myths were responsible for the bond of loyalty between de Gaulle and his people and they explain why Frenchmen continue to react so positively to Gaullist leadership. Following this introductory analysis there is a detailed examination of all the important lines of French foreign policy, from the independent nuclear deterrent to the championing of the "Third World," and passing through the various "swing" policies toward Germany, Russia, and China that de Gaulle has employed as "pivots" for maneuver against his allies. These chapters are interesting and sound, though they are all over-loaded with lengthy quotations, many of which are familiar to even the casual student. Moreover, there is a tantalizing refusal to identify in the text the source of many quotations, thus obliging the reader to turn continually to the footnotes at the back and making, thereby, the going even slower than it is in this volume heavy with excised citations.

The only real disappointment is the absence of a genuine conclusion. For although the two page concluding chapter is judicious, I found it vastly out of scale with the abundant body of analysis that came before. Professor Kulski's strong implication at the end is that all will not necessarily change once de Gaulle is gone. For this reviewer such an implication called to mind a conclusion that seems latent throughout this useful book and that well deserves emphasis. To a very large degree Gaullist foreign policy is just traditional French foreign policy dressed in fancy clothes and employing broadly dramatic gestures. This being said, the probability is strong that it will continue after de Gaulle, perhaps in more somber garb and with more sober movements. What is important to know then is less the outline of familiar French goals in world politics and more the degree of energy and will to pursue these goals that will be employed by de Gaulle's successors. Here the primacy of domestic politics is clear and Kulski rightly ties the future of France's world role to the stability and direction of her internal political life. Although he shies away from giving us much to reflect upon in this regard, Kulski's skillful analysis of domestic factors throughout the book encourages the reader to venture an answer to the *après de Gaulle* question on his own. This exercise in itself makes this study well worth reading.—NICHOLAS WAHL, *Princeton University.*

Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics: The American and British Experience. BY KENNETH N. WALTZ. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967. Pp. xiii, 331. $3.95, paper.)

Professor Waltz, now of Brandeis University, has made not only a controversial but also a more imaginative and durable contribution to the study of comparative politics and international relations than the paperback format of *Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics* might suggest. To be precise, his contribution is at the important and fascinating intersection of comparative politics and international relations. Professor Waltz, previously known mainly for his insightful study of international relations, is also knowledgeable in analyzing the American and British political systems. The work is the product of substantial research time, some of which was profitably spent in Britain. More striking, however, is Waltz's exhibition of intellectual boldness, critical verve, and incisive writing.

The book is organized in what amount to two separate modes of presentation. The first set of five chapters, following an introduction, analyzes in topical order the political processes and governmental structures of the United States and Great Britain. Anglo-American comparisons are made under each topical heading; for example, "prime ministers and president," "bipartisan foreign policy," or "parties and appointments." Each of the following four chapters presents a national case study of the functioning of the given political system in relation to a particular policy. The British system is thus studied as it met the problem of postwar military policy, particularly nuclear weapons, and the problem of joining an integrated western continental Europe. The American system is studied in its responses to foreign aid and to the general military involvements characterizing the whole period of the cold war and especially its less cold phases. The case studies are intended to support theses developed in the earlier part of the book. Yet they could stand apart because of their inherent interest and because of the fresh and realistic style in which Waltz presents the policy issues.

Waltz seeks in both parts of his book to establish two theses. The first is the superiority of the American to the British political system in dealing with foreign policy (and domestic policy as well). The second, admittedly dealt with only indirectly, is the foreign policy capability of Western democratic governments in competition with authoritarian states. Like the author, let us concentrate on the first thesis. Has Waltz, as he appears to believe in his concluding chapter, demonstrated the superiority of the American system? More significantly, *can* he or anyone else demonstrate such a phenomenon? In rigorous scientific terms, of course, the answer is no. Waltz, despite his useful citation of quantitative data, is much too sophisticated to claim that he has proved the point by evidence of the kind demanded by our most statistically-minded colleagues. Indeed, Waltz does not even argue that his case studies are chosen to be representative according to any scientific canon. Demonstration in this area plainly has to be impressionistic, and Waltz's effort should be judged by the less exact standard of our conventional research. Even by that standard, however, the superiority of one system to another may be non-demonstrable. Success or failure in developing and supporting a foreign policy is not only hard to define; it is also hard to attribute to the virtues or vices of a political system when there are so many obviously important independent variables, besides the political system, to which success or failure is attributable. Moreover, the whole question of the superiority of the American or the British system is hardly worth asking if one accepts, as I believe one should, that a given constitutional and general political system developed by a nation over a considerable period has a strong claim to be more clearly functional for that nation than any other general system would be. Neither the American nor British system would then be thought superior in any comparative sense.

In rejecting so relativist a view, Waltz is playing an established game but, as he notes, on the opposite side from the old players. The tradition among political scientists on both sides of the Atlantic has been to favor the British system on almost every count: parliamentary-cabinet system over separation of powers, responsible parties over loose brokerage parties, and high-status career service (notably in diplomacy) over American partisan appointments. Having dissented from this Anglophile position and asserted instead the suitability of American political arrangements for American circumstances, I now find it odd to have to dispute a view that assures us of the superiority of the American system. In Waltz's comparison, Britain suffers on many counts. The parliamentary-cabinet system, with responsible parties, works against prime ministerial success in foreign policy-making. The career service is less open to innovative personalities than the American. And so on. These views, it must be emphasized, are not now peculiarly Waltz's. They are part of the new mood of self-criticism, even self-laceration, shared by many Englishmen during the national malaise of the 1960's. The mood will probably pass, but in the meantime, while Britain is still losing status in the world, its once over-praised political institutions are targets along with everything else.—LEON D. EPSTEIN, *University of Wisconsin*.

The Nation is Burdened: American Foreign Policy in a Changing World. By Roger D. Masters. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967. Pp. vii, 319. $6.95.)

A recurrent lament among students of modern diplomatic history is that, to their detriment, nations have departed from the "balance of power" principle and that policy-makers have forsaken that basic axiom of statecraft—dedication to the "national interest." Recent American foreign policy has been "burdened," we are told in the work before us, because these tested diplomatic concepts have too often been ignored.

An Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University, whose principal field is political philosophy, Masters disclaims any special competence to undertake a critique of American foreign policy. It is a judicious disclaimer. At a number of points in his treatment, the lack of background will be evident to the knowledgeable reader; the documentation is sparse, frequently consisting of a single (and often controversial) source; the layman or beginning student is likely to find the lack of relevant factual data an impediment to understanding.

Yet Masters exhibits an incisive critical capacity. His analysis of the inadequacies of postwar American foreign policy is, more often than not, cogent and persuasive. Precisely because he is not steeped in prevailing orthodoxies, he can and does scrutinize conventional policy assumptions that have too seldom been examined (or re-examined) with desired objectivity.

Nearly all significant dimensions of America's relations with the outside world—from the formulation of external goals and the impact of philosophical traditions upon national attitudes, to the problem of nuclear proliferation, the NATO crisis, and Red China's accession to the ranks of the nuclear powers—are examined. And in virtually every case, Masters concludes that the effectiveness of American policies is blunted by antiquated ideas, by inertia, by irrelevant ideological slogans, and by a distorted sense of national purpose.

His remedy for these failings—the central theme of his book—is for officials in Washington to adopt, and the American public to support, the principles of "balance of power" and pursuit of the "national interest" as basic strategies in dealing with the challenges posed by a turbulent international environment. Perhaps because he is not writing in his own field of expertise, Masters seems unaware that his thesis is a hearty perennial in the literature of international relations; for almost twenty years, the President and his advisers have been urged to "return" to traditional concepts like balance of power and national interest. It is surely a reasonable assumption by now that, if they have not done so, the explanation must be sought in something other than deafness or a failure of will.

What policy-makers and specialists will miss in Masters' account is a thorough and rigorous appraisal of what "balance of power" has meant historically; of what its relevance is today—in an era vastly different from nineteenth century Europe; of what the conditions have been in earlier periods, and are today, that make the principle viable as a guide for national policy. A no less searching examination is required for the companion doctrine of "national interest" before it can be accepted as among the eternal verities of diplomacy.

For toward any concrete problem that "burdens" the American nation in its foreign relations—from the war in Vietnam, to the Arab-Israeli dispute, to revolutionary upheaval in Latin America—there are as many conflicting versions of the "national interest" as there are available policy alternatives. With such abstractions, there is always a temptation—which Masters' analysis seldom resists—for these ideas to degenerate into little more than incantations and nostrums. Policy dilemmas and ambiguities, the assumption seems to be, will dissolve to the extent that they are repeated. Or, when they are not viewed as nostrums, they frequently are identified with the policy recommendations made by the author. By a process that is almost never explained, pursuing the "national interest" becomes in effect accepting the author's policy proposals. "Neutralizing" Southeast Asia, for example, might well be the best way to bring stability to that troubled region; but beginning the search for a solution that is in the "national interest" (as hawks and doves alike would agree) may or may not lead to adoption of a neutralization scheme. Similarly, in countless other instances—dealing with de Gaulle's France, or better American relations with the Arab world, or revitalizing the United Nations—it is far from clear what light concepts like balance of power or national interest throw on these complex problems.

In brief, it is a pity that the principles relied upon by Masters to lighten the "burden" of American foreign policy were not subjected to the same perceptive scrutiny which the nation's recent diplomatic record received. Until they are, Masters need not be surprised at reluctance in the State Department to adopt his views.—Cecil V. Crabb, jr., *Vassar College.*

The Polaris Missile Strike: A General Economics Systems Analysis. By Robert E. Kuenne. (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1966. Pp. x, 434. $8.00.)

Professor Kuenne's study of the Fleet Ballistic Missile System will be of interest to many political scientists. Those specializing in United States foreign and security policy will find his conclusion, that "we are overbuilding missile submarines" (p. 393) provocative, to say the least. Those interested in the application of mathematical techniques to contemporary policy issues will find this readable example of quantified analysis instructive.

While the distinction between systems analysis and operations research is far from clear, this study is probably of the latter genre despite the author's characterization in the title. The author takes as given what a systems analyst would have to consider variable, namely, deterrence means an "invulnerable second-strike retaliatory capacity against Soviet *population centers*" (p. 30, author's emphasis). To define deterrence as assured destruction capabilities is legitimate and certainly simplifies computational problems, but it also changes the study from what is usually meant by systems analysis—an examination of alternative goals as well as alternative means, into a complex but much lower order maximization problem. Consequently, unless one is willing to accept or at least tolerate the author's concept of finite deterrence, there is little point in reading the book. If, however, one can accept this concept, the rest of the argument proceeds easily. The author develops a set of probability models which include submarine vulnerability, navigation and guidance error, launch reliability, missile range, missile interception, command and control error, and accurate Soviet "hunches" about the location of our fleet—to mention only the major variables. He then determines the probable fatalities in the 95 largest Soviet cities (their aggregate population is 45.7 million), under four sets of parameter estimates: (1) most favorable, (2) reasonable, (3) unfavorable, and (4) extremely unfavorable.

In the most favorable case, a fleet of 16 submarines on station would totally destroy the 95 target cities. Under extremely unfavorable conditions, it takes slightly more than 30 to accomplish the same awful task. Since the unfavorable conditions take into account future defensive possibilities presently beyond the state of the art, the author prefers the second category, reasonable conditions, as the basis for strategic planning. Using "reasonable" assumptions, an attack by 15 submarines will produce 95 per cent fatalities. Interestingly, under no conditions is it necessary to deploy more than ten submarines to produce a 50 per cent casualty rate—23 million dead! At this point it is well to remind the reader there may not be 23 million survivors to target should a polaris attack be ordered *after* a retaliatory blow by our other assured distruction forces (Titan, Minuteman, B-52, B-111). Polaris submarines account for a rather small fraction of our total strategic megatonnage. The author concludes by suggesting we consider stationing only 15 missile submarines (military worth equals .979 under most favorable conditions, .954 under reasonable conditions, .847 under unfavorable conditions, and .594 under extremely unfavorable conditions) and invest the difference in attack submarines to protect them.

The author is explicit and self-conscious about his exclusion of policy and political variables which might alter the requirements for deterrence in specific real world situations. However, he is not immune from criticism as long as he bills his work as a systems analysis. Elegance and rigor in determining the relationships among included variables do not justify failure to include all relevant variables—for example, a policy decision to use Polaris in a "damage limiting" role. Yet the very weakness of the study as a policy or systems analysis are its strengths as an operations analysis. His treatment of planning and technological uncertainties is carefully and impressively handled by testing results for their sensitivity to shifts in major parameters. And his modest claims for his conclusions as "hypotheses to stir discussion among the experts in submarine warfare [rather] than . . . encapsulated policy recommendations . . . " (p. 374) anticipates the kinds of criticisms this reviewer has made as does his invitation for criticism of both his assumptions and analysis. But the critical assumption of the entire analysis is the very one most subject to challenge. On the other hand, his straightforwardness about the other limitations of his analysis make the study exemplary of the kind a decision-maker wants *after* he has decided on finite deterrence.

The book is a major contribution to the small body of systematic and well documented reasoning and analysis of assured destruction capabilities. It is fraught with policy implications—for arms control and nuclear proliferation as well as for deterrence, force structure planning, and weapon systems deployment. The author's self-imposed restraints have prevented him from elaborating them, however. This reviewer hopes Professor Kuenne plans future contributions to deterrence analysis which include more policy variables, even at the cost of mathematical precision.—JOHN C. RIES, *University of California, Los Angeles.*

Nuclear War and Nuclear Peace. BY Y. HARKABI. (New York: Donald Davey & Co., 1966. [Israel Programme for Scientific Translations] Pp. 279. $7.50.)

This compendium of nuclear strategy greatly alleviates a dearth of introductory material for national security policy studies—an increasingly popular topic in political science curricula. In scope, selection, and synthesis it surpasses for textbook purposes its only real competitor, Morton Halperin's still-useful, but more simplistic and less thorough, *Contemporary Military Strategy.*

A work devoted to this somewhat arcane specialty might too easily ignore the less exotic ranges of the spectrum of warfare. Far from having made war "unthinkable," the existence of nuclear weapons—while reducing the likelihood of central war between major powers and diminishing the general level of violence from the excesses of the two World Wars—holds up a psychological umbrella under which local wars blaze which formerly would have been extinguished by a Great Power fire brigade, and in whose shadow minor military forces can stalemate great armies. Perceiving this, Harkabi has set his topic of emphasis against its proper background, Raymond Aron's "polymorphism of conflict."

Although the author distinguishes between the work of "strategy analysts" and that of "peace researchers," this unnatural bifurcation only reflects a transient immaturity of those callings. The disparate emphases do indeed exist for most war/peace professionals, but all the good ones on either bench recognize that the two vectors of thrust are as complementary and mutually indispensable as the rails we still occasionally ride until monorail trains are perfected. *Nuclear War and Nuclear Peace* fulfills the promise of its title not merely by giving "equal time" to arms control and disarmament, but by indicating forcefully that these considerations are a fully integral part of nuclear strategy.

Ever since a few denizens of the "think factories" got around to examining the premises of a successful deterrence it has been well understood that this is pre-eminently a psychological phenomenon. Image-formation, tacit bargaining, signalling and communication, education-of-the-enemy, involuntary incentives to attack, and similar abstract mental constructs receive from Gen. Harkabi their full due of attention.

Some re-orientation of mental modes is required before one can quell his intuition and accede to the idea that American security can be fostered by a significant improvement in the impregnability of an opponent's fighting posture. Yet, such are the ironic subtleties to which profound strategic analysis of a situation can lead, and of which Harkabi happily takes cognizance. Consider, for example, whether the instability of the nuclear balance would not be aggravated, to the detriment of the United States, if the Soviets thought they owned only a vulnerable strategic striking force which could never be relied on to survive an American first-strike.

But enough of laud! This Israeli Strategic Research director's own nation provides a graphic and up-to-date illustration of the outstanding failure of his book—which is identical with the failure of the strategical thinkers' profession as a whole. Israel's exemplary execution in June 1967 of an audacious initiative cannot be faulted—for as long as they kept that initiative. To their prompt disadvantage, however, they heeded the precedent of 1951 and, like all Western statesmen since, failed to challenge the principle, "Engage in combat for no purpose beyond winning a cease-fire," established when Malik and Gromyko, learning of the ghastly effects on the Chinese army of Operation Killer then in progress, proposed an armistice in Korea. By all accounts, the occupation of Amman, Damascus, and even Cairo was well within the capacity of the victorious Israeli forces, but was forsaken for reasons of higher politics. Despite the shrieking kilowatts of the Egyptian radio, this stunning accomplishment could scarcely have failed to signify to the Arab masses the true dimensions of their armies' defeat, thereby interring the radicals' plans for a "second round." Moreover, it is difficult to picture the Arab governments, thus trussed, refusing to concede diplomatic recognition or to negotiate that elusive permanent peace settlement. "Accept with alacrity whenever a defeated foe offers a cease-fire," has become the enervating corollary to Malik's maxim.

For, despite a widespread, self-conscious awareness that war and politics are neighbors on the same continuum, neither the eminent strategists Harkabi has consulted nor any others seem fully to have absorbed certain implications of the continued ubiquity of organized conflict. Defeat on the battlefield, alienation of friends, embitterment of the diplomatic discourse, and escalation toward Armageddon, among other hazards and costs of war in these times, are all risked without a clear comprehension of what arms, once taken up, ought to accomplish before they are again laid down. Unless preservation or restoration of the political *status quo ante* is by itself worth this gamble, the authors of our theories of limited war—pre-occupied almost exclusively with buttressing the limitations, while ignoring the considerable damage done to the international environment by maladroit, extended, or indecisive wars—have neglected to begin the theory which can guide our political leadership toward an understanding of the specific, restrained functions warfare by nature can fulfill as an instrument of national policy.—John V. Hilberg, *University of Connecticut.*

Disarmament and World Economic Interdependence. ED. BY EMILE BENOIT. (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, and New York: Columbia University Press, 1967. Pp. 260. $8.00.)

The United States in a Disarmed World. BY ARNOLD WOLFERS, ROBERT E. OSGOOD, PAUL Y. HAMMOND, LAURENCE W. MARTIN, ROBERT W. TUCKER, CHARLES BURTON MARSHALL, AND LIVINGSTON T. MERCHANT. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1966. Pp. xi, 236. $8.50.)

Both of these collections of articles are concerned with disarmament. Beyond that, however, the two books could hardly be more dissimilar.

The volume by Arnold Wolfers and his collaborators emerged from a study undertaken for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency of the "Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World" submitted by the United States to the Geneva Disarmament Conference in April, 1962. An important feature of that plan is that each stage in the reduction of national military establishments is to be accompanied by increasing emphasis on international peacekeeping forces. In contrast the Soviet plan assumes that the abolition of armaments is sufficient to insure a peaceful international order. Each of the chapters considers the political consequences that might arise were the three-stage American proposal implemented.

The initial essay by Wolfers examines the relationship between disarmament, peacekeeping forces, and the national interest. He suggests that the establishment of strong international peacekeeping forces may *increase*, rather than decrease, the need for national security forces. More specifically, he points to three sources of threat to the United States in a disarmed world: Sino-Soviet subversive war; the end of American influence over allies in the Far East and Europe; and a threat from the "Third World" over issues which may divide the world along a north-south axis. Reference to the first of these potential threats is a recurring theme in these papers, but at least one of the contributors (Robert Tucker) suggests that perhaps the problem of indirect aggression has been exaggerated. As to the second point, Wolfers does not point out that a failure to implement effective control over the spread of nuclear weapons may also have the result of decreasing American influence over its allies.

Robert Osgood addresses his chapter to the role of military power in a disarming world, and he concludes that were a stable order to emerge in that kind of environment, it would be because a new system of alliances resulted in a military equilibrium. Paul Hammond's essay on nonmilitary instruments of policy in a disarmed world warns against optimism about their usefulness for American policy.

The other four papers also tend to be critical of the Outline. From somewhat different perspectives, Laurence Martin, Robert Tucker, Charles Burton Marshall, and Livingston Merchant suggest that the American proposal, while far more realistic than its Soviet counterpart, flows from some assumptions about the nature of international conflict which may well be untenable. They are particularly critical (as are most of the contributors to this volume) of the view that international peacekeeping forces can in fact prove effective substitutes for national forces in maintaining the right of political independence. This assessment may not be wholly unwarranted; recent events in the Middle East suggest that international peacekeeping forces whose presence depends upon the consent of one or both belligerents may fall short of insuring either peace or security.

In summary, the dominant view in these essays is not inconsistent with Professor Marshall's conclusion that the Outline "may promote an aura of abstract good intentions for United States policy. Its usefulness with respect to the credibility of United States policy is another matter" (p. 191).

The articles in Emile Benoit's volume were originally prepared by authors from the United States, United Kindgom, Norway, France, Germany, Holland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary for the Conference on Economic Aspects of World Disarmament and Interdependence. Whereas the Johns Hopkins volume is narrowly focused, essayish, and generally pessimistic about the political consequences of the American disarmament proposal, *Disarmament and World Economic Interdependence* is eclectic, empirical, and the authors tend to stress the advantages of arms reduction. The articles are diverse in scope, central concepts, and method. For example, Arthur Brown and Olav Bjerkholt consider the economic impact of disarmament on the United Kingdom and Norway; John Hoagland and John Teeple examine the economics of regional arms races in a paper that is particularly timely in view of the recent Arab-Israeli war; and Benoit and Harold Lubell present an impressive global survey of the economic burdens of national defense. In method the articles range from a perceptive essay by Alexander Eckstein on "Arms Control and the Vulnerability of Communist China's Economy to External Pressures and Inducements," to Johan Galtung's interesting cross-national (Norway, France, Poland) survey of public attitudes on the economic effect of disarmament. Many present quantitative data (and even some mathematical models) in support of their conclusions.

Space does not permit even a brief discription of every article. Suffice it to say that there is general agreement that the economic benefits of arms reduction or disarmament are likely to be substantial. Several chapters stress that the widespread problems of poverty and economic development, which are increasingly likely to become sources of international political conflict, are unlikely to be resolved unless a substantial portion of the resources presently allocated to armaments are used for economic aid. But, it we can generalize from Galtung's opinion data, it is far from self-evident that such a reallocation would in fact follow any arms reduction. Moreover, although there is a general consensus that economic advantages will accrue from arms control, most of the contributors acknowledge that disarmament is primarily a political rather than an economic issue, and that the perceived imperatives of politics will usually dominate the calculus of economics. This thesis emerges clearly in papers on China (Eckstein), the Soviet Union (Morris Bernstein), and others.

Both books under review suffer from a fault that is apparently endemic to symposium volumes—neither includes a strong introductory or concluding essay which attempts to tie the various papers together. Owing to the greater diversity in its chapters, this omission is particularly regrettable in the case of Professor Benoit's volume.—Ole R. Holsti, *The University of British Columbia.*

Voices Prophesying War, 1763–1984. By I. F. Clarke. London: Oxford University Press, 1966. Pp. x, 254. $10.00.)

The author has collected some 700 books and articles prophesying war since 1763 when an anonymous writer produced a story entitled "The Reign of George VI." In a war from 1900 to 1925 this heroic monarch is said to have enhanced the glory of Britain by the conquest of France and most of the rest of Europe utilizing military and naval instruments and tactics of the 18th century. A few writings of the next century, especially in England and France during the Napoleonic period indicated the strong sentiment of nationalism, the acceptance of war as the normal means to achieve national glory and security, and the mutual fear and antagonism of these two countries, as well as the inability of the writers to conceive of future war as different from war of the past.

There were a few exceptions. After the Montgolfiers' balloon ascent in 1783 and Robert Fulton's demonstration of torpedoes and submarines in 1803 some engravers pictured a future French invasion of England by great "aerostatic machines" carrying 3000 men, or by great windmill driven barges after torpedoes and submarines had destroyed the British fleet. The utilization of steam for navigation led to further fears of invasion in the 1840's. The advances of science and technology in the 19th century, though it generally induced confidence in the increasing capability of man to conquer nature and the inevitability of progress toward human welfare, caused some anxiety about future war. Victor Hugo predicted in 1864 that the invention of aircraft would put an end to war, but until 1871 most of the writers on future war "took it for granted that the next war would be fought more or less after the style of the last and that war would continue to be conducted in a relatively restrained and humane manner" (p. 3).

A new period in this literature was initiated by the anonymous publication in Blackwood's Magazine, May 1871, of an article entitled "The Battle of Dorking." It was written by Lieut. Col. Sir George Tomkyns Chesney and told of the invasion and conquest of England by Germany utilizing the military efficiency it had demonstrated in the recent Franco-Prussian war. The article caused a sensation in England, went through numerous reprintings, was translated into French, German, Italian and other languages, inspired commentaries by civilian and military writers, and stimulated a vast literature predicting future war, generally between Britain and France. Naval rivalry developed between these countries in the 1880's and in the next two decades a channel tunnel was seriously proposed, steam driven iron clads were introduced, France allied itself with Russia, and conflicting claims developed in Africa. After the rise of German sea power in the 1890's the Anglo-French entente of 1903 and the development of the airplane and submarine, Germany became the enemy of England, and, as the alliance systems developed, writers of all countries foresaw war between the triple alliance and the triple entente.

Before 1914 most writers continued to assume that war was inevitable, that it was necessary for national defense, that the new technology would make it short, and that "our" side would win by superior fortitude and tactics. Few foresaw the character of World War I, least of all the military men. Ivan Bloch, the Polish banker, foresaw in 1897 the destructiveness of modern weapons and the stalemate of vast entrenched armies, H. G. Wells predicted the atomic bomb in 1913, Sir Arthur Conan Doyle foresaw the destructiveness of submarine warfare in July, 1914, and pacifists like Bertha Von Suttner (*Lay Down Your Arms,* 1892) and Norman Angell, (*The Great Illusion,* 1910) followed Victor Hugo in believing that war had become costly beyond any possible economic or political gains and, therefore, irrational. Much of the writing, however, was by professionals or patriots who justified Bernard Shaw's comment to the publisher of "*The New Battle of Dorking,*" by an anonymous writer in 1900 describing the coming French invasion of England. Shaw asked, "Who wrote it?" and added "Only a professional soldier could be so ignorant of warfare." The author proved to be Col. F. N. Maude (pp. 137, 233).

After World War I, and even more after World War II, the tone of war prophesying changed. It was no longer nationalistic propaganda but realistic accounts of the sad state of the human race after the next war. "War itself and not an enemy nation is the target of attack" (p. 162). Alfred Noyes (*The Last Man*, 1940), Aldous Huxley (*Ape and Essence*, 1948), and George Orwell (*Nineteen Eighty-four*, 1949), were typical, in foreseeing the destruction of man as a species or of the human spirit if war continued. The nineteenth century optimism foreseeing continuous human progress through science and technology had ended. According to Dr. G. B. Chisholm, former director of the World Health Organization, "The system and situation (seeking security by national power) represents an extensive malfunctioning of human minds which is very dangerous. . . . The transcendence of world values over local and national values is overdue and essential to survival. Its delay is in the most literal sense, endangering all mankind" (pp. 180, 207).

Though not very well organized, the book assembles an important body of data indicating the changes of opinion about war under the influence of changing conditions of international politics and technology, and the relative unreliability of that opinion in predicting the character of the next war. It includes a chronological list of books and articles prophesying war since 1763 and a bibliography of books about war since 1770 which, surprisingly, omits the 19th century treatises of Jomini, Clausewitz, and Mahan and the work of Lewis Richardson, who initiated the application of scientific method to the study of war in the 1930's.—QUINCY WRIGHT, *University of Virginia.*

Latin America in World Politics. BY NORMAN A. BAILEY. (New York: Walker and Co., 1967. Pp. xx, 250. $7.50.)

This book purports to be a response to the paucity of realistic analyses of the inter-American system, at once a text and an original treatise. This is a difficult combination, and regrettably it does not come off.

Setting the stage for his main theme, the author argues that the "quasi-anarchic" international system is given some order through the arrangement of all states into a hierarchical structure of "paramounts," "clients," and "floaters" (neutrals). The paramounts are those states which "are not . . . dominated as to foreign policy formulation by any other," as measured by their ability "to maintain autonomous action." The few paramounts exercise hegemony over the many clients, which are states that, at a minimum, must follow the general foreign policy orientation of their paramount and, at worse, are tightly regulated even in their domestic affairs.

The choice of terms alone, as well as much of the later substantive analysis, would clearly seem to imply that, except for the floaters, the world is divided into a series of satellite systems, on the order of the Soviet bloc under Stalin. Now, as a sophisticated description of the international system this simply will not do, and the author knows it. So he attempts to wriggle free by fudging his concepts. The paramount-client relationship, we are told, may sometimes involve nothing more than "a loose arrangement extending only to the foreign policy sphere, and perhaps, even there, only to an agreement not to impede the policy initiatives of the paramount." Elsewhere he goes even further, noting that paramounts need clients (for support) as well as vice-versa, which gives the clients a certain power: "As many examples of clients influencing the foreign policies of paramounts may be adduced . . . as of paramounts influencing their clients." By thus seeking to cover himself against the charge, to put it mildly, of oversimplification, the author succeeds only in emptying his hypotheses of rigor and meaning.

Still, once we get to the main body of the book, an analysis of the inter-American system, the prevailing themes are of power, dominance, and hierarchy. The OAS is described as an organization of clients, designed by the United States to institutionalize the "Pax Americana" and more effectively to control the hemisphere. Several chapters on the operation of the system are in this vein, stressing the ordinate-subordinate relationship between the United States and Latin America. Such an approach, while serving as a useful corrective to official panegyrics, nonetheless is oversimplified.

Few will find it enlightening to learn that the United States is the predominant power in the Western Hemisphere and, as such, exercises strong influence in Latin America. Nonetheless, the pattern of inter-state relationships in the hemisphere is complex, and is not adequately described by the paramount-client metaphor, unless so qualified with more-or-lesses (as it is by the author) as to end up saying very little. It is highly instructive, for example, that even the two hemispheric states that have been *most* subject to U. S. power and pressure, Cuba and the Dominican Republic, can hardly be described as docile American satellites.

As for the OAS, it should be remembered that the impetus for its establishment came more from Latin America than the United States and that the system has lasted as long as it has because it is thought to serve Latin American as well as North American interests. The existence of the organization is seen to exert a restraining influence on the United States, and in fact it usually, though obviously not invariably, has. Precisely because the utility of the OAS to the United States is diminished to the degree it is perceived to be under Washington's control, the United States has normally played a moderate broker's role in inter-American decision-making processes, seeking consensus rather than coerced support.

Another major drawback of the book is the constant intrusion of the author's generally conservative values, all the more annoying in that they are foisted on the unsuspecting student in the guise of empirical analysis. This is particularly evident in the author's cold-warriorism. The Guatemalan and Cuban revolutions and the continuing unrest in Latin America are primarily interpreted as "Soviet challenges" to the hemisphere, to which the Latin Americans have regrettably failed to respond properly, in part because of U. S. vacillations ("a loss of faith in the ability of the paramount to defend its own interests and offer protection to its clients"), and in part because of the Latin American "patron-peon psychology." Hardly anywhere does the author indicate he is aware of the polycentric nature of communism today and the genuine differences in the hemisphere over the causes and nature of, let alone the proper response to, radical movements.

As a text the book has some fairly useful discussions of Latin American politics, inter-American conflicts, and the process of regional integration. However, these are marred throughout by poor organization and lack of focus, pedestrian and unanalytical descriptive passages, and the author's penchant for unsupported, inaccurate and frequently ideologically-biased generalizations.—JEROME SLATER, *SUNY, Buffalo.*

The Inter-American System. BY GORDON CONNELL-SMITH. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966. Pp. xix, 376. $8.75.)

Some books are valuable because they either uncover new factual material or provide a significantly new perspective. Others make a contribution by filling gaps through the bringing together of previously dispersed, although available, material. This volume falls into the latter category. There is little new here but it is significantly better than the existing general works on inter-American relations.

The volume is basically a political history of the development of cooperation in the Western Hemisphere. The book begins by tracing inter-American relations through the end of World War II. This historical summary, which takes up over 40 per cent of the book, is interspersed with comments attempting to point out the significance of various actions and events. On the whole the section is well done. Then follow chapters on "Inter-American Relations Since the End of the Second World War," "The Organization of American States," "The OAS and the Peace and Security of the Hemisphere," and "The OAS and Other Fields of Inter-American Co-operation." The final chapter attempts to draw some general conclusions and this is followed by a postscript on the Dominican crisis of April 1965 which was attached in July of 1965 to update the manuscript and to prove that those events were simply an extension of the author's predictions (which they more or less were). This last section might have profited from an opportunity to see some of the other evaluations of those events.

The author feels that the inter-American system was originally promoted by the United States to secure Latin American acceptance of the U. S. policy of restricting extra-continental influence in the Western Hemisphere. Gordon Connell-Smith feels that inter-American cooperation has clearly served U. S. interests more than those of Latin America. The organizational efforts have given the U. S. political support in providing a deterrent to possible armed attacks and also have been occasionally helpful in countering communist subversion within the hemisphere. The U. S. uses the organization to try to make its hegemony acceptable to Latin America and to bolster the North American self-image as that of a moral nation interested in cooperation rather than domination. The effectiveness of the inter-American system is generally limited to minor disturbances and, the author points out, it has shown much more readiness to fight communism than the far "more formidable threat to democratic institutions in the hemisphere" from the Right. He is certainly correct in reminding the reader that whatever policy the U. S. follows is intervention in some form but that most Latin Americans do not protest if it is a form with which they agree, such as economic aid. The author is very critical of the United States' "conversion" to the promotion of social change in Latin America on the grounds that this runs counter to the long-time U. S. connections with the conservative interests in Latin America. The University of Hull professor feels that the Good Neighbor Policy succeeded because great social experimentation was taking place in the U. S. at the time. He claims that the Johnson administration has shown few signs of being prepared for anything like a new deal for the poor in the United States today: therefore the Alliance for Progress will fail. The author also claims that the U. S. welcomed the overthrow of the Goulart administration primarily due to his foreign policy stance.

Throughout the book there is a tendency to interrupt the narrative to draw conclusions which have little evidence to support them. Partly this may be a natural outgrowth of trying to compress a complex subject into less than 350 pages. This volume also serves to expose many of the problems of political histories. The author ideally should have devoted more consideration to alternative actions before criticizing and perhaps set up some standards against which to judge the use of power. At one point in the book he seems to accept the inevitability that the U. S. will dominate the hemisphere and then proceeds to criticize it for dominating. The crux of the question is the form the power should take. A more systematic approach utilizing some of the theoretical approaches to the behavior of states might well have yielded more useful conclusions and brought a clearer definition of the issues.

Nevertheless, as a general history of the inter-American system with particular emphasis on the last ten years, the book is well worth reading. Although the author's sources occasionally may be questioned, the book is well-researched, tightly written, and provocative. It must be accepted as a standard work on inter-American relations.—Michael Francis, *University of Notre Dame.*

La Organización de los Estados Americanos. (O. E. A.) 2nd edition. By Felix Fernandez-Shaw. (Madrid: Ediciones Cultura Hispánica, 1963. Pp. 989. Pesetas 350.)

La Integración de Centroamérica. By Felix Fernandez-Shaw. (Madrid: Ediciones Cultura Hispánica, 1965. Pp. 1086. Pesetas 450.)

Panamá y Sus Relaciones Centroamericanas. By Felix Fernandez-Shaw. (Madrid: Ediciones Cultura Hispánica, 1964. Pp. 329. Pesetas 350.)

To publish three volumes totalling some 2,400 pages within three years would be quite an achievement, even if there were no exact correspondence between quantity and quality. Actually, the author of the three books under review is qualified also by practical experience to deal with the problems of Central and South America, being in the Foreign Service of Spain and having been in active diplomatic duty in the area. In fact, the first (1959) edition of his work on the Organization of American States was a pioneer study not only in the Spanish but also in the English literature. The late J. M. Yepes of Colombia had published in the Thirties a study on *Panaméricanisme* and, with Pereira da Silva, a comparative *Commentaire du Pacte de la Société des Nations et des Statuts de l'Union Panaméricaine* (as the O.A.S. was called at that time). The two standard works on the O.A.S. in English (by Ch. G. Fenwick and by Ann and A. J. Thomas) appeared in the same year as the present second edition of Dr. Fernandez-Shaw's *O.E.A.* It differs from these in the large space given to source material (almost one third of the book) which makes it into a very useful reference work. The documents include not only the Charter of Bogota and the Rio Treaty but also the Pact of Bogota (1948), the Declaration of Punta del Este and other important Declarations and Resolutions, ratification charts, lists of the regular, special and technical Inter-American Conferences and minister meetings and of the decisions taken by them, and a 14 page bibliography. More space is also allotted to the historical background from the Hispano-American through the Pan-American to the Inter-American periods (1826 to 1889 to 1948). The latter year in which the Charter of the O.A.S. was adopted is certainly of historical importance; however, the period of Inter-Americanism can more properly be considered to have started with Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy. The bulk of the volume is devoted to this period and it is in this part that the author deals with the Charter of Bogota and its legal, political and ideological nature, the structure of the Organization and the Pact of Bogota concerning the Pacific Settlement of Disputes, while the Rio Treaty on Reciprocal Assistance is somewhat briefly and incongruously discussed within the framework of the historical background. As Spaniard the author has added an Epilogue on the relations between the "mother country" and the O.A.S. His proposals for the future of these relations are modest: recognition of an observer status for Spain in the Organization and of a diplomatic observer at the Pan-American Union as well as contacts between Spanish and O.A.S. organs. He realizes, as J. L. Kunz has pointed out, that Spain can approach Latin America no longer *ratione imperii* but only *imperio rationis*.

The size of the book on the *Integration of Central America*, too, is due to the inclusion in the main body of the work of long lists of the meetings of the various Central American bodies and of the even longer texts of the relevant regional documents. It is most comprehensive and a true reference work. Its three main chapters deal with the political, economic, and cultural integration of the area, which has progressed much further than that of Latin America in general. While the

Common Market for South America is still in the beginning stages, its Central American counterpart became fully integrated within and without and is a success. The new Charter of San Salvador of 1962 which entered into force in 1965 provides for a more elaborate structure of the Organization of Central American States than did the Act of 1951 and this integration process is going on as evidenced in particular by the efforts to transform this regional organization into a "Central American Community." In October, 1965, a draft charter for such a community presented by Guatemala was submitted to the members of the Organization by its Foreign Ministers Conference.

The third book under review on *Panama and its Central American Relations* forms a natural link between the first two, for Panama is a member of the O.A.S. but not of the O.D.E.C.A., although geographically it is considered part of Central America. Almost half of the book is taken up by documents, including some not strictly related to the subject—such as the Economic Convention of Bogota (1948) and the Charter of Quito (1948). The text itself does not deal with all the relations between Panama and the Central American States but only with Panama and the political, economic, and cultural integration of Central America. As for the political integration, Dr. Fernandez-Shaw concludes that the first Charter of O.D.E.C.A. served as the baptism while the second had the role of confirmation. It is doubtful, however, whether the relations have developed much beyond the conception stage.

All in all, the books under review, in particular the first two, are an achievement and it is to be hoped that a third edition of the work on the O.A.S. will come out soon. Judging from past experience, it should be imminent.—SALO ENGEL, *The University of Tennessee.*

The Evolution of International Organizations. ED. BY EVAN LUARD. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966. Pp. 342.)

This book, as its editor declares, is not a history of international organizations, but a "series of case studies . . . designed to consider the changes that have taken place in the structure of some of the most important organizations so far in existence; and to assess . . . the factors that have mainly influenced or inhibited change during their evolution" (p. 7). The volume includes chapters on the following "organizations": "The League of Nations," by F. P. Walters; "The General Assembly of the United Nations," by Geoffrey Goodwin; "The Security Council," by Inis L. Claude, Jr; "The United Nations Secretariat," by Sydney D. Bailey; "The Administrative Committee on Coordination," by Martin Hill (dealing with the coordination of the specialized agencies); "United Nations Peace Forces," by Evan Luard; "The International Labour Organisation," by John McMahon; "The International Monetary Fund," by W. M. Scammell; "The World Bank," by Andrew Shonfield; "The Economic Organs of the United Nations," by Ralph Townley (covering principally the regional economic commissions and the various programs and agencies under ECOSOC); and "The European Economic Community," by John Pinder. An introduction by the editor on the process of change in international organizations, and some concluding generalizations based on the experiences reviewed, complete the collection.

All of the chapter subjects are thus fruit from the same basket, but they are not all fruit of the same species. They do not therefore form an integrated comparative study that can be reviewed as a unit. This is not necessarily in criticism of the book. Mr. Luard fairly characterizes it as "a preliminary essay in the neglected sociology of international institutions: a study of the mechanics of change within international organizations" (p. 8). In this sense, it is an interesting and useful survey of internal developments, especially with respect to methods of operation in the institutions chosen, many of which are unfamiliar even to most political scientists.

The patterns of change vary considerably according to the nature and functions of the agency under scrutiny; but the processes of change, and the factors inhibiting or promoting it, do not in the end turn out to be essentially different from those applicable to change in political institutions of national and less-than-national scope. Thus, Luard finds among the chief causes of change: alterations in the political composition of the membership; changing needs to be met; the personal influence of officials; the activating interest of individual governments; and, "perhaps ultimately more important than any other," the attitude of governments in general about the purposes such organizations may procure for them (p. 310).

Space allows only a few chapters to be noted individually. Those on the General Assembly and Security Council are two of the most interesting analyses, which seem especially well balanced in contrast to the chapter on UN Peace Forces—the weakest in the book. For one thing, the chapter on Peace Forces does not deal with a continuing institution, as do all the others. Rather, it contrasts the concept of international military sanctions to enforce the peace (which never developed as an international institution) with experience of both the League and the UN in actually establishing a limited number of nonsanctions military forces. To fit the theme of the book, however, the editor finds first "a fairly clear course of development," that is partly at least "the result of a gradual development and crystallization of thought about the nature and scope of such forces . . ." (p. 138). But later he concedes (more accurately, in my view) that any pattern found "derives in part from the chance characteristics of the particular situations encountered" (p. 176). The chapter, moreover, is marred by some curious errors of fact: it was *not* "easier to establish a peace force . . . in 1964 than in 1960" (p. 171); Canada was very much a part of the Congo Force (p. 160); France has regularly paid her UNEF assessments (p. 152). It also has some highly dubious interpretations, such as that the Uniting for Peace resolution constituted "a major revision of the constitutional structure of the UN . . . which alone made possible the accomplishment of some future peacekeeping operations" (p. 147).

Chapters on the Administrative Committee on Coordination and on the economic organs of the UN, both of which give valuable perspective to a wide array of related agencies, would be even more interesting if they dealt more adequately with some of the external political factors that influenced the developments covered. Limitations of space were undoubtedly frustrating in this respect; but another restraining influence may have been the fact that these two chapters were written by members of the Secretariat.

The chapter on the European Economic Community differentiates it, as a supranational organization, from the international agencies studied in the other chapters; but justifies its inclusion to provide useful lessons in assessing when it may become possible for the latter to evolve to the supranational level. Unfortunately, the experience of the EEC seems to show, first, that its effective degree of supranationality was much less than appeared to be the case before the 1965 "crisis"; and secondly, that existing international organizations lack all the prerequisites for developing into supranational institutions.—RUTH B. RUSSELL, *Columbia University*.

ANNOUNCEMENTS

TRANSFER OF NEWS AND NOTES SECTION

Beginning with the last quarter of 1967 the information previously published in the News and Notes section of the REVIEW will be circulated as part of a newsletter prepared by the Washington Office and mailed periodically to every individual member of the American Political Science Association.

The sixty-fourth Annual Meeting of the Association will be held September 3–7, 1968 at the Washington-Hilton Hotel, Washington, D.C.

NOMINATIONS

The Association's Committee on Nominations invites all members to propose candidates for the elective offices of the Association: President-elect; three Vice Presidents; Secretary; Treasurer; and eight Council members for two-year terms.

Suggestions and supporting statements may be sent to any member of the Committee: Aaron B. Wildavsky, University of California, Berkeley, Chairman; Richard F. Fenno, Jr., University of Rochester; Robert E. Ward, University of Michigan; Harry Eckstein, Princeton University; Leon D. Epstein, University of Wisconsin; and William S. Livingston, University of Texas.

The sooner suggestions are received the better; to be considered at all they must arrive by March 1, 1968.

SIXTY-THIRD ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

Minutes of the Council Meeting

The Council of the American Political Science Association met at 9:10 A.M., September 5, 1967, at the Pick-Congress Hotel in Chicago, with President Robert Dahl presiding. The following officers, members of the Council, nominees for election in 1967, and former presidents of the Association were present: William Anderson, M. Margaret Ball, Marver Bernstein, William Buchanan, Holbert Carroll, H. Paul Castleberry, Robert A. Dahl, James C. Davies, Alex N. Dragnich, David Easton, Harry Eckstein, Heinz Eulau, Merle Fainsod, Carl J. Friedrich, Samuel Hendel, Charles O. Jones, Max M. Kampelman, Herbert Kaufman, Evron M. Kirkpatrick, Merle Kling, Robert E. Lane, Avery Leiserson, Harvey C. Mansfield, Charles McClelland, Wallace Mendelson, Alfred C. Meyer, Jack W. Peltason, Clara Penniman, Paul L. Puryear, Laurence I. Radway, Austin Ranney, William H. Riker, Victor G. Rosenblum, Clinton Rossiter, Glendon Schubert, Kenneth N. Waltz, Daniel Wit.

The Editor of the REVIEW, Professor Austin Ranney, presented his report. There was discussion of the large backlog of manuscripts for the REVIEW, of the relation of national to regional journals, and of the possibility of publishing additional periodicals divided by subject matter. A motion was unanimously passed that a Committee be appointed by the President of the Association to study these matters and report to the Council at next year's meeting. The Editor announced that Robert Lane had resigned from the

Editorial Board. A motion was unanimously passed that Fred Greenstein replace Professor Lane.

The Chairman of the Program Committee for 1967, Professor Harry Eckstein, gave his report. There was some discussion of the omission of the question of Viet Nam from the program for the meeting. It was pointed out, however, that panels on violence and revolution are part of the program. The Executive Director added that, if requested, the Association would try to arrange facilities for meetings on special topics.

The Executive Director, Dr. Evron Kirkpatrick, then gave his report. He mentioned that for the first time the Executive Director's Report was printed in the Final Program of the meeting. A motion was unanimously passed encouraging the Executive Director to continue this practice. Dr. Kirkpatrick reported that the Political Science Directory would be published sometime during the fall and also that the Association will maintain a directory of retired professors who wish to make known their availability for temporary teaching positions. Dr. Kirkpatrick then reported that the Helen Dwight Reid Award Committee had decided to make no award this year because of the small number of theses submitted The Executive Committee, however, authorized next year's Committee to receive theses for both 1966 and 1967 and to make two awards if it should wish to. The price of panel papers was discussed It was decided that the costs of the reproduction and sale of papers should be examined in order to see if there can be a reduction in the price of papers.

In submitting his report, the Treasurer, Dr. Max M. Kampelman, indicated that the Association was in fine financial condition. The projected budget for 1967–68 was unanimously approved by the Council. The Council unanimously authorized the Executive Director on behalf of the Council to express appreciation for the grants and gifts received from a number of donors.

Marver Bernstein, Chairman of the Committee on Professional Standards and Responsibilities, reviewed the Committee's report. With the permission of the Council, the Chairman of the Department of Political Science at the University of Oregon spoke before the Council and asked that: (1) a staff director be appointed who would systematically ascertain the feelings of a wide range of political scientists about the ethical standards of the profession, (2) that there be appointed to the Bernstein Committee additional members who would represent conflicting points of view and, (3) that specific attention be paid to the responsibilities *of* government *to* political scientists.

The seven recommendations of the Bernstein Committee were then discussed at length. In the discussion, it was emphasized that openness concerning the sources and conditions of support for research is a fundamental responsibility of scholars. The Committee was encouraged to define the standards and methods that will serve to implement the principle of full disclosure.

The motion was unanimously adopted that, having discussed and seriously considered the report of its Committee on Professional Standards and Responsibilities, the Council (a) commends the Committee for its efforts to date and encourages the Committee to continue its work and to prepare a report early enough in 1968 to permit its full consideration by the Council prior to its next meeting, (b) agrees with the Committee that the general principles of its first three recommendations should be incorporated in its final report, (c) joins with the Committee in requesting the Executive Director, the Editor of the Review, and officers of the Association to follow its 4th and 5th recommendations, (d) favorably acts on the Committee's 6th recommendation and directs the Executive Committee to plan and execute details for implementing the recommendation, and (e) adopts the Committee's 7th recommendation.

An amendment was moved advising the Bernstein Committee to consider recommendations indicating both the responsibilities of political scientists with respect to government or other research support and the responsibilities of government or other research supporters toward maintaining the freedom of social scientists in their research. Because it was felt that the mandate of the Committee was already sufficiently broad, the motion was tabled.

After unanimously passing a motion that the Council accept the report of the Executive Committee as printed in the June, 1967, issue of *The American Political Science Review*, the Council turned to resolutions submitted by members of the Association.

Since the whole question of the future relations of officers, staff members, and members of the Association to any other organization is now under consideration by the Bernstein Committee, the Council accepted a motion recommending the rejection of the Clarke resolution with respect to the outside activities of elected or staff officers of the APSA.

The resolution submitted by George Carey, forbidding elected officials of the Association using their positions to advance their personal views on policy, and the resolution by A. Lee Fritschler *et al.*, requiring that officers and staff of the Association apprise the President and the Council of the receipt of any governmental funds, were referred to the Committee on Professional Standards and Responsibilities.

The resolution by Samuel Hendel, condemning certain activities of the House Unamerican Activities Committee, and the resolution of William J. Parente, on racial and urban problems, were next considered. President Dahl ruled these resolutions out of order as being in conflict with Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution of the Association. Dr. Hendel appealed this ruling. The appeal was not carried.

The Council adjourned at 5:45 P.M.

KENNETH N. WALTZ
Secretary

Minutes of the Annual Business Meeting

The Annual Business Meeting of the American Political Science Association was called to order by President Robert A. Dahl at 4:45 P.M., September 6, 1967.

President Dahl thanked the officers and staff of the Association, the members of the Council, and the members of other committees for their cooperation during his term of office. He drew special attention to the imaginative work done by the Chairman of the Program Committee and emphasized the importance of the Committee on Professional Standards and Responsibilities to the future of the profession. He then asked the Chairman of that Committee, Professor Marver Bernstein, to summarize its report.

After the reading of the secretary's minutes of the Council's meeting, Professor Clinton Rossiter moved the adoption of the motion on the Bernstein report that had previously been accepted by the Council, but specified that such adoption would not preclude the consideration of resolutions previously submitted to the Council. The motion was carried. Professor Samuel Hendel, noting that his resolution had been found unconstitutional by the Council, spoke for the substance of the resolution and proposed that consideration be given—during the next year—to an amendment to the Constitution that would make the maintenance of academic freedom in the broadest sense a purpose of the Association. On a motion that Hendel's resolution be accepted, the constitutional question notwithstanding, President Dahl again ruled the resolution unconstitutional. A motion to overturn the ruling of the chair was defeated. Professor Robert Clarke then moved the adoption of his resolution; the motion was defeated.

The Editor of the REVIEW, the Treasurer, and the Executive Director, whose reports were available to the membership, made brief remarks. The Chairman of the Nominating Committee, Professor Gwendolen Carter, proposed the following officers for 1967–68:

President Elect: David Easton, University of Chicago

Vice Presidents: Stephen K. Bailey (Syracuse University), Harvey C. Mansfield (Columbia University), Jack W. Peltason (University of Illinois, Champaign-Urbana)

Secretary: Harvey Glickman, Haverford College

Treasurer: Max M. Kampelman, Washington, D. C.

Members of the Council for two years: Holbert N. Carroll (University of Pittsburgh), Charles O. Jones (University of Arizona), Merle Kling (Washington University, St. Louis), Roy C. Macridis (Brandeis University), Paul L. Puryear (Fisk University), Robert A. Scalapino (University of California, Berkeley), Glendon Schubert (University of North Carolina), Daniel Wit (Northern Illinois University)

No nominations were made from the floor, and the new officers were overwhelmingly elected.

Professor Dahl then turned the gavel over to the new President, Merle Fainsod, who at 7:00 P.M. declared the meeting adjourned.

KENNETH N. WALTZ
Secretary

ARTICLES ACCEPTED FOR FUTURE PUBLICATION*

March, 1968

Roger W. Benjamin and John H. Kautsky, "Communism and Economic Development"

Thomas W. Casstevens, "A Theorem about Voting"

Robert Eyestone and Heinz Eulau, "City Councils and Policy Outcomes"

Paul Y. Hammond, "Risk Distribution, Rationalization, and Legitimization in Defense Policymaking"

J. Woodford Howard, Jr., "On the Fluidity of Judicial Choice"

M. Kent Jennings, "The Transmission of Political Values from Parent to Child"

Henry F. Kaiser, "A Measure of the Quality of Legislative Apportionment"

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* Production exigencies may occasionally necessitate publication of articles in issues other than those given in this listing.

Willmoore Kendall and George W. Carey, "The 'Intensity' Problem and Democratic Theory"
Nelson W. Polsby, "The Institutionalization of the United States House of Representatives"
William H. Riker and Peter C. Ordeshook, "A Theory of the Calculus of Voting"
Roberta S. Sigel, "School Children's Political Image of President Kennedy"
David M. Wood, "Majority v. Opposition in the National Assembly of the Fifth Republic: A Guttman Scale Analysis"
Aristide R. Zolberg, "The Structure of Political Conflict in the New States of Tropical Africa"

June, 1968

Charles R. Adrian and Charles Press, "Decision Costs in Coalition Formation"
Robert Alford, "Voting Turnout in American Cities"
Steven J. Brams, "Measuring the Concentration of Power in Political Systems"
S. E. Finer, "Pareto and Pluto-Democracy"
Carl J. Friedrich, "Some Thoughts on the Relation of Political Theory to Anthropology"
Lewis A. Froman, Jr., "Organization Theory and the Explanation of Important Characteristics of Congress"
Dean Jaros, Herbert Hirsch, and Fred Fleron, "The Malevolent Leader: Political Socialization in an American Sub-culture"
Charles O. Jones, "The Minority Party and Policy-Making in the House of Representatives"
Fred Kort, "A Nonlinear Model for the Analysis of Judicial Decisions"
Lewis Lipsitz, "If, as Verba Says, the State Functions as a Religion, What Are We to Do to Save Our Souls?"
Richard M. Merelman, "On the Neo-Elitist Critique of Community Power"
Bruce M. Russett, "Commentary on Brams' Measuring the Concentration of Power in Political Systems"
Michael J. Shapiro, "The House and the Federal Role: A Computer Simulation of Roll-Call Voting"

September, 1968

Richard Ashcraft, "Locke's State of Nature: Historical Fact or Moral Fiction?"
Edward N. Beiser, "The Reapportionment Cases: A Comparative Analysis of State and Federal Judicial Behavior"
Moshe M. Czudnowski, "A Salience Dimension for the Study of Political Culture" Jerome M. Gilison, "Soviet Elections as a Measure of Dissent: The Missing One Percent"
A. James Gregor, "Political Sciences and the Uses of Functional Analysis"
Kenneth P. Langton and M. Kent Jennings, "Political Socialization and the High School Civics Curriculum in the United States"
Michael Leiserson, "Factions and Coalitions in One-Party Japan: An Explanation Based on the Theory of Games"
Milton G. Lodge, "Soviet Elite Attitudes in the Post-Stalin Era"
Martin C. Needler, "Political Development and Socioeconomic Development: The Case of Latin America"
Robert A. Schoenberger, "Conservatism, Personality and Political Extremism"
Joel J. Schwartz and William R. Keech, "Group Influence on the Policy Process in the Soviet Union"
J. David Singer, Bruce M. Russett, and Melvin Small, "National Political Units in the Twentieth Century: A Standardized List"
Jack E. Vincent, "National Attributes as Predictors of Delegate Attitudes at the United Nations"
Raymond E. Wolfinger and Fred I. Greenstein, "The Repeal of Fair Housing in California: An Analysis of Referendum Voting"

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

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

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

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

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

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